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Jobs provide higher earnings and better benefits as countries grow, but they 
are also a driver of development. Poverty falls as people work their way out  
of hardship and as jobs empowering women lead to greater investments  
in children. Efficiency increases as workers get better at what they do, as more 
productive jobs appear, and less productive ones disappear. Societies flourish 
as jobs bring together people from different ethnic and social backgrounds 
and provide alternatives to conflict. Jobs are thus more than a byproduct of 
economic growth. They are transformational—they are what we earn, what 
we do, and even who we are.
High unemployment and unmet job expectations among youth are the most 
immediate concerns.  But in many developing countries, where farming and 
self-employment are prevalent and safety nets are modest at best, unemploy-
ment rates can be low. In these countries, growth is seldom jobless. Most of 
the poor work long hours but simply cannot make ends meet. And the 
violation of basic rights is not uncommon. Therefore, the number of jobs  
is not all that matters: jobs with high development payoffs are needed.
Confronted with these challenges, policy makers ask difficult questions. 
Should countries build their development strategies around growth, or 
should they focus on jobs? Can entrepreneurship be fostered, especially 
among the many microenterprises in developing countries, or are entrepre-
neurs born? Are greater investments in education and training a prerequisite 
for employability, or can skills be built through jobs? In times of major crises 
and structural shifts, should jobs, not just workers, be protected? And is there 
a risk that policies supporting job creation in one country will come at the 
expense of jobs in other countries?
The World Development Report 2013: Jobs offers answers to these and other 
difficult questions by looking at jobs as drivers of development—not as 
derived labor demand—and by considering all types of jobs—not just formal 
wage employment.  The Report provides a framework that cuts across sectors 
and shows that the best policy responses vary across countries, depending  
on their levels of development, endowments, demography, and institutions. 
Policy fundamentals matter in all cases, as they enable a vibrant private sector, 
the source of most jobs in the world. Labor policies can help as well, even  
if they are less critical than is often assumed.  Development policies, from 
making smallholder farming viable to fostering functional cities to engaging 
in global markets, hold the key to success. 
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In almost every language there is a range of words related to 
jobs, each emphasizing a different angle. Some words hint at 
the nature of the activity being performed, evoking the skill or 
expertise that is required. Others refer to the volume of human 
inputs used in production, bringing images of effort and con-
veying a sense of physical exertion. There are also words asso-
ciated with the sheer numbers of people engaged in economic 
activity, which are more easily associated with aggregate sta-
tistics. In other cases, what seems to be at stake is a contrac-
tual relationship, involving mutual obligations and a degree of 
stability. In some languages, there are even words to designate 
the place where the person works, or at least a slot in a produc-
tion process. This multiplicity of words clearly shows that jobs 
are multi-dimensional and cannot be characterized by a single 
term or measured by a single indicator.
Words related to jobs do not always translate well from one 
language to another, as the range of options available in each 
case can be different. If languages shape thinking, there are 
times when the ways in which people refer to jobs seem to be 
at odds. Gaps probably arise from the different characteristics 
of jobs being emphasized in different societies. They also sug-
gest that jobs’ agendas can differ across countries.
In many languages, words related to jobs serve not only as 
common nouns but also as proper nouns. Throughout his-
tory family names have been associated with specific skills or 
trades: Vankar in Hindi, Hattori in Japanese, Herrero in Span-
ish, or Mfundisi in Zulu, just to mention a few. The use of 
job-related words as household identifiers shows that people 
associated themselves with what they did. Nowadays, people aspire to choose their jobs based 
on what motivates them and on what could make their lives more meaningful. In almost every 
language there are also several words to express the lack of a job. Almost invariably these words 
have a negative connotation, close in spirit to deprivation; at times they even carry an element 
of stigma. In all these ways, language conveys the idea that jobs are more than what people 
earn, or what they do at work: they are also part of who they are. 
Afrikaans
Lithuanian
Ukrainian
Farsi
Hebrew
Maori Basque
Tswana
Mohawk
Galician
Bengali
RomanianSwahili
Russian
Tamil
Turkish
D
utch
Zulu
Shona Hung
arian
Polish
G
uaraní
Croatian
German
Greek
English
Burmese
Portuguese
Portuguese
Hindi Yorùbá
Tibetan
AmharicRoma
Spanish
Juba Arabic
Quechua
Romansh
JapaneseDinka
A
ym
ar
a
R
om
a
Fi
nn
is
h
Ic
el
an
d
ic
G
eo
rg
ia
n
Sw
ed
is
hB
ah
as
a
W
el
sh
Ta
g
al
og
G
a
Arabic
MalagasyBulgarian
Indonesian/Malaysian
French
Italian Thai
ChineseKorean
Urdu
Mapuche
Albanian
TajikiGaelic
Kirundi
Vietnamese
Jobs
© 2012 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
Some rights reserved
1 2 3 4  15 14 13 12
This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. Note that The World Bank does not necessarily own each 
component of the content included in the work. The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of the content contained in the work 
will not infringe on the rights of third parties. The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of 
Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The 
World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all 
of which are specifically reserved.
Rights and Permissions
This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, you are free to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for com-
mercial purposes, under the following conditions:
Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: World Bank. 2012. World Development Report 2013: Jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank. DOI: 
10.1596/978-0-8213-9575-2. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0. 
Translations—If you create a translation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This translation was not 
created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation. The World Bank shall not be liable for any content 
or error in this translation.
All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 
20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org.
Softcover
ISSN: 0163-5085
ISBN: 978-0-8213-9575-2
e-ISBN: 978-0-8213-9576-9
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9575-2
Hardcover
ISSN: 0163-5085
ISBN: 978-0-8213-9620-9
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9620-9  
Photo credits:
page 67: Garimpeiros (independent prospectors) at the Serra Pelada gold mine, in Brazil © Sebastião Salgado/Amazonas—Contact Press 
Images. Used with permission of Sebastião Salgado/Amazonas—Contact Press Images. Further permission required for reuse. 
page 91: Day laborer in a pineapple plantation in Pontian, Malaysia © Justin Guariglia/Redux. Used with permission of Justin Guariglia/
Redux. Further permission required for reuse. 
page 145: Shopkeeper and a friend at a foodstuff shop in Mpape, Nigeria © Ayemoba Godswill/World Bank; Rural migrants working in 
construction in China © Curt Carnemark/World Bank. 
page 222: Farmers in a pomegranate field in Tajikistan © Gennadiy Ratushenko/World Bank; Wage worker at a garment factory in Vietnam 
© Lino Vuth/World Bank; Street vendor in Kabul, Afghanistan © Steve McCurry/Magnum Photos; Drying peppers in the street in Mexico 
© Curt Carnemark/World Bank. 
page 248: Employees at a call center in Poland © Piotr Malecki/Panos Pictures. 
page 318: Worker at a construction site in Jakarta, Indonesia © Sebastião Salgado/Amazonas—Contact Press Images. Used with permission 
of Sebastião Salgado/Amazonas. Further permission required for reuse.
Cover design: Will Kemp, World Bank
Interior design: Debra Naylor
vContents
Foreword  xiii
Acknowledgments  xv
Abbreviations and data notes  xvii
Overview Moving jobs center stage  2
Jobs wanted  3
Development happens through jobs  8
Valuing jobs  14
Jobs agendas are diverse . . . but connected  17
Policies through the jobs lens  21
Jobs are center stage, but where are the numbers?  34
Questions When is the conventional wisdom right?   36
Notes  39
References  41
1  The jobs challenge  48
A job, but not always a salary  49
Youth bulges, aging societies, and migrant nations  51
Cities, wages, and women  52
Jobs are changing in surprising ways  54
Prosperity, but a changing distribution of earnings  56
The role of the private sector  58
Vulnerability on a global scale  58
Question 1 What is a job?   63
Notes  68
References  69
vi  C O N T E N T S
Part 1 Jobs are transformational  74
2  Jobs and living standards  76
Jobs improve material well-being  76
Jobs are more than just earnings  82
Jobs and life satisfaction  84
Question 2 Growth strategies or jobs strategies?  87
Notes  92
References  93
3  Jobs and productivity  98
Employment turbulence, not jobless growth   98
Most jobs are in very small farms and firms   104
In farms, uneven technological progress  106
Among firms, much churning and few gazelles  107
Question 3 Can entrepreneurship be fostered?  114
Notes  119
References  121
4  Jobs and social cohesion  126
Jobs can help manage social tensions  127
Jobs (or the lack of jobs) can shape social interactions   134
Question 4 Can policies contribute to social cohesion?   140
Notes  146
References  147
Part 2 What are good jobs for development?  152
5  Valuing jobs  154
Rights as the foundation  155
The value of jobs to individuals and society  158
Spillovers from jobs  159
Can the development payoffs from jobs be quantified?  162
Question 5 Skills or jobs—which comes first?  174
Notes  179
References  182
6  Diverse jobs agendas  190
Agrarian economies  190
Conflict-affected countries  193
Urbanizing countries  197
Resource-rich countries  199
Small island nations  203
 Contents  vii
Countries with high youth unemployment  206
Formalizing economies  210
Aging societies  213
Question 6 A targeted investment climate?  217
Notes  223
References  225
7 Connected jobs agendas  232
Migration of workers  232
Migration of jobs  237
Question 7 Competing for jobs?   243
Notes  249
References  250
Part 3 Policies through the jobs lens  256
8  Labor policies revisited  258
Labor regulations: A “plateau” effect  260
Collective representation: New forms of voice  263
Active labor market programs: Effective within limits  267
Social insurance: The challenge of expanding coverage  272
Question 8 Protecting workers or protecting jobs?  277
Notes  281
References  284
9  Beyond labor policies  292
Establishing the fundamentals  293
Setting policy priorities for jobs  298
Diverse jobs agendas, diverse policy priorities  301
Connected jobs agendas: Global partnerships for jobs  305
Jobs are center stage, but where are the numbers?  311
Question 9 How to accelerate labor reallocation?  313
Notes  319
References  321
Appendixes  328
Glossary  329
Bibliographical note  332
Background papers and notes  334
Selected indicators  337
Index  381
viii  C O N T E N T S
Boxes 
 1 How does women’s labor force participation increase?  30
 1.1  The nature of work and leisure change as cities 
develop  53
 1.2  Jobs bring earnings opportunities to women, but also new 
difficulties  54
 1.3  The temporary staffing industry is growing in developing 
countries  57
 1.4 Responses to the crisis went beyond income support for the 
unemployed  62
 1.5 Few countries produce statistics on informality  64
 1.6 Not all child work is child labor   66
 2.1  There many dimensions of living standards and many ways 
to measure them  77
 2.2  Most poor people work  80
 2.3  The value of job attributes can be quantified through hedonic 
pricing  83
 2.4 Work can pose risks to health and safety  84
 2.5 The relationship between growth and employment is not 
mechanical  88
 2.6 Korea went from a growth to a jobs strategy, and Singapore 
the oher way around  90
 3.1  What drives economic growth?  99
 3.2  Microenterprises account for most job creation and 
destruction  106
 3.3  Most microenterprises are in rural areas and engage in 
commerce  110
 3.4  What explains the boom in the garment industry in 
Bangladesh?   117
 4.1  What is social cohesion?   128
 4.2  Do jobs cause trust? Analysis of Eurobarometer and 
Latinobarómetro Surveys  132
 4.3  Displacement and unemployment can lead to the erosion of 
trust and ties  133
 4.4  Jobs, motivation, and identity in Risaralda, 
Colombia  134
 4.5 Voice can be extended to the self-employed: The case of 
SEWA  135
 4.6 Some jobs connect people across ethnic boundaries  136
 4.7  Measuring inequality of opportunities in access to 
jobs  138
 4.8 Domestic workers: The journey to an ILO 
convention  141
 4.9 From laws on the books to laws in action in Cambodia’s 
garment sector  142
 4.10 In post-conflict settings, well-designed programs reduce 
social tensions  143
 5.1  Children do perilous work in artisanal gold mines in 
Mali  155
 5.2 Compliance with core labor standards is partial   157
 5.3 The concept of Decent Work and the Decent Work 
Agenda  158
 5.4 Economics and the social sciences deal with spillovers from 
jobs, under different names  160
 5.5 Several data sources can be used to quantify the development 
payoffs from jobs  163
 5.6 International definitions of green jobs can be too narrow for 
developing countries  170
 5.7 How skills are formed, and how they can be 
measured  175
 5.8 Manpower planning has given way to dynamic skills 
development  177
 6.1  Can agrarian Ethiopia compete in manufacturing?   194
 6.2  Conflict can increase labor force participation among 
women   194
 6.3  Solving jobs challenges is urgent in South Sudan  195
 6.4  Development pessimism about Bangladesh was 
understandable, but has been proven wrong   197
 6.5  The entrepreneurs of Bangladesh are local  198
 6.6  Landowner companies can build capacity while spreading 
the wealth   203
 6.7  The debate on how to reduce informality is intense 
in Mexico  212
 6.8 In Ukraine, the impact of aging is compounded by migration 
and declining fertility  216
 6.9 Once again, the debate rages over industrial policy  218
 6.10 Caution is needed when interpreting results from 
enterprise surveys  219
 6.11 Special economic zones have a mixed record  221
 7.1 Why do multinationals locate where they do?  240
 7.2 E-links create job opportunities in developing countries, 
but the scale is still modest  240
 7.3 Globalization is often viewed as jobs migrating 
abroad  244
 8.1 Employment protection legislation covers more than 
firing  rules  260
 8.2  Are bargaining councils the cause of unemployment in  
South Africa?  265
 8.3  New forms of collective bargaining are emerging 
in China  266
 8.4 Recicladores forced changes in Bogotá’s solid waste 
management policies  267
 8.5 E-links to jobs: New technologies open new frontiers  268
 8.6 The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act launched the biggest public works program 
in the world  271
 8.7 Modern technology can reduce social protection costs, 
leakage, and corruption  276
 Contents  ix
Figures 
 1 A job does not always come with a wage  5
 2 Among youth, unemployment is not always the issue  6
 3 In China, employment growth is led by the private 
sector  8
 4 Jobs are transformational  8
 5 Jobs provide higher earnings and benefits as countries 
grow  9
 6 Jobs account for much of the decline in extreme 
poverty  10
 7 Simultaneous job creation and destruction characterize all 
economies  11
 8 Larger firms pay higher wages  12
 9 The employment share of microenterprises is greater in 
developing countries  13
 10 People who are unemployed, or do not have motivating jobs, 
participate less in society  14
 11 Views on preferred jobs and most important jobs 
differ  16
 12 Some jobs do more for development  17
 13 The individual and social values of jobs can differ  17
 14 Good jobs for development are not the same 
everywhere  20
 15 Manufacturing jobs have migrated away from high-income 
countries  22
 16 Three distinct layers of policies are needed  23
 17 Finance and electricity are among the top constraints faced 
by formal private enterprises  24
 18 Combining work and training increases the success rates of 
programs  27
 19 A decision tree can help set policy priorities  28
 20 Which countries succeeded at addressing their jobs challenges 
and how?  32
 1.1  A job does not always come with a wage  50
 1.2  Among youth, unemployment is not always the issue  51
 1.3  Employment growth is needed to cope with population 
growth  52
 1.4  Moving from farms to cities does not always bring economic 
growth   53
 1.5  Labor productivity remains low in developing 
countries   55
 1.6  The skills mix changes with economic development   56
 1.7  Jobs provide higher earnings and benefits as countries 
grow   57
 1.8  Wages in developing countries are catching up   59
 1.9  Returns to education are higher in poorer countries   60
 1.10 In China, employment growth is led by the private 
sector  60
 1.11 In developing countries, the crisis affected earnings more 
than employment  61
 1.12 A majority of countries have ratified the core labor 
standards  65
 2.1  Working hours vary across ages   78
 2.2  Women spend more time in activities not directly generating 
income  79
 2.3  Jobs are the most important source of household 
income  80
 2.4  Jobs take households out of poverty, especially in developing 
countries  81
 2.5  Jobs account for much of the decline in extreme 
poverty  82
 2.6  Workers often care more about job security than about 
income  85
 2.7  Life satisfaction is lower among farmers and the 
unemployed  86
 3.1  Economic growth does not occur at the expense of jobs in the 
medium term  99
 3.2  Simultaneous job creation and destruction characterize all 
economies   100
 3.3  Labor reallocation across sectors was a driver of productivity 
growth in East Asia  101
 3.4  Efficiency gains at the firm level are the main driver of 
productivity growth  102
 3.5  Efficiency gains and employment growth can go 
together  103
 3.6  Smallholder farming is dominant outside Latin 
America  104
 3.7  The employment share of microenterprises is greater in 
developing countries   105
 3.8  Crop yields have diverged vastly across regions  107
 3.9  The dispersion of productivity in manufacturing is greater in 
developing countries   108
 8.8 Kurzarbeit has become a new word in labor market 
policies  280
 9.1 How does women’s labor force participation 
increase?  300
 9.2  There have been successes in tackling jobs challenges around 
the world  302
 9.3 Improving business practices facilitates compliance with 
labor standards  307
 9.4 Knowledge gaps on jobs and development chart the research 
agenda  312
 9.5 China’s hukou system has been partially liberalized  315
x  C O N T E N T S
 3.10  Large firms tend to perform better and to pay better than 
small ones  109
 3.11  Young firms are more likely than old ones to engage in 
innovative activities  109
 3.12 Surviving firms were born larger and grew less in Ghana than 
in Portugal  111
 3.13 The majority of firms grew little in India and Mexico  112
 3.14 Some among the self-employed have the potential to become 
successful entrepreneurs  115
 3.15 Management scores vary widely across small enterprises in 
Sub-Saharan Africa  116
 4.1  Trust and civic engagement go together with peaceful 
collective decision making  129
 4.2  People who are unemployed trust and participate 
less  130
 4.3  People with motivating jobs trust and participate 
more  131
 4.4  Having a job means more community participation in 
Indonesia  132
 4.5  Inequality of job opportunities varies across 
countries  139
 5.1  Views on preferred jobs and most important jobs 
differ  159
 5.2 Some jobs do more for development  160
 5.3 The individual and social values of jobs can differ  162
 5.4 Some earnings gaps decrease with the level of development; 
some do not   165
 5.5 A higher women’s share of household income raises food 
expenditures in the Republic of Congo  166
 5.6 Who gets the jobs matters for poverty reduction in Bulgaria 
and Latvia  166
 5.7 Agglomeration effects vary across industrial sectors in 
Taiwan, China  167
 5.8 Knowledge spillovers from foreign direct investment increase 
domestic productivity  168
 5.9 High emissions per worker can go hand in hand with low 
emissions per unit of output  169
 5.10 Proximity of garment factories stimulates schooling among 
young girls in Bangladesh  171
 5.11 Not all jobs provide social identity, networks, or a sense of 
fairness  172
 5.12 Gender and father’s education account for a large share of 
inequality of opportunity in access to jobs  173
 5.13 Relative to other obstacles, skills have become more severe 
constraint to business  175
 6.1 In the absence of a Green Revolution, poverty remains high 
in agrarian economies   192
 6.2  Instability and poor infrastructure are severe constraints on 
business in conflict-affected countries  196
 6.3  Small island nations are located far away from economic 
centers  204
 6.4 Migration matters for small island nations, even more so in 
the Pacific  205
 6.5  Youth unemployment rates are extremely high in some 
countries  207
 6.6 Having higher education does not bring better employment 
chances in Tunisia   208
 6.7  Labor regulation may not be the biggest obstacle to 
formalization  211
 6.8 The labor force will shrink if age-specific participation rates 
remain constant   214
 6.9 Labor productivity has to increase to avoid declines in living 
standards  215
 6.10 The assessment of constraints to business varies across 
enterprises  220
 7.1 Manufacturing jobs have migrated away from high-income 
countries  238
 7.2 The global number of manufacturing jobs has not varied 
much  239
 7.3 Policies for jobs may or may not harm other 
countries  247
 8.1 The mix of labor policies and institutions varies across 
countries  259
 8.2 The coverage of collective bargaining is low in developing 
countries  264
 8.3 Combining work and training increases the success rates of 
programs  269
 8.4 In Romania, public works programs have the lowest 
placement rate and highest placement costs   272
 8.5 Labor taxes and social contributions vary across different 
countries facing different job challenges  275
 8.6 Workers are willing to give up earnings for access to health 
insurance and pensions  275
 8.7 Decoupling between job creation and job destruction was 
massive in the United States during recessions  278
 9.1 Three distinct layers of policies are needed  293
 9.2 Finance and electricity are among the top constraints faced 
by formal private enterprises  295
 9.3  The rule of law is associated with development   297
 9.4 A decision tree can help set policy priorities  299
 9.5 Chile reduced its dependence on mineral exports  304
 9.6 Unemployment rates for youth have fallen in 
Slovenia  305
 9.7 Offers to liberalize services are generally modest  309
 9.8 Is there a “missing middle” in the distribution of 
manufacturing firms in India?   314
 9.9 Export processing zones were a driver of foreign direct 
investment in Sri Lanka  316
 9.10 Restrictions to hukou conversion increase with city size and 
income  317
 Contents  xi
Maps
 1 Only in some countries are migrants a substantial share of 
the population  21
 3.1 Manufacturing activities are sprawling out of the main urban 
centers in the Republic of Korea   102
 7.1 Only in some countries are migrants a substantial share of 
the population  233
 7.2 Many migrants are highly skilled  235
 8.1 Coverage of social insurance remains low in many 
countries   274
Tables
 3.1  Few small firms grew in Mexico  113
 6.1  Projects in extractive industries are capital intensive and 
create few jobs   200
 6.2  Cities in resource-rich developing countries are among the 
most expensive in the world   201
 8.1 There is a wave of new empirical evidence on the impacts 
of EPL  261
 8.2 The impacts of minimum wages are a favorite research topic 
in labor economics  262

xiii
Foreword
Today, jobs are a critical concern across the globe—for policy makers, the business community, 
and the billions of men and women striving to provide for their families. 
As the world struggles to emerge from the global crisis, some 200 million people—includ-
ing 75 million under the age of 25—are unemployed. Many millions more, most of them 
women, find themselves shut out of the labor force altogether. Looking forward, over the next 
15 years an additional 600 million new jobs will be needed to absorb burgeoning working-age 
populations, mainly in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Meanwhile, almost half of all workers in developing countries are engaged in small-scale 
farming or self-employment, jobs that typically do not come with a steady paycheck and ben-
efits. The problem for most poor people in these countries is not the lack of a job or too few 
hours of work; many hold more than one job and work long hours. Yet, too often, they are not 
earning enough to secure a better future for themselves and their children, and at times they 
are working in unsafe conditions and without the protection of their basic rights.  
Jobs are instrumental to achieving economic and social development.  Beyond their critical 
importance for individual well-being, they lie at the heart of many broader societal objec-
tives, such as poverty reduction, economy-wide productivity growth, and social cohesion. The 
development payoffs from jobs include acquiring skills, empowering women, and stabilizing 
post-conflict societies. Jobs that contribute to these broader goals are valuable not only for 
those who hold them but for society as a whole: they are good jobs for development.
The World Development Report 2013 takes the centrality of jobs in the development pro-
cess as its starting point and challenges and reframes how we think about work. Adopting a 
cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary approach, the Report looks at why some jobs do more for 
development than others. The Report finds that the jobs with the greatest development payoffs 
are those that make cities function better, connect the economy to global markets, protect the 
environment, foster trust and civic engagement, or reduce poverty. Critically, these jobs are not 
only found in the formal sector; depending on the country context, informal jobs can also be 
transformational.
Building on this framework, the Report tackles some of the most pressing questions policy 
makers are asking right now: Should countries design their development strategies around 
growth or focus on jobs? Are there situations where the focus should be on protecting jobs 
as opposed to protecting workers? Which needs to come first in the development process—
creating jobs or building skills? 
The private sector is the key engine of job creation, accounting for 90 percent of all jobs in 
the developing world. But governments play a vital role by ensuring that the conditions are in 
place for strong private sector–led growth and by alleviating the constraints that hinder the 
private sector from creating good jobs for development.  
The Report advances a three-stage approach to help governments meet these objectives. 
First, policy fundamentals—including macroeconomic stability, an enabling business envi-
ronment, investments in human capital, and the rule of law—are essential for both growth and 
job creation. Second, well-designed labor policies can help ensure that growth translates into 
employment opportunities, but they need to be complemented by a broader approach to job 
creation that looks beyond the labor market. Third, governments should strategically identify 
xiv  F O R EWO R D
which jobs would do the most for development given their specific country context, and re-
move or offset the obstacles that prevent the private sector from creating more of those jobs. 
In today’s global economy, the world of work is rapidly evolving. Demographic shifts, tech-
nological progress, and the lasting effects of the international financial crisis are reshaping the 
employment landscape in countries around the world. Countries that successfully adapt to 
these changes and meet their jobs challenges can achieve dramatic gains in living standards, 
productivity growth, and more cohesive societies. Those that do not will miss out on the trans-
formational effects of economic and social development. 
The World Development Report 2013 is an important contribution to our collective under-
standing of the role of jobs in development. Its insights will provide valuable guidance for the 
World Bank Group as we collaborate with partners and clients to advance their jobs agendas. 
Working together, we can foster job creation and maximize the development impact of jobs.
Jim Yong Kim
President
The World Bank Group
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TEWA Termination of Employment of Workmen Act
TFP total factor productivity
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DAtA notes 
The use of the word countries to refer to economies implies no judgment by the World Bank 
about the legal or other status of territory. The term developing countries includes low- and 
middle-income economies and thus may include economies in transition from central plan-
ning, as a matter of convenience. Dollar figures are current U.S. dollars, unless otherwise 
specified. Billion means 1,000 million; trillion means 1,000 billion.

Jobs are the cornerstone of economic and  social development. Indeed, development happens through jobs. People work their 
way out of poverty and hardship through bet-
ter livelihoods. Economies grow as people get 
better at what they do, as they move from farms 
to firms, and as more productive jobs are cre-
ated and less productive ones disappear. Soci-
eties flourish as jobs bring together people 
from different ethnic and social backgrounds 
and nurture a sense of opportunity. Jobs are 
thus transformational—they can transform 
what we earn, what we do, and even who we 
are. 
No surprise, then, that jobs are atop the 
development agenda everywhere—for every-
one from policy makers to the populace, from 
business leaders to union representatives, from 
activists to academics. Looking to seize oppor-
tunities for job creation presented by massive 
demographic shifts, technological innovations, 
global migrations of people and tasks, and deep 
changes in the nature of work, policy makers ask 
difficult questions:
•  Should countries build their development 
strategies around growth or should they 
rather focus on jobs? 
•  Can entrepreneurship be fostered, especially 
among the many microenterprises in devel-
oping countries, or are entrepreneurs born? 
•  While jobs can contribute to social cohesion, 
is there anything governments can do about 
it, apart from trying to support job creation? 
•  Are greater investments in education and 
training a prerequisite for employability, or 
can skills be built through jobs? 
•  Should efforts to improve the investment cli-
mate target the areas, activities, or firms with 
greater potential for job creation? 
•  What is the risk that policies to foster job 
creation in one country will come at the ex-
pense of jobs in other countries?
•  When confronted with large shocks and ma-
jor restructuring, is it advisable to protect jobs 
and not just people? 
•  How can the reallocation of workers be ac-
celerated from areas and activities with low 
productivity to those with greater potential?
Individuals value jobs for the earnings and 
benefits they provide, as well as for their contri-
butions to self-esteem and happiness. But some 
jobs have broader impacts on society. Jobs for 
women can change the way households spend 
money and invest in the education and health 
of children. Jobs in cities support greater spe-
cialization and the exchange of ideas, making 
other jobs more productive. Jobs connected 
to global markets bring home new technologi-
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tries grow richer, the policy environment 
must be conducive to growth. That requires 
attending to macroeconomic stability, an en-
abling business environment, human capital 
accumulation, and the rule of law.
•  Labor policies. Because growth alone may not 
be enough, labor policies need to facilitate 
job creation and enhance the development 
payoffs from jobs. Policies can address labor 
market distortions while not being a drag on 
efficiency. But they should avoid distortion-
ary interventions that constrain employ-
ment in cities and global value chains—and 
provide voice and protection for the most 
vulnerable.
•  Priorities. Because some jobs do more for 
development than others, it is necessary to 
identify the types of jobs with the greatest 
development payoffs given a country’s con-
text, and to remove—or at least offset—the 
market imperfections and institutional fail-
ures that result in too few of those jobs being 
created.
The centrality of jobs for development 
should not be interpreted as the centrality of 
labor policies and institutions. Nearly half 
the people at work in developing countries 
are farmers or self-employed and so are out-
side the labor market. And even in the case of 
wage employment, labor policies and institu-
tions may or may not be the main obstacle to 
job creation. Often, the most relevant obstacles 
lie outside of the labor market. The catalysts 
for job creation may be policies that make cit-
ies work better, help farmers access and apply 
appropriate agricultural techniques, or allow 
firms to develop new exports. Jobs are the cor-
nerstone of development, and development 
policies are needed for jobs.
Jobs wanted
To many, a “job” brings to mind a worker with 
an employer and a regular paycheck. Yet, the 
majority of workers in the poorest countries 
are outside the scope of an employer-employee 
relationship. Worldwide, more than 3 billion 
people are working, but their jobs vary greatly. 
Some 1.65 billion are employed and receive reg-
cal and managerial knowledge. And in turbulent 
environments, jobs for young men can provide 
alternatives to violence and help restore peace.
Through their broader influence on living 
standards, productivity, and social cohesion, 
these jobs have an even greater value to society 
than they do for the individual. But some jobs 
can have negative spillovers. Jobs supported 
through transfers or privilege represent a bur-
den to others or undermine their opportunities 
to find remunerative employment. Jobs damag-
ing the environment take a toll on everybody. 
Thus it is that some jobs do more for develop-
ment, while others may do little, even if they are 
appealing to individuals.
Which jobs have the greatest develop-
ment payoffs depends on the circumstances. 
Countries differ in their level of development, 
demography, endowments, and institutions. 
Agrarian socie ties face the challenge of making 
agricultural jobs more productive and creat-
ing job opportunities outside farms. Resource-
rich countries need to diversify their exports, 
so that jobs are connected to global markets 
rather than supported through government 
transfers. Formalizing countries need to de-
sign their social protection systems in ways 
that extend their coverage without penalizing 
employment. 
A vast majority of jobs are created by the 
private sector. Governments, though, can sup-
port—or hinder—the private sector in creat-
ing jobs. The idea that development happens 
through jobs sheds new light on the strategies, 
policies, and programs governments can pur-
sue. Strategies should identify which types of 
jobs would have the highest development pay-
offs, given a country’s circumstances. Policies 
should remove the obstacles that prevent the 
private sector from creating jobs. Programs for 
generating employment may also be warranted, 
for instance, in conflict-affected countries. But 
the costs and benefits of these policies and pro-
grams have to be assessed, taking into account 
the potential spillovers from jobs, both positive 
and negative.
At a more practical level, this jobs lens on 
devel opment leads to a three-layered policy 
approach:
•  Fundamentals. Because jobs provide higher 
earnings and broader social benefits as coun-
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rights as the boundaries of what is unacceptable. 
Among them are the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the 
International Labour Organization Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(1998), which further specifies core labor stan-
dards. Combining these different perspectives, 
jobs are activities that generate income, mone-
tary or in kind, without violating human rights.
Different places, different jobs
The world of work is particularly diverse in de-
veloping countries. This variety refers not only 
to the number of hours worked and the number 
of jobs available, the usual yardsticks in indus-
trial countries, but also to the characteristics of 
jobs. Two main aspects stand out. One is the 
prevalence of self-employment and farming.2 
The other is the coexistence of traditional and 
modern modes of production, from subsistence 
agriculture and low-skilled work to technology-
driven manufacturing and services and highly 
skilled knowledge work.
While nearly half of the jobs in the developing 
world are outside the labor market, the shares of 
wage work, farming, and self- employment differ 
greatly across countries.3 Nonwage work repre-
sents more than 80 percent of women’s em-
ployment in Sub-Saharan  Africa—but less than 
ular wages or salaries. Another 1.5 billion work 
in farming and small household enterprises, or 
in casual or seasonal day labor. Meanwhile, 200 
million people, a disproportionate share of them 
youth, are unemployed and actively looking for 
work. Almost 2 billion working-age adults, the 
majority of them women, are neither working 
nor looking for work, but an unknown number 
of them are eager to have a job. Clarifying what 
is meant by a job is thus a useful starting point.
The meaning of the words used to de-
scribe what people do to earn a living varies 
across countries and cultures. Some words re-
fer to workers in offices or factories. Others are 
broader, encompassing farmers, self-employed 
vendors in cities, and caregivers of children and 
the elderly. The distinction is not merely seman-
tic. The varied meanings hint at the different 
aspects of jobs that people value. And views on 
what a job is almost inevitably influence views 
on what policies for jobs should look like.
For statisticians, a job is “a set of tasks and 
duties performed, or meant to be performed, 
by one person, including for an employer or 
in self-employment.”1 Jobs are performed by 
the employed. These are defined as people who 
produce goods and services for the market or 
for their own use. But the statistical definition 
is mute about what should not be considered 
a job. International norms view basic human 
F I G U R E  1  A job does not always come with a wage
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
Note: Data are for the most recent year available.
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for both men and women in Tanzania and Viet-
nam. Beyond these stark contrasts in participa-
tion, women continue to earn significantly less 
than men, and the differences are not fully ex-
plained by education, experience, or sector of 
work. While a growing share of youth between 
ages 15 and 24 allocate most of their time to 
schooling and training, youth unemployment is 
still alarming in some countries (above 40 per-
cent in South Africa since early 2008 and above 
50 percent in Spain in early 2012).5 Even in 
countries where it is low, youth unemployment 
is twice the national average or more. In addi-
tion, 621 million young people are “idle”—not 
in school or training, not employed, and not 
looking for work. Rates of idleness vary across 
countries, ranging between 10 and 50 percent 
among 15- to 24-year-olds (figure 2).6 Many 
youth work in unpaid jobs; if paid, they are less 
likely to have social insurance.7
The changing world of work
This complex picture is compounded by mas-
sive demographic shifts. To keep employment 
as a share of the working-age population con-
stant, in 2020 there should be around 600 mil-
lion more jobs than in 2005, a majority of them 
in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. While some 
countries have experienced very large increases 
in their labor force—nearly 8 million new en-
trants a year in China since the mid-1990s and 7 
million in India—others face a shrinking popu-
lation. Ukraine’s labor force, for example, is es-
timated to fall by about 160,000 people a year.8
Rapid urbanization is changing the com-
position of employment. More than half the 
population in developing countries is expected 
to be living in cities and towns before 2020.9 
As a result, the growth of the nonagricultural 
labor force will vastly exceed the growth of the 
agricultural labor force. This structural change, 
which in industrial countries took decades, now 
transforms lives in developing countries in a 
generation. Structural change can bring about 
remarkable improvements in efficiency, and 
some developing countries have narrowed the 
productivity gap with industrial countries rap-
idly. But others have failed to catch up.10 Over-
all, the gap between developing and developed 
regions remains wide. 
Globalization is also changing the nature 
of jobs. Industrial countries are shifting from 
20 percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(figure 1). 
Work across the developing world is also 
characterized by a high prevalence of informal-
ity, whether defined on the basis of lack of firm 
registration, lack of social security coverage, or 
lack of an employment contract. Informal em-
ployment is not under the purview of labor reg-
ulations, either because of their limited scope or 
because of deliberate avoidance or evasion. Re-
gardless of the specific definition used, informal-
ity is generally associated with lower productiv-
ity. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
formalization would result in greater efficiency. 
Informality can be a symptom of lower produc-
tivity as much as it can be a cause of it.4
Gender and age differences are striking. 
Worldwide, fewer than half of women have jobs, 
compared with almost four-fifths of men. In 
Pakistan, 28 percent of women but more than 
82 percent of men participate in the labor force, 
whereas participation rates are above 75 percent 
F I G U R E  2  Among youth, unemployment is not always the 
issue
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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Between 1995 and 2005, the private sector ac-
counted for 90 percent of jobs created in Bra-
zil, and for 95 percent in the Philippines and 
Turkey.21 The most remarkable example of the 
 expansion of employment through private sec-
tor growth is China. In 1981, private sector em-
ployment accounted for 2.3 million workers, 
while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had 80 
million workers.22 Twenty years later, the private 
sector accounted for 74.7 million workers, sur-
passing, for the first time, the 74.6 million work-
ers in SOEs (figure 3). 
In contrast to the global average, in some 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 
the state is a leading employer, a pattern that can 
be linked to the political economy of the post-
independence period, and in some cases to the 
abundance of oil revenues.23 For a long period, 
public sector jobs were offered to young college 
graduates. But as the fiscal space for continued 
expansion in public sector employment shrank, 
“queuing” for public sector jobs became more 
prevalent, leading to informality, a devaluation 
of educational credentials, and forms of social 
exclusion.24 A fairly well-educated and young 
labor force remains unemployed, or underem-
ployed, and labor productivity stagnates.25
Overall, countries have been successful at 
creating jobs. More people have jobs now than 
ever before, and those jobs provide generally 
higher earnings. Indeed, amid rapid social and 
economic change, poverty has declined in de-
veloping countries. The share of the popula-
tion of the developing world living on less than 
US$1.25 a day (in purchasing power parity) fell 
from 52 percent in 1981 to 22 percent in 2008, 
or from 1.94 billion people to 1.29 billion.26 
This reduction is the result of multiple factors, 
but the creation of millions of new, more pro-
ductive jobs, mostly in Asia but also in other 
parts of the developing world, has been the 
main driving force.27
Jobs are vulnerable to economic downturns, 
though, much more so in the private sector than 
the public sector. Short-term crises may wipe 
out years of progress. They may start in a single 
country but now, through globalization, spread 
over entire regions or to the world. The recent 
financial crisis created 22 million new unem-
ployed in a single year. Growth in total employ-
ment, hovering around 1.8 percent a year before 
2008, fell to less than 0.5 percent in 2009, and 
by 2011 had not yet reached its pre-crisis level.28 
primary and traditional manufacturing indus-
tries toward services and knowledge-intensive 
activities.11 At the same time, technological 
improvements and outsourcing to developing 
countries are leading to a decline in medium-
skilled jobs.12 Production tasks have been splin-
tered so that they can be performed in different 
locations.13 Transnational companies have built 
integrated value chains to tap into national skill 
pools around the world.14 Outsourcing is oc-
curring in services as well as in manufacturing. 
The share of developing countries in exports of 
world services nearly doubled to 21 percent be-
tween 1990 and 2008.15
Technology is changing the way workers and 
firms connect, through their access to much 
larger, even global, employment marketplaces. 
Some of the new marketplaces operate through 
the internet; others use mobile phone technol-
ogy.16 Part-time and temporary wage employ-
ment are now major features of industrial and 
developing countries. In South Africa, tempo-
rary agency workers make up about 7 percent of 
the labor force; the temporary staffing industry 
provides employment to an average of 410,000 
workers a day. In India, the number of tempo-
rary workers that employment agencies recruit 
grew more than 10 percent in 2009 and 18 per-
cent in 2010.17
This changing landscape of global produc-
tion has also brought about shifts in skill en-
dowments and in the world distribution of top 
talent. China and India rank high in perceived 
attractiveness as outsourcing hubs because of 
their exceptionally high ratings in the avail-
ability of skills.18 India has close to 20 million 
students in higher education, nearly as many as 
the United States; both countries are outpaced 
by China, with 30 million postsecondary stu-
dents.19 The United States still accounts for a 
large share of top scores in international student 
assessments, but the Republic of Korea has the 
same share as Germany, and both are closely fol-
lowed by the Russian Federation. The number 
of high-performing students in Shanghai alone 
is one-fifth that of Germany and about twice 
that of Argentina.20
The role of the private sector
In such rapidly changing times, the private sec-
tor is the main engine of job creation and the 
source of almost 9 of every 10 jobs in the world. 
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Demography, urbanization, globalization, 
technology, and macroeconomic crises bring 
about formidable jobs challenges. Countries 
that fail to address them may fall into vicious 
circles of slow growth in labor earnings and 
job-related dissatisfaction affecting a sizable 
portion of the labor force.30 Youth unemploy-
ment and idleness may be high, and women 
may have fewer job opportunities, leaving po-
tential economic and social gains untapped.31 
A repeating pattern of small gains in living 
standards, slow productivity growth, and erod-
ing social cohesion can set in. In contrast, 
countries that address these jobs challenges can 
develop virtuous circles. The results—pros-
perous populations, a growing middle class, 
increased productivity, and improved oppor-
tunities for women and youth—may then be 
self-reinforcing.
Development happens through jobs
Jobs are more than just the earnings and benefits 
they provide. They are also the output they gen-
erate, and part of who we are and how we interact 
with others in society. Through these outcomes, 
Policy responses to prevent and mitigate the im-
pact of crises involve different combinations of 
instruments, with potentially diverse implica-
tions for jobs.29
F I G U R E  4  Jobs are transformational 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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F I G U R E  3  In China, employment growth is led by the private sector
Source: Kanamori and Zhao 2004.
Note: Data for foreign-owned companies in 2002 and for non-state-owned enterprises in 2003 are not available.
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not refer to identical workers. But growth also 
improves the living standards of workers whose 
skills have not changed. 
More than two decades of research on pov-
erty dynamics, spanning countries as different 
as Canada, Ecuador, Germany, and South Africa, 
show that labor-related events trigger exits from 
poverty.33 These events range from the head of 
a household changing jobs to family members 
starting to work and to working family mem-
bers earning more. Conversely, a lack of job op-
portunities reduces the ability of households 
to improve their well-being.34 In a large set of 
qualitative studies in low-income countries, get-
ting jobs and starting businesses were two of the 
main reasons for people to rise out of poverty.35
Quantitative analysis confirms that changes 
in labor earnings are the largest contributor to 
poverty reduction (figure 6). In 10 of 18 Latin 
American countries, changes in labor income 
explain more than half the reduction in poverty, 
and in another 5 countries, more than a third. In 
Bangladesh, Peru, and Thailand, changes in edu-
cation, work experience, and region of residence 
mattered, but the returns to these characteristics 
(including labor earnings) mattered most. Just 
having work was not enough, given that most 
people work in less developed economies. What 
made a difference for escaping poverty was in-
creasing the earnings from work.36
jobs can boost living standards, raise productiv-
ity, and foster social cohesion (figure 4). 
Jobs are what we earn 
Jobs are the most important determinant of 
living standards. For most people, work is the 
main source of income, especially in the poorest 
countries. Many families escape or fall into pov-
erty because family members get or lose a job. 
Opportunities for gainful work, including in 
farming and self-employment, offer households 
the means to increase consumption and reduce 
its variability. Higher yields in agriculture, ac-
cess to small off-farm activities, the migration 
of family members to cities, and transitions to 
wage employment are milestones on the path to 
prosperity.32 And as earnings increase, individ-
ual choices expand—household members can 
choose to stay out of the labor force or to work 
fewer hours and dedicate more time to educa-
tion, to retirement, or to family.
Earnings from work increase with economic 
development, and the benefits associated with 
jobs improve as well. The relationship is not 
mechanical, but growth is clearly good for jobs 
(figure 5). Admittedly, as economies become 
more developed, the average skills of jobhold-
ers increase, implying that observations across 
countries are not strictly comparable, as they do 
F I G U R E  5  Jobs provide higher earnings and benefits as countries grow 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = purchasing power parity. Each dot represents a country.
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are created and less productive jobs disappear. 
These gains may ultimately be driven by new 
goods, new methods of production and trans-
portation, and new markets, but they material-
ize through a constant restructuring and real-
location of resources, including labor.38 Net job 
creation figures hide much larger processes of 
gross job creation and gross job destruction. On 
average across developing countries, between 
7 and 20 percent of jobs in manufacturing are 
created within a year, but a similar proportion 
disappear (figure 7).39
Because economies grow as high-productivity 
jobs are created and low-productivity jobs dis-
appear, the relationship between productivity 
gains and job creation is not mechanical. In the 
medium term, employment trends align closely 
with trends in the size of the labor force, so 
growth is truly jobless in very few cases. In the 
short term, however, innovations can be associ-
ated with either increases or decreases in em-
Beyond their fundamental and immediate 
contribution to earnings, jobs also affect other 
dimensions of well-being, including mental and 
physical health. Not having a job undermines 
life satisfaction, especially in countries where 
wage employment is the norm and where the 
lack of opportunities translates into open un-
employment rather than underemployment. 
Among those employed, the material, nonmate-
rial, and even subjective characteristics of jobs 
can all have an impact on well-being.37 Other 
features such as workplace safety, job security, 
learning and advancement opportunities, and 
health and social protection benefits are valued 
by workers. But relatively few jobs offer these 
advantages in developing countries.
Jobs are what we do
Economic growth happens as jobs become more 
productive, but also as more productive jobs 
F I G U R E  6  Jobs account for much of the decline in extreme poverty
Sources: Azevedo and others 2012; Inchauste and others 2012; both for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: Family composition indicates the change in the share of adults (ages 18 and older) within the household. Labor income refers to the change in employment and earnings for 
each adult. Nonlabor income refers to changes in other sources of income such as transfers, pensions, and imputed housing rents. If a bar is located below the horizontal axis, it 
means that that source would have increased, instead of decreased, poverty. The changes are computed for Argentina (2000–10); Bangladesh (2000–10); Brazil (2001–09);  Chile 
(2000–09); Colombia (2002–10); Costa Rica (2000–08); Ecuador (2003–10); El Salvador (2000-09); Ghana (1998–2005); Honduras (1999–2009); Mexico (2000–10); Moldova (2001–10); 
Panama (2001–09); Paraguay (1999–2010); Peru (2002–10); Nepal (1996–2003); Romania (2001–09); and Thailand (2000–09). The changes for Bangladesh, Ghana, Moldova, Nepal, 
Peru, Romania, and Thailand are computed using consumption-based measures of poverty, while the changes for the other countries are based on income measures.
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ployment.40 The popular perception is that pro-
ductivity grows through downsizing, but some 
firms are able to achieve both productivity and 
employment gains.41 In Chile, Ethiopia, and 
Romania, successful “upsizers” contributed to 
output and employment growth substantively; 
sometimes they are more numerous than the 
successful “down sizers.”42 And the combination 
of private sector vibrancy and state sector re-
structuring led to rapid output and employ-
ment growth in transition economies and in 
China in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.43 
Successful upsizers tend to be younger, 
leaner, and more innovative.44 But overall, large 
firms are both more innovative and more pro-
ductive. They invest more in machinery. They 
are much more likely than small firms to de-
velop new product lines, to introduce new tech-
nology, to open and close plants, to outsource, 
and to engage in joint ventures with foreign 
partners.45 These firms produce more with a 
given amount of labor, and export more as well. 
They also pay substantively higher wages than 
micro- and small enterprises (figure 8). In de-
veloping countries, however, many people work 
in very small and not necessarily very dynamic 
economic units.
Family farms dominate in agriculture. At 1.8 
and 1.2 hectares, respectively, average farm size 
is small in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially 
in Asia.46 The Green Revolution has led to both 
higher cereal yields and more job creation be-
cause the new technologies are labor intensive. 
But progress has been uneven across regions 
and has not taken place on a large scale in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. More mechanized farms have 
higher productivity, but constraints in land 
markets usually slow mechanization; without it, 
yields per hectare tend to be higher on smaller 
farms.
Outside agriculture there are massive 
 numbers of microenterprises and household 
businesses (figure 9). These small units play 
significant roles in job creation, even in high- 
middle-income countries. They account for 97 
percent of employment in the manufacturing 
sector in Ethiopia, but still for a sizable 39 per-
cent in Chile. In the services sector, their role is 
often more important. Even in Eastern European 
countries, where the private sector is only two 
decades old, microenterprises are the source of 
10 to 20 percent of employment in manufactur-
F I G U R E  7  Simultaneous job creation and destruction 
characterize all economies 
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and  
Scarpetta 2009b and Shiferaw and Bedi 2010.
Note: The figure shows annual job flows. Data are from Argentina (1996–2001); Brazil (1997–2000);  
Canada (1984–97); Chile (1980–98); Colombia (1983–97); Estonia (1996–2000); Ethiopia (1997–2007);  
Finland (1989–97); France (1989–97); Germany (1977–99); Hungary (1993–2000); Indonesia (1991–94); Italy 
(1987–94); Latvia (1983–98); Mexico (1986–2000); the Netherlands (1993–95);  Portugal (1983–98); Romania 
(1993–2000); Slovenia (1991–2000); Taiwan, China (1986–91); the United Kingdom (1982–98); the United 
States (1986–91, 1994–96); and República Bolivariana de Venezuela (1996–98).
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enterprises, the gazelles, invest and earn higher 
returns.50
While large firms are more productive, they 
were not all born large. In industrial countries, 
some of the more resounding successes, from 
Honda to Microsoft, started in garages. Many 
successful companies in developing countries 
also grew out of small household businesses. 
Thailand’s Charoen Pokphand Group, founded 
in 1921 as a small seed shop in Bangkok by two 
brothers, has grown into one of the largest multi-
national conglomerates in agribusiness, operat-
ing in 15 countries and encompassing close to 
100 companies. India’s Tata Group transformed 
from a Mumbai-based family-owned trading 
firm in the late 19th century to a multinational 
conglomerate, comprising 114 companies and 
subsidiaries across eight business sectors on 
 several continents. Many of China’s success-
ful clusters, such as the footwear industry in 
 Wenzhou, also started from small family busi-
nesses working close to each other.51
Unfortunately, in many developing coun-
tries, larger and older firms tend to be stagnant 
while smaller and younger enterprises are prone 
to churning. A vibrant dynamic process is usu-
ally absent. In Ghana, many firms were born 
large and showed little growth over 15 years; in 
Portugal, by contrast, many firms born as mi-
croenterprises grew substantially.52 The major-
ity of firms in India is also born small, but they 
tend to stay small, without displaying much 
variation in employment over their life cycle. 
A revealing comparison involves the size of 
35-year old firms relative to their size at birth. 
In India, the size declines by a fourth; in Mex-
ico, it doubles. In the United States, it becomes 
10 times bigger.53 The potential gains from 
greater entrepreneurial vibrancy, and from a 
more substantial reallocation of labor from 
low- to high-productivity units, are sizable.54 
But helping those gains materialize is a daunt-
ing task.
Jobs are who we are 
Having, or not having, a job can shape how peo-
ple view themselves and relate to others. While 
some jobs can be empowering, in extreme cases 
a lack of job opportunities can contribute to vi-
olence or social unrest. Youth may turn to gangs 
to compensate for the absence of identity and 
belonging that a job might provide. In Ecua-
F I G U R E  8  Larger firms pay higher wages
Source: Montenegro and Patrinos 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: The figure uses 138 household and labor force surveys spanning 33 countries over 1991–2010. The 
horizontal axis reports the estimated wage premium of small firms (10 to 50 workers) and large firms (more 
than 50 workers) relative to microenterprises, controlling for worker characteristics.
ing and 30 to 50 percent of employment in ser-
vices. The large numbers of economic units are 
associated with a very wide dispersion of total 
factor productivity. In India, even within nar-
rowly defined sectors, a manufacturing plant 
at the 10th percentile of the distribution gener-
ates 22 times less output than a plant in the 90th 
percentile would produce with the same inputs. 
This pattern is similar in a number of Latin 
American countries. By comparison, the ratio is 
1 to 9 in the United States.47
While microenterprises have lackluster per-
formance as a group, they are also very diverse. 
Microenterprises and household businesses are a 
means of survival for the poor and a way of di-
versifying out of farming activities. On  average, 
their owners do not earn much.48 But in middle-
income countries, many among the owners of 
micro- and small enterprises are as entrepreneur-
ial as their peers in industrial countries. Their 
weak performance may be due to an adverse 
investment environment—for example, limited 
access to credit.49 Yet a small number of micro-
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whose fathers did not have formal sector jobs 
were significantly less likely to have such jobs 
themselves.58
The distribution of jobs within society—and 
perceptions about who has access to opportu-
nities and why—can shape expectations for the 
future and perceptions of fairness. Children’s 
aspirations may be influenced by whether their 
parents have jobs and the types of jobs they 
have. The Arab Spring was not merely about 
employment. But disappointment, especially 
among youth, about the lack of job opportuni-
ties and frustration with the allocation of jobs 
based on connections rather than merit echoed 
across countries.
dor, for instance, they did so “because they were 
searching for the support, trust, and cohesion—
social capital—that they maintained their fami-
lies did not provide, as well as because of the lack 
of opportunities in the local context.”55
The workplace can be a place to encounter 
new ideas and interact with people of different 
genders or ethnicities. Bosnians interviewed 
in the late 1990s commented that “the area in 
which there is the greatest support for ethnic co-
operation is in the workplace.”56 Business people 
in Trinidad and Tobago reported that they in-
teracted with people of a wider range of ethnic-
ities at work than they did in their social lives.57 
Networks can also exclude. In Morocco, people 
F I G U R E  9  The employment share of microenterprises is greater in developing countries
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team estimates and EUROSTAT.
Note: Microenterprises are firms, formal or informal, with fewer than 10 workers. Data for developing countries are from Argentina  (2006–10), Bolivia (2005, 2007), Chile (2006, 
2009), Colombia (2009), the Czech Republic (2005–07), the Arab Republic of Egypt (2006), Ethiopia (1999), Ghana (1991), Hungary (2007–08), India (2004, 2009), Mexico (2004–10), 
Poland (2005–07), Romania (2005–07), Slovenia (2005–07), South Africa (2005–07), Turkey (2006–10), Uruguay (2009), República Bolivariana de Venezuela (2004–06), and Vietnam 
(2009). Data for industrial countries are from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom over 2005–07.
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The nature of jobs matters as well. Jobs that 
empower, build agency, and respect rights are 
associated with greater trust and willingness to 
participate in civil society. Jobs that create eco-
nomic and social ties may build incentives to 
work across boundaries and resolve conflict. 
And if people believe that job opportunities are 
available to them either now or in the future, 
their trust in others and their confidence in in-
stitutions may increase. Ultimately, jobs can in-
fluence social cohesion through their effects on 
social identity, networks, and fairness.
Valuing jobs
Not all forms of work are acceptable. Activities 
that exploit workers, expose them to dangerous 
environments, or threaten their physical and 
mental well-being are bad for individuals and 
societies alike. Child prostitution and forced la-
bor contravene principles of human dignity and 
undermine individual and collective well-being. 
Today, an estimated 21 million people globally 
are victims of bonded labor, slavery, forced pros-
titution, and other forms of involuntary work.61 
Jobs influence how people view themselves, 
how they interact with others, and how they 
perceive their stake in society.59 Jobs also can 
have collective consequences. They can shape 
how societies handle collective decision making, 
manage tensions between diverse groups, and 
avoid and resolve conflicts. The relationship is 
not immediate or direct, however. Jobs are only 
one factor contributing to the capacity of socie-
ties to manage collective decision making peace-
fully. And social cohesion can in turn influence 
jobs by shaping the context in which entrepre-
neurs make business decisions. 
Trust beyond one’s own group and civic en-
gagement are two indicators of social cohesion. 
Unemployment and job loss are associated with 
lower levels of both trust and civic engagement 
(figure 10). While causality is difficult to es-
tablish, there is more than just a correlation at 
stake. Indonesian men and women who were 
working in 2000 but not in 2007 were less likely 
to be participating in community activities than 
those still at work. And those who were working 
in 2007 but not in 2000 were significantly more 
likely to be involved in the community than 
those who were still out of work.60
F I G U R E  10 People who are unemployed, or do not have motivating jobs, participate less in society
Source: Wietzke and McLeod 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: The vertical axis shows the probability of the respondent being an active member of one or more of nine types of associations, controlling for the income, education,  
and demographic characteristics of respondents. In panel a, the probability is linked to being unemployed, and panel b to having a job characterized as cognitive, creative, or 
independent. The vertical lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimated probability.
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household income contributed by women of-
ten results in improvements in children’s edu-
cational attainment and health. In Bangladesh, 
where the garment industry employs women 
in large numbers, the opening of a garment 
factory within commuting distance of a vil-
lage is seen as a signal of opportunity and leads 
to increased schooling for girls.64 Among dis-
advantaged castes in Southern Indian villages, 
an increase of US$90 in a woman’s annual in-
come is estimated to increase schooling among 
her children by 1.6 years.65
Similarly, a job created or sustained through 
foreign direct investment (FDI) matters for 
other jobs, and thus for other people. With the 
investment come knowledge and know-how. 
These raise productivity not only in the foreign 
subsidiary but also among local firms interact-
ing with the subsidiary or operating in its vicin-
ity. Such knowledge spillovers are sizable in low- 
and middle-income countries.66 Conversely, a 
job in a protected industry that needs to be sup-
ported through transfers (either by taxpayers 
or by consumers) generates a negative spillover, 
even more so when the need for protection is 
associated with the use of outdated technology 
that results in high environmental costs.
Jobs can also affect other people by shaping 
social values and norms, influencing how groups 
coexist and manage tensions. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, surveys found that the number of 
people willing to work together or do business 
with someone of a different ethnicity was greater 
than the number of people in favor of intereth-
nic cooperation in schools or neighborhoods.67 
And in the Dominican Republic, a program tar-
geted to youth at risk shows that jobs can change 
behaviors with positive implications for society. 
Participation in the Programa Juventud y Em-
pleo (Youth and Employment Program), which 
provides a combination of vocational and life 
skills training, reduced involvement in gangs, 
violence, and other risky behaviors.68 
For the same level of earnings and benefits, 
the larger the positive spillovers from a job, the 
more transformational the job can be, and the 
greater its value to society. In everyday parlance, 
good jobs are those that provide greater well-
being to the people who hold them. But good 
jobs for development are those with the highest 
value for society. Understanding these wider 
In 2008, 115 million children between the ages 
of 5 and 17 were involved in hazardous work.62 
International norms of human rights and labor 
standards reject forced labor, harmful forms of 
child labor, discrimination, and the suppression 
of voice among workers.
Beyond rights, the most obvious outcome 
of a job is the earnings it provides to its holder. 
These earnings can be in cash or in kind and 
may include a range of associated benefits. 
Other characteristics, such as stability, voice, 
and fulfillment at work, also affect subjective 
well-being. Several of these dimensions of jobs 
have been combined into the concept of De-
cent Work, introduced by the International La-
bour Organization (ILO) in 1999.63 Defined as 
“opportunities for women and men to obtain 
decent and productive work in conditions of 
freedom, equity, security and human dignity,” 
this concept has been used by many govern-
ments to articulate their policy agendas on 
jobs. The concept of Decent Work has also been 
embraced by the United Nations and several 
international organizations and endorsed by 
numerous global forums. 
As jobs provide earnings, generate output, 
and influence identity, they shape the well-
being of those who hold them—and they also 
affect the well-being of others. To understand 
how much jobs contribute to development, it is 
necessary to assess these effects—the spillovers 
from jobs. Jobs that generate positive spillovers 
have a greater value to society than they have 
to the individual who holds the job, while the 
opposite is true when spillovers are negative. In-
tuitively, many people have notions about such 
broader payoffs. When asked about their most 
preferred jobs, respondents in China, Colombia, 
Egypt, and Sierra Leone give different answers 
from those they offer when asked to identify 
the most important jobs to society (figure 11). 
Working as a civil servant or as a shop owner is 
generally preferred by individuals, while teach-
ers and doctors are quite often mentioned as the 
most important jobs for society. 
Who gets a job makes a difference too, and 
not just for individuals. In a society that values 
poverty reduction, jobs that take households 
out of hardship generate a positive spillover, 
because they improve the well-being of those 
who care. Female employment also matters be-
yond the individual. An increase in the share of 
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tribute to common goals, such as poverty reduc-
tion, environmental protection, or fairness. 
Because a job can affect the well-being of 
others as well as that of the jobholder, two jobs 
that may appear identical from an individual 
perspective could be different from a social per-
spective (figure 13). The individual perspective 
provides a useful starting point, because it often 
coincides with the social perspective. A high-
paying job in Bangalore’s information technol-
ogy sector is probably good for the worker; it is 
also good for India because it contributes to the 
country’s long-term growth. In other cases, the 
pay offs to jobs has shaped recent development 
thinking.69
Spillovers from jobs can be identified across 
all three transformations (figure 12). Some di-
rectly affect the earnings of others, as when a job 
is supported through government transfers, or 
restrictive regulations that reduce employment 
opportunities for others. Other spillovers take 
place through interactions: in households in the 
case of gender equality, at the workplace when 
knowledge and ideas are shared, or in society 
more broadly in the case of networks. Spillovers 
also occur when jobs and their allocation con-
F I G U R E  11 Views on preferred jobs and most important jobs differ
Sources: Bjørkhaug and others 2012; Hatløy and others 2012; Kebede and others 2012; and Zhang and others 2012; all for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who would want the job for themselves (individual value) and those who think the job is good for society (social value).
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the biggest payoff may be for jobs that reduce 
poverty or defuse conflict. Certainly, the level 
of development matters. The jobs agenda is not 
the same in an agrarian economy as in one that 
is rapidly urbanizing. It is bound to be different 
still in countries already grappling with how far 
the formal economy can be extended. 
two perspectives may conflict. For instance, Viet-
nam’s poverty rate declined with unprecedented 
speed in the 1990s when land was redistributed 
to farmers and agricultural commercialization 
was liberalized.70 From the individual perspec-
tive, farming jobs involve difficult working con-
ditions, substantial variability in earnings, and 
no formal social protection. But they can make 
a major contribution to development, as a ticket 
out of poverty for many. Conversely, bloated 
public utilities often offer a range of privileges to 
their employees even if the utilities themselves 
provide only limited coverage and unreliable 
services and are obstacles to economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Such jobs may look ap-
pealing from an individual perspective, but are 
less so to society.
Jobs agendas are diverse . . .  
but connected
Jobs challenges are not the same everywhere. 
Creating more jobs may be a universal goal, but 
the types of jobs that can contribute the most 
to development depend on the country context. 
Jobs that connect the economy to the world may 
matter the most in some situations; in others, 
F I G U R E  13  The individual and social values of jobs can differ
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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F I G U R E  12 Some jobs do more for development
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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jobs that do no environmental damage have 
particularly positive development impacts. 
•  Formalizing countries. Large and growing ur-
ban populations generally lead to more de-
veloped economies, where a fairly substantial 
proportion of firms and workers are covered 
by formal institutions and social programs. 
But further increasing formality to levels typi-
cal of industrial countries involves tradeoffs 
between living standards, productivity, and 
social cohesion. There is a premium on jobs 
that can be formalized without making labor 
too costly and on jobs that reduce the divide 
between those who benefit from formal insti-
tutions and those who do not. 
In some countries, the jobs challenge is 
shaped by demography and special circum-
stances affecting particular groups.
•  In countries with high youth unemployment 
young people do not see opportunities for 
the future. Many of these countries have large 
youth bulges, which can put downward pres-
sure on employment and earnings. Many also 
have education and training systems that are 
not developing the kinds of skills needed by 
the private sector. On closer inspection, the 
problem is often more on the demand side 
than the supply side, with limited compe-
tition reducing employment opportunities, 
especially in more skill-intensive sectors. In 
these settings, removing privilege in business 
entry and access to jobs is likely to have large 
development payoffs.
•  Aging societies also face generational issues, 
but these stem from a shrinking working-age 
population and the high cost of providing 
and caring for a growing number of elderly 
people. The impact of the declining working-
age population can be mitigated through pol-
icies for active aging, ensuring that the most 
productive members of society, including 
the highly skilled elderly, can work. Contain-
ing the increase in pension, health care, and 
long-term care costs can be achieved through 
reforms in program design, but these reforms 
can be a source of social strain. 
Natural endowments, including geography, 
and institutions can create unique jobs challenges.
But the nature of good jobs for development 
in a particular context is not simply a function 
of income per capita. It may be influenced by 
conflict that is ongoing or still reverberating. 
A country’s geography or its natural endow-
ments can also be determining factors. Small is-
land nations have unique jobs challenges, as do 
resource-rich economies. Or demography may 
be the key characteristic—witness the imposing 
but very different challenges in countries facing 
high youth unemployment and those with ag-
ing populations.
A typology of jobs challenges
A country’s level of development, institutional 
strength, endowments, and demography de-
fine where the development payoff from jobs 
is greatest. The jobs agenda in one country will 
thus be different from that in another country, 
depending on their dominant features. The 
challenges facing countries as they move along 
the development path are illustrated by the 
agrarian, urbanizing, and formalizing cases:
•  Agrarian countries. Most people are still en-
gaged in agriculture and live in rural areas. 
Jobs that improve living standards have a 
substantial development payoff because of 
high poverty rates. Cities need to be more 
functional to reap the benefits from agglom-
eration and global integration, so jobs that 
set the foundation for cities to eventually be-
come economically dynamic are good jobs 
for development. Even in the most optimistic 
scenario, however, it may take decades before 
urbanization is complete, so increasing pro-
ductivity in agriculture is a priority.
•  Urbanizing countries. Productivity growth in 
agriculture has risen enough to free up large 
numbers of people to work in cities. Job 
opportunities for women, typically in light 
manufacturing, can have positive impacts 
on the household allocation of resources. 
Jobs that deepen the global integration of 
urbanizing countries, especially in higher-
value-added export sectors, are also good 
for development. As countries urbanize, 
congestion, pollution, and other costs of 
high density become increasingly serious, so 
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that would make the greatest contribution to 
development in each case. This focus allows 
for a richer analysis of the potential tradeoffs 
between living standards, productivity, and 
social cohesion in a specific context. It pro-
vides clues about the obstacles to job creation 
and, ultimately, the priorities for policy makers 
(figure 14).
Migration of people—and of jobs
The movement of people and jobs implies that 
jobs challenges, while being country specific, 
also have a global scope. These processes have 
implications for living standards and productiv-
ity at both the sending and the receiving ends, 
and they can transform families and entire com-
munities, for better or for worse. Tradeoffs are 
inevitable, and coping with them only through 
the policies of receiving countries alone may 
prove unsatisfactory.
At the turn of the 21st century, there were 
more than 200 million international migrants 
worldwide, nearly 90 million of them work-
ers. Many migrants are temporary or seasonal 
workers who eventually return home. Some 
countries are mainly recipients, while others are 
sources, and yet others neither host nor send 
significant numbers of migrants (map 1). Some 
are large recipients either in absolute numbers 
(for instance, the United States) or in relative 
terms (Jordan and Singapore). Migrants from 
Bangladesh, Mexico, and India represent a large 
share of total migrants worldwide; Fiji, Jamaica, 
and Tonga have a large share of their population 
overseas. Figures for some of the smaller coun-
tries are striking. For instance, about a fifth of 
all Salvadorians live abroad, while more than 60 
percent of the populations of Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates are foreign-born.71
International migration increases the in-
comes of migrants and their families through 
earnings and remittances. The majority of the 
studies find either no effect or a very small nega-
tive effect on the labor earnings of locals in re-
ceiving countries. Migrants also contribute to 
global output if their productivity abroad is 
higher than it would be at home, which is usually 
the case. They may even contribute to output in 
the sending country, as networks of migrants 
and returnees channel investments, innovation, 
•  Resource-rich countries may have substantial 
foreign exchange earnings, but this wealth 
may not translate into employment creation 
beyond the exploitation of natural resources. 
Indeed, the abundance of foreign exchange 
can hamper the competitiveness of other ex-
port activities. Some resource-rich countries 
distribute part of their wealth through trans-
fers or subsidized public sector jobs, while 
relying on migrants to do menial work. This 
approach can maintain living standards but at 
the expense of productivity growth and social 
cohesion. In those countries, jobs that sup-
port the diversification of exports can have 
large development payoffs. 
•  Small island nations, because of their size and 
remoteness, cannot reap the benefits from 
agglomeration and global integration except 
through tourism. So the productivity spill-
overs from jobs are limited, as are employ-
ment opportunities outside basic services and 
government. Outmigration offers an alter-
native for improving living standards, while 
return migration and diaspora communities 
can stimulate the diffusion of new business 
ideas among locals. 
•  In conflict-affected countries, the most imme-
diate challenge is to support social cohesion. 
Employment for ex-combatants or young 
men vulnerable to participation in violence 
takes on particular importance. With fragile 
institutions and volatile politics, attracting 
private investment and connecting to global 
value chains may be out of reach for quite 
some time. Yet construction can boom even 
in poor business environments, and it is la-
bor intensive. Investments in infrastructure 
can not only support social cohesion through 
their direct employment impact, they can also 
be  a step in preparing for future private sector 
job creation.
These criteria are not mutually exclusive. 
Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
are both resource rich and conflict affected; 
Jordan and Armenia are formalizing and also 
have high youth unemployment. Still, look-
ing through the jobs lens and focusing on the 
key features of the different country types can 
help identify more clearly the kinds of jobs 
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computer and information services, legal and 
technical support, and other business services. 
India was the pioneer, but other countries—
Brazil, Chile, China, and Malaysia, to name a 
few—have also seized the opportunity.72
The obvious winners of job migration are the 
workers and entrepreneurs in countries to which 
industries and splintered service jobs have mi-
grated. This migration, along with the transfer 
of new technologies and advanced management 
methods, contributes to productivity growth 
and higher living standards. The hidden win-
ners of job migration are consumers worldwide. 
The improved international division of labor in-
creases the availability of goods and services and 
enhances the possibility of gaining from trade. 
The clear losers are those who have seen their 
jobs disappear because of the declining compet-
itiveness of their industries and services. Among 
the losers, many skilled workers find comparable 
jobs without a substantial loss in salary, but oth-
and expertise. Social effects are more mixed. 
On the positive side, migration connects people 
from different cultures in ways bound to widen 
their horizons. On the negative side, the separa-
tion from family and friends can be a source of 
distress and isolation. Migration may also bring 
racial prejudice and heighten social tensions in 
host countries, especially when migrants are se-
cluded in segregated occupations or neighbor-
hoods, preventing their integration in society.
Jobs are on the move as well. The past four 
decades have been marked by the outsourcing of 
manufacturing tasks from industrial countries 
to the developing world, especially to East Asia 
(figure 15). More recently, the same pattern is 
observable for service tasks. In fact, services are 
the fastest-growing component of global trade. 
Developing countries are now exporting not 
only traditional services, such as transportation 
and tourism, but also modern and skill-inten-
sive services, such as financial intermediation, 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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ers do not. Low-skilled workers or those with 
industry- or occupation-specific skills that are 
no longer in demand are those who suffer most.
Policies through the jobs lens
While it is not the role of governments to create 
jobs, government functions are fundamental for 
sustained job creation. The quality of the civil 
M A P  1 Only in some countries are migrants a substantial share of the population
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Özden and others 2011, and Artuc and others 2012, using census data around 2000.
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.  
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
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service is critically important for development, 
whether it is teachers building skills, agricul-
tural extension agents improving agricultural 
productivity, or urban planners designing func-
tional cities. Temporary employment programs 
for the demobilization of combatants are also 
justified in some circumstances. But as a general 
rule it is the private sector that creates jobs. The 
role of government is to ensure that the condi-
tions are in place for strong private-sector-led 
a. Immigrants, % of labor force
b. Emigrants, % of native labor force
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growth, to understand why there are not enough 
good jobs for development, and to remove or 
mitigate the constraints that prevent the cre-
ation of more of those jobs.
Government can fulfill this role through a 
three-layered policy approach (figure 16):
•  Fundamentals. Because jobs improve with 
development, providing higher earnings and 
benefits as countries grow rich, a prerequisite 
is to create a policy environment that is con-
ducive to growth. Macroeconomic stability, 
an enabling business environment, human 
capital accumulation, and the rule of law are 
among the fundamentals. Ensuring macro-
economic stability involves containing volatil-
ity and avoiding major misalignments of rela-
tive prices. Adequate infrastructure, access to 
finance, and sound regulation are key ingredi-
ents of the business environment. Good nutri-
tion, health, and education outcomes not only 
improve people’s lives but also equip them for 
productive employment. The rule of law in-
cludes protection of property rights and also 
the progressive realization of rights at work, to 
avoid a situation where growth co exists with 
unacceptable forms of employment.
•  Labor policies. Because growth does not me-
chanically deliver employment, a second layer 
is to ensure that labor policies do not under-
mine job creation and instead enhance the de-
velopment payoffs from jobs. But labor mar-
ket imperfections should not be addressed 
through institutional failures. Instead, they 
should remain on a range—a plateau—where 
negative efficiency effects are modest. Labor 
policy should avoid two cliffs: the distortion-
ary interventions that clog the creation of jobs 
in cities and in global value chains, and the 
lack of mechanisms for voice and protection 
for the most vulnerable workers, regardless of 
whether they are wage earners. The first cliff 
undermines the development payoffs from 
agglomeration and global integration; the 
second leads to low living standards and a so-
cial cohesion deficit. 
•  Priorities. Because some jobs do more for de-
velopment than others, it is necessary to un-
derstand where good jobs for development 
lie, given the country context. More selective 
policy interventions are justified when in-
centives are distorted, resulting in too few of 
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on data from the United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the United Nations Statistics Division.
Note: Japan is not included in panel a. GDP = gross domestic product.
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lead to an overvaluation of its currency, making 
imports more affordable and exports less com-
petitive. Resource-rich countries face similar 
pressures for their currencies to appreciate, and 
the commodity booms of the last few years have 
only made these pressures stronger. Currency 
overvaluation can also happen in countries 
where large volumes of foreign assistance are 
needed to jump-start development, cope with 
natural disasters, or facilitate recovery after a 
conflict. An analysis of 83 developing countries 
between 1970 and 2004 confirms that aid fosters 
growth (albeit with decreasing returns) but in-
duces overvaluation and has a negative impact 
on export diversification.77
An enabling business environment. Finance, 
infrastructure, and business regulations set the 
quality of the investment climate and thus in-
fluence job creation by private firms. Access to 
finance, a chief constraint to business expan-
sion in countries in every development phase, 
is the top constraint in low- and upper-middle-
income countries (figure 17). Financial markets 
have the potential to allocate resources toward 
more productive uses, thwart the channeling 
of resources to those with political connections 
or economic power, and expand financial in-
those jobs. If this is the case, policies should 
remove the market imperfections and institu-
tional failures that prevent the private sector 
from creating more good jobs for develop-
ment. If the failures and imperfections can-
not be clearly identified, or cannot be easily 
removed, offsetting them may be an option, 
but the costs and benefits of doing so need to 
be carefully assessed.
Fundamentals: Ensuring the basics
Macroeconomic stability. Volatility hurts em-
ployment and earnings, often immediately. Ac-
cording to a recent estimate, a 1.0 percent decline 
in gross domestic product (GDP) is associated 
with an increase in the unemployment rate of 
0.19 percentage point in Japan, 0.45 percentage 
point in the United States, and 0.85 percentage 
point in Spain.73 In developing countries, where 
farming and self-employment are more preva-
lent and income support mechanisms are more 
limited, the short-term impact of macroeco-
nomic instability is less on open unemployment 
and more on earnings from work.74
Volatility can originate internally or be 
caused by external shocks. Internally, it is often 
the outcome of unsustainable budget deficits 
and lax monetary policy. But tight budgets and 
rigid monetary policy rules may not be a magic 
wand. Budget deficits are more or less worri-
some depending on how quickly an economy is 
growing, whereas the independence of central 
banks needs to be weighed against the overall 
coherence of the country’s development strat-
egy. Assessing the soundness of macroeconomic 
management requires taking account of the 
impact of fiscal and monetary policies on eco-
nomic growth.75
Volatility may also result from external shocks, 
including natural disasters and crises originat-
ing abroad. Precautionary policies can cushion 
those shocks, if and when they occur. Most often, 
short-term stimulus or adjustment packages are 
needed—but these tend to be less effective in the 
developing world than in developed countries 
because of lower multiplier effects.76
Avoiding exchange rate misalignment is nec-
essary to sustain a vibrant export sector—and 
thus to create jobs connected to international 
markets and global value chains. Surges in a 
country’s foreign exchange earnings generally 
F I G U R E  16  Three distinct layers of policies are needed
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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takes to comply with regulations or to receive 
permits.81 Business regulations also affect com-
petition and thus the pressure to innovate and 
increase productivity. Across countries, regula-
tions on business entry are inversely correlated 
with productivity and firm creation, with stron-
ger effects in sectors that have higher rates of 
entry.82 In Mexico, easing entry requirements 
increased business registration and employ-
ment and drove down consumer prices, largely 
through creating new firms rather than formal-
izing informal firms.83
Human capital. Good outcomes in nutrition, 
health, and education are development goals 
in themselves, because they directly improve 
people’s lives. But they also equip people for 
productive employment and job opportuni-
ties—and through this channel, human capi-
tal drives economic and social advances. There 
is robust evidence from throughout the world 
that an additional year of schooling raises earn-
ings substantially, and that this earnings pre-
mium reflects the higher productivity of more 
educated workers.84 Together, nutrition, health, 
and education combine to form human skills 
and abilities that have been powerfully linked to 
productivity growth and poverty reduction in 
the medium to longer run.85 Also, better health 
brings, directly, higher labor productivity. As 
such, human capital is a fundamental ingredi-
ent for desirable job outcomes. 
Human capital formation is cumulative. 
Of crucial importance are adequate health 
and nutrition during “the first 1,000 days,” 
clusion. But regulatory oversight is needed to 
ensure transparency  and competition in how 
funds are allocated.78 The financial crisis of 2008 
reopened heated debates on the appropriate 
regulation of the financial sector and the need 
to balance prudence and stability with innova-
tion and inclusion. 
Access to affordable and quality infrastruc-
ture is a prerequisite for firms to operate. Power 
shortages are the number-two constraint to 
firm growth and job creation mentioned by 
entrepreneurs the world over—and number 
one in low-income countries. Telecommunica-
tions allow for a better flow of information with 
suppliers and customers, and the internet and 
mobile technology facilitate the spread of new 
ideas. Roads provide greater access to markets, 
as do ports and airports.79 The way infrastruc-
ture is regulated is important as well. Inad-
equate pricing policies and regulations amplify 
the gap in needed infrastructure services. In 
many countries, monopolies based on politi-
cal connections have led to reduced quantities 
of infrastructure services at higher prices and 
lower quality.80 
Business regulation also affects the oppor-
tunities for businesses to grow and create jobs. 
Regulations can increase the cost of doing busi-
ness, in money or in time needed to comply. 
Steps taken to meet requirements or to pay fees 
are a burden for businesses, as are delays or dis-
cretionary decisions, such as those for permits 
or licenses. There is great variation across firms 
in the same location with regard to the time it 
F I G U R E  17 Finance and electricity are among the top constraints faced by formal private enterprises
Source: IFC, forthcoming.
Note: The analysis is based on World Bank enterprise surveys covering 46,556 firms in 106 countries. Small firms have fewer than 20 employees, medium firms have 21–99, and 
large firms 100 and more.
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consistently find crime and corruption to be ob-
stacles to conducting business.95 
An effective judicial system is a key institu-
tion for enforcing property rights and reduc-
ing crime and corruption. An independent, 
accountable, and fair judiciary can contribute 
to private sector growth and job creation by en-
forcing the rules that govern transactions and 
by helping ensure that the costs and benefits of 
growth are fairly distributed. The justice system 
can enforce contracts, reduce transaction costs 
for firms, and create a safe and more predictable 
business environment.96 And effective courts in-
crease the willingness of firms to invest.97 
An institutional environment that respects 
rights is an important ingredient of the rule of 
law and a foundation for good jobs for develop-
ment. The ILO’s core labor standards provide a 
floor in the areas of child labor, forced labor, 
discrimination, and freedom of association 
and collective bargaining.98 Health and safety 
at work also call for attention by governments 
and employers. Ensuring that standards are 
applied in practice requires providing access to 
information to workers and employers. It also 
implies expanding legal coverage to workers in 
jobs that fall outside formal laws and regula-
tions. Associations of informal workers can 
inform them about their rights, help them use 
legal mechanisms, and offer them collective 
voice.99
Labor policies: Avoiding the two cliffs
A malfunctioning labor market may prevent 
economic growth from translating into more 
and better jobs. Traditional analyses focus on 
labor supply, labor demand, and their matching 
to explain why there may not be enough employ-
ment, or not enough wage employment in the 
case of developing countries. By not addressing 
labor market imperfections, or by creating them, 
labor policies can indeed constrain job creation, 
even seriously. In many cases, however, the con-
straints to creating transformational jobs are not 
connected to the labor code. The low productiv-
ity of smallholder farming in agrarian econo-
mies is probably more closely related to failures 
in agricultural research and extension. And the 
lack of competition in technologically advanced 
activities that could boost the demand for skilled 
work in countries with high youth unemploy-
from conception to two years of age. Brain 
devel opment in this time period affects physi-
cal health, learning abilities, and social be-
havior throughout life.86 Ensuring adequate 
nutrition, health, and cognitive stimulation 
through a nurturing environment from the 
womb through the first years raises returns to 
later child investments significantly.87 While 
foundations are laid early on, human capital 
and skills continue to be formed throughout 
childhood and young adulthood. School-
ing is fundamental for the further develop-
ment of cognitive and social skills until the 
end of the teenage life. Social skills remain 
malleable through adolescence and the early 
adult years.88 Young adults can continue 
into more specialized skill-building, includ-
ing at tertiary levels, but success depends on 
whether the generic skills needed to learn 
and adapt to different tasks and problem- 
solving environments have been acquired. 
These general skills are especially important in 
more dynamic economic environments.
Unfortunately, the evidence shows that many 
countries are falling short in building up the 
human capital of their children and youth. The 
quality of delivery systems has often failed to 
keep pace with the expansion of access to basic 
social services. In a large majority of develop-
ing countries that took part in the Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 
2009, at least one-fifth of 15-year-old students 
were functionally illiterate (not reaching at least 
level 2 in the PISA reading assessment).89
The rule of law. Across countries, the pres-
ence of institutions that protect property rights, 
uphold the rule of law, and rein in corruption is 
associated with higher levels of development.90 
Property rights foster private sector growth by 
allowing firms to invest without the fear that 
their assets will be stolen or confiscated.91 The 
ability to enforce contracts widens the circle 
of potential suppliers and customers, as per-
sonal connections become less important in 
establishing trust.92 The rule of law has direct 
implications for the growth of firms and jobs. 
Entrepreneurs who believe their property rights 
are secure reinvest more of their profits than 
those who do not.93 Conversely, rampant crime 
and violence are likely to drive firms away and 
discourage domestic and foreign investment.94 
Across countries, investment climate surveys 
26  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
youth, women, and the less skilled. In Colombia 
and Indonesia, minimum wage increases had 
only a modest overall effect but the employment 
impact was stronger for young workers.101 Reg-
ulations more clearly affect job flows, creating 
“stickiness” in the labor market and slowing the 
pace of labor reallocation. 102 While this hinders 
economic efficiency, the evidence on produc-
tivity is fairly inconclusive, though admittedly 
scarce.103 
In developing countries, collective bargain-
ing does not have a major impact outside the 
public sector and activities characterized by 
limited competition, where there are rents to 
share.104 Unions consistently raise wages for 
workers. Studies place this premium in the 5 to 
15 percent range in Mexico; around 5 percent 
in Korea; and at 10 to 20 percent in South Af-
rica.105 The costs in terms of reduced jobs are 
not so clear, however. In some countries, though 
not all, the tradeoff seems to be lower employ-
ment, but even then the magnitudes are rela-
tively small. The limited evidence on union ef-
fects on productivity is also mixed.106 The main 
challenges are extending voice to those who are 
not wage earners, so that the constraints facing 
their farms and microenterprises can be ad-
dressed, and organizing collective bargaining in 
a way that enhances productivity.
Active labor market programs, such as train-
ing, employment services, wage subsidies, and 
public works, have a mixed record.107 When they 
are not well grounded in the needs and realities 
of the labor market or when administration is 
poor and not transparent, they are of little use 
or even worse. When they are well designed and 
implemented, they can help facilitate job match-
ing, mitigate the negative impacts of economic 
downturns, and fill the gap when employers 
or workers underinvest in training (figure 18). 
Even when this is the case, though, effects tend 
to be modest, so expectations about what active 
labor market policies can achieve need to be 
held in check.
Social insurance coverage is limited even in 
the most formalized developing countries. Un-
employment insurance can help workers man-
age the risks of job loss, but it can also weaken 
job search efforts. When unemployment insur-
ance, pensions, health care, and other benefits 
are financed through the payroll, high contri-
bution rates can create hiring disincentives. In 
ment is more likely to stem from cronyism and 
political favoritism.
There is no consensus on what the content 
of labor policies should be. Views are polarized, 
reflecting differences in fundamental beliefs. To 
some, labor market regulations and collective 
bargaining are sources of inefficiency that re-
duce output and employment, while protecting 
insiders at the expense of everyone else. In this 
view, unemployment insurance and active labor 
market programs create work disincentives and 
are a waste of money. To others, these policies 
provide necessary protection to workers against 
the power of employers and the vagaries of the 
market. They can even contribute to economic 
efficiency by improving information, insuring 
against risks, and creating conditions for long-
term investments by both workers and firms.
Advocates of both views can find examples 
to support their positions. Those who see labor 
policies and institutions as part of the problem 
point to the impressive long-term job creation 
record of the United States, a country with lim-
ited interventions in the labor market. They also 
point to the protective job security rules that 
have impeded young people from finding work 
in many North African and Southern European 
countries. By contrast, those who see labor poli-
cies as part of the solution point to job-sharing 
as decisive in Germany’s relative success in 
weathering the financial crisis.
A careful review of the actual effects of labor 
policies in developing countries yields a mixed 
picture. Most studies find that impacts are mod-
est—certainly more modest than the intensity 
of the debate would suggest.100 Across firm sizes 
and country levels of development, labor poli-
cies and regulations are generally not among the 
top three constraints that formal private enter-
prises face. Excessive or insufficient regulation 
of labor markets reduces productivity. But in 
between these extremes is a plateau where ef-
fects enhancing and undermining efficiency can 
be found side by side and most of the impact 
is redistributive, generally to the advantage of 
middle-aged male workers (as opposed to own-
ers of capital, women, and younger workers). 
In most countries that have been studied, 
job security rules and minimum wages have a 
small effect on aggregate employment. These 
rules offer benefits for those who are covered, 
while negative effects tend to be concentrated on 
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the health insurance program for the poor in 
Vietnam are encouraging in this respect.109 This 
cliff may be less visible than excessive labor mar-
ket rigidity, but it is no less real. 
Priorities: Realizing the development 
payoffs from jobs
In addition to ensuring that the fundamen-
tals support growth and that labor policies are 
 adequate, decision makers can help realize the 
development payoffs that come from jobs. Some 
jobs do more than others for living standards, 
productivity, and social cohesion. What those 
jobs are depends on the country context—its 
level of development, demography, endow-
ments, and institutions. In some circumstances, 
there will be no constraints to the emergence of 
good jobs for development, and no specific pol-
icy will be needed. In others, governments can 
support the private sector in creating more of 
these jobs. Sometimes this can be achieved by re-
moving constraints that impede the creation of 
jobs with high development payoffs. When this 
is not possible, policies can be more proactive 
and bypass the constraints, provided that the 
gains to society from doing so outweigh the cost.
developing countries where formal sectors are 
small, funding these programs through general 
taxation is increasingly discussed,108 but any 
taxes create distortions. In the end, there is no 
substitute for affordable social protection ben-
efits that are valued by workers. The main issue 
is coherently integrating social protection and 
social assistance to minimize gaps and overlaps.
In sum, labor policies and institutions can 
improve labor market information, manage 
risk, and provide voice. But these advantages 
can come at the expense of labor market dy-
namism, reduced incentives for job creation 
and job search, and a gap in benefits between 
the covered and uncovered. The challenge is to 
set labor policies on a plateau—a range where 
regulations and institutions can at least partially 
address labor market imperfections without 
reducing efficiency. Labor market rules that 
are too weak or programs that are too modest 
or nonexistent can leave problems of poor in-
formation, unequal power, and inadequate risk 
management untreated. In contrast, rules that 
are too stringent and programs that are too am-
bitious can compound market imperfections 
with institutional failures.
The focus on good jobs for development of-
fers some insights to assess where the edges of 
the plateau, the cliffs, may lie. At one end of the 
plateau are labor policies that slow job creation 
in cities, or in global value chains, and make 
countries miss out on jobs supporting agglom-
eration effects and knowledge spillovers. Forgo-
ing the development payoffs from urbanization 
and global integration would be a consequence 
of falling off the cliff. This is not necessarily an 
argument for minimum regulation. There is also 
scope for arrangements strengthening spatial 
coordination, and thus increasing efficiency, as 
suggested by China’s recent experience with col-
lective bargaining.
At the other end of the plateau, the absence 
of mechanisms for voice and protection for 
those who do not work for an employer, or do so 
in the informal sector, is also a concern. Extend-
ing voice for workers who are often among the 
poorest may result in higher living standards. 
Limiting abuses by employment intermediar-
ies should enhance efficiency, and building in-
clusive social protection systems can contribute 
to greater social cohesion. The experience of 
India’s Self Employed Women’s Association and 
F I G U R E  18  Combining work and training increases the 
success rates of programs
Source: Fares and Puerto 2009.
Note: The figure shows the correlation coefficient between type of training and reported success of a 
program, with success defined as improving employment or earnings and being cost-effective. 
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In the absence of gaps of this sort, it is difficult 
to justify government interventions beyond 
establishing the fundamentals and adopting 
adequate labor policies. 
Data and analysis can be used to iden-
tify misaligned incentives, indicated by a 
gap between the individual and the social 
value of jobs. Several research areas deal with 
these gaps. For instance, the tools of pub-
lic finance can measure the tax burden that 
applies to capital and labor and assess the cross- 
subsidization between individuals or firms. 
The methods of labor economics can uncover 
gaps between the actual earnings of specific 
groups of workers and their potential earnings, 
or between the social and individual returns to 
schooling. Poverty analyses help in identifying 
the kind of jobs that are more likely to provide 
opportunities to the poor, or the locations 
where job creation would have a greater im-
pact on reducing poverty. Productivity stud-
ies allow for quantifying the spillovers from 
employment in foreign-owned investment 
companies, or in cities. Environmental studies 
shed light on the carbon footprint and pollu-
tion created by various types of jobs. And val-
A simple approach to setting policy priorities 
follows five steps (figure 19):
•  Step one: What are good jobs for development? 
Assessing the development payoffs from 
jobs in a particular country context is the first 
step in identifying priorities. The nature of 
those jobs varies with the characteristics of 
the country, including its phase of develop-
ment, demography, endowments, and insti-
tutions. Jobs challenges are not the same in 
agrarian economies, resource-rich countries, 
conflict-affected countries, or in countries 
with high youth unemployment. And the jobs 
with the greatest development impact differ 
as well, resulting in diverse jobs agendas. 
•  Step two: Are there enough of these jobs? A 
country may or may not face constraints in 
creating good jobs for development. For ex-
ample, light manufacturing can offer employ-
ment opportunities for women, with signifi-
cant impacts on poverty. If a boom is under 
way, the development value of new manufac-
turing jobs might materialize. But it might 
not if, for example, inadequate urbanization 
policies limit the establishment of new firms. 
F I G U R E  19 A decision tree can help set policy priorities 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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But there are cases when constraints can nei-
ther be removed nor offset. An engagement strat-
egy involving a deeper analysis of the options 
and buy-in by key stakeholders is needed then. 
Policy making to remove or offset constraints 
needs to be selective and supported by good 
public finance principles. The costs and benefits 
of policy options need to be assessed, but calcu-
lations are different when the overall develop-
ment impact is the guiding objective. An em-
ployment program to demobilize ex-combatants 
in a  conflict-affected country could be assessed 
in terms of whether the earnings gains of par-
ticipants justify the program costs, but a full 
 accounting should also incorporate the poten-
tially positive effects from reintegration and 
peace building. In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the cost of an integration program for 
ex-combatants was about US$800 per benefi-
ciary.110 Such a program would likely be judged 
as cost inefficient by traditional standards. 
Whether or not it is still worth implementing 
depends on the value policy makers attach to so-
cial cohesion benefits. These benefits should be 
stated for the policy decision to be transparent.
Diverse jobs agendas, diverse policy 
priorities
Some countries have successfully set policy to 
bring out the development payoffs from jobs, in 
ways that provide a model to others.
As an agrarian country, in the 1990s Viet-
nam concentrated on increasing productivity 
in agriculture, freeing labor to work in rural 
off-farm employment and eventually support-
ing migration to cities. In 1993, more than 70 
percent of employment was in agriculture, 58 
percent of the population lived in poverty, and 
famine was still a real concern.111 Two decades 
later, Vietnam is the second-largest exporter 
of rice and coffee; the largest exporter of black 
pepper and cashew nuts; and a top exporter of 
tea, rubber, and seafood products. Poverty has 
declined dramatically. Combined with a strong 
emphasis on agricultural extension, land reform 
and deregulation led to rapidly growing agri-
cultural productivity on very small farm plots. 
These policies were part of a broader package 
of reforms, or Doi Moi, that took Vietnam from 
central planning to a market economy with a 
socialist orientation.112 Policies also aimed at 
ues surveys can discover which types of jobs 
provide social networks and social identity.
•  Step three: Can the constraints be identified? 
The gaps between the individual and social 
values of specific types of jobs indicate un-
exploited spillovers from jobs. The gaps typi-
cally arise from market imperfections and in-
stitutional failures that cause people to work 
in jobs that are suboptimal from a social point 
of view, lead firms to create jobs that are not 
as good for development as they should be, or 
connect people less through jobs than would 
be socially desirable. But identifying those 
constraints is not always easy. For instance, 
a broad set of cultural, social, and economic 
forces may result in insufficient employment 
opportunities for women. Similarly, the ob-
stacles to more jobs in cities could be in the 
land market, or in the institutional arrange-
ments to coordinate urban development, 
or in the ability to raise revenue to finance 
infrastructure.
•  Step four: Can the constraints be removed? If 
the institutional failures and market imper-
fections leading to misaligned incentives can 
be identified, reforms should be considered. It 
is a good economic principle to target reforms 
on the failures and imperfections at the root 
of the problem. Where reforms are technically 
and politically feasible, policy makers can di-
rectly tackle the major constraints hindering 
the creation of more good jobs for develop-
ment by the private sector. 
•  Step five: Can the constraints be offset?  Reforms 
might not be feasible, technically or politically. 
Or perhaps the constraints for jobs are not 
identifiable. An alternative then is to adopt 
offsetting policies that can restore the incen-
tives for job creation. For instance, if a dif-
fuse but entrenched set of norms and beliefs 
makes it difficult for women to work, efforts 
could aim at increasing their employability 
through targeted investments in social and 
physical infrastructure (box 1). Similarly, if 
politically charged regulations slow down the 
reallocation of labor toward more productive 
activities, urban infrastructure and logistics 
could enhance the attractiveness of jobs in 
cities and jobs connected to world markets.
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expressed satisfaction with their social integra-
tion, and 85 percent of community members 
felt there was trust between the two groups.115 
While ex-combatants were only a small share of 
Rwanda’s population of 10 million, their reinte-
gration had payoffs for social cohesion. Rwanda 
has built on this start by rejuvenating the private 
sector through reforms of institutions and busi-
ness regulations.116 The coffee industry has cre-
ated thousands of new jobs.117 
Chile, a resource-rich country, has managed 
its copper riches in a way compatible with job 
creation in nonresource sectors. Home to more 
than a quarter of the world’s copper reserves, 
Chile diversified its exports and its economy 
while effectively managing resource-related 
risks such as currency appreciation and infla-
tion. Unemployment fell to single digits from 
around 20 percent in the early 1980s.118 A re-
source stabilization fund (since 1987) to gether 
with a transparent fiscal rule (since 1999) al-
creating employment opportunities outside ag-
riculture. The country opened to foreign inves-
tors, first in natural resource exploitation and 
light manufacturing, and then more broadly in 
the context of its accession to the World Trade 
Organization in 2007. Registered FDI increased 
fourfold in just two years, from 1992 to 1994; 
over the past five years, FDI inflows exceeded 8 
percent of GDP.113 
Rwanda, a conflict-affected country, has re-
bounded after the ethnic conflict and destruction 
of the mid-1990s. By 2000, Rwanda’s economy 
had returned to precrisis levels as a result of the 
cessation of conflict as well as an aggressive pack-
age of reforms.114 Growth has continued, reach-
ing an estimated 8.8 percent in 2011, and the 
poverty rate fell by 12 percentage points between 
2005 and 2010. In the wake of the conflict, the 
government supported the reintegration and de-
mobilization of more than 54,000 former com-
batants. In 2012, 73 percent of ex-combatants 
Some developing countries have experienced important increases 
in women’s labor participation over a relatively short period of time. 
Nowhere has the change been faster than in Latin America. Since 
the 1980s, more than 70 million women have entered the labor 
force, raising the female labor participation rate from 36 percent to 
43 percent. In Colombia, the rate increased from 47 percent in 1984 
to 65 percent in 2006. By contrast, in the Middle East and North 
Africa, women’s labor force participation has only grown by 0.17 
percentage points per year over the last three decades. 
Recent research attributes this rapid transformation to increases 
in labor force participation among married or cohabiting women 
with children, rather than to demographics, education, or business 
cycles. Changes in social attitudes contributed to the transforma-
tion, but this is a complex area with limited scope—and justifica-
tion—for direct policy intervention. For instance, women’s partici-
pation rates are very low in the West Bank and Gaza, particularly 
among married women. But this cannot be mechanically attributed 
to religion, as countries like Indonesia have high participation rates. 
Other social norms and regulations prevent women from participat-
ing, despite their willingness and capacity to do so. 
While the scope to influence social attitudes is limited, evidence 
suggests that public policies and programs in other areas have an 
important role to play. It also suggests that a combination of tar-
geted investments and interventions in social and physical infra-
structure can modify women’s labor force participation and the 
BOX 1   How does women’s labor force participation increase?
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Amador and others 2011, Chioda 2012, and World Bank 2011d.
returns to their earnings. These investments can be categorized into 
three groups. They can address shortages in the availability of ser-
vices (such as lack of electricity or daycare facilities) that force women 
to allocate large amounts of time to home production. They can 
make it easier for women to accumulate productive assets, such 
as education, capital, and land, facilitating their entry into high- 
productivity market activities. And they can remove norms or regula-
tions that imply biased or even discriminatory practices, preventing 
women from having equal employment opportunities. 
There are successful experiences with targeted investments 
and interventions of each of these three sorts. Public provision or 
subsidization of child care can reduce the costs women incur at 
home when they engage in market work. Examples include pub-
licly provided or subsidized day care such as Estancias Infantiles in 
Mexico, Hogares Comunitarios in Colombia, and similar programs 
in Argentina and Brazil. Improvements in infrastructure services—
especially in water and electricity—can free up women’s time 
spent on domestic and care work. Electrification in rural South 
Africa, for instance, has increased women’s labor force participa-
tion by about 9 percent. Correcting biases in service delivery insti-
tutions, such as the workings of government land distribution and 
registration schemes, allows women to own and inherit assets. 
Finally, the use of active labor market policies, the promotion of 
networks, and the removal of discriminatory regulations are impor-
tant to make work more rewarding for women.
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New Zealand in 2007 to provide employment 
opportunities through migration, leading to 
higher remittances, improved knowledge of 
agricultural techniques, computer literacy, 
and English-language skills.125 Brazil provides 
an example of a rapidly formalizing country. 
Over the past decade, job creation in the for-
mal sector has been three times as rapid as in 
the informal sector. Just in the five years lead-
ing up to the crisis, the formal share of total 
employment increased by about 5 percentage 
points.126 Non-contributory social protection 
programs such as Bolsa Familia, a simplifica-
tion of tax rules for small business, increased 
incentives for firms to formalize their work-
ers, and improved enforcement of tax and 
labor regulations contributed to this success. 
Poland, an aging society, has seen its employ-
ment ratio increase from 60 percent in 2006 to 
65 percent in 2009. This was due to changes in 
the application of eligibility rules of disabil-
ity pensions, and pension reforms adjusting 
the level of benefits down as life expectancy 
increases. In 2012, a new wave of pension re-
forms raised the retirement age to 67 for men 
and women from the current 65 for men and 
60 for women.127
Connected jobs agendas: Global 
partnerships for jobs
Policies for jobs in one country can have spill-
overs to other countries, both positive and nega-
tive. An important issue is whether international 
coordination mechanisms could influence gov-
ernment decisions to enhance the positive spill-
overs and mitigate the negative. Several  areas 
lend themselves to more and better coordination.
Rights and standards. Cross-border mecha-
nisms exist to set standards and provide chan-
nels for improving compliance with rights. ILO 
conventions can influence domestic legislation 
and be a channel for voice and coordination in-
ternationally, as demonstrated by the process of 
adopting the conventions for home-based and 
domestic workers. The support for core labor 
standards in the 1998 Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles and Rights at Work suggests 
that countries respond to pressure from the in-
ternational community.128 Yet the pressure only 
goes so far. The persistence of forced labor, chil-
dren working in hazardous conditions, discrimi-
lowed the country to save for difficult times and 
avoid a loss of competitiveness. Governance re-
forms in all areas of public sector management 
promoted accountability and transparency. An 
active export-oriented growth policy, including 
the welcoming of foreign investment, supported 
productivity spillovers from jobs connected to 
global markets. Competitive innovation funds 
for nonmineral export sectors, especially in 
agribusiness, have broadened the export base.119 
The public budget boosted education spending, 
which almost doubled between 1990 and 2009, 
leading to an unprecedented expansion of sec-
ondary and tertiary education.120
Slovenia has successfully tackled its very high 
youth unemployment rate, reducing the ratio of 
youth to adult unemployment from three in 
the 1990s to around two today.121 The success 
in reducing youth unemployment cannot be 
 attributed to spending on active labor market 
programs (about average for transition coun-
tries), liberalizing the labor market (rules re-
main more restrictive than the average in de-
veloped countries), or low minimum wages 
(still on the high side).122 Potential distortions 
from these policies seem to be somewhat off-
set, however, by a model of consensus-based 
decision making whereby trade unions and 
employer organizations, with broad coverage, 
set wages that respond well to macroeconomic 
trends and sectoral productivity.123 Sustained 
growth before the global crisis is ultimately 
responsible for much of Slovenia’s decline in 
youth unemployment. Taking advantage of 
European integration, the economy success-
fully restructured its export sector. Very good 
infrastructure and a fairly well-skilled work-
force helped as well.
Examples of successful policies can actu-
ally be found across the entire typology of jobs 
challenges (figure 20). As an urbanizing coun-
try, Korea carefully designed and phased poli-
cies to accompany the transition of jobs from 
agriculture to light manufacturing and then 
to industries with higher value added.124 Land 
 development programs were established first, 
followed by a land-use regulation system, and 
then by comprehensive urban planning. Hous-
ing and transportation policies held the dis-
economies of urbanization in check. Tonga, a 
small island nation, is actively using the Recog-
nized Seasonal Employer program launched by 
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nied by two projects, one to build capacity for 
monitoring working conditions in garment fac-
tories and one to support an arbitration council 
to resolve collective labor disputes.129
Beyond the initiatives of governments 
through conventions and trade agreements, a 
growing emphasis is being placed on private 
sector accountability and the broader corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) agenda, whereby 
companies voluntarily bring social and envi-
ronmental concerns into their operations.130 
Codes of conduct are most likely to be adopted 
by companies based in the European Union and 
North America, which then make engagement 
with labor standards a condition of business 
with suppliers. But there is limited evidence on 
the extent to which codes of conduct translate 
into improved enforcement of standards. Be-
nation, and lack of voice suggest that ratification 
on its own is not sufficient.
Trade agreements are a potential instrument 
for international coordination on rights. They 
can incorporate incentives for attention to voice 
and working conditions by linking trade access 
to the adoption and enforcement of labor laws 
and standards. Whether linking rights to trade 
actually leads to better outcomes for workers on 
either side of a trade agreement is less clear. La-
bor clauses can be used as a protectionist tool, 
undermining trade and employment opportu-
nities in developing countries. Moreover, in the 
absence of capacity and institutions to moni-
tor and enforce compliance, trade agreements 
on their own can be weak instruments. For 
instance, Cambodia’s successful bilateral trade 
agreement with the United States was accompa-
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can be more mixed. They are clearly positive 
when cell phones connect people (and especially 
the poor) to product markets, to employment 
 opportunities, or to government services. They 
can be negative when the disappearance of retail 
trade leads to the decline of urban centers and 
affects the livelihoods of older shopkeepers who 
may not find alternative employment easily. An 
adequate sequencing of services liberalization 
and domestic regulatory reform is needed to 
manage these tradeoffs, and, in doing so, ad-
dress the concerns of developing countries.136 
International collaboration can fill the knowl-
edge gaps and facilitate implementation.137
International agreements can also promote 
global public goods. One case in point is gen-
der equality. Trade is not gender neutral, imply-
ing that liberalization changes women’s access 
to jobs. Traditionally men were more likely to 
have “brawn jobs,” involving stronger physi-
cal requirements, while “brain jobs” involving 
dexterity, attention, or communication—from 
stitching garments to processing data—present 
more opportunities for women. Call centers in 
Delhi and Mumbai employ more than 1 million 
people, most of them women. Preferential ac-
cess for imports from sectors with more “brain 
jobs” can thus create employment opportunities 
for women in countries where gender equality 
is far from attained.138 But as countries move 
up the ladder of global value chains, gender 
opportunities can change. This was the case in 
Malaysia, where the share of women working in 
manufacturing declined in the mid-1980s.139 
Migration. In contrast to the movement of 
goods and services across borders, few interna-
tional agreements pertain to migration in gen-
eral and the migration of workers in particular. 
Those in existence have limited coverage. ILO 
conventions 97 and 143, in force since 1952 and 
1978, refer to the prevention of discrimination 
or abusive conditions against migrants and call 
for penalties and sanctions against those who 
promote clandestine or illegal migration. But 
they have been ratified by only 49 and 23 coun-
tries, respectively. Liberalizing the provision of 
services by natural persons, in line with Mode 4 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), is not on the agenda of many countries, 
industrial or developing. And the United Na-
tions international convention on the rights of 
migrant workers and their families, which en-
cause of the complexity of global supply chains, 
seasonal and temporary workers are outside the 
reach of CSR frameworks. Workers outside of 
global supply chains are not covered.131 To be ef-
fective, CSR efforts should focus more on build-
ing the capacity of local firms to comply and the 
capacity of labor inspectorates to do their work.
Trade and investment. International trade 
in goods has been gradually liberalized over 
time, and the notion that freer trade is mutu-
ally beneficial for the transacting parties is 
now widely shared. However, many developing 
countries still lack the competitiveness to har-
ness the benefits from global integration. Direct 
assistance to reduce logistic costs and improve 
the competitiveness of firms and farms is thus 
a priority. Aid for trade has increased substan-
tially and now accounts for about a third of 
total aid to developing countries. But there is 
scope for making the assistance more effective, 
by focusing on the export activities most suited 
to address the specific jobs challenges that re-
cipient countries face. Increasing the involve-
ment by the private sector would also enhance 
the effectiveness of the assistance.132 
In contrast to trade in goods, progress in 
services liberalization has been slow, at both 
the multilateral and the regional levels. Offers 
to the Doha Round currently being negotiated 
promise greater security in access to markets 
but no additional liberalization compared to 
the policies in force.133 Services are character-
ized by well-known market imperfections—
from network externalities in infrastructure to 
asymmetric information and moral hazard in 
finance—and are thus subject to more perva-
sive regulations. Liberalizing trade in services 
requires adequate domestic regulation. Setting 
up markets for electricity, or cushioning the so-
cial impacts of large distributors on retail trade, 
is challenging.134 Not surprisingly, liberalization 
of services is much less advanced in developing 
countries than in industrial countries.135 
The productivity gains from liberalizing 
services would be substantial. Many services 
are inputs into the production process. Elec-
tricity, finance, telecommunications, and trade 
have a direct impact on business costs, affecting 
the competitiveness of downstream sectors. By 
boosting job creation and raising labor earn-
ings, these productivity gains should also lead 
to improved living standards. Social impacts 
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tionship between jobs and movements in and 
out of poverty; the dynamics of micro- and 
small enterprises in the informal sector; and the 
links between jobs and human behaviors and 
norms. Research on the magnitude of spillovers 
from jobs could identify good jobs for devel-
opment tailored to country contexts. Another 
important research area concerns the impact of 
jobs on the acquisition of cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, and how this impact varies de-
pending on the characteristics of the job and the 
person who holds it. Similarly, more evidence 
on productivity spillovers from jobs across cit-
ies with different characteristics would have a 
high value for development policy. Estimates of 
the environmental impacts of different types of 
jobs are, today, scarce at best. In the area of la-
bor policies, more empirical work is needed on 
the boundaries of the plateau, depending on the 
characteristics of the country. More research is 
also needed on how international trade, invest-
ment across borders, and migration affect the 
composition of employment across countries. 
More solid knowledge on the sequencing of in-
ternational commitments and domestic policies 
related to services could address the reluctance 
of developing countries to make further prog-
ress in the direction of liberalization and reap 
the gains from global integration.
Setting policy priorities for jobs needs to be 
based on reliable data. Given that a large share of 
the people at work in developing countries are 
not wage employees, and that even fewer have a 
formal sector job, the measurement of employ-
ment is challenging. Determining which jobs 
have the greatest payoffs for poverty reduction 
requires linking information on a household’s 
income or consumption with information on 
the employment of its members. Understand-
ing which economic units create more jobs, or 
whether labor reallocation leads to substantial 
growth rather than just churning, requires in-
formation on the inputs and outputs of very 
diverse production units. Assessing how the 
composition of employment affects trust and 
willingness to participate in society requires in-
formation on individual values and behaviors.
The paucity of empirical analyses on the em-
ployment impact of the global crisis in devel-
oping countries and the difficulty of compar-
ing measures of informal employment across 
countries suggest that data quality and avail-
tered into force in 2003, has been ratified by only 
22 countries—mostly sending countries. 
While migration occurs across borders, leg-
islation is mostly driven by country-specific 
laws. This is an area where a global perspec-
tive is warranted, but views on what needs to 
be done are diverse. One view focuses on the 
large earnings differentials between countries, 
suggesting that global productivity and pov-
erty reduction would accelerate enormously 
with the free movement of labor.140 Another 
perspective focuses instead on national secu-
rity and the protection of communities and 
their cultures, implying the need for barriers 
to contain migration. Yet another highlights 
the moral  imperative of protecting the human 
rights of migrants, no matter their legal status, 
and giving shelter to those who suffer any form 
of persecution.141 None of these views suffices, 
however, because any one of them alone cannot 
address the complex tradeoffs that migration 
poses for policy design.
In many instances, both sending and re-
ceiving countries can benefit from migration 
through a collaborative approach. Most abuses 
perpetrated by traffickers, firms, or workers 
are associated with illegal migrant flows, so the 
formalization of these flows is a basic tool for 
protecting the rights of migrant workers. This 
formalization cannot be enforced without the 
cooperation of institutions in both sending and 
receiving countries. That is why bilateral agree-
ments are also needed, with provisions for quo-
tas by occupation, industry, region, and dura-
tion of stay.142 The agreements can distinguish 
between temporary movements of workers 
and steps to permanent migration, with condi-
tions and protocols to go from one to another. 
They can include considerations about taxa-
tion,  social security, and even financing higher 
education—a special concern in the case of 
“talent” migration. These agreements can design 
incentives so that stakeholders in both sending 
and receiving countries have an interest in en-
forcing the provisions.143
Jobs are center stage, but where are 
the numbers?
A significant research and data agenda lies 
ahead. Further analysis is needed on the rela-
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standardized and include informal firms and 
microenterprises in establishment surveys. Such 
an approach would move jobs center stage. 
*   *   *
Countries have a choice in responding to the jobs 
challenges of demographics, structural shifts, 
technological progress, and periodic macroeco-
nomic crises. They can simply pursue growth, 
ensure that the labor market functions well, and 
hope that jobs will follow. Or they can recog-
nize that growth does not mechanically deliver 
the jobs that do most for development. Jobs for 
women, jobs in cities and in global value chains, 
and jobs providing voice and protection for the 
most vulnerable in society may come high on 
the list. The precise nature of the jobs challenge 
depends on a country’s geography, endowments, 
institutions, and level of development. What is 
common to all is the need to remedy the insti-
tutional failures and market imperfections that 
prevent the private sector from creating more 
of those good jobs for development. Coun-
tries can then return to the difficult questions 
posed at the outset. For each of them, there is 
a conventional wisdom that practitioners do 
not consider to be totally satisfactory. The jobs 
lens in development does not lead to a flat rejec-
tion of the conventional wisdom, but to a quali-
fication of when it holds and when it does not.
In short, countries can leave themselves open 
to small gains in living standards, slow produc-
tivity growth, and fractious societies. Or, by ad-
dressing their jobs challenges, they can enjoy 
a self-reinforcing pattern of more prosperous 
livelihoods, rising productivity, and the stron-
ger social cohesion that comes from improving 
 employment opportunities and fairness in ac-
cess to jobs.
ability remain a constraint for policy making. 
Much  effort goes into measuring unemploy-
ment rates, and measuring them often.144 But 
open unemployment is not a very telling in-
dicator in countries where a large fraction of 
the labor force is not salaried. The Millennium 
Development Goal on eradicating poverty lists 
four indicators to monitor progress toward the 
employment target, defined as “achieving full 
and productive employment and decent work 
for all, including women and young people.” 
But these indicators only partially capture ad-
vances in the quantity and quality of jobs in the 
developing world.145
Today’s challenges for labor statistics can be 
regrouped into three key areas: data gaps; data 
quality issues; and planning, coordination, and 
communication issues. Data gaps concern coun-
tries where labor statistics do not exist at all or 
are collected only sporadically. Whenever such 
statistics exist, data quality is a concern through-
out the statistical production chain, from the 
use of appropriate definitions to questionnaire 
design, from sampling frame to interviewer 
processes, and from data entry and coding to 
verification and estimation procedures. Plan-
ning, coordination, and communication issues 
arise when different institutions are responsible 
for collecting and disseminating the data.146
A quarter of a century ago, a renewed em-
phasis on poverty reduction as the key objec-
tive of development policy launched a long-
term data effort. Across the world, information 
on household living standards was collected 
through standardized surveys. The sampling 
methods and the variable definitions used were 
duly documented. And the data and documen-
tation were made available to researchers and 
practitioners whenever possible. For jobs, em-
ployment modules attached to household sur-
veys used for poverty analyses would need to be 
Growth strategies or jobs strategies? The conventional wisdom 
is to focus on growth as a precondition for continued 
increases in living standards and strengthened social cohe-
sion. But lags and gaps among the three transformations of 
living standards, productivity, and social cohesion are not 
uncommon. The impact of growth on poverty reduction var-
ies con siderably across countries. And in some cases, growth 
is not accompanied by increased social cohesion—even 
though poverty may fall and living standards improve for 
some, the expectations of others remain unfulfilled. The 
employment intensity of different sectors and fairness in 
access to employment opportunities matter as well. It is thus 
jobs that bring together the three transformations.
Tradeoffs among improving living standards, accelerating 
productivity growth, and fostering social cohesion arguably 
reflect a measurement problem, more than a real choice. If 
growth indicators captured the intangible social benefits 
from jobs, from lower poverty to greater social cohesion, a 
growth strategy and a jobs strategy would be equivalent. But 
a growth strategy may not pay enough attention to female 
employment, or to employment in secondary cities, or to 
idleness among youth. When potentially important spill-
overs from jobs are not realized, a jobs strategy may provide 
more useful insights.
Can entrepreneurship be fostered? The conventional wisdom 
is that most micro- and small enterprises in developing 
countries are just forms of survivorship, with limited chances 
to grow. But self-employed workers account for a large share 
of employment in developing countries. Even if only a frac-
tion of them succeeded in building a viable business, the 
aggregate impact on living standards and productivity would 
be substantial. Moreover, in developing countries many large 
enterprises are born large, often the result of government 
support or privileged access to finance and information. 
Breaking privilege is one more reason why the success of 
micro- and small enterprises is so important.
Management practices are important in explaining firm 
productivity, even in small and medium-size firms. The 
capacity to acquire skills and to apply them to business is one 
of the most important characteristics of successful entrepre-
neurs. Yet markets fail to nurture entrepreneurship, because 
knowledge spillovers imply that some of the returns to 
acquiring or developing new managerial ideas and knowl-
edge are appropriated by others. And the potential to absorb 
management practices differs greatly among beneficiaries. 
Observable characteristics of small business owners can pre-
dict entrepreneurial potential, and programs to upgrade 
their managerial capacity have been shown to make a differ-
ence. Programs targeted to small business owners with entre-
preneurial potential can thus make a substantial difference 
in living standards and productivity.
Can policies contribute to social cohesion? The conventional 
wisdom is that a lack of jobs is detrimental to social cohesion, 
but other than ensuring full employment there is little that 
governments can or should do. Yet open unemployment is 
not the main challenge in many countries, as the characteris-
tics of jobs also matter. While not all jobs can positively affect 
social cohesion, those that shape social identity, build net-
works—particularly for excluded groups—and increase fair-
ness can help defuse tensions and support peaceful collective 
decision making. 
Measures that support inclusion, extend access to voice 
and rights, and improve transparency and accountability in 
the labor market can increase the extent to which people per-
ceive that they have a stake in society. This perception can be 
especially critical when risks of social unrest from youth 
unemployment and conflict are high. Employment programs 
can undermine social cohesion if they have weak governance 
or divisive targeting, but can have positive effects when they 
are well-designed. Jobs policies for youth at risk can incorpo-
rate counseling and training in conflict resolution. Public 
works programs can facilitate community participation and 
engagement between citizens and local authorities. Policies 
can thus focus not only on the number of jobs, but on expand-
ing job opportunities for excluded groups.
Skills or jobs—what comes first? The conventional wisdom is 
that investing in skills will lead to job creation and to higher 
productivity and labor income. High unemployment and 
skills mismatches are often attributed to shortcomings in 
education and training systems. But in reality they can also 
result from market distortions, which send the wrong signals 
to the education system or lead to a lack of dynamism in pri-
vate firms. In such situations, massive investments in train-
ing systems, as seen in many parts of the world, might show 
disappointing results as hoped-for job outcomes do not 
materialize.
A core set of basic skills, both cognitive and social, is 
necessary for productive employment, and they cannot just 
be acquired on the job. Without such generic skills, the 
prospects of improving employment opportunities and 
earnings are thin. Skills are also critical for countries to 
move up the value-added ladder, as they can ignite innova-
tion, produce the benefits of mutual learning, and hence 
lead to job creation themselves. But in between, much 
learning can happen through work: job opportunities can 
shape social skills and create demand for education and 
training. Learning on the job leads to significantly higher 
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earnings in many settings, with the return to one year of 
work experience being around a third to half of the return 
to an additional year of schooling. 
A targeted investment climate? The conventional wisdom is 
that a level playing field is preferable because governments 
do not have enough information to pick winners and tar-
geting can be  captured by interest groups. But given the 
often limited fiscal space and administrative capacity of 
developing countries, creating an enabling business envi-
ronment across the board can be challenging, and the rele-
vant question is how policy priorities should be set. The 
conventional wisdom views targeting with a skepticism 
that stems from failed experiences with industrial policy. 
However, targeting may not necessarily be aimed at indus-
trial sectors. Supporting job creation in sectors with high 
rates of female employment, or productivity gains in small-
holder farming, or more jobs connected to global value 
chains may have high development payoffs depending on 
country contexts.
When there is clarity about where the good jobs for devel-
opment are, and there is sufficient information to under-
stand what can be done to support the creation of those jobs, 
a targeted investment climate may be warranted. But this is 
provided that targeted interventions can be designed in a way 
that makes them resilient to  capture by interest groups. The 
risk of capture is easier to contain when the number of 
 beneficiaries is very large, such as the case of farmers, urban 
businesses, and female micro-entrepreneurs. It is much 
higher in the case of industrial policy.
Competing for jobs? The conventional wisdom is that the num-
ber of jobs is not finite, so that policies for jobs in one country 
cannot be harmful to other countries. Indeed, in the medium 
to long term, total employment is roughly determined by the 
size of the labor force. But policies may alter global trade, 
investment, and migration flows, affecting the composition of 
employment. The concern is that the share of good jobs for 
development may decline in one country as it increases in 
another. Policies aimed at capturing a larger global share of 
the jobs with the largest productive spillovers can reduce well-
being abroad, even if global well-being increases.
However, not all efforts to support job creation amount to 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Whether they do so depends on 
the type of instruments used and the nature of the spillovers 
from jobs. A key question is what purpose policies serve. Poli-
cies that aim to improve compliance with rights, prosecuting 
forced labor and harmful forms of child labor, amount to 
providing a global public good. On the other hand, policies 
that aim at reaping the benefits from productive externalities 
may adversely affect other countries, especially when they 
undermine an open trading system and are not aligned with a 
country’s dynamic comparative advantage.
Protecting workers or protecting jobs? The conventional wis-
dom is that policies that protect people are preferable, because 
they mitigate welfare losses while at the same time allowing 
the reallocation of labor, hence supporting creative destruc-
tion. Protecting jobs that are no longer economically viable 
through government transfers and employment protection 
legislation freezes an inefficient allocation of resources. Pro-
tecting jobs also entails a high risk of capture. It may lead to 
enduringly unproductive jobs, stifle technological advance, 
prevent structural change, and eventually undermine growth.
However, there are times when many jobs are lost or 
threatened at once and few are being created. There are also 
jobs generating substantial productivity spillovers, whose 
disappearance in large numbers can lead to ghost towns and 
depressed regions. Protecting people should have primacy if 
shocks are idiosyncratic—if the employment dislocation is 
local and limited and if turnover continues to be the norm. 
Protecting jobs may be warranted in times of systemic crises 
or major economic restructuring. But job protection policies 
can create permanent inefficiency, especially in countries 
with weak institutions, making it indispensable to establish 
and enforce trigger rules and sunset clauses that define the 
extent and size of the protection.
How to accelerate the reallocation of workers? The conven-
tional wisdom is to focus policy on removing the labor 
market rigidities that keep workers in firms or areas with 
low productivity. But reforms may not always be politically 
feasible. In India, complex and cumbersome labor market 
institutions have unambiguously negative effects on eco-
nomic efficiency but these institutions have remained largely 
untouched for 60 years.
Tolerance for the avoidance or evasion of distortive regu-
lation can help contain their cost but not ensure dynamism. 
In India, widespread noncompliance has been the dominant 
response to cumbersome labor regulations. However, labor-
intensive manufacturing sectors remain sluggish despite 
buoyant performance of the overall economy. Other coun-
tries with similarly stringent regulatory obstacles have 
accomplished more efficiency-enhancing labor reallocation 
by actively taking advantage of productivity spillovers from 
jobs in industrial clusters, dynamic cities, or global value 
chains to make the regulations less binding. In Sri Lanka, 
the development of export processing zones (EPZs) drove 
the takeoff of the garment industry. In Brazil, the surge of 
internal migration is closely associated with the country’s 
continuing integration into the global economy and a devel-
opment policy that favors clusters and agglomeration. In 
China, labor reallocation is rooted in the development of 
competitive cities, supported by regional competition and 
experimentation. A strategic focus on enhancing productiv-
ity spillovers from jobs, through urbanization and global 
integration, can overcome the labor rigidity.
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Get the policy 
fundamentals right
Set priorities for 
public action
One size does 
not fit all
Labor policies matter 
less than assumed
A global agenda  
for jobs is needed
Jobs drive 
development
They should not be an  
afterthought of growth
Jobs are created by 
the private sector
Public action  
sets the stage
Some work is 
unacceptable
Rights should not  
be overlooked
They have a bearing regardless  
of the jobs challenge
Focus on the jobs with  
greater development payoffs
It is not just the  
number of jobs
Some have greater 
development payoffs
Informal  
is normal
Many jobs in developing countries are 
in farms and very small firms
Jobs challenges vary  
across countries
The main constraints to 
job creation may lie elsewhere
Data and cooperation on cross-border 
investments and migration lag
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Chapter 1
Worldwide, more than 3 billion people have jobs, but the nature of their jobs varies greatly. Some 1.65 billion have 
regular wages or salaries. Another 1.5 billion 
work in farming and small household enterprises, 
or in casual or seasonal day labor. The majority 
of workers in the poorest countries are engaged 
in these types of work, outside the scope of an 
employer-employee relationship. Another 200 
million people, a disproportionate share of them 
youth, are unemployed and actively looking for 
work. Almost 2 billion working-age adults are 
neither working nor look ing for work; the 
majority of these are women, and an unknown 
number are eager to have a job.1 
The jobs challenge facing the world is multi-
faceted, ranging from improving aspects of the 
work people do, to supporting the reallocation 
of people to better jobs, to creating jobs for 
those who want to work. Youth bulges in some 
countries are bringing in millions of new job 
seekers. Sub-Saharan Africa’s labor force grows 
by about 8 million people every year. South 
Asia’s grows by 1 million people every month. 
Elsewhere, the working population is rapidly ag-
ing, and more and more workers are putting off 
retirement. By 2020, more than 40 million ad-
ditional jobs will be needed for people 65 years 
and older.2
Structural and technological changes are 
moving more people from rural areas to cities. 
In the next 15 years, half of the population in 
developing countries will reside in urban areas, 
the result of a migration that is rapidly shifting 
work from the farm to the factory or the street. 
The rural-urban shift generally improves indi-
vidual well-being, especially for those who find 
wage employment. Still, workers’ share of global 
income may be declining, a pattern attributed in 
part to globalization and technological change. 
Wages for the same occupation are converging 
across countries, but a higher premium is paid 
for more skilled occupations. Women’s earnings 
still lag behind those of men, and the fraction of 
them who work varies enormously across coun-
tries. While women’s labor force participation 
exceeds 75 percent in Vietnam, it is only 28 per-
cent in Pakistan.
As the world changes, so do jobs. Despite im-
provements in workers’ education levels, many 
firms report that they have difficulty finding the 
skilled workers they seek. Part-time and tempo-
rary work appear to be increasing. In India and 
South Africa, for example, there has been a 
sharp rise in the number of temporary employ-
ment services and labor brokers. Outsourcing 
was once concentrated in manufacturing, but 
new technology is now enabling the splintering 
of tasks in services. Meanwhile, new platforms 
on the internet and mobile phones offer innova-
tions for matching workers and employers, and 
not only for highly skilled jobs.
The jobs challenge
Demographic transitions, structural change, technological progress, and 
global volatility are changing the world of work. Yet, traditional farming 
and self-employment remain dominant in many countries.
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A job, but not always a salary
To many, the word job brings to mind a worker 
with an employer and a regular paycheck. Yet, 
this narrow definition excludes nearly 1.5 billion 
people who work for a living. The concept of a 
job is actually much broader than wage employ-
ment. Jobs are activities that generate actual or 
imputed income, monetary or in kind, formal or 
informal. But not all forms of work can be 
deemed jobs. Activities performed against the 
will of the worker or involving violations of fun-
damental human rights should not be consid-
ered jobs. Some other activities that entail work 
effort, such as cooking and cleaning at home, are 
not considered jobs unless they are performed by 
people hired and paid for the work.
Multiple forms of work
Defining and measuring jobs is challenging be-
cause the ways people spend their time and work 
are diverse (question 1). Economists usually dis-
tinguish between work and leisure, but the real-
ity is more complex. Time can be allocated to 
nonproduction and production activities. The 
first category includes time spent eating, sleep-
ing, schooling, and at recreation. Production in-
cludes both market and nonmarket work. 
Whether an activity is considered production 
can be assessed based on a third-person test: “if 
an activity is of such character that it might be 
delegated to a paid worker, then that activity 
shall be deemed productive.”3
Patterns in time allocated to production dif-
fer across countries and over time. Jobs that 
span eight hours a day, five days a week, with 
paid vacation, are not the norm in developing 
countries. Some jobs involve a few hours of 
work during certain days of the week or certain 
weeks of the year; others entail long hours most 
days of the week almost every week of the year. 
Some people have had only one job in the pre-
vious week, while others have engaged in two 
or more jobs. In 2011, temporary employment 
represented more than one-fifth of total wage 
employment in the Republic of Korea and Spain, 
but around 5 percent in Australia and the Slovak 
Republic.4
The measurement of unemployment or un-
deremployment is equally challenging. Some 
people would like to work more hours, whereas 
others would rather not. More than 15 percent 
of those employed in Armenia, Colombia, Gua-
temala, and Peru, but less than 3 percent in 
Hungary, Pakistan, Portugal, and the United 
States worked fewer hours than desired.5 Some 
people who would like to work have no job. 
Unemployment rates vary over the business cy-
cle; around 2009 and 2010, when the worst of 
the international crisis hit most countries in 
the world, they ranged from more than 20 per-
cent in South Africa and Spain to less than 5 per-
cent in Austria, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand.6
The world of work is more diverse in devel-
oping countries than in developed countries. 
This diversity refers not only to the number of 
hours worked and number of jobs available, 
usual yardsticks in developed countries, but 
also to characteristics of jobs. Two main aspects 
stand out. First, there is prevalence of self- 
employment, which often makes measures of 
unemployment and underemployment inade-
quate.7 Second, the coexistence of traditional 
and modern modes of production leads to 
large variations in the nature of work, from 
subsistence agriculture and menial work to 
technology-driven manufacturing and services. 
Work across the developing world is charac-
terized by a high prevalence of informality, 
whether defined on the basis of firm registra-
tion, social security coverage, or a written em-
ployment contract. Informal employment is 
not under the purview of labor regulations, ei-
ther because of their limited scope or because 
they are deliberately avoided or evaded. Re-
gardless of the specific definition used, infor-
mal employment is generally associated with 
lower productivity. However, this does not nec-
essarily mean that firm registration, social secu-
rity coverage, or a written contract would result 
in greater efficiency. Informality can be a symp-
tom of lower productivity as much as it can be 
a cause of it.
Different places, different jobs
Self-employment and farming represent almost 
half the jobs in the developing world. The vast 
majority of those in self-employment work 
in small enterprises with no paid employees.8 
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But shares of wage work, farming, and self- 
employment differ greatly by gender and across 
countries. Nonwage work represents more 
than 80 percent of women’s employment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but less than 20 percent in 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(figure 1.1). 
Gender differences are also striking.9 World-
wide, less than 50 percent of women have jobs, 
whereas almost 80 percent of men do. Roughly 
50 percent of both working men and working 
women are wage earners, but this statistic hides 
substantial variation across countries and re-
gions. Women are significantly underrepre-
sented in wage employment in low- and lower-
middle-income countries, but are more likely 
than men to work for wages in middle-income 
countries. In countries such as Pakistan, where 
28 percent of women but more than 82 percent 
of men participate in the labor force, wage em-
ployment is a much lower share of total employ-
ment among women than among men. Even in 
countries such as Tanzania and Vietnam, where 
participation rates are above 75 percent for both 
men and women, wage employment still lags 
behind for women. Beyond these stark con-
trasts, women continue to earn significantly less 
than men. And these differences are not fully 
explained by education, experience, or sector of 
work.
A growing share of youth, typically defined 
as people ages 15 to 24, is in schooling or in 
training. Still, youth unemployment reaches 
alarming levels in some countries (above 40 per-
cent in South Africa since early 2008 and above 
50 percent in Spain in early 2012).10 Even in 
countries where it is relatively low, the youth un-
employment rate is twice or more the national 
average. In addition, a large share of young peo-
ple are considered “idle”—not in education, not 
employed, and not in training or looking for 
work (figure 1.2).11 In some countries, more 
than one-third of 15- to 24-year-olds are idle; in 
most countries, unemployment rates are small 
compared to idleness rates.12 In many cases, 
when youth work they do so in unpaid jobs. If 
paid, they are less likely to have access to social 
security.13
Although child labor is in decline, it still af-
fects 1 in 8 children (1 in 14 in the case of haz-
ardous work). The International Labour Orga-
nization (ILO) defines child labor as any work 
by a child under age 12 or, for a child above 
age 12, any work that impedes education or is 
damaging to health and personal development. 
Worldwide, 306 million children were at work in 
F I G U R E  1.1  A job does not always come with a wage
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
Note: Data are for the most recent year available.
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2008. Of these, 215 million were engaged in ac-
tivities that constituted child labor, and 115 mil-
lion were involved in hazardous work.14 Most of 
these children are unpaid family workers or par-
ticipate in farming. More than half live in Asia 
and the Pacific; but the share is highest is in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where child labor affects 1 in 4 
children (or 65 million of them). 
Youth bulges, aging societies,  
and migrant nations
Demographic shifts can be massive, but they do 
not always go in the same direction. The most 
populous countries in the world have experi-
enced very large increases in their labor force: 
nearly 8 million new entrants a year in China 
and 7 million a year in India since the early 
1990s. (These rates are now decelerating rapidly, 
particularly in China.) Many smaller countries 
face large relative increases, even if the absolute 
numbers are less astounding. In other countries, 
the overall population and the labor force are 
shrinking. For example, Ukraine’s labor force is 
estimated to decrease by 0.75 percent annually, 
the equivalent of approximately 160,000 fewer 
people every year.15 
A simple conceptual exercise illustrates the 
challenges raised by these dramatic demographic 
transitions. To keep the ratio of employment to 
working-age population constant, in 2020, there 
should be around 600 million more jobs than in 
2005. More than 175 million of them, or nearly 
1 million a month, would be needed in East Asia 
and the Pacific as well as in South Asia (figure 
1.3). The number of jobs in Sub-Saharan Africa 
would have to increase by about 50 percent, 
which translates into employment growth of 2.7 
percent a year. But in Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, where populations are aging, only 2.4 
million new jobs would be needed during the 
same period.
The age structure of the labor force, not sim-
ply its size, matters as well. Youth are staying in 
school longer and entering the labor market 
later, whereas adults are living longer and 
healthier lives. The labor force participation rate 
of people 65 years of age and older has remained 
relatively stable over the past two decades. Even 
with a stable participation rate, however, close to 
42 million jobs will have to be generated by 2020 
to cope with the growth in the number of older 
people. One-quarter of these jobs will need to be 
in China, even though the size of the Chinese 
labor force will have started to decline in abso-
lute terms.16
International migration is also changing the 
size and composition of the labor force in many 
countries. At the turn of the century, there were 
more than 200 million international migrants 
worldwide, and nearly 90 million of them were 
workers. If international migrants constituted a 
nation, theirs would be the fifth-largest in the 
world, ahead of Brazil. Precise estimates diverge 
but there is agreement that migrants represent 
nearly 3 percent of the world population.17
These aggregate figures hide important dif-
ferences across countries. Some are large migra-
tion recipients either in absolute numbers (for 
instance, the United States) or in relative terms 
F I G U R E  1. 2  Among youth, unemployment is not always 
the issue
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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been the case.22 Population movements away 
from agriculture were indeed associated with 
rapid economic growth in East Asia; much less 
so in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 1.4). 
Technological change induces families to in-
crease market production in place of home pro-
duction.23 Structural change has increased the 
time devoted to consumption or investment 
activities but it has also meant more work. In 
some cases, structural change has even led to 
 reduced leisure,24 particularly for workers who 
shift to market jobs with low productivity.25 In 
the past, this process of structural change often 
took decades, but in many developing coun-
tries, it is transforming lives within a generation 
(box 1.1).
The shift from home to market production is 
not gender neutral, because women have tended 
to specialize in home production whereas men 
traditionally have focused more on market pro-
duction. As women move into jobs, they often 
continue to work at home. When both jobs and 
home activities are considered, women are gen-
erally busier than men. This is so in rich and 
poor countries. Evidence from Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, Europe, and India shows that women spend 
more time on production activities than men 
do.26 But when they take on jobs—especially 
(Jordan and Singapore). Migrants from coun-
tries such as Bangladesh, India, and Mexico rep-
resent a large share of total migrants worldwide; 
countries such as Fiji, Jamaica, and Tonga have a 
large share of their population overseas. Figures 
for some of the smaller countries are striking. 
For instance, nearly one-fifth of all Salvadorians 
live abroad, while more than three-fifths of the 
population in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates is foreign-born.18
Cities, wages, and women
Economic development brings significant 
changes in the composition of the labor force, a 
process known as structural transformation.19 
Before 2020, more than half of the total popula-
tion in developing countries is expected to be 
living in cities and towns.20 That means that the 
growth of the nonagricultural labor force will 
vastly exceed the growth of the agricultural la-
bor force.21 Urbanization derives from growth 
in agricultural productivity that sustains higher 
standards of living. It can also be associated 
with rapid economic growth at the aggregate 
level, because urban jobs tend to be more pro-
ductive than rural jobs. But that has not always 
F I G U R E  1. 3  Employment growth is needed to cope with population growth
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on data from the International Labour Organization and World Development Indicators.
Note: Estimations are for the period 2005–20, based on projected population growth assuming constant employment rates.
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F I G U R E  1. 4  Moving from farms to cities does not always bring economic growth
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Note: Data correspond to changes between 1985 and 2010. GDP = gross domestic product. 
The process of structural transformation can be seen today in small 
and medium-size cities throughout the developing world. The pro-
cess has been so fast that most people, even young ones, remem-
ber the old rural setting. As they have embraced the traits of mod-
ern urban life, their jobs and their leisure have changed so much 
that they do not contemplate returning to the old mores.
A neighborhood of 5,000 outside the city of Tangerang, Indone-
sia, started coming to life 25 years ago, when iron, rubber, garment, 
and thread factories sprang up in the surrounding areas. Some in 
the neighborhood still work as farmhands. But most women and 
men earn their living in the factories, as well as in a variety of jobs 
that rose up alongside them. Many men drive ojeks (motorcycle 
taxis); women sell sweets and other items by the gates of the facto-
ries. Residents also make a living through home-based garment 
piecework, handicrafts such as broom-making, and construction 
work; some are civil servants and teachers. Poorer women collect 
and resell scraps of fabric. The flow of newcomers has also offered 
an income-generating opportunity to local families from renting 
rooms for lodging. Seemingly everyone in the neighborhood has a 
cell phone and gets around on their own motorcycle.
A 28-year-old steelworker and father of one said that getting 
factory work used to be a lot easier when the community was 
newer. Junior high school graduates were still accepted for work 
then. Now, he said, production workers must have at least a senior 
high school degree, and vocational school graduates under age 30 
BOX 1.1  The nature of work and leisure change as cities develop
Source: World Bank 2011a.
are preferred. Practices surrounding recruitment have also become 
tighter. “It is public knowledge,” he added, “that to be accepted in 
the company, candidates must have an inside connection because 
more and more people need work, while the number of job oppor-
tunities is limited.” Many factory workers in the neighborhood 
work on a six-month contract and hope for its renewal. The best 
local job available is often reported to be running one’s own busi-
ness. Even when faced with possible unemployment, a 41-year-old 
noted he had “never thought of returning to the village. That is 
desperate. Don’t be desperate. Find another job and don’t get 
picky.”
Comparing the situation now to the early days, a local official 
described the neighborhood’s busy market as “cleaner and more 
strategic now, and there are more sellers or merchants, so there are 
more options. Public transportation to the market is more accessible 
now. It used to be hard to find, and the streets used to be muddy.” 
He estimated that poverty in the neighborhood had fallen by half, 
from 20 percent at the turn of the century to around 10 percent now. 
He indicated that the neighborhood had weathered the global 
financial crisis well and that factory workers had been able to keep 
their jobs. These changes to work come with changes in leisure. 
Young men now spend time on computer chats and playing video 
games. “We used to send letters through the post office,” recalls 
a 22-year-old. “Now, nobody wants to go to the post office. . . . 
It’s beneath them. Now everyone has cell phones.”
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Transnational companies have built integrated 
value chains and can tap into national skill pools 
around the world.30 Outsourcing is occurring in 
services as well as manufacturing. The share of 
developing countries in exports of world services 
rose from 11 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 
2008.31 India has led the way in the information 
technology (IT) sector, but other countries, such 
as the Arab Republic of Egypt, have begun to fo-
cus attention on exporting services.32
This changing landscape of global produc-
tion has also brought about shifts in skills en-
dowments and in the distribution of top talent 
across countries. India and China rank high in 
perceived attractiveness as hubs of outsourcing 
because of their exceptionally high ratings in 
people skills and availability.33 India has close to 
20 million students in higher education, nearly 
as many as the United States; both countries are 
outpaced by China, with 30 million postsecond-
ary students.34 The United States still accounts 
for a large share of international top scorers in 
student assessments, but Korea has the same 
share as Germany, and both are closely followed 
those that are outside the household setting—
their economic role changes (box 1.2).
Jobs are changing in surprising ways
New technologies, globalization, and structural 
transformation have brought about remarkable 
improvements in efficiency. Some developing 
countries have managed to narrow the produc-
tivity gap with industrial countries in only a few 
decades.27 But others have failed to catch up and 
the gap remains considerable for all de veloping 
regions (figure 1.5). 
The nature of work is changing as well. 
Industrial countries are experiencing a sus-
tained shift away from primary and traditional 
manufacturing industries toward services and 
knowledge-intensive jobs. At the same time, 
technology improvements and greater reliance 
on outsourcing to developing countries is lead-
ing to a decline in middle-skilled jobs.28 Technol-
ogy has allowed production tasks to be splintered 
and therefore performed in different locations.29 
Jobs can transform women’s roles in households and in society 
more broadly. In a community of 3,000 inhabitants outside Durban, 
South Africa, 80 percent of the women were estimated to be work-
ing outside their home, mainly as teachers and nurses but also in 
offices and retail outlets or with the police. Women did not have 
such opportunities 10 years ago. “Women are no longer regarded 
as housewives,” a young woman remarked in a Durban focus 
group.
In a bustling neighborhood in East Jakarta, in Indonesia, women 
work as street sellers, peddling food, glasses, plates, and carpets. 
Young women explained that selling carpets is hard work that 
women do “because they have to help support their families. Their 
husbands’ jobs don’t generate enough income.” With more educa-
tion than their elders, young women in this area of Jakarta are more 
likely to be working in the nearby ceramic factory or in one of the 
shops or beauty salons in the neighborhood’s markets or at the new 
shopping malls in the city.
In a poor neighborhood of Santiago de los Caballeros, the 
second-largest city in the Dominican Republic, only a few women 
sold clothes and sweets in the streets a decade ago. Many are now 
earning incomes from activities such as selling lottery tickets or run-
ning small clothing stores and beauty salons. The incomes of these 
women are vitally important to their families because men are 
struggling. Factory opportunities and other jobs associated with 
the city’s free trade zone have been shrinking in recent years. Par-
ticipants in a Santiago focus group said that women found work 
BOX 1.2  Jobs bring earnings opportunities to women, but also new difficulties
more easily than men because employers have “more confidence in 
them [the women].” 
Increased labor force participation is not without challenges. 
The women in Santiago worry about their safety because of assaults, 
theft, and gang violence; many think it is too dangerous to work at 
night. Despite the expansion of work opportunities, mobility con-
tinues to be a constraint not only because of poor transportation 
and safety risks but also because of the roles women play as income-
earners and as caregivers in the household. In rural areas, women 
face difficulties in traveling for farm work and other jobs outside 
their villages because of traditional cultural and gender norms.
In a semi-urban area outside Cuzco, in Peru, large numbers of 
women are now engaged in home-based handicrafts, sewing, and 
diverse agricultural activities. Outside the home, they take up farm 
jobs, run their own small shops or restaurants, or work for hire in 
these places. The women explained, however, that they consider 
home-based activities (such as raising livestock) to be better jobs 
than jobs outside the home, because “it’s peaceful work, and we can 
look after the kids.”
Women encounter many difficulties in commuting across cities 
for work. In Lautoka, an urban area in Fiji, the local economy is stag-
nant, and women are working in much larger numbers to help their 
households cope. Focus group participants explained that only men 
“can take up jobs in a different town . . . but not the wife because 
she has responsibilities at home to look after the kids and in-laws.”
Source: World Bank 2011a.
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 attractiveness as hubs for the outsourcing of ser-
vices. Ghana and Senegal, ranked 26th and 28th, 
come in significantly ahead of emerging market 
powerhouses like South Africa or Turkey.39 
High-skilled niches are developing the world 
over. They tend to be  located in close proximity 
to centers of higher education in metropolitan 
areas with good infrastructure, from Cairo’s 
Smart Village Business Park to Ghana’s IT En-
abled  Service Industry cluster. 40 Bangalore and 
Chennai in India and Suzhou in China have 
emerged as global research and development 
hotspots.
Technology itself is changing the way work-
ers and firms connect, through their access to 
much larger, even global, marketplaces for em-
ployment. Some of these marketplaces operate 
through the Internet; others use mobile phone 
technology.41 These changes are affecting work-
ers in developing countries and not just those in 
high-skilled occupations. Babajobs, for example, 
was launched in 2009 and is now the largest 
digital marketplace for blue-collar jobs in India, 
with more than 320,000 job listings and more 
than 80,000 job seekers.
With changes in technology and the organi-
zation of work, permanent jobs are becoming 
by the Russian Federation. The number of high-
performing students in the city of Shanghai 
alone is one-fifth of that of  Germany and about 
double that of Argentina.35
Skills are not one-dimensional, however. Dif-
ferent jobs require different combinations of 
manual skills (needed for physical tasks), cogni-
tive skills (needed for mental tasks), and social 
skills (needed to interact with others). The dis-
tribution of employment by occupation can be 
used to estimate the skill intensity of produc-
tion. As incomes rise, countries tend to use fewer 
manual skills in production, and more nonrou-
tine cognitive skills. 36 However, even for a given 
level of gross domestic product (GDP) per cap-
ita, countries can use nonroutine skills to vary-
ing degrees (figure 1.6).37
Technological progress expands the possibili-
ties for emerging and even low-income coun-
tries to create jobs in higher-skilled production 
activities as well as to link to international value 
chains in services and manufacturing. In other 
words, technological progress enables countries 
to diverge from a linear evolutionary path from 
manual skill intensity to the use of higher-order 
cognitive and social skills.38 India and China top 
the list of countries in an index measuring their 
F I G U R E  1. 5  Labor productivity remains low in developing countries
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. Ratio is measured in 2005 purchasing power parity US$.
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Prosperity, but a changing 
distribution of earnings 
Earnings from work increase with economic de-
velopment, and the benefits associated with jobs 
improve as well (figure 1.7). The relationship is 
not mechanical, but growth is unambiguously 
good for jobs. Part of the change in earnings and 
benefits stems from the higher average skills that 
economies gain as they become more devel-
oped; part comes from workers with the same 
skills enjoying better opportunities. 
Poverty has declined in the developing world, 
to a large extent through jobs. The share of the 
population of the developing world living on 
less than US$1.25 a day (in purchasing power 
parity, or PPP) fell from 52 percent in 1981 to 22 
percent in 2008, or from 1.94 billion to 1.29 bil-
lion people.47 This reduction is the result of 
multiple factors, but the creation of millions of 
new, more productive jobs, mostly in Asia but 
also in other parts of the developing world, has 
been the main driving force.48 More people have 
jobs now than ever before, and those jobs pro-
vide generally higher earnings.
less common. Part-time and temporary wage 
employment (also called nonstandard employ-
ment) is now a major feature of industrial coun-
tries. More than half the firms in the United 
States expect to raise the share of their part-time 
and temporary employees over the next five 
years.42 The trend is also evident in developing 
countries (box 1.3). 
People’s jobs may not match their aspirations. 
Surveys in high-income countries show that as 
many as half of all workers—among both self-
employed and wage employees—would prefer 
to be their own bosses.43 Percentages are lower 
in low- and middle-income countries, where 
a larger fraction of the labor force works in 
household enterprises or on farms. On average, 
about one-fourth of adults from 35 countries in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia prefer self- 
employment, but the rate varies from 10 percent 
in Azerbaijan and Hungary to 43 percent in 
Belarus and Turkey.44 In poorer countries, self- 
employment is often a choice of last resort, in 
part because of the inability to find salaried em-
ployment.45 Owning a small business is a goal to 
which the poor do not always aspire.46
F I G U R E  1. 6  The skills mix changes with economic development
Source: Aedo and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. All skill intensities are measured relative to the U.S. level. Each data point shows the skill intensity of national production, derived from tran-
scribing the occupational structure to individual skills, following Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003.
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A decade ago, the temporary staffing industry was seen as irrele-
vant outside of high-income countries. But it is now growing rapidly 
in some developing countries, even beyond large cities.a This 
growth is often viewed as a response to the complex regulatory 
framework facing employers. Temporary staffing also allows more 
flexibility in the management of peak workloads and in adjusting 
staffing levels up or down in line with business demands. 
Depending on the context, the temporary staffing industry 
employs different types of workers, from mainly entry-level, previ-
ously unemployed workers seeking to gain experience to highly edu-
cated, mid-level career employees looking to fast-track their careers.
In South Africa, temporary workers make up about 7 percent of 
the labor force; the temporary staffing industry provides employ-
ment to an average of 410,000 workers a day.b Finance—the sector in 
the statistics that includes temporary staffing—was a close second 
to retail in employment growth from 1994 to 2009. Unskilled jobs 
and service-related occupations dominate the employment distri-
bution within the labor brokering subsector. A worker employed in 
temporary staffing services is less likely to contribute to pension 
funds or health insurance and is generally seen as more vulnerable.
Temporary forms of employment have existed in India for 
decades, partly as a way to circumvent rigid labor laws.c However, 
BOX 1.3  The temporary staffing industry is growing in developing countries
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a.  Dourgarian (2011) remarks that it is not the Group of 8 countries that led the pack in the growth in the staffing industry in 2011, but the BRICs (Brazil, India, the Russian 
 Federation, and China), along with Indonesia, Mexico, and Pakistan.
b.  The discussion on South Africa is drawn from Bhorat (2012) for the World Development Report 2013.
c. World Bank 2011b.
d. TeamLease 2010. 
e. Bajaj 2011.
f. ILO 2011; Musgrave 2009.
the modern industry of temporary staffing is only 15 years old, 
and is developing rapidly. The number of temporary workers 
recruited by labor brokers grew more than 10 percent in 2009 and 
18 percent in 2010. According to some media reports, workers are 
quitting permanent jobs to move into more attractive temporary 
roles. Some firms claim that as many as 15 percent of new recruits 
are permanent employees switching to temporary jobs.d Competi-
tion in the Indian temporary staffing industry is strong. Agencies 
have introduced lower recruitment fees to gain more market share 
and to drive growth. Large temporary staffing firms are entering 
niche activities such as business consulting (Manpower) and train-
ing (TeamLease).e 
As temporary staffing grows, so do calls to examine the regula-
tory framework of the industry.f Some of those calls focus on 
addressing vulnerability. Workers in these jobs typically face lower 
earnings (because a portion of the pay is diverted to temporary 
staffing agencies). They also face a lack of benefits, coverage by 
labor laws, and job security. Other efforts focus on professionalizing 
the industry. For instance, in 2011 TeamLease and seven other staff-
ing firms formed the Indian Staffing Federation to advocate for 
changes in labor laws and more acceptance for the industry in a 
country where a vast majority of the labor force is unorganized.
F I G U R E  1. 7  Jobs provide higher earnings and benefits as countries grow 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = purchasing power parity. Each dot represents a country.
100
80
60
40
20
0
300 3,000 30,000
co
nt
rib
ut
or
s 
to
 s
oc
ia
l s
ec
ur
ity
pr
og
ra
m
s,
 %
 o
f t
ot
al
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
GDP per capita, 2005 PPP US$
b.  Social security coverage
100,000
10,000
1,000
300
100
3,000 30,000
av
er
ag
e 
w
ag
e 
in
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g,
 
20
05
 P
PP
 U
S$
GDP per capita, 2005 PPP US$
a.  Average wage
58  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
does not have a role to play. The quality of the 
civil service is critically important for develop-
ment, whether it is teachers building skills, agri-
cultural extension agents improving agricul-
tural productivity, or urban planners designing 
functional cities. Public works programs or em-
ployment programs for the demobilization of 
combatants are also justified in some circum-
stances. But the private sector is the main en-
gine of job creation and the source of roughly 
nine of 10  jobs in the world. Between 1995 and 
2005, the private sector accounted for almost 90 
percent of jobs created in Brazil. In the Philip-
pines and Turkey, the fraction reached 95 
percent.51 
But the most remarkable example of the 
expansion of employment through private 
sector growth is the case of China. In 1981, 
private sector employment accounted for 2.3 
million workers while state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) had 80 million workers. Two decades 
later, employment in private sector firms ac-
counted for 74.7 million workers surpassing, 
for the first time, the 74.6 million workers in 
SOEs (figure 1.10).52 
In contrast to the global average, in some 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 
the state keeps a leading role as an employer—a 
pattern that can be linked to the political econ-
omy of the post-independence period and, in 
some cases, to the abundance of oil revenues.53 
For a long period, public sector jobs were of-
fered to young college graduates. In recent years, 
however, the fiscal space for continued expan-
sion in public sector employment shrank, and 
“queuing” for public sector jobs became more 
prevalent, leading to increasing transitions into 
informality, a devaluation of education creden-
tials, and forms of social exclusion.54 A relatively 
well-educated and young labor force remains 
unemployed, or underemployed, and labor pro-
ductivity stagnates.55
Vulnerability on a global scale
Jobs are vulnerable to economic downturns—
and much more so in the private than in the 
public sector. Short-term crises may wipe out 
years of progress. They may start in a single 
country and through globalization spread over 
entire regions or, as in the recent one, to the 
Yet in a majority of countries, both indus-
trial and developing, the share of labor in total 
income is declining.49 This trend, which has 
been observed since the mid-1980s and early 
1990s, has been attributed to various forces, 
from technological progress biased toward 
skilled workers to global competition under-
mining workers’ bargaining power. The en-
trance of China and India in world trade has 
doubled the size of the globalized labor force, 
hence reducing the price of labor relative to that 
of other factors of production.50
Changes in the distribution of income in 
recent years have actually taken place not only 
between factors of production but between 
workers. Two distinctions are relevant in this re-
spect: between high- and low-skill workers, and 
between those who work in tradable sectors and 
those who do not. Tradable sectors produce 
goods and services that can be exported or im-
ported, such as shirts or computers. A turning 
point came in the mid-1990s, when labor earn-
ings in developing countries started to grow 
faster than those in industrial countries, regard-
less of level of skill. But the trend is more pro-
nounced in tradable sectors, whereas low-skill 
workers in nontradable sectors continue to be 
the most disadvantaged (figure 1.8).
The relatively lower wages among low-skill 
workers compared with high-skill workers, par-
ticularly in nontradable sectors in developing 
countries, are consistent with an increase in re-
turns to education. Returns to education mea-
sure the wage premium on higher educational 
attainment for workers of the same sex with the 
same age and work experience. In all regions, 
more schooling is associated with higher labor 
earnings, but the gain is not linear. The labor 
earnings of workers with tertiary education are 
double or more than those of workers with sec-
ondary education only. However, workers with 
only a secondary education earn little more than 
those with elementary education. The education 
premium is generally higher the lower the in-
come level of the country (figure 1.9).
The role of the private sector
The solution to all these demographic and 
technological challenges rests with the private 
sector. That does not mean that the government 
 The jobs challenge  59
rea. In 2007, an alarming rise in food prices be-
got problems with food supply and inflation, 
increasing poverty and reducing real wages in 
parts of the developing world.56
whole world. In 1995, a financial crisis in Mex-
ico engulfed most of Latin America as well as 
other emerging countries. In 1997, a speculative 
attack on Thailand’s currency severely affected 
the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Ko-
F I G U R E  1. 8  Wages in developing countries are catching up
Source: Based on Oostendorp 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
Note: The database used to construct this figure contains wage data by occupations for an unbalanced panel of more than 150 countries from 1983 to 2008. The data are derived 
from the International Labour Organization (ILO) October Inquiry database by calibrating the data into a normalized wage rate for each occupation. For a description of the data, 
see Freeman, Oostendorp, and Chor 2011. The vertical axis in panels a and b represents the ratio between U.S. wages and non-U.S. wages. The vertical axis in panels c and d repre-
sents the coefficient of variation of wages—a measure of wage inequality—across all countries in the sample.
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creating 22 million new unemployed in a single 
year. Growth in total employment, which had 
been hovering around 1.8 percent a year before 
2008, fell to less than 0.5 percent in 2009, and by 
In 2008, the bursting of asset price bubbles 
and the resulting collapse of financial institu-
tions in the United States and some European 
countries initiated a crisis of worldwide span, 
F I G U R E  1. 9  Returns to education are higher in poorer countries
Source: Montenegro and Patrinos 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
Note: Reported figures are unweighted averages of country-level private returns, for the most recent year within the period 2000–10 in a sample of 69 countries.
F I G U R E  1.10 In China, employment growth is led by the private sector
Source: Kanamori and Zhao 2004.
Note: Data for foreign-owned companies in 2002 and for non-state-owned enterprises in 2003 are not available.
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countries. The less formalized the labor market, 
the more earnings shrank and the less employ-
ment numbers gave away. In Central and East-
ern Europe, where the labor market is largely 
formalized, the growth rate of GDP dropped on 
average by 12 percentage points, employment 
contracted by 3 percent, and earnings fell by 
more than 8 percent (figure 1.11).62 In East Asia, 
where formal employment rates are very low, 
the average decline in GDP growth was 5.5 per-
centage points and total employment numbers 
barely changed.63 
The policy response to the crisis was unprec-
edented in its scale, but it also involved different 
combinations of instruments, with potentially 
different implications for jobs. Fiscal stimulus 
across the world amounted to US$5.5 trillion 
in purchasing power parity, with China, Japan, 
and the United States accounting for more than 
70 percent of it.64 Of 77 countries for which 
data are available, 80 percent used fiscal ex-
pansion. Higher-income countries favored tax 
cuts, higher unemployment benefits, and di-
rect support for enterprises. Low- and middle- 
income countries boosted expenditures, includ-
ing spending on training and income-support 
measures.65 Across countries, responses mainly 
aimed at preventing or mitigating employment 
2011 had not yet returned to its pre-crisis level.57 
As Europe struggles with high levels of public 
debt, vulnerabilities in its banking sector, and 
uncertainties about the euro, and as growth de-
celerates in China and India, it is by no means 
clear that the global crisis is over.
The impact of the 2008–09 crisis varied 
across developing countries. Some, such as the 
Baltic countries, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico, 
Romania, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey, had 
absolute declines in employment; other coun-
tries such as Brazil, China, and Indonesia expe-
rienced only a brief deceleration. Country- 
specific studies shed further light on employment 
impacts across different population groups. For 
example, it is estimated that the crisis cost China 
between 20 million and 36 million jobs, particu-
larly among migrant workers in export-oriented 
sectors.58 In Mexico, it caused a decline of half a 
 million jobs between 2008 and the second quar-
ter of 2009, particularly among women, youth, 
and older workers, as well as a 10 percent drop 
in real wages.59 In Indonesia, although the ef-
fects of the crisis were mild, young, casual, and 
informal workers were affected.60 Across coun-
tries, the young bore the largest brunt.61
Adjustment patterns, in terms of jobs lost or 
earnings declines, also varied in developing 
F I G U R E  1.11  In developing countries, the crisis affected earnings more than employment 
Source: Khanna, Newhouse, and Paci 2010.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. The vertical axis measures the difference in growth rates before and after the beginning of the crisis.
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Countries worldwide used an array of policy responses to confront 
the jobs crisis. Macroeconomic stimulus and targeted sector policies 
were supplemented by policies to strengthen income support for 
those affected; measures to boost labor demand through wage 
subsidies, credit policies, and public works programs; and invest-
ments in skills and tailor-made employment services for those most 
affected. 
Globally, unemployment insurance played a minor role. Only 
15.4 percent of the unemployed received benefits during the crisis, 
because of the low effective coverage of unemployment insurance 
programs. In 23 countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Central Europe, and Latin America, the 
duration of benefits was extended. Countries with large informal 
sectors or without unemployment schemes relied on a mix of cash 
transfers and public works schemes to provide additional income 
support for those in need. Colombia’s Familias en Acción—a pro-
gram focusing on strengthening nutrition and education for chil-
dren—increased its coverage from 1.8 million to 2.7 million families. 
Argentina expanded the coverage of family benefits to all informal 
sector workers.
Countries across all income levels took measures to boost labor 
demand. Of the resources devoted to creating and protecting jobs, 
high-income countries spent more than half (56 percent) on credit 
policies for firms. They also implemented work-sharing arrange-
ments to cushion the impact of the crisis. Take-up rates for these 
BOX 1.4   Responses to the crisis went beyond income support for the unemployed
Sources: ILO and World Bank 2012.
initiatives reached 3.3 percent of the employed in Italy, 3.2 percent 
in Germany, and 2.7 percent in Japan. 
Low- and middle-income countries spent 67 percent of their 
resources on direct job creation measures and public works pro-
grams. Mexico, for example, extended its temporary works program 
to around 250,000 workers, or 0.5 percent of the labor force. Wage 
subsides were popular in Europe. They were most often imple-
mented through a reduction in social security contributions and 
were targeted to small and medium enterprises or to disadvantaged 
groups such as long-term job seekers and the young. To reach an 
effective scale in a timely manner, though, countries needed to have 
had such programs in place before the crisis.
In comparison, efforts to ramp up training, employment ser-
vices, or specific support programs for vulnerable groups were rela-
tively modest in scope and scale. Building or maintaining skills took 
the lion’s share of the budget in this category, with Chile, Italy, Mex-
ico, Turkey, and the United States spending the most.
Overall, countries with more mature social protection systems as 
well as established employment programs were able to respond 
quickly and reduce the impact of the crisis on jobs. With few excep-
tions, though, little is known about possible unintended effects of 
their programs such as whether preserving some jobs came at the 
expense of destroying others. Careful impact analysis is only in its 
initial stages.
losses, rather than trying to offset earnings 
shortfalls (box 1.4).
*   *   *
Demography, urbanization, globalization, tech-
nological progress, and macroeconomic crises 
bring about formidable jobs challenges. Coun-
tries that fail to address them may fall into vi-
cious circles of slow growth in labor earnings and 
job-related dis satisfaction affecting a sizable por-
tion of the labor force.66 Youth unemployment 
and idleness may be high, and women may face 
limited job  opportunities, leaving potential eco-
nomic and social gains untapped.67 A repeating 
pattern of small gains in living standards, slow 
productivity growth, and eroding social cohe-
sion may emerge. In contrast, countries that suc-
cessfully address these job challenges can develop 
 virtuous circles. The results—prosperous popu-
lations, a growing middle class, increased produc-
tivity, and improved opportunities for women 
and youth—may then be self-reinforcing. 
QUeStION 1
The world of work is diverse, especially in devel-
oping countries, and it is changing rapidly. 
Against this backdrop, the diversity of the words 
used to describe what people do to earn a living 
across countries and cultures should not be sur-
prising. Even people who speak the same lan-
guage can have vastly different interpretations 
of the meaning of a job. For some, the word 
conjures up an image of a worker in an office 
or a factory, with an employer and a regular 
paycheck. Others may think of farmers, self- 
employed vendors in cities, and caregivers of 
children or elderly relatives.
Work matters and words matter
The varied interpretations capture the different 
aspects of jobs that people value. A woman in 
Hanoi, Vietnam, explained, “an old woman who 
just sells vegetables can gain respect from others 
and people listen to her.”68 A man who had 
worked his way out of poverty in Satgailijhara, 
Bangladesh, linked the value of his job as a rice 
farmer to being able to invest in his children, “I 
have been able to get my children educated. 
That’s the best achievement in life.”69 
Ela Bhatt, a lawyer and the founder of Self 
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in In-
dia, described her struggle with the language of 
work, given the multiplicity of tasks that people 
do every day and over time: “A small farmer 
works on her own farm. In tough times, she also 
works on other farms as a laborer. When the ag-
riculture season is over, she goes to the forest to 
collect gum and other forest produce. Year 
round, she produces embroidered items either at 
a piece rate for a contractor or for sale to a trader 
who comes to her village to buy goods. Now, 
how should her trade be categorized? Does she 
belong to the agricultural sector, the factory sec-
tor, or the home-based work sector? Should she 
be categorized as a farmer or a farm worker? Is 
she self-employed or is she a piece-rate worker?”70
These questions are not merely semantic. 
The words and categories that are used to de-
scribe work have tangible implications. Views 
on what a job is and what it means almost inevi-
tably influence views on what policies for jobs 
should look like. Those for whom the word job 
is associated with the image of a worker in an 
office or a factory, with an  employer and a pay-
check, may focus on a supportive investment 
climate for firms. Those for whom the word also 
encompasses farming, street vending, waste 
picking, and domestic employment may think 
of jobs policies as including land reform, agri-
cultural extension, urban policies, or the provi-
sion of voice to the most vulnerable workers.
According to the International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians (ICLS), which sets standard 
definitions for official use across countries, a job 
is “a set of tasks and duties performed, or meant 
to be performed, by one person, including for an 
employer or in self-employment.”71 Under this 
definition, a job is not the same as employment. 
The existence of job vacancies and people with 
more than one job means that the number of 
jobs is greater than the number of people em-
ployed. The existence of unemployment means 
that people do not find the jobs they want. Jobs 
refer to tasks, while the wage employed, farmers, 
and the self-employed refer to the people who 
do them.
Some gray areas
The ICLS definition excludes some forms of 
work from official employment statistics. The 
employed are part of the economically active 
population, defined as people who contribute to 
“the production of goods and services as de-
fined by the United Nations systems of national 
accounts and balances.”72 The system of national 
accounts (SNA) includes “all production actu-
ally destined for the market, whether for sale or 
barter,” as well as the production of goods for 
one’s own use, but “excludes all production of 
services for own final consumption within 
households.”73 This definition thus leaves out of 
official statistics activities such as child-rearing, 
care of the elderly, or home cooking, as well as 
traveling to work.
What is a job?
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Informality is another important gray 
area. After nearly four decades of debates 
about the concept of informality, there is still 
no consensus on what is meant by informal 
jobs. Some schools of thought link informality 
to characteristics of firms—whether the busi-
ness is registered or pays taxes. Others focus 
on characteristics of workers—whether they 
are covered by social protection or have an 
employment contract. And yet others stress 
modes of production and levels of productiv-
ity to define informality. A consensus is start-
ing to emerge on how to measure informality, 
but the definitions used still leave out types of 
work that some consider informal. Meanwhile, 
relatively few countries produce regular statis-
tics on informality (box 1.5).
Some countries are starting to develop esti-
mates of these other types of activities. The 
SNA offers guidelines to countries for produc-
ing satellite accounts reflecting forms of house-
hold work that are not considered jobs. Ac-
cording to these guidelines, “a job can refer 
to unpaid household service and volunteer 
work performed by one person for a household 
outside the SNA production boundary but 
within the general production boundary.”74 
Mexico, for instance, has used this guidance to 
estimate the value of unremunerated activities 
in households, such as housekeeping and child 
care. These activities represented nearly a quar-
ter of Mexican GDP between 2003 and 2009 
and were equivalent to about two-thirds of 
worker wages and benefits.75 
The concept of dual economies has an old lineage.a Based on the 
recognition of dual economies and the Harris and Todaro two-sector 
model, the term informality was first coined by a U.K. anthropologist 
in a paper about Ghana. The concept gained popularity with a 
widely cited report from a mission of the International Labour Orga-
nization (ILO) to Kenya.b Since then, studies on informality have pro-
liferated, and the concept has become standard in development 
studies, labor economics, and other disciplines. Today the causes 
and implications of informality are the subject of an intense aca-
demic debate and an extended research agenda aimed at under-
standing how labor markets function in developing countries.c 
A variety of approaches can be used to measure informality, 
informal employment, and the informal sector. Measurement be- 
comes even more complex when informality is combined with 
other concepts like illegal and underground activities or nonstan-
dard work. The lack of systematic country-level data on informality 
has led researchers to construct their own estimates using similar 
but not identical criteria, which sometimes lead to diverging 
conclusions.
Recommendations on the measurement of informality were first 
drafted in 1993 by the 15th International Conference of Labour 
 Statisticians (ICLS). Four years later, the United Nations created the 
Delhi Group to document and recommend methods for defining 
and collecting data on the informal sector. In 2003, the 17th ICLS, 
through the document “Guidelines Concerning a Statistical Defini-
tion of Informal Employment,” introduced a definition of informal 
employment and a series of rules for its measurement. Since 2006, 
BOX 1.5   Few countries produce statistics on informality
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Boeke 1942; Lewis 1954.
b. Harris and Todaro 1970; Hart 1973; ILO 1972.
c.  A few among the most recent are Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur 2006; Perry and others 2007; Kanbur 2009; Blades, Ferreira, and Lugo 2011; and Vanek and others 2012.
d. ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market (database).
e. Vanek and others 2012.
the Delhi Group has been working with the ILO on a forthcoming 
“Manual of Surveys of Informal Employment and Informal Sector.” In 
2008, the newest version of the United Nation’s system of national 
accounts adopted most of the previous resolutions and recommen-
dations on the measurement of informality. That resulted in a broad 
definition that includes both the informal sector and informal 
employment. However, gray areas remain in relation to activities 
such as farming, independent professionals, and activities among 
rural workers in general.
Few countries produce regular official statistics on informality. 
The dearth of data is apparent in global repositories such as the 
ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labor Market database, which, in its most 
recent version, includes data on informality for only 60 countries.d A 
report on informality across the world by the ILO and Women in 
Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) makes 
systematic use of the most thorough definition of informality, cover-
ing informal employment and employment in informal firms, to 
present data on 47 countries.e The ILO-WIEGO report shows infor-
mality rates ranging from 40 percent in Uruguay and 42 percent in 
Thailand to 75 percent in Bolivia and 80 percent in India.
The extent of informality varies with differences in productivity 
across firms and workers, as well as with differences in the nature of 
regulations and the degree to which they are enforced. Whether 
informality is the result of exit, exclusion, uneven enforcement, or 
low firm productivity is still a matter of debate. Better measurement 
can provide information on the magnitude of informality and pro-
vide more data for the advancement of studies in this area.
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are discriminated against, such as migrants, 
women, and indigenous people. Migrant work-
ers in sweatshops in Latin America, child sol-
diers in conflict-afflicted areas of Africa, people 
trafficked for sexual exploitation in Europe and 
Asia, and temporary migrant workers under 
sponsorship contracts in the Middle East are 
the subjects of the most conspicuous forms of 
forced labor and trafficking in the world.
Child labor provides another striking exam-
ple (box 1.6). Although it is covered by the core 
labor standards and many countries have rati-
fied the relevant ILO conventions and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ILO 
estimates that 115 million children worldwide 
were involved in hazardous work in 2008. Mea-
surement is complicated by legal and moral 
concerns, as well as by the flawed design of sur-
veys that may induce parents to misreport chil-
dren’s work.80 These statistics may actually rep-
resent only a lower boundary on the size of the 
problem. 
Recent research shows that children work for 
diverse and complex reasons.81 They range from 
household poverty to the relative accessibility 
and affordability of schooling and from the 
preferences of families and even children re-
garding work and play to the influence of tech-
nological change, international trade, and ur-
What is not a job?
While views about what a job means vary, a 
broad consensus exists on the types of activities 
that should never be considered a job. Interna-
tional norms define basic human rights as the 
boundaries of what is unacceptable. The United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which the UN General Assembly embraced 
unanimously in 1948, provides for the right to 
work and protection from discrimination.76 The 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Princi-
ples at Work adopted at the ILO conference in 
1998 further specifies core labor standards that 
call for an end to forced and compulsory labor, 
child labor, and labor discrimination, and that 
provide for freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining.77 Most countries have ratified 
the conventions on forced labor, child labor, and 
discrimination; fewer have ratified the conven-
tions on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining (figure 1.12).78
While international agreements help define 
what forms of work are unacceptable, in prac-
tice many people work in activities that violate 
their rights. Some 21 million people are esti-
mated to be subject to forced labor, and around 
1 million to trafficking.79 In many cases, forced 
labor is inflicted upon minorities or groups that 
F I G U R E  1.12  A majority of countries have ratified the core labor standards
Source: ILO 2012c.
Note: Con. = Convention.
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may affect schooling, health, fertility, and behav-
ior, although establishing these links has been 
challenging. Rarely is there a one-to-one trad-
eoff between school and work. In many places, 
the majority of children who work are also at-
tending school. Moreover, a child may have 
dropped out of school for reasons unrelated to 
child labor. The participation of children 12 
years and older in family farming and small 
household enterprises can in some cases con-
tribute to the acquisition of skills.83 
In sum, jobs are activities that generate actual 
income, monetary or in kind, and do not violate 
fundamental rights and principles at work. 
This definition includes the categories of work 
covered by ICLS guidelines: wage or salary em-
ployment, employers, members of cooperatives, 
family workers (including unpaid family mem-
bers), and the self-employed. In many instances, 
however, these categories may fail to uniquely or 
clearly classify certain individuals. For instance, 
small farmers are sometimes wage employed or 
self-employed, but they may also be employers 
if they hire unpaid family workers. Jobs include 
labor activities that generate income for the 
household, even if no income measure can be at-
tributed to a person’s specific labor, as in the case 
of household enterprises and farming.
By this definition, jobs are much broader 
than just working in an office or a factory, with 
an employer and a regular paycheck.
banization. Children in wealthier households 
may, in some settings, be engaged in child labor 
if household assets and access to finance, land, 
or other resources generate more demand for 
work from household members.82 Child labor 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), children engaged in 
child labor include “all persons aged between 5 and 17 years who during a 
specified time period were engaged in one or more of the following activities: 
(a) hazardous work; (b) worst forms of child labor other than hazardous work; 
and (c) other forms of child labor (depending on age of the child and weekly 
hours worked).”a The “worst forms of child labor” include any work that jeopar-
dizes the health, safety, or morals of a child. Such work is determined to be haz-
ardous depending on its specific nature, the demands on children in particular 
industries, and the general working conditions. Apart from hazardous work, 
the worst forms of child labor include all forms of slavery, bondage, military 
conscription, trafficking, and using, procuring, or offering children for prostitu-
tion, pornography, or other illicit activities.
This definition of child labor is governed by two ILO Conventions (132 and 
182), two ILO recommendations (146 and 190), and the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. However, international standards also provide countries 
with some latitude in setting allowed boundaries for the involvement of chil-
dren in productive activities (regarding ages or the definition of hazardous 
work, for example). The standards also permit limited work in the performance 
of household chores or in light productive activities that are not considered 
harmful.
BOX 1.6   Not all child work is child labor
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. ILO 2008a. 
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Garimpeiros (independent prospectors) at the Serra Pelada gold mine, in Brazil
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Notes
 1. World Development Report 2013 team estimates.
 2. World Development Report 2013 team estimates 
based on data from the International Labour 
Organization, http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/ 
EAPEP/eapep_E.html, and World Development 
Indicators, http:/data-worldbank.org/data/cata 
log/world-development-indicators.
 3. Reid 1934, 11.
 4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Employment database, http:// 
www.oecd.org/employment/database. Tempo-
rary work refers to a mixture of seasonal jobs, 
fixed-term contracts, on-call workers, and 
temporary help agency workers that varies by 
country, depending on national definitions and 
available statistics.
 5. Lee, McCann, and Messenger 2007.
 6. ILO Department of Statistics, “Short term indi-
cators of the labour market,” http://laborsta.ilo 
.org/sti/sti_E.html.
 7. Ghose, Majid, and Ernst 2008.
 8. Gindling and Newhouse 2012 for the World De-
velopment Report 2013.
 9. World Bank (2011c) offers a more in-depth re-
view of these issues.
10. ILO Department of Statistics, “Short term indi-
cators of the labour market,” http://laborsta.ilo 
.org/sti/sti_E.html.
11. Youth not in employment, education, or training 
are also sometimes referred to as “NEETs.” See the 
statistical annex for more information. Kovrova, 
Lyon, and Rosati 2012 for the World Develop-
ment Report 2013; Ranzani and Rosati 2012 for 
the World Development Report 2013.
12. Lyon, Rosati, and Guarcello 2012 for the World 
Development Report 2013.
13. World Bank 2006.
14. ILO 2010.
15. United Nations Population Division, World Pop-
ulation Prospects 2011; ILO, Labor Force Partici-
pation Estimates and Projections. 
16. Rozelle and Huang 2012 and estimates from In-
ternational Labour Office database on labor sta-
tistics, Laborsta, http://laborsta.ilo.org/, October 
2011.
17. IOM 2008; Lucas 2005; Özden and others 2011.
18. IOM 2010.
19. Chenery and Syrquin 1975; Clark 1940; Kuznets 
1966; Rostow 1960.
20. UN 2011b.
21. Herrmann and Khan 2008.
22. This is the main observation that sparked the re-
search on the informal sector: Harris and Todaro 
1970; Hart 1973; ILO 1972. For a recent study of 
the process of structural change in Africa, see 
Losch, Freguin-Gresh, and White (2012). 
23. Freeman and Schettkat 2005; Ngai and Pissarides 
2008.
24. Bardasi and Wodon 2006; Lee, McCann, and 
Messenger 2007; Maddison 2001; Ramey and 
Francis 2009.
25. Bardasi and Wodon 2010; Gammage 2010. 
26. Charmes 2006; Gálvez-Muñoz, Rodríguez- 
Modroño, and Domínguez-Serrano 2011; Hir-
way and Jose 2012. Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil 
(2011) argue that differences in total work by 
gender change over the business cycle but con-
verge over the long term.
27. ILO 2009a; Pagés 2010.
28. Autor and Dorn 2011; Gratton 2011; Holzer and 
Lerman 2009.
29. Feenstra 2010.
30. Brown, Ashton, and Lauder 2010. For U.S. parent 
companies, according to the National Science 
Foundation, the share of research performed by 
Asia-located affiliates outside of Japan rose from 
5 to 14 percent from 1997 to 2008, mainly in 
China, Korea, Singapore, and India (http://nsf 
.gov/statistics/seindl12/c4/c4s4.htm).
31. Goswami, Mattoo, and Sáez 2011.
32. Goswami, Mattoo, and Sáez 2011.
33. A.T. Kearney 2011.
34. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization Institute of Statistics, http://
stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/
tableView.aspx?ReportId=175.
35. WDR team estimates of the top 20 percent of 
PISA ratings among 12 countries in the 2009 
Programme for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA) of 15-year-olds.
36. This skill definition broadly follows Autor, Levy, 
and Murnane (2003) and Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011). Other approaches distinguish, for exam-
ple, between cognitive, noncognitive, and techni-
cal skills (World Bank 2010) or cognitive/problem 
solving, learning, personal/behavioral/ethical, and 
social and communication skills (ILO 2008b).
37. Aedo and others 2012 for the World Develop-
ment Report 2013.
38. Brown, Ashton, and Lauder 2010.
39. A.T. Kearney 2011.
40. Yoshino 2011.
41. Examples include oDesk (https://www.odesk 
.com/), babajob (http://www.babajob.com/), 
Google trader (for example, http://www.google 
.co.ug/africa/trader/search?cat=jobs), and Souk-
Tel (http://www.souktel.org/).
42. McKinsey Global Institute 2011.
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70. Bhatt 2006, 17.
71. Article 2, ILO 2007. Also see UN (2009).
72. Article 9, ILO 1982, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/
normativeinstrument/wcms_087481.pdf.
73. UN 2009, 6–7.
74. ILO 2009b, 42.
75. INEGI 2011.
76. UN 1948, http://www.un.org/en/documents/
udhr/, article 23 (1).
77. ILO 1998.
78. The core international labor standards are the 
subject of eight conventions covering the four 
 areas: Convention 87 (1948), the Freedom of As-
sociation and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention; Convention 98 (1949), the Right to 
Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention; 
Convention 29 (1930), the Forced Labour Con-
vention; Convention 105 (1957), the Abolition 
of Forced Labour Convention; Convention 100 
(1951), the Equal Remuneration Convention; 
Convention 111 (1958), the Discrimination (Em-
ployment and Occupation) Convention; Con-
vention 138 (1973), the Minimum Age Conven-
tion; and Convention 182 (1999), the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention. See “Con-
ventions,” NORMLEX Database: Information on 
International Labour Standards, International 
Labour Organization, Geneva. ILO (2012). http://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/.
79. Andrees and Belser 2009; ILO 2009c; ILO 2012b.
80. Dillon and others 2012.
81. Basu 1999; Basu and Tzannatos 2003; Cigno and 
Rosati 2005; Edmonds 2008.
82. Del Carpio and Loayza 2012; Hazarika and 
Sarangi 2008.
83. Edmonds (2008) offers a review of the theoretical 
and empirical evidence on child labor.
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Jobs are transformational
PART1
Introduction to Part 1
Economic development is about improve-ments in living standards supported by productivity growth. It also involves so-
cial change associated with urbanization, inte-
gration in the world economy, and the drive 
toward gender equality. All of these transforma-
tions are related to jobs. The development pro-
cess is about some jobs becoming better and 
others disappearing, about people taking jobs 
and changing jobs, and about jobs migrating 
to other places within and across countries. 
Development often entails the movement of 
labor from rural, agricultural, and mostly sub-
sistence activities to urban, nonagricultural, and 
mostly market-oriented activities. This move-
ment transforms the lives of families and com-
munities, the organization of firms, and the 
norms and values of societies. It can boost pro-
ductivity and improve living standards and also 
affect the cohesiveness of society. Jobs are thus a 
key driver of development.
• Living standards: Jobs provide earnings op-
portunities to lift people out of poverty, raise 
their consumption, and contribute to indi-
vidual well-being more broadly. 
• Productivity: Through job creation and de-
struction within sectors and reallocations 
across sectors and countries, jobs are also at 
the root of economic growth.
• Social cohesion: Jobs define who people are 
in many ways; by shaping values and be-
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haviors, they can influence trust and civic 
engagement.
Distinguishing these three transformations pro-
vides an understanding of how jobs contribute 
to development. People’s well-being is the ulti-
mate goal, and the transformation of living 
standards captures this link directly. But sus-
tained improvements in living standards are im-
possible without productivity growth or when 
resources are wasted through confrontation. 
That is why it is necessary to look at the three 
transformations jointly.
Chapter 2
Jobs are the most important determinant of living standards around the world. For the vast majority of people, their work is the 
main source of income, especially in the poorest 
countries. And jobs-related events are the most 
frequent reasons for families to escape or fall 
into poverty. Furthermore, as earnings increase, 
individual choices expand—household mem-
bers can opt to stay out of the labor force or to 
work fewer hours and dedicate more time to 
education, retirement, or family. Opportunities 
for gainful work, including in farming and 
self-employment, offer households the means to 
increase consumption and reduce its variability. 
Higher crop yields, access to small off-farm en-
terprise activities, the migration of family mem-
bers to cities, and transitions to wage employ-
ment are milestones on the path to prosperity. 
In addition to their fundamental and imme-
diate contribution to earnings, jobs affect other 
dimensions of well-being, positively and nega-
tively. Not having a job undermines mental 
health, especially in countries where wage em-
ployment is the norm and the lack of employ-
ment opportunities translates into open unem-
ployment rather than underemployment. But a 
job prone to occupational accidents or work-
related diseases can damage physical health or 
worse. More generally, monetary, nonmonetary, 
and even subjective characteristics of jobs can all 
have an impact on well-being (box 2.1).
Jobs also influence how workers see them-
selves and relate to others. Most people feel that 
jobs should be meaningful and contribute to so-
ciety. Together with other objective job charac-
teristics, the self-esteem a job provides is an im-
portant determination of satisfaction with life. 
Jobs improve material well-being
Over the course of a country’s development, 
higher productivity and labor earnings allow 
households to allocate more time to invest-
ment and consumption activities and less to 
production. Thus, schooling and retirement 
gain importance relative to work. For the past 
century or so, the number of hours worked by 
youth in industrial countries has declined 
steadily as access to education has increased. 
Similarly, the number of years in retirement 
has increased in parallel with longer life expec-
tancy.1 Higher earnings also facilitate longer 
periods of job seeking, especially among 
younger household members, often leading to 
higher unemployment rates. Among men and 
women of prime age (25 to 54), total working 
hours (market and nonmarket) have remained 
relatively stable, with the main change being 
the growing share of market activities among 
women (figure 2.1). These general trends are 
not ironclad, however.
Jobs and living standards
Jobs are the main source of income for the majority of households and a 
key driver of poverty reduction. But their contribution to well-being goes 
beyond the earnings they provide.
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nied by higher market participation among 
women.3 Developed and developing econ- 
omies allocate a similar share of the day to 
work. But women allocate a larger share than 
men to activities not directly generating income 
(figure 2.2). 
Jobs do not automatically guarantee sus-
tained improvements in earnings and well- 
being. Working people often remain mired in 
poverty. In many countries, adults in poor 
households are more likely to be working than 
those in nonpoor households. The poor are not 
usually characterized by lack of jobs or hours of 
work; they often have more than one job and 
work long hours, but their jobs are poorly remu-
nerated (box 2.2).
In more affluent societies, a larger share of 
income is derived from capital, transfers (social 
The nature of production, consumption, 
and investment activities varies across coun-
tries as well. In some, low hours of work among 
youth are associated more with idleness than 
with schooling; in others, schooling has pro-
ceeded at an accelerated pace. Similarly, job 
characteristics change with development. In 
rural economies where agricultural activities 
predominate, the purpose of household pro-
duction is often direct consumption. Less de-
veloped economies tend to be characterized 
by more working time dedicated to jobs with-
out wage payments, including farming and 
other types of self-employment. Development 
changes the organization of work from home 
to market production.2 As economies develop, 
more work is remunerated through wages and 
salaries. This reallocation is usually accompa-
Debates on how to define and measure living standards go far back 
in social sciences. The work by Rowntree and Booth in late 19th cen-
tury England is usually mentioned as seminal, especially in relation 
to the measurement of poverty. In the 1930s, the creation of the Sys-
tem of National Accounts concentrated on measuring the total mar-
ket value of the goods and services produced in an economy and 
made gross domestic product (GDP) per capita the main indicator 
of living standards in general. By the 1970s and 1980s, there was a 
growing agreement that important aspects of well-being, such as 
health status, or exposure to crime, pollution, and urban conges-
tion, were not fully accounted for in GDP. Research also showed that 
the distribution of material amenities affected individual well-
being. There is now consensus that living standards depend not 
only on average incomes and consumption but also on access to 
benefits as diverse as health and education, sanitation and housing, 
and security and freedom.a
There are ongoing systematic efforts to collect individual, 
household, and community data to better understand and com-
pare living standards in developing and developed countries. Com-
plete poverty profiles for different groups of the population within 
a country, based on the comparison of income or consumption 
aggregates to international or national poverty lines, have prolifer-
ated. Microdata collection efforts have allowed a close monitoring 
BOX 2.1   There are many dimensions of living standards and many ways to measure them
of standards of living and poverty reduction worldwide. Advances 
toward the first Millennium De velopment Goal (Eradicate extreme 
poverty) have been documented using global monetary poverty 
measures. The availability of richer datasets, in turn, has supported 
the emergence of newer measures of living standards, many of 
them multidimensional in nature. These measures combine both 
monetary and nonmonetary indicators of well-being, as well 
as information on their distribution across different population 
groups.b
Despite this progress, important controversies remain, particu-
larly on which indicators are more appropriate for gauging each 
dimension of well-being and on the weights that should be attrib-
uted to each. Some recent proposals even suggest a revamping of 
statistical systems to formulate better measures of production that 
take into consideration changes in the quality of goods, govern-
ment services, and time allocated to home activities and leisure. 
There are also proposals to include among measures of living stan-
dards subjective indicators of well-being and indicators on the level 
and sustainability of human, physical, and environmental assets.c 
Other proposals emphasize subjective indicators building on a phil-
osophical point of view.d Aggregating indicators and comparing 
them over time and across space becomes more intricate in this 
case, because of differences in values and beliefs.
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a.  Adelman and Morris 1973; Chenery and Syrquin 1975; Nordhaus and Tobin 1973; Sen and Hawthorn 1987; Steckel 1995; Streeten 1979.
b.  Among these indicators are the Human Development Index (UNDP 1990), the Human Opportunity Index (Paes de Barros and others 2009), and a large variety of multi­
dimensional poverty indexes (Alkire and Foster 2011; Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003; Kakwani and Silber 2008). See also OECD 2011.
c. Fitoussi, Sen, and Stiglitz 2010.
d.  This is the case, for instance, of the measures of Gross National Happiness in Bhutan by the Center for Bhutan Studies.
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F I G U R E  2 .1  Working hours vary across ages
Sources: Berniell and Sanchez­Paramo 2011; Ramey and Francis 2009.
Note: GDP = gross domest product. The vertical axis measures weekly hours spent on production activities (market and nonmarket work), including some outside the boundaries of 
the system of national accounts, such as child care. The measure does not include time allocated to schooling or leisure. The horizontal axis measures real GDP per capita in 2000 US$.
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assistance), or savings (social insurance and 
pensions). Still, the majority of households 
worldwide make their living through their work, 
and labor earnings represent the largest share of 
total household income (figure 2.3). The main 
change that comes with development is the 
composition of labor income.4
Job-related events are the main escape route 
from poverty in developing and developed 
countries alike. More than two decades of re-
search on poverty dynamics, spanning countries 
as different as Canada, Ecuador, Germany, and 
South Africa, show that labor-related events 
trigger household exits from poverty (figure 
2.4). These events range from the head of a 
household taking a new job, to family members 
starting to work, to working family members 
earning more from their labor. In a large set of 
qualitative studies in low-income countries, get-
ting jobs and starting businesses were two of the 
main reasons people gave to explain their rise 
out of poverty.5 Conversely, a lack of job op-
portunities reduces the ability of households to 
improve their well-being.6
Jobs are not the only force that determines 
whether a household escapes from poverty. De-
mographic changes, such as the arrival of a new-
born, relatives moving in, or a family split be-
cause of death or separation, affect expenditures 
per capita, hence the household’s poverty status. 
The same is true of changes in nonlabor income 
from assets or transfers, be they private remit-
tances, public social assistance, or pensions. 
These developments may all interact and often 
occur simultaneously. For example, the migra-
tion of family members to a city for a job may 
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(education, work experience, or region of resi-
dence) were important, but that the returns 
to these characteristics mattered more. Among 
those returns is the relative price of labor. 9
The connection between jobs and poverty 
reduction is not mechanistic, and not all transi-
tions out of poverty require a change in the type 
of work undertaken. Changes in the productiv-
ity of the same job may also be at play. In Ban-
gladesh and Vietnam, for example, poverty tran-
sitions have been dominated not by changes in 
income sources from farm to nonfarm income, 
but by higher income within the same sector.10 
Richer insights on the connection between 
labor-related events and transitions out of pov-
erty can be obtained from studies that follow 
the same households over extended periods of 
time. Studies in several countries in Asia and in 
Sub-Saharan Africa show that farming and off-
farm activities are intricately related and not 
improve the well-being not only of the migrants 
but also of those who stay in the rural village. In 
addition to receiving remittances, those who stay 
behind may have access to the migrants’ land to 
cultivate and work more as a result.7
With all these changes occurring at the same 
time, gauging the contribution of labor earnings 
to poverty reduction is difficult. However, recent 
methods allowing to decompose changes in pov-
erty by sources of income confirm the funda-
mental contribution of change in labor earnings 
(figure 2.5). In 10 of 18 countries considered for 
the analysis, labor income explains more than 
half of the change in poverty, as measured by the 
US$2.50-a-day poverty line. In another 5 coun-
tries, it accounts for more than a third of the 
 reduction in poverty.8 A further decomposition 
of the contribution of labor income to poverty 
reduction in Bangladesh, Peru, and Thailand 
found that changes in individual characteristics 
F I G U R E  2 . 2  Women spend more time in activities not directly generating income
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on ISSP 2005 for Spain and the United States, 1999 Time Use Survey of India, and 2006 Guatemala Household Survey. 
Note: The figure refers to people aged 15 years and more. Income-generating activities is the time devoted to wage or salaried employment; farming, own­account work,  
self­employment with hired labor, and unpaid family labor in household enterprises; investment refers to time allocated to education, health care, and job search; other activities 
includes work outside the system of national accounts, for example child care, housework. Leisure and other activities associated with consumption (for example, shopping and 
social interactions), as well as sleep, are not included.
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F I G U R E  2 . 3 Jobs are the most important source of household income
Source: Covarrubias and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
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It is not lack of work that defines the poor. This realization has 
brought to the fore the concept of the working poor, and questions 
about who they are, and why they remain poor even when they 
have jobs. First studied by researchers in some countries such as the 
United States, this concept of the working poor is now recognized 
globally. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has included 
the working poor in its statistics since the mid-1990s, and measure-
ments of this group have been added as a Millennium Development 
indicator.
The working poor are defined as employed persons in house-
holds whose members are living below one of the two international 
poverty lines—either US$1.25 or US$2 a day.a Household expendi-
ture surveys allow for a classification of the population as poor and 
nonpoor, based on the level of consumption per person. These sur-
veys also provide information on household members who work. 
According to the ILO’s most recent estimate, 910 million workers—
nearly 30 percent of total global employment—were living on less 
than US$2 a day.b The incidence is much higher among low-income 
countries. It reaches 63.7 percent in Africa and 54.2 percent in Asia.c
BOX 2.2   Most poor people work
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
Notes: For a review of the working poor in developed countries, see Blank, Danziger, and Schoeni (2006) and Brady, Fullerton, and Cross (2010); for developing countries, see Fields 
(2011). The content and scope of the Millennium Development Goals can be found in United Nations, “We Can End Poverty, 2015: Millennium Development Goals,” United Nations, 
New York. 
a.  Indicator 18, “Poverty, income distribution and the working poor,” KILM (Key Indicators of the Labour Market) (database), 7th ed. 2011, International Labour Organization, Geneva.
b. ILO 2011, 41–42.
c.  Estimates are for 2009 for a selection of low­income countries from the ILO KILM.
d. Anker 2011.
e. Poverty Labor Trend Index, National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), Mexico City.
Caution is needed in interpreting this concept, however. Outside 
the group of the working poor, there may be individuals who have 
very low labor earnings but whose expenditures are above the pov-
erty line because they have other sources of income such as private 
transfers or earnings from social insurance or social assistance pro-
grams. In other words, being excluded from the category of working 
poor does not mean one has high labor earnings.
Another concept that indicates whether job earnings are 
 sufficient to ensure an adequate standard of living for a person 
or a household is the living wage. This is the level of earnings 
that would provide a satisfactory standard of living to workers 
and their families. But moving from this definition to measurement 
is difficult. With more than half of all working people engaged 
in nonwage work, accurate measures of labor earnings may not 
be available. Moreover, there are diverse interpretations of what 
constitutes a standard family and a lack of consensus on computa-
tion methods.d An alternative is measuring the percentage of the 
population that cannot reach the poverty line with labor incomes 
only, as the Poverty Labor Trend Index in Mexico does.e
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F I G U R E  2 . 4  Jobs take households out of poverty, especially in developing countries
Source: Inchauste 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: Nonlabor events include changes in nonlabor earnings (such as rents or pensions) and demographic changes. A trigger event is defined as the most important event occurring  
during a poverty reduction spell among a set of mutually exclusive categories of events such as changes in family structure, in sources of income, and in needs of the household.
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nonlabor eventslabor events
necessarily substitutes for each other. Access to 
land, increases in farm yields, and access to mar-
kets are fundamental for the growth of off-farm 
jobs and hence for diversification in family in-
comes.11 Simply having work is not what mat-
ters most, according to these studies, since most 
people work in rural economies. What is impor-
tant for escaping poverty is deriving greater 
earnings from work.
Other factors of production are critical for 
explaining poverty reduction through jobs, 
particularly in rural areas. Studies from Uganda 
and Pakistan, using rural data spanning 4 and 
10 years respectively, show that higher agricul-
tural productivity, the growing commercializa-
tion of agriculture, and an increase in cash crop 
production contributed substantially to pov-
erty reduction. The increase in the price of cash 
crops over this period also helped.12 Improve-
ments in land rights and better access to input 
and output markets, due to infrastructure in-
vestments, also raised the odds of escaping pov-
erty, particularly in Uganda. All of these factors 
affect the labor productivity of farmers but 
originate in land markets or food markets 
rather than labor markets.
The largest poverty reductions documented 
are associated with jobs in agriculture. The cases 
of China and Vietnam, in the 1980s and 1990s 
respectively, testify to the importance of agricul-
tural productivity and the forces unleashed by 
land reform, investments in rural infrastructure, 
and off-farm job opportunities.13 In rural China, 
poverty reduction was associated with off-farm 
activities, but the workers engaged in these ac-
tivities tended to be those who had benefited 
from increased farm incomes and by obtaining 
more education.14 Furthermore, easier access to 
off-farm employment and opportunities for mi-
gration reduced the exposure of households to 
income shocks. A similar pattern of events has 
been documented in other Asian and Sub- 
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among households with few assets. Studies from 
Uganda and Pakistan show that the share of 
household members who work also has a con-
siderable impact. Households with rising de-
pendency ratios were more likely to remain 
poor or fall into poverty, while households 
whose share of working-age adults increased 
were less likely to fall into poverty or remain in a 
state of poverty.18
Jobs are more than just earnings
Jobs have consequences beyond wages and earn-
ings. Other aspects such as workplace safety, 
 stability, commuting time, learning and ad-
vancement opportunities, entitlements to pen-
sion benefits, and other amenities are highly val-
ued by some workers. However, quantifying the 
monetary value of these other aspects of a job 
is not easy. Comparable surveys in Jianyang, 
Saharan African countries. Whereas poverty re-
duction in rural areas in Asia is associated with 
diversification into nonfarm activities, in Sub-
Saharan Africa, it may be more closely associ-
ated with increases in farm productivity.15 
Jobs and relapses into poverty are also con-
nected. Widespread shocks such as droughts, 
floods, and conflicts can drive households into 
poverty or even chronic poverty. Events specific 
to individuals, such as illness or poor health of 
the head of household, can have the same effect. 
In these cases it is not joblessness per se that 
pushes families into poverty but rather the de-
struction of personal and household assets.16 
And even taking these shocks into account, job 
loss of the head of household remains a critical 
determinant of a fall into poverty.17
The poor clearly rely on their labor to make 
a living. The death or disability of an income 
earner  significantly increases the odds of falling 
into poverty or remaining poor, particularly 
F I G U R E  2 . 5  Jobs account for much of the decline in extreme poverty
Sources: Azevedo and others 2012; Inchauste and others 2012; both for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: Family composition indicates the change in the share of adults (ages 18 and older) within the household. Labor income refers to the change in employment and earnings for 
each adult. Nonlabor income refers to changes in other sources of income such as transfers, pensions, and imputed housing rents. If a bar is located below the horizontal axis, it 
means that that source would have increased, instead of decreased, poverty. The changes are computed for Argentina (2000–10); Bangladesh (2000–10); Brazil (2001–09); Chile 
(2000–09); Colombia (2002–10); Costa Rica (2000–08); Ecuador (2003–10); El Salvador (2000­09); Ghana (1998–2005); Honduras (1999–2009); Mexico (2000–10); Moldova (2001–10); 
Panama (2001–09); Paraguay (1999–2010); Peru (2002–10); Nepal (1996–2003); Romania (2001–09); and Thailand (2000–09). The changes for Bangladesh, Ghana, Moldova, Nepal, 
Peru, Romania, and Thailand are computed using consumption­based measures of poverty, while the changes for the other countries are based on income measures.
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dents and diseases kill an average of 6,000 peo-
ple a day, or 2.2 million a year. Most of these 
deaths (1.7 million) result from work-related 
diseases; the remainder is linked to fatal acci-
dents in the workplace and during commutes 
to or from work.20 Every year, more than 400 
million people (nearly 15 percent of the global 
labor force) suffer from occupational accidents 
or illnesses involving work-related diseases. In 
some cases, the incidence is intolerably high: 
half of slate pencil workers in India and 37 per-
cent of the miners in Latin America suffer from 
some stage of silicosis (an occupational lung 
disease caused by inhalation of silica dust).21 
Mental health can be threatened by abusive re-
lations between managers and workers and 
sexual harassment. Health risks are not con-
fined to wage employment. Collecting and car-
rying water or cooking over open stoves, as 
many self-employed workers do, poses risks, 
and these risks are more likely to  affect women 
than men.22 
China; Risaralda, Colombia; Cairo and Fayoum, 
the Arab Republic of Egypt; and Port Loko and 
Free Town, Sierra Leone, showed the limited 
ability of respondents to attach a monetary value 
to job benefits, despite expressing willingness to 
pay.19 Among those who do give an explicit valu-
ation, the willingness to pay for pension benefits 
goes from 5 percent of monthly wages in China 
to 7 percent in Colombia and 13 percent in 
Egypt. Lower values are given for transportation 
allowances (2, 1, and 7 percent, respectively), but 
having a permanent contract is valued more, es-
pecially in Egypt (3, 8, and 22 percent, respec-
tively) (box 2.3).
Characteristics of jobs have other less tan-
gible, but no less real, effects on well-being. In 
particular, jobs can have a direct impact on 
workers’ health, a key component of human 
development and personal well-being (box 
2.4). Ex posure to hazardous substances causes 
an  estimated 651,000 deaths annually, mainly 
in developing countries. Work-related acci-
Workers place a value on jobs that goes beyond income. At the indi-
vidual level, people assess the impact a job might have on their 
physical and mental well-being, as well as on their families. In addi-
tion to the earnings the job provides, they can value the stability of 
a job, its earnings, the possibilities of advancement, or the flexibility 
of working hours. Workers might also value how well a job connects 
them to society, the prestige associated with it, or its contribution to 
social goals.
Hedonic pricing assesses how people value specific job charac-
teristics through their job satisfaction or happiness more broadly. 
Indicators of subjective well-being are linked through sta tistical 
analysis to various job characteristics, including earnings. Statistical 
methods can be used to assess the contribution of each of these job 
characteristics to happiness or job satisfaction.
The weights associated with different job characteristics in the 
estimated hedonic price function allow an assessment of the value 
workers attach to each job characteristic. The monetary value of a 
job characteristic can be assessed by comparing the corresponding 
weight in the hedonic price function with the weight of earnings. 
Thus, for instance, a hedonic function reveals the share of earnings 
respondents would be willing to forgo in exchange for stability, or 
for creativity at work, or for a job providing voice in the workplace.b
Using surveys commissioned for this Report, hedonic valuation 
of health insurance benefits range from 1.5 percent of hourly wages 
BOX 2.3  The value of job attributes can be quantified through hedonic pricing
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Calculations by the World Development Report 2013 team of the FAFO (Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo [Fafo Research Foundation]) 2012 Survey on Good Jobs.
b. Recent examples are Hintermann, Alberini, and Markandya 2010 and Falco and others 2012.
in Colombia and China to 4.2 percent in Egypt and 5.1 percent in 
Sierra Leone.a This is significantly lower than the explicit valuations 
answered by those surveyed: 4.9 percent in China, 10 percent in 
Colombia and Sierra Leone, and, at the highest, 25 percent in Egypt. 
This indicates that the revealed preference of individuals for health 
insurance benefits in the job are lower than the price they express 
they would be willing to pay. Hedonic pricing can also identify the 
revealed preference to pay for other less tangible job charac-
teristics. Salaried workers in Colombia, China, and Egypt would 
forgo up to 1.5 percent of hourly wages for jobs that are “meaning-
ful.” In Egypt, salaried workers reveal a price tag equivalent of up 
to 2.1 percent of hourly wages for jobs that are non-manual or 
nonroutine. 
This approach is especially relevant in the assessment of job 
benefits. These benefits involve a deduction from earnings in ex- 
change for access to a pension in old age, for instance. Jobholders 
typically value these benefits, but they may value them less than the 
associated deductions in earnings through social security contribu-
tions. If the expected value of the pension is low or uncertain, 
they may prefer to remain in the informal sector. In contrast, a well-
designed program that allows longevity risks to be pooled with 
other jobholders may be valued by the jobholder more than the 
deductions associated with participation.
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by the system of social benefits, and from dis-
crimination. In any case, a lower employment 
rate is one of the main channels through which 
disability may lead to poverty.
In countries where wage employment is 
the norm, joblessness may severely affect well-
being. Together with income, social status has 
been recognized as an important factor in the 
development and maintenance of mental 
health.26 Studies document the detrimental ef-
fects of unemployment and the positive effects 
when finding a job.27 Medical research has as-
sociated unemployment with stress, depression, 
heart disease, and alcoholism.28 Psychological 
hardship, marital dissolutions, and suicide have 
also been associated with job loss.29 Depression 
and stress-related illnesses are becoming more 
common with the expansion of outsourcing, 
labor informality, and mobility in the modern 
workplace.30
The impact of unemployment on mental 
health appears to occur independently of the 
availability of social insurance or other mecha-
nisms of protection.31 This is because the psy-
chological hardship of unemployment is also 
associated with social stigma. Studies show that 
a worker who is unemployed or who has a vul-
nerable job faces less duress if the phenomenon 
is more pervasive or if there is less inequality in 
the incidence of unemployment or the distribu-
tion of vulnerable jobs. This finding demon-
strates the close interaction between a person’s 
job and their place in society.32
Jobs and life satisfaction
Happiness, both a personal goal and a social as-
piration, is related to employment status. A large 
body of literature shows that unemployed peo-
ple report lower happiness and life satisfaction 
than their employed counterparts.33 For in-
stance, in Indonesia subjective well-being in-
creases when gaining a job and decreases when 
losing it.34 Some researchers argue that this dis-
content is transitory, but others point out that, 
as long as concerns about job stability persist, 
so does un happiness. This “unhappiness effect” 
is more typically reported in men than in 
women, but evidence indicates that women are 
affected by the unemployment of their spouse. 
Occupational accidents and work-related 
diseases have economic costs. These costs are 
difficult to compute because the estimates 
ought to include spending on health care and 
sickness benefits, as well as the forgone earn-
ings from workdays lost. Estimating these costs 
is particularly difficult in the case of the self-
employed. The few studies that have tried to do 
so suggest that the burden on society could be 
high. In Spain, in the industrial sector alone, 
these costs were estimated to amount to 1.72 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2004. In Mauritius, the cost of work-related in-
juries  represented around 2.8 percent of GDP 
in 2003.23 Global estimates put the cost asso-
ciated with work-related sickness at around 4 
percent of GDP.24
Opportunities to participate in labor markets 
for people with disabilities vary across countries. 
The employment ratio of people with disabilities 
ranges from 70 percent, in Poland, to 20 percent, 
in Switzerland and Zambia, lower than the ratio 
for the overall population.25 Disabilities may be 
preexisting conditions or the result of job-related 
injuries or conditions. Different labor outcomes 
among persons with disabilities stem from pro-
ductivity differentials, from disincentives created 
Surveys of workers in garment factories in three countries underscore the 
health and safety hazards they face in their jobs. Garment workers in Indonesia, 
Jordan, and Haiti have reported physical stresses linked to work, including hun-
ger, thirst, and severe fatigue.
In Indonesia, more than half the workers surveyed reported that they had 
experienced severe thirst often or every day. Heat is a likely contributor. Asked 
whether the factory is too hot or too cold, only about half (52 percent) reported 
that temperature was not a concern. Occupational safety is an issue for many: 
59 percent of workers reported concerns about dangerous equipment; 73 per-
cent were concerned about accidents; 64 percent, about dusty or polluted air; 
and 69 percent, about chemical odors.
In factories in Jordan, 37 percent of workers reported concerns about dan-
gerous equipment, and 45 percent reported concerns about accidents and 
injuries.
In Haiti, 40 percent of workers reported that they had experienced severe 
fatigue or exhaustion occasionally, often, or every day; 41 percent reported 
frequent headaches, dizziness, backaches, or neck aches. A stunning 63 per-
cent of workers reported that they had experienced severe thirst often or 
every day.
BOX 2.4   Work can pose risks to health and safety
Source: IFC and ILO 2011.
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employed have higher levels of satisfaction 
than the unemployed.
Whether the self-employed express greater 
satisfaction than wage workers depends on the 
context. In industrial countries and in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, life satisfaction is, on 
average, similar among both groups, but in 
Latin America, it is substantially lower among 
the self-employed.42
Jobs contribute to how people view them-
selves and relate to others. Most people feel 
strongly that their jobs should be meaningful 
and contribute to society. A 2005 survey of 29 
countries asked people about the characteristics 
that they valued in their jobs.43 Over three- 
quarters reported that it is important to have a 
job that is useful to society, and a similar share 
agreed that it is important that their jobs help 
other people. In nine countries, the share who 
reported that it is important for jobs to be so-
cially useful was higher than the share reporting 
that high income is important. While most of 
these are high-income countries, preferences for 
The lack of employment can lower the self- 
esteem and undermine the  social status of other 
family members.35
When jobs are in short supply and unem-
ployment becomes a problem, people change 
their expectations and attitudes. Data from the 
World Value Surveys for a large set of countries 
(both developed and developing) show that 
higher unemployment rates are associated with 
lower ambitions to do meaningful work, per-
haps indicating that a lack of available jobs im-
pels individuals to accept any job. 
It is not only one’s joblessness that may be 
important to life satisfaction. In the United 
Kingdom, the unemployed are less unhappy in 
districts in which the unemployment rate is 
higher, suggesting that joblessness always hurts 
but that it hurts less if there are many unem-
ployed people in the local area.36 The effect on 
happiness of not having a job seems to be par-
tially offset by the lower social stigma when 
the lack of jobs is widespread. Joblessness also 
leads to a loss of contact with people through 
the workplace and to a contraction in related 
social networks, which can erode social capital 
and undermine the sense of engagement with 
others.37
Simply having a job does not guarantee 
higher life satisfaction. Feeling insecure at work 
because of earnings variability, job instability, or 
health and safety concerns also affects a person’s 
sense of well-being (figure 2.6).38 For wage 
workers, the type of contract and its duration 
are important; part-timers and seasonal work-
ers express less job satisfaction. Even workers 
with long-term contracts may feel insecure.39 In 
factories in Haiti, Jordan, and Vietnam, earn-
ings from work did not influence the reported 
level of life satisfaction, but working conditions 
did.40 In more developed countries, jobs that 
provide more autonomy are linked to higher life 
satisfaction.41
Most research on the links between jobs and 
life satisfaction has been conducted in settings 
where wage employment is the norm. A grow-
ing literature on life satisfaction in developing 
regions, where a smaller share of those who 
work are wage earners, shows that farmers have 
the lowest levels of life satisfaction relative to 
other workers and the unemployed (figure 
2.7). Meanwhile, wage workers and the self-
F I G U R E  2 . 6  Workers often care more about job security 
than about income
Source: ISSP 2005.
Note: The analysis covers 29 countries, each represented in the figure by a dot. Respondents scored the 
importance of job security and job income on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 = very important, 4 = important, 
3 = neither important nor unimportant, 2 = unimportant, 1 = not important at all.
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and social norms. Notwithstanding this, other 
health variables used as proxies of job satisfac-
tion such as absence of fear or sadness also 
show an association with working conditions. 
Research for Haiti, Jordan, and Vietnam finds 
working conditions such as basic hygiene and 
health, workplace facilities, or presence of 
unions to be associated with fewer feelings of 
fear or sadness.44
*   *   *
Jobs have an impact on the well-being of the 
person who holds them, but they can also have 
an impact on the well-being of others. Some 
jobs bring more poverty reduction and, as 
such, benefit those who consider eradicating 
poverty to be a fundamental societal goal. 
Some jobs promote higher employment rates 
among women, giving more say on the way 
household resources are allocated, typically 
leading to greater spending on raising children. 
Gender equality, much the same as poverty re-
duction, is a broadly shared societal goal. Jobs 
that have these additional impacts do more for 
development. Given such spillover effects, jobs 
play a fundamental role in the well being of 
 individuals and entire societies. Jobs may thus 
be the center piece of a development strategy 
(Question 2).
F I G U R E  2 . 7 Life satisfaction is lower among farmers and the 
unemployed
Sources: Gallup 2009, 2010.
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socially useful and high-income jobs did not dif-
fer greatly in the Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
or South Africa.
Job satisfaction and other measures of non-
material well-being such as happiness or iden-
tity may be affected by cultural differences 
QUeStION 2
Rapid and sustained growth is generally viewed 
as the main priority for developing countries, 
and as a precondition for continued increases in 
living standards and strengthened social cohe-
sion. Economic growth, living standards, and 
social cohesion can indeed move together, and 
they often do—as shown, for example, by the 
remarkable experience of East Asian economies, 
including the Republic of Korea and Singa-
pore.45 Building on the East Asian experience, 
the conventional wisdom is to focus on growth 
and assume that increased living standards and 
greater social cohesion will follow. This is the 
main tenet behind “growth strategies,” “growth 
diagnostics,” and “binding constraints analyses,” 
all of which aim to identify and remove obsta-
cles to economic growth and to sustain it over 
prolonged periods of time.
But transformations in living standards, pro-
ductivity, and social cohesion do not necessarily 
happen at the same pace. Lags and gaps in rising 
living standards can be illustrated by the differ-
ent impacts growth has on poverty reduction 
across countries. A 2 percent annual growth rate 
can reduce poverty rates by 1 percent in some 
countries and by 7 percent in others.46 Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, and Zambia experienced periods of 
economic growth with very little change in pov-
erty incidence.47 On the other hand, important 
advances in poverty reduction have also hap-
pened during periods of slow growth, as oc-
curred in Brazil and Mexico during the 1990s 
and the first half of the 2000s.48 And in some 
cases, growth is not accompanied by increased 
social cohesion—even though poverty may fall 
and living standards improve for some, the ex-
pectations of others remain unfulfilled. Tunisia 
is a clear example in this regard: its growth rate 
is well above the average of the region, but it has 
nonetheless experienced serious social and po-
litical tensions.49
The recognition of these lags and gaps has 
led to more nuanced approaches to economic 
growth in which the growth being sought is 
“pro-poor,” “shared,” or “inclusive.”50 In these 
versions, it is not just the rate of growth that 
matters but also the initial distribution of in-
come and the possibility of redistributing re-
sources through the growth process itself and 
through government transfers.51
Behind these sensible qualifiers, it is possible 
to point to the role of jobs. Growth is “inclusive” 
when higher earnings are driven by employ-
ment opportunities for the majority of the labor 
force, particularly the poor. Recent studies show 
that the impact of economic growth on poverty 
reduction depends critically on the employment 
intensity of different sectors.52 Employment 
 opportunities also matter for social cohesion. 
It is thus jobs that bring together the three 
transformations.
Realizing the role jobs play implies going be-
yond the sequential view in which growth issues 
are addressed first and employment follows 
from increased demand. Instead, jobs are seen 
as a medium that can make the development 
transformations a reality. From a sta tistical 
point of view, the relationship between growth 
and employment (or unemployment) shows 
substantial variation over time, across countries, 
and across sectors. In light of this diversity, a 
given rate of growth does not guarantee a given 
level of job creation or a given composition of 
employment (box 2.5).
When a growth strategy may not be 
sufficient
Focusing on the aggregate relationship be-
tween growth and employment downplays 
some of the most important channels through 
which jobs connect to development. The very 
notion of employment as derived labor de-
mand does not reflect the situation of the many 
working people in developing countries who 
are farmers and self-employed. The focus on 
the labor market as the transmission chain be-
tween growth and employment also does not 
capture the interaction of working people with 
others in households, at the workplace, and in 
society more broadly. Focusing solely on the 
relationship between growth and employment 
may fail to measure how jobs can foster gender 
equality, support urbanization, or contribute 
Growth strategies or jobs strategies?
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In practice, however, tradeoffs between the 
three transformations can amount to more than 
just lags and gaps. Depending on the nature of 
the jobs challenges facing a country, tensions 
may emerge between growth that generates jobs 
for living standards and growth that generates 
jobs for productivity growth or for social cohe-
sion. Examples abound:
• In agrarian economies, increasing productiv-
ity in smallholder farming is fundamental for 
poverty reduction, given the share of the pop-
ulation living in rural areas. But urban jobs in 
activities that connect the economy to world 
markets and global value chains are necessary 
for growth. With limited resources to support 
both, a tradeoff between living standards and 
productivity may arise.
• In resource-rich countries, massive invest-
ments in extractive industries support accel-
to peaceful collective decision making. Under-
standing how to enhance these positive spill-
overs from jobs might be difficult when only 
aggregates are considered. 
The case of urbanizing economies such as 
Bangladesh may support the idea that the three 
major transformations happen simultaneously. 
Taking advantage of their abundance of rela-
tively low-skilled labor, such economies can 
 engage in world markets through light manu-
facturing. Wage employment is created in large 
numbers, providing opportunities for rural mi-
grants, and cushioning social tensions at a time 
of rapid social change. In Bangladesh, the ex-
pansion of the light manufacturing sector has 
allowed for the integration of young women 
into the labor market, at a time of falling fertility 
rates. Employment opportunities for women 
have in turn led to growing female schooling, 
better human development outcomes, and 
faster poverty reduction.
The statistical connection between economic growth and employ-
ment is sometimes termed Okun’s Law. In 1962 Arthur Okun found 
that in the years immediately following World War II, a 1 percent 
increase in gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States 
brought about a 0.3 percent decline in unemployment. Since then, 
this empirical regularity has found support in a wide variety of coun-
tries. Recent research, however, suggests that Okun’s Law is not as 
stable as its name implies.a
The debate on the stability of Okun’s Law sheds light on the char-
acteristics of economic recessions and expansions. A recent study 
indicates that, in industrial countries, unemployment has become 
more responsive to output declines over the past 20 years. This has 
been attributed to institutional reforms that have made labor mar-
kets more flexible. Interestingly, economies that suffer financial cri-
ses and large housing price busts (such as the United States and 
Spain in recent years) have deeper and longer increases in unem-
ployment than Okun’s Law would have predicted; whereas econo-
mies with large short-time work schemes (like Germany, Italy, Japan, 
and the Netherlands) show less unemployment than predicted.b 
While Okun’s Law relates to unemployment, other studies focus 
on the growth elasticity of employment. In its simplest form, this 
elasticity is the ratio between the percentage change in employ-
BOX 2.5   The relationship between growth and employment is not mechanical
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Cazes, Verick, and Al Hussami 2011; Moosa 2012.
b. Balakrishnan, Das, and Kannan 2009.
c. Martins 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
d. World Bank 2010.
e. Bhalotra 1998; Roy 2004.
f. Arias­Vasquez and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
g. IFC, forthcoming.
ment and the percentage change in GDP. These elasticities show 
great variability over time and space, too, making it difficult to fore-
cast net job creation over the course of development. For instance, 
in Tanzania growth elasticities of employment declined from 1.04 in 
the period 1992–96 to 0.27 in the period 2004–08. Similar trends 
have been reported for Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mozambique.c In Latin 
America, recent estimates show that growth elasticities of employ-
ment were much lower during the global financial crisis than in pre-
vious crises. In other words, the Great Recession produced compara-
tively less net employment destruction in that region.d 
While employment and unemployment are aggregates, growth 
may also affect the composition of unemployment. Important con-
troversies, such as why manufacturing employment in India has 
stagnated despite rapid growth in the sector can be interpreted in 
this light.e Other studies show that, given their different labor inten-
sities, economic growth in some sectors like agriculture, construc-
tion, or services generates more employment than does economic 
growth in manufacturing.f Investment projects in agribusiness in 
Ukraine, in construction in India, and in tourism in Rwanda have had 
large employment impacts, not only because of the direct jobs cre-
ated but also because of indirect job creation in their large network 
of distribution channels.g
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fully accounting for the negative impact of cur-
rent pollution on workers’ future health would 
make a more complete evaluation of the output 
potential of a growth strategy based on a given 
technology. Opting for defused tensions or 
greater integration in world trade would lay the 
ground for accelerating growth in the future in a 
sustainable way, which a short-term evaluation 
based on output growth alone would fail to con-
sider. If measures of growth captured the intan-
gible social benefits from jobs, a growth strategy 
and a jobs strategy would be equivalent. How-
ever, when focusing on measured growth only, 
spillovers from jobs can easily be overlooked, 
and this is why a jobs strategy may be needed. By 
focusing on the spillovers from jobs, a jobs strat-
egy highlights the different outcomes of interest 
in a development process.
Considering a jobs strategy is a way to call 
attention to the social value of jobs. A jobs strat-
egy assesses the types of jobs that do more for 
development in a particular country context. It 
relies on qualitative and quantitative analyses to 
identify how jobs contribute to living standards, 
productivity, and social cohesion. And it seeks to 
identify where the constraints to the creation of 
the jobs with the highest development payoff 
lie in practice. In some cases, a jobs strategy will 
focus on increasing female labor participation, 
in others on creating employment opportuni-
ties for youth, yet in others on creating a sup-
portive environment for the creation of jobs in 
cities, or jobs connected to global value chains. 
This may not be too different from preparing 
a more comprehensive growth strategy, except 
that jobs would be center stage.
Jobs strategies are not needed under all cir-
cumstances. A jobs strategy is warranted only 
when potentially important spillovers from 
jobs are not realized, leading to tensions be-
tween living standards, productivity, and social 
cohesion. When improvements in living stan-
dards, productivity, and social cohesion happen 
together, as was the case in several East Asian 
countries, and may now be the case in urbaniz-
ing economies such as Bangladesh, a growth 
strategy may be more appropriate. Yet even re-
markably successful East Asian economies such 
as Korea and Singapore, which undoubtedly de-
livered inclusive growth over many decades, also 
had jobs strategies at specific points in their de-
velopment histories (box 2.6).
erated rates of growth and connections with 
international markets but generate little di-
rect (or even indirect) employment and of-
ten little poverty reduction. Moreover, the 
abundance of foreign exchange undermines 
the competitiveness of other activities, mak-
ing it difficult to create productive jobs in 
other sectors.
• In countries with high youth unemployment, 
job opportunities are not commensurate with 
the expectations created by the expansion of 
education systems. And the active labor mar-
ket programs needed to defuse social tensions 
in the short term may not do much for pov-
erty reduction because many of the jobless 
come from middle-class families, and devot-
ing public resources to finance them may re-
duce economic dynamism.
• In formalizing economies, there is an effort 
to support social cohesion by extending the 
coverage of social protection to as many 
workers as possible. Broad coverage regard-
less of the type of job is often seen as part of a 
social compact. But extending coverage with-
out distorting incentives to work, save, and 
participate in formal systems is difficult and 
may have adverse impacts on productivity 
and long-term growth.
When a jobs strategy may be appropriate 
Tradeoffs between improving living standards, 
accelerating productivity growth, and fostering 
social cohesion arguably reflect a measurement 
problem. While the contribution jobs make to 
output can be quantified, some of the spillovers 
from jobs cannot. Measured output does not 
increase when jobs defuse social tensions, even 
though these outcomes are valued by society 
and may increase productivity in the future. 
Conversely, measured output does not decline 
when jobs in export sectors are replaced by jobs 
producing for the domestic market, even 
though the oppor tunities to acquire technical 
and managerial knowledge through work tend 
to be higher in the export sectors.
If the spillovers from jobs could be appro-
priately quantified, the tradeoffs would be fully 
understood and an adequate evaluation of the 
output and employment potential of a given 
growth strategy would be possible. For example, 
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The Republic of Korea and Singapore are success stories combining 
long-term economic growth with rapid poverty reduction and 
strong social cohesion. But at different points in time, both coun-
tries relied on jobs strategies.
Singapore was confronted with a tense social situation at inde-
pendence, with both high unemployment and inter-ethnic tension. 
Its first development strategy focused on jobs, housing, and wage 
moderation. As unemployment subsided, the next strategy was 
geared toward raising labor costs to encourage higher-value-added 
activities. This cost drive resulted in a recession, however, and since 
then Singapore has focused on growth, rather than jobs.
Conversely, Korea abandoned development planning in 1996, 
but in 2010, it adopted a jobs strategy for the next decade as its 
highest-level policy document. In October 2010, the Korean govern-
ment launched the “National Employment Strategy 2020 for the Bal-
ance of Growth, Employment and Welfare.” In the tradition of long-
range plans, this national strategy has a clear target for 2020: an 
increase in the employment rate of the working-age population 
(15–64 years) to a minimum of 70 percent—the average among 
industrial economies. The strategy was rooted in the mismatch 
between macroeconomic indicators that pointed to a recovering 
economy and the inability of individuals—especially youth—to find 
adequate employment. 
BOX 2.6   Korea went from a growth to a jobs strategy, and Singapore the other way around
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Huff 1994, 1995; Republic of Korea 2010.
a.  The 40­hour workweek was introduced in 2004 and applied only to companies with over 1,000 employees.
b.  This system allows employees to take leave to compensate for overtime, work during holidays, or night work. 
c.  The wage peak system allows companies to rehire workers after they retire.
The strategy identifies four pillars to achieve the 70 percent tar-
get. The first recognizes the importance of collaboration between 
the public and private sectors for employment creation and consists 
of implementing economic and industrial policies in a job-friendly 
manner. The second aims at improving flexibility and fairness in the 
workplace and consists of a series of reforms to increase regulation 
in certain areas of the labor law, while decreasing regulation in oth-
ers. Thus the 40-hour workweek became enforceable for all compa-
nies, regardless of size,a with the obligatory introduction of the work 
time savings system.b Simultaneously, regulations on duration of con-
tracts for temporary workers and fixed-term contracts were relaxed 
to allow for more hiring flexibility. The third pillar focuses on increas-
ing labor force participation and skill development of women, youth, 
and older workers. This involves developing the option of perma-
nent part-time jobs, thus allowing parents to both work and care for 
their children, especially in sectors suffering from labor shortages 
and unable to fill full-time jobs. Older workers would be retained 
longer in the active labor force by having the option to work shorter 
hours under the wage peak system.c Last but not least, the inten-
tion is to facilitate welfare-to-work transitions, by encouraging able- 
bodied welfare recipients to enroll in employment assistance pro-
grams and by reinforcing their obligation to pursue employment.
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Chapter 3
Productivity growth happens as jobs be-come more productive, as new high- productivity jobs are created, and as low- 
productivity jobs disappear. In the medium 
term, trends in employment align closely with 
trends in the labor force, so there is no such a 
thing as jobless growth. But the short-term rela-
tionship between employment and growth is 
more complex. Large numbers of jobs are being 
created and destroyed simultaneously, leading 
to structural change and spatial labor realloca-
tion. Underneath these sectoral and spatial 
changes are firm dynamics that result in a con-
stant restructuring and reallocation of resources, 
including labor. 
In developing countries, many people work 
in very small and not so dynamic economic 
units. Family farms, which often predominate 
in agriculture, average only 1.2 hectares in Asia, 
and 1.8 hectares in Sub-Saharan Africa. Outside 
of agriculture, microenterprises and household 
businesses account for a large share of employ-
ment in a majority of developing countries. 
These businesses make a significant contribution 
to gross job creation and destruction, although 
not necessarily to net job creation and produc-
tivity growth. 
In agriculture, the Green Revolution has 
led to higher cereal yields and to employment 
growth because the new technologies are labor 
intensive. The progress has been uneven across 
regions, however. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Green Revolution has not taken place on a large 
scale.
Outside of agriculture, productivity varies 
substantially across enterprises, implying po-
tentially large productivity gains from job real-
location. The speed at which productivity grows 
also varies. Large firms are more innovative, 
provided that they are exposed to competition. 
At the other end, microenterprises are a diverse 
group. A vast majority of them, more prone to 
churning than to growth, are a means of survival 
for the poor. Yet some are entrepreneurial, and 
their success could boost wage employment.
Employment turbulence,  
not jobless growth
Jobless growth is a popular notion, often be-
lieved to be grounded on data. However, unem-
ployment rates neither explode nor vanish over 
time, so employment trends align closely with 
trends in the size of the labor force. The growth 
of gross domestic product (GDP) certainly mat-
ters for employment growth, but in the medium 
term it matters less than demographics and par-
ticipation rates. Data from 97 countries over the 
past decade confirm that a positive relationship 
exists between the growth of GDP per capita and 
the growth of employment per capita (figure 
Jobs and productivity
Reallocation from low- to high-productivity jobs matters more for growth in 
developing countries, where differences in productivity across sectors and within 
sectors are wide. But reallocation often amounts to little more than churning.
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deed associated with a decline in employment in 
the same year (figure 3.1b). Only in subsequent 
years did this negative employment effect wane.
Productivity growth is a turbulent pro-
cess. Analyses covering economies as different 
as Ethiopia and the United States in different 
periods over the past three decades reveal the 
magnitude of gross job creation and gross job 
destruction (figure 3.2). In the manufacturing 
sector of developing countries, between 7 and 
3.1a).1 The relationship is not very strong, but 
only in very  few cases was growth truly jobless. 
On the other hand, the short-term relation-
ship between growth and employment is not 
so straightforward. Growth happens partly 
through the disappearance of low-productivity 
jobs as well as through the creation of more 
productive jobs.2 So for the same sample of 
countries over the same decade, surges in total 
factor productivity (TFP) in one year were in-
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
At the risk of simplifying, four main forces lie behind increases in an 
economy’s per capita output. The first is the use of more capital per 
unit of labor. The second is an increase in the number of people 
working, relative to the total population. This happens when fertility 
declines and the share of adults in the total population increases; 
it is also happens when women shift their work from household 
chores to income-generating activities. The third mechanism 
through which output can grow is by making people themselves 
more productive. The acquisition of skills, also known as human 
capital accumulation, allows a person to do more using the same 
amount of capital. The fourth mechanism is technological progress, 
BOX 3.1   What drives economic growth?
measured as changes in total factor productivity. Technological 
progress amounts to combining capital, labor, and skills more effi-
ciently, while applying new knowledge. 
Growth decomposition quantifies the contribution of each of 
these four forces to economic growth. It can be done for any partic-
ular country given sufficient data on gross domestic product, capi-
tal, employment, and human capital. Some of these variables may 
need to be constructed or approximated; for instance, the stock of 
capital in an economy is estimated based on accumulated invest-
ments, while human capital is approximated by the educational 
attainment of its population, corrected for the quality of education.
F I G U R E  3 .1  Economic growth does not occur at the expense of jobs in the medium term
Source: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on average growth decomposition accounting for years 1999–2009.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; TFP = total factor productivity. Data are from 97 countries. Panel a presents the relationship between annual growth of GDP per capita and 
the growth of the employment-to-population ratio. Each dot represents a country. Panel b depicts the correlation between annual growth in total factor productivity (TFP) and 
employment rate growth in the same year, and in subsequent years. 
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20 percent of jobs are created every year, while 
a similar proportion disappear.3 Even when 
aggregate employment was declining, as in 
the 1990s in Romania and Slovenia and in the 
manufacturing sector of República Bolivariana 
de Venezuela, many new jobs were being cre-
ated. Conversely, when aggregate employment 
was growing by 6 percent in Mexico, jobs were 
disappearing at almost twice that rate. 
Job flows may be associated with profound 
transformations in the sectoral structure of the 
economy. Technological change often occurs for 
specific products and processes, causing pro-
ductivity to grow at different paces in different 
sectors. However, the relative weight of different 
sectors in the economy is determined not only 
by technological progress, but also by market 
demand and nonmarket forces. When there is 
an expansion of the most productive sectors, ag-
gregate productivity increases. This composition 
effect, called productivity-enhancing structural 
change, is well documented in the case of labor 
shifts from agriculture to industry and services. 
Analysis based on more disaggregated data sug-
gests that reallocation of labor across sectors has 
also been an important driver of productivity 
growth in several fast-growing East Asian coun-
tries. In China, it contributed 4.1 percentage 
points of the 7.3 percent annual growth in ag-
gregate labor productivity over the past decade; 
in Vietnam, it accounted for 2.6 points out of 4.2 
(figure 3.3).4 
Job flows are also associated with changes 
in the spatial distribution of employment. 
The structural shift from agriculture in rural 
areas to industry and services in towns and 
cities may be the most visible example of spa-
tial labor reallocation, but it is not the only 
one.5 Even within sectors, job flows often have 
a strong spatial dimension. New plants associ-
ated with more innovative activities tend to start 
in large, diversified cities—incubators—with 
a higher density of suppliers and labor, and 
more fluent exchanges of information. As they 
mature and become more self-sufficient in in-
formation, these plants move to smaller cities, 
where land and wage costs are lower. As a result, 
many medium and small cities tend to be more 
specialized.6
The extent of spatial relocation varies across 
sectors and countries. For instance, in the Re-
public of Korea, manufacturing dominance in 
F I G U R E  3 . 2  Simultaneous job creation and destruction 
characterize all economies
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and  
Scarpetta 2009b and Shiferaw and Bedi 2010.
Note: The figure shows annual job flows. Data are from Argentina (1996–2001); Brazil (1997–2000);  
Canada (1984–97); Chile (1980–98); Colombia (1983–97); Estonia (1996–2000); Ethiopia (1997–2007);  
Finland (1989–97); France (1989–97); Germany (1977–99); Hungary (1993–2000); Indonesia (1991–94); Italy 
(1987–94); Latvia (1983–98); Mexico (1986–2000); the Netherlands (1993–95);  Portugal (1983–98); Romania 
(1993–2000); Slovenia (1991–2000); Taiwan, China (1986–91); the United Kingdom (1982–98); the United 
States (1986–91, 1994–96); and República Bolivariana de Venezuela (1996–98).
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main driver of aggregate productivity growth is 
firms becoming better at what they do (figure 
3.4).9 Entry and exit also contribute, which in-
dicates that new firms are more productive than 
those exiting. In general, exiting firms see their 
productivity decline before they close, whereas 
new firms tend to attain the average levels of 
productivity of their industry within five years. 
These complex dynamics imply that at any point 
in time, firms with very different productiv-
ity levels coexist, even within narrowly defined 
industries.10
The popular perception that productivity 
grows through downsizing at the firm level is 
partially supported by these analyses. Indeed, 
in many cases, employment tends to shrink in 
firms experiencing rapid productivity growth.11 
But downsizing is only part of the story. There 
are also many successful upsizing firms, achiev-
ing both productivity growth and employment 
growth.12 For instance, one-fourth of manufac-
urban centers has continued for a long period 
of time. Enterprises have been sprawling into 
the suburbs of urban centers rather than leap-
frogging to different locations as in some in-
dustrial countries (map 3.1). Similar shifts are 
happening in Brazil, China, and Vietnam.7 In 
India, large manufacturing enterprises are mov-
ing away from urban centers into rural loca-
tions.8 Regardless of the nature of the shift, al-
most inevitably jobs are created in some places 
and destroyed in others.
Underneath these sectoral and spatial changes 
in the structure of employment are the firm 
dynamics connecting job flows and productiv-
ity growth. Aggregate productivity grows when 
existing firms become better at what they do, 
when more productive firms enter the market, 
and when less productive ones exit. It also grows 
when more productive firms become bigger and 
less productive ones become smaller. Decompo-
sition analyses show that in most countries the 
F I G U R E  3 . 3  Labor reallocation across sectors was a driver of productivity growth in 
East Asia
Source: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on Kucera and Roncolato 2012.
Note: The figure shows the decomposition of labor productivity growth in 81 economies over 1999–2008 into productivity changes due to changes within sectors and reallocation 
across sectors. Seven sectors are considered: agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; mining and utilities; manufacturing; construction; trade, restaurants, and hotels; transport, 
storage, and communication; and other services. The regional growth rates are weighted averages, with weights based on an economy’s share in regional GDP.
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m a p  3 .1 Manufacturing activities are sprawling out of the main urban centers in the Republic of Korea
Source: Park et al. 2011.
Note: The maps show employment shares of manufacturing industries at the city or county level for 1960, 1985, and 2005.
F I G U R E  3 . 4 Efficiency gains at the firm level are the main driver of productivity growth
Source: Based on Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 2009b.
Note: The figure decomposes annual labor productivity growth. Data for industrial countries are from France (1990–95), the Netherlands (1992–2001), the United States (1992,1997), 
Portugal (1991–1994), the United Kingdom (2000, 2001), and Germany (2000–02). Data for developing economies are from Argentina (1995–2001); Brazil (2001); Chile (1985–99); 
Colombia (1987–98); Estonia (2000, 2001); the Republic of Korea (1988, 1993); Slovenia (1997–2001); Taiwan, China (1986, 1991, 1996); and República Bolivariana de Venezuela 
(1999). Within captures the changes at the firm level, between the changes in employment shares across firms, cross the interaction between the former two, and entry and exit the 
opening and closure of firms.
an
nu
al
 la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 g
ro
w
th
, %
14
manufacturing services
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
–2
–4
Fra
nc
e
Po
rtu
ga
l
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
Ge
rm
an
y
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Ne
th
erl
an
ds
Fin
lan
d
La
tvi
a
Ve
ne
zu
ela
, R
B
Br
az
il
Ch
ile
Co
lom
bia
Ar
ge
nt
ina
Ta
iw
an
, C
hin
a
Es
to
nia
Slo
ve
nia
Ko
rea
, R
ep
.
Ge
rm
an
y
Po
rtu
ga
l
La
tvi
a
Es
to
nia
within between cross entry and exit
Incheon
Taegu
Pusan
SEOUL
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Sea of
Japan
Yellow
Sea
Korea Strait
129°E126°E 127°E 128°E
34°N
35° N
36°N
37°N
Taegu
Pusan
SEOUL
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA Sea of
Japan
Yellow
Sea
Korea Strait
129°E126°E 127°E 128°E
34°N
35° N
36°N
37°N
SEOUL
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA Sea of
Japan
Yellow
Sea
Korea Strait
129°E126°E 127°E 128°E
34°N
35° N
36°N
37°N
CITIES AND TOWNS
PROVINCE CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
EMPLOYMENT SHARES OF
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
40%
30%
20%
10%
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES ARE SPRAWLING INTO SUBURBS OF URBAN CORE IN KOREA
1960 1985 2005
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. 
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
0 30 60 Kilometers 0 30 60 Kilometers 0 30 60 Kilometers
COUNTY BOUNDARIES
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
IBRD 39533
SEPTEMBER 2012
EMPLOYMENT
SHARES OF
MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES
40%
30%
20%
10%
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.  
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
CITIES AND TOWNS
PROVINCE CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
COUNTY BOUNDARIES
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.  
he boundaries, colors, denominati ns a d any other information 
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of  The World Bank  
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any 
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
 Jobs and productivity  103
be successful upsizers.13 Recent evidence based 
on 26,000 manufacturers from 71 countries fur-
ther shows that firms that innovated in products 
or processes were more likely to be successful up-
sizers; they not only attained higher total factor 
productivity than noninnovative firms; they also 
exhibited higher employment growth.14
Transition economies in Europe illustrate 
the links between job reallocation and pro-
ductivity growth. Before reforms were imple-
mented, these economies suffered from large 
distortions caused by a rigid planning system, 
which prevented resources from flowing to 
more efficient uses. Liberalization led to mas-
sive downsizing and job losses. Eventually, it also 
strengthened incentives, mobility, and markets, 
opening up space for more productive private 
companies. The entry of these dynamic players 
contributed between 20 and 50 percent of total 
labor productivity growth in the late 1990s. The 
exit of obsolete firms released resources that 
could be used more effectively by new or exist-
ing firms. Although lack of experience and small 
turing plants operating in Chile over 2001–06 
were successful downsizers, consistent with the 
popular perception. But another one-fourth 
were successful upsizers, achieving both pro-
ductivity and employment growth (figure 3.5). 
More important, the successful upsizers con-
tributed more to production, employment, and 
aggregate productivity growth than the success-
ful downsizers. Results were similar in Romania 
between 2000 and 2005, and in Ethiopia between 
2005 and 2009. While country experiences vary, 
having a critical mass of successful upsizers is not 
uncommon. 
Across countries, successful upsizers in man-
ufacturing industries tend to be younger, leaner, 
and more innovative. Among survivors in the 
same industry and region, younger firms were 
more likely to be upsizers in Chile over 2001–06, 
and successful upsizers in Romania over 2000–
05. In all three countries, survivors employing 
fewer than 20 employees tended to upsize fewer 
rather than downsize. In Romania, survivors in-
vesting more in capital per worker also tended to 
F I G U R E  3 . 5 Efficiency gains and employment growth can go together
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census reported 1.33 million manufacturing 
firms with annual sales above RMB 5 million.16 
Most of them were private. The entry of these 
new businesses and the closure of nonviable 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) accounted for 
two-thirds of TFP growth in manufacturing 
sectors over 1998–2006.17 
Most jobs are in very small farms 
and firms
Many people in developing countries work 
in very small and not very dynamic economic 
units—family farms, microenterprises, and 
household businesses. Although microenter-
prises are often defined as firms employing ten 
or fewer workers, many among them are actu-
ally one-person businesses. Given their contri-
bution to total employment, these small eco-
nomic units cannot be ignored. Understanding 
their dynamics is crucial to deciphering the rela-
tionship between jobs and productivity. 
In family farms, hired labor is usually em-
ployed in simple tasks such as weeding and har-
vesting, whereas family labor usually carries out 
care-intensive activities such as water manage-
ment, land preparation, and fertilizer applica-
tion. Limited reliance on hired labor is due to 
the difficulty to monitor effort, and without 
machinery, farms cannot be expanded beyond 
the size manageable by the family’s labor, which 
is typically 1 to 2 hectares.18 Family farms domi-
nate even in high-income countries, and owner 
cultivation is the most common form of land 
tenure, especially in Asia (figure 3.6).
At 1.2 and 1.8 hectares, respectively, average 
farm size is small in both Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.19 In Asia, farmers typically own land 
plots, which they supplement through tenancy 
contracts that facilitate transfers from relatively 
land-abundant to relatively labor-abundant 
households. Farms in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
slightly larger than in Asia, but size and the im-
portance of owner farming are becoming similar 
in both regions.20 There are some exceptions to 
this pattern. Colonial governments created large 
farms in some developing countries, such as es-
tates in southern Africa, haciendas in Latin 
America and the Philippines, and plantations in 
the Caribbean. In Sub-Saharan Africa, large ar-
eas are also held as customary land—owned col-
lectively by extended families, clans, or lineage.21
size often made the new firms less productive 
than the average firms of more advanced coun-
tries, these new firms were more efficient than 
domestic incumbents. They played a strong role 
in boosting productivity in medium- and high-
technology industries and in exerting competi-
tive pressure on existing firms.15
China’s rapid productivity growth was 
also underpinned by large-scale reallocation. 
Beginning in 1978, economic reform efforts 
gradually expanded the influence of markets 
and deepened global integration. All of this 
created unprecedented opportunities for the 
formation of private entities, including town-
ship and village enterprises, and the entry of 
foreign companies. During the first decade of 
reform (1978–88), reallocation from agricul-
ture to nonagriculture activities was the source 
of almost half of all productivity growth. In the 
following decades, however, the main drivers 
of productivity growth were labor reallocation 
out of the state sector, private sector vibrancy, 
and state sector restructuring. The scale of 
business entry was startling: the number of 
industrial firms rose from 377,000 in 1980 to 
nearly 8 million in 1996. The 2004 economic 
F I G U R E  3 . 6  Smallholder farming is dominant 
outside Latin America
Source: FAO 2010.
Note: ha = hectare. Countries in Asia include: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand; in Europe and Central Asia: Azerbaijan, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey; in Latin America and the Caribbean: Brazil, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay, República Bolivariana de Venezu-
ela, and Virgin Islands (United States); in the Middle East and North Africa: the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia; and in Sub-Saharan Africa: Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Madagascar.
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It is often claimed that most employment, and 
most job creation, is associated with small and 
medium enterprises, but that is generally not true 
in developing countries. In reality, micro- and 
small enterprises account for the bulk of employ-
ment, even in middle-income countries (figure 
3.7). Their share is often underestimated, because 
economic censuses and plant-level surveys rarely 
cover the informal segment of the economy, 
where businesses are especially small. But data 
from household and labor force surveys that are 
representative of the entire population provide 
a different picture. These small enterprises play 
significant role in employment in manufactur-
ing. They account for 97 percent of employment 
Outside of agriculture, microenterprises 
and household businesses are dominant. More 
than 80 percent of registered manufacturing 
establishments in Argentina, Bolivia, El Salva-
dor, and Mexico have fewer than 10 workers.22 
About 90 percent of manufacturing establish-
ments employ 5 to 49 workers in China; India; 
Indonesia; Korea; the Philippines; and Taiwan, 
China.23 The share of microenterprises is even 
higher outside manufacturing, reaching 94 
percent in the services sector of Mexico and 98 
percent in all modern sectors in Tunisia.24 In 
several African and Latin American countries, 
the majority of informal enterprises consist of 
1- to 3-person businesses.25
F I G U R E  3 . 7  The employment share of microenterprises is greater in developing countries
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on International Income Distribution Database (I2D2) and EUROSTAT.
Note: Microenterprises are firms, formal or informal, with fewer than 10 workers. Data for developing countries are from Argentina  (2006–10); Bolivia (2005, 2007); Chile (2006, 
2009); Colombia (2009); the Czech Republic (2005–07); the Arab Republic of Egypt (2006); Ethiopia (1999); Ghana (1991); Hungary (2007–08); India (2004, 2009); Mexico (2004–10); 
Poland (2005–07); Romania (2005–07); Slovenia (2005–07); South Africa (2005–07); Turkey (2006–10); Uruguay (2009); República Bolivariana de Venezuela (2004–06); and Vietnam 
(2009). Data for industrial countries are from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom over 2005–07.
Ethiopia
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Colombia
Ghana
Mexico
Venezuela, RB
Argentina
Poland
Turkey
Hungary
South Africa
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Chile
Romania
Vietnam
industrial countries (average)
Uruguay
India
Bolivia
share of employment, %
manufacturing sector services sector
1000 80604020
106  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
yields per hectare tend to be higher in smaller 
farms, because family farms apply more labor 
per unit of land, even though they apply fewer 
purchased inputs. This inverse relationship be-
tween farm size and productivity was first ob-
served in South Asia.27 But it has also emerged 
in Sub-Saharan Africa as population pressure 
on the land has led to agricultural intensifica-
tion. In Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, 
a 1 percent increase in farm size is associated 
with a 0.1 to 0.2 percent reduction in yield.28 
The use of family labor per hectare is also in-
versely correlated with farm size.29 
The relationship between crop yields and 
farm size emerges, because the larger, more 
mechanized farms have higher productivity. But 
in the manufacturing sector in Ethiopia and 39 
percent in Chile. In services sectors, their role is 
often more important. Even in Eastern European 
countries, where private sector entry is only two 
decades old, microenterprises account for 10 to 
20 percent of employment in manufacturing and 
for 30 to 50 percent of employment in services. 
Micro- and small enterprises also play a critical 
role in job creation and destruction (box 3.2).26
In farms, uneven technological 
progress
It is generally assumed that large farms are more 
productive. In low-income countries, however, 
In some household and labor force surveys, employees are asked to 
report the size of the firm they work for, or the size of their own busi-
ness if they are self-employed. This information can be used to esti-
mate the distribution of employment by plant size. This distribution 
can in turn be used to correct for the omission of informal enter-
prises in an economic census or plant-level survey. 
This approach was applied to Chile’s manufacturing survey, the 
Annual National Industrial Survey (Encuesta Nacional Industrial 
Anual), which covers more than 90 percent of employment among 
establishments with 50 workers or more, but less than half the 
employment in establishments with 10 to 49 workers. Nearly 
300,000 workers in microenterprises are omitted from the survey; 
250,000 of them work in firms with fewer than 5 employees. 
BOX 3.2   Microenterprises account for most job creation and destruction
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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The distribution of job flows by firm size that emerges from 
the manufacturing survey can be adjusted based on the distri- 
bution of employment by plant size from Chile’s household survey, 
the  National Socio economic Characterization Survey (Encuesta de 
Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional, or CASEN). Before this 
adjustment, larger firms seem to account for most job creation and 
destruction. But the adjustment shows that microenterprises con-
tribute about 80 percent of gross job flows. This estimate should not 
be taken literally, because the microenterprises for which informa-
tion on job creation and destruction is available are not necessarily 
representative—the Chilean census started to include microenter-
prises only in the late 1990s. But even with a margin of error, the 
estimate is so large that it changes the picture of job creation and 
job destruction.
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may not be productive in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and high-yielding varieties in irrigated areas 
may be low-yielding in rain-fed areas.35
The agricultural growth associated with 
the Green Revolution not only creates jobs in 
farming but also facilitates the development of 
the nonfarm sectors.36 The adoption of mod-
ern technology stimulates the production and 
marketing of fertilizer and other purchased 
inputs. Increased supply of cereals stimulates 
the development of food markets and keeps 
the cost of living low for those who migrate to 
the cities. In addition to these backward and 
forward links, the increase in farmers’ incomes 
heightens the demand for goods and services.37 
Cross-country analyses show that agricultural 
growth has resulted in the expansion of non-
farm sectors, particularly where the agricul-
tural sector is large.38
Among firms, much churning and 
few gazelles
Outside of agriculture, productivity varies sub-
stantially across enterprises, implying that job 
reallocation could lead to large gains in aggre-
gate productivity. In India, within a narrowly 
defined manufacturing industry, a plant at the 
90th percentile of the TFP distribution gener-
constraints in land markets usually slow expan-
sion and mechanization.30
The new technologies of the Green Revolu-
tion contributed to job creation because they 
were labor intensive. Short-statured, fertilizer-
responsive, high-yielding varieties of rice and 
wheat were developed by international agri-
cultural research centers in the late 1960s. The 
varietal improvement of other cereals such as 
maize followed. These varieties, as well as im-
proved production practices, were quickly dif-
fused, particularly in tropical Asia. The amount 
of inorganic fertilizer applied has steadily in-
creased over extended periods.31 Thanks to 
continual technological improvements and 
sustained adoption, cereal yields have increased 
dramatically for the past several decades.32 
Progress has been uneven across regions, 
however (figure 3.8). In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
there is no evidence to suggest that small farm-
ers were slower than larger farmers in adopting 
the new technologies. But the Green Revolution 
has not taken place on a large scale, even though 
farmland has been growing scarce because 
of population pressure on limited  cultivable 
areas.33 Feeding growing populations from a 
shrinking amount of farm land requires Sub-
Saharan African countries to increase cereal 
yields.34 Yet improved agricultural technology 
is location specific: improved varieties in Asia 
F I G U R E  3 . 8  Crop yields have diverged vastly across regions
Source: FAOSTAT-Agriculture (database), Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 
Note: Figures are weighted averages of yields for wheat, rice, and coarse crops.
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efficiency tends to suffer. Large SOEs without 
foreign competitors are less innovative and pro-
ductive than other large firms.41
For a given size, young firms are also more 
likely than old firms to engage in innovative ac-
tivities. They also have better growth prospects, 
a finding consistent with evidence from indus-
trial countries (figure 3.11).42 For example, in 
the 1990s, when China was in the early stages 
of reform, human and financial resources were 
concentrated in SOEs. However, the incentive 
structure in these enterprises hindered innova-
tion. In contrast, the new township and village 
enterprises lacked the resources to adopt new 
technology and import new equipment, but 
they were more flexible in their decision mak-
ing. As a result, these younger firms were more 
dynamic than large SOEs, although they were 
less productive than large and medium private 
companies.43 
In developing countries, the dispersion of 
productivity and growth prospects across firms 
is further widened by the large number of 
micro enterprises, many of which are barely 
more than a means of subsistence for the poor. 
A majority of these microenterprises have lim-
ited capital and often even lack a fixed address. 
ates 22 times as much output as a plant at the 
10th percentile. In comparison, the estimated 
ratio is only 9 to 1 in the United States.39 The 
dispersion of TFP is also high in a number of 
Latin American countries (figure 3.9). Detailed 
data on nonmanufacturing firms are scarcer. 
But the dispersion of TFP in retail businesses in 
Mexico, and in communication and transporta-
tion businesses in Uruguay, is also sizable.40
The speed at which productivity grows also 
varies across firms. Large firms are typically 
more innovative than small firms. They tend to 
invest more in machinery and hire more edu-
cated workers. They are also more likely than 
small firms to engage in activities such as devel-
oping new product lines, introducing new tech-
nology, opening and closing plants, outsourc-
ing, and engaging in joint ventures with foreign 
partners (figure 3.10a). Large firms produce 
more with a given amount of labor, are more 
likely to export, and tend to export more. They 
also pay substantively higher wages than micro- 
and small enterprises (figure 3.10b). They pay a 
wage premium even controlling for age, educa-
tion, and other worker characteristics. Not all 
large firms are innovative, however. When size 
is supported through nonmarket mechanisms, 
F I G U R E  3 . 9  The dispersion of productivity in manufacturing is greater in developing countries
Source: Pagés 2010.
Note: TFP = total factor productivity. The figure shows the ratio of TFP among plants between the 90th and the 10th percentiles of the TFP distribution within narrowly defined 
industries. TFP is measured as physical productivity, as defined by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008). The data cover only the manufacturing sector. Data are from Argentina 
(2002), Bolivia (2001), Chile (2006), China (2005),  Ecuador (2005), El Salvador (2005),  India (1994), Mexico (2004), United States (1997), and Uruguay (2005).
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F I G U R E  3 .10 Large firms tend to perform better and to pay better than small ones
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2011a; and Montenegro and Patrinos 2012 for the World Development Report 
2013.
Note: Panel a uses World Bank enterprise surveys covering more than 54,000 firms across 102 developing countries over 2006–10 for overall performance, and 19,000 firms across 
47 developing countries over 2002–05 for innovative activities. The analysis controls for firm characteristics, industry, and country. In this panel, large firms employ 100 or more 
workers and small firms fewer than 20 workers. Panel b uses 138 household and labor force surveys spanning 33 countries over 1991–2010 and controls for worker characteristics. 
In this panel, large firms are those employing more than 50 workers and small firms 10 to 50 workers.
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F I G U R E  3 .11  Young firms are more likely than old ones to engage in innovative activities
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2011a.
Note: The figure uses World Bank enterprise surveys covering 19,000 firms across 47 developing countries over 2002–05, controlling for firm characteristics, industry, and country. 
Statistically insignificant estimates are reported as zeroes.
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cumulated human and physical capital while 
working for a wage or a salary. Operating 
micro enterprises is a choice for them. Those 
who achieve higher productivity levels are more 
likely to stay in business, grow, and create job 
opportunities for others.46 
A very small group of microenterprises actu-
ally displays a strong performance. This group 
bears similarities with the so-called “gazelles” of 
industrial countries—high-growth companies 
whose revenues increase by at least 20 percent 
annually for four years or more. In industrial 
countries, the term “gazelle” is used for com-
panies starting from a revenue base of at least 
US$1 million, which makes them very big 
by developing-country standards. Nonetheless, 
the same dynamism can be found at a much 
smaller scale. Data from seven Sub-Saharan 
African countries show that the median capital 
stock held by urban informal enterprises is less 
than US$80, whereas the capital stock for those 
in the top quintile averages US$5,000. The aver-
age monthly profit of those in the top quintile 
is seven times the median monthly profit. The 
rate of returns to capital is also relatively high in 
these firms.47 This heterogeneity among micro-
enterprises suggests they can be an incubator 
for large and productive firms.
The dynamism of microenterprises matters 
not only for livelihoods but also for productivity 
growth. Large firms innovate more, but they are 
Many are  located in rural areas, absorbing some 
labor slack during the low agricultural season 
(box 3.3). Across 18 developing countries, 44 
percent of the people living on less than US$1 a 
day in urban areas, and 24 percent of those in 
rural areas, work in a nonagricultural business. 
On average, they do not earn much.44
Nonetheless, these nonfarm activities pro-
vide an important channel to diversify income 
for the poor. In nine Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, most nonfarm jobs were generated by 
households starting businesses, rather than en-
tering the rapidly expanding private wage sector. 
Despite being modest, earnings from household 
enterprises contribute to consumption much 
the same as earnings from wage employment 
do. And these small businesses offer an avenue 
for poor households to engage in gradually 
more productive activities.45
While microenterprises have a lackluster per-
formance as a group, they are also very diverse. 
In middle-income countries, a significant share 
of the owners of micro- and small enterprises 
are as entrepreneurial as their peers in indus-
trial countries. Their weak performance may 
be driven more by contextual factors such as 
limited access to credit and policy-induced bar-
riers to access technologies and markets, than 
by limited capacity. In several Latin Ameri-
can countries, for example, entrants into self- 
employment tend to be workers who have ac-
Microenterprises in urban areas, and particularly those in the infor-
mal sector, tend to attract the attention of academics and policy 
makers. But microenterprises are prominent in rural areas as well. 
The surveys of micro- and small enterprises in Africa and in Latin 
America and the Caribbean show that fewer than half are in cities 
and towns with 20,000 inhabitants or more. The urban share reaches 
46 percent in the Dominican Republic but is below 30 percent in all 
other countries surveyed. Even if rural towns are counted (generally, 
localities with 2,000 to 20,000 inhabitants), well over half of the 
enterprises are in strictly rural areas in most countries.
The vast majority of microenterprises are engaged in commerce, 
supporting the conventional view that associates microenterprises 
with street vendors and petty traders. But a significant number are 
involved in light manufacturing activities. According to the 1-2-3 
surveys of West African countries, the most important sector in capi-
tal cities is petty trading (27.1 percent of all enterprises), followed by 
BOX 3.3   Most microenterprises are in rural areas and engage in commerce
Sources: Fox and Sohnesen 2012; Grimm, Kruger, and Lay 2011; Liedholm 2002. 
other manufacturing and food (16 percent) and other services (11.8 
percent). Similarly, the surveys of countries in Africa and in Latin 
America and the Caribbean suggest that 56 to 74 percent of micro- 
and small firms in urban areas, and 60 to 70 percent in rural areas, 
are engaged in commerce. The surveys of household enterprises in 
Sub-Saharan African countries show similar patterns. These surveys 
identify three manufacturing activities as the most important across 
all countries: textiles and apparel, food and beverages, and wood 
and forest products. These three categories account for about 75 
percent of manufacturing enterprises in urban areas and nearly 90 
percent of manufacturing enterprises in rural areas.
Most of the microenterprises operate from home or on the 
street. According to the surveys of household enterprises in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 25 to 45 percent of these microfirms use home as 
primary point of operation, and 10 to 40 percent of them simply 
work on the street.
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a multinational conglomerate comprising 114 
companies and subsidiaries across 8 business 
sectors on several continents.49 Many of China’s 
successful clusters, such as the footwear and 
electric appliance industry in Wenzhou, also 
started from small family businesses working 
close to each other.50
A vibrant firm life cycle is often missing, 
however. Larger and older firms tend to be 
stagnant, while smaller enterprises are prone to 
churning. In Ghana, for example, many firms 
are born large and show little growth over 15 
years (figure 3.12). In Portugal, by contrast, 
not all born large. In industrial countries, some 
of the more resounding successes, from Honda 
to Microsoft, started in garages. And many suc-
cessful companies in developing countries also 
grew out of small household businesses. Thai-
land’s Charoen Pokphand Group, founded in 
1921 as a small seed shop in Bangkok by two 
brothers, has grown into one of the world’s larg-
est multinational conglomerates in agribusiness, 
operating in 15 countries and encompassing 
close to 100 companies.48 India’s Tata Group 
transformed from a Mumbai-based, family-
owned trading firm in the late 19th century to 
Sources: Cabral and Mata 2003; Sandefur 2010. 
F I G U R E  3 .12  Surviving firms were born larger and grew less in Ghana than in Portugal
b.  Surviving rms: Final year versus initial year
a.  Initial year: All rms versus surviving rms
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.4
PortugalGhana
PortugalGhana
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 10
number of employeesnumber of employees
Surviving rms
resembled other rms
Surviving rms grewSurviving rms did
not grow
Surviving rms were born
larger than other rms
100 1,000
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 10 100 1,000
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 10 100 1,000
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 10 100 1,000
all rms, 1984   
surviving rms, 1984   
all rms, 1988
surviving rms, 1988
number of employeesnumber of employees
surviving rms, 1984   
surviving rms, 1991  
surviving rms, 1988   
surviving rms, 2003   
112  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
20 to 30 percent of household enterprises leave 
the market over a two-year period, while the 
total number of household enterprises remains 
about the same.54 In Sub-Saharan Africa, few 
household enterprises expand into employment 
beyond the household, as shown by the experi-
ences of Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Madagascar.55 
In Mexico, individuals starting microenterprises 
are more likely to remain the sole worker than to 
increase the firm size (table 3.1).56 
The wide dispersion of productivity among 
businesses, the large number of unsustainable 
microenterprises, and the stagnation of larger 
firms all suggest that the process of market se-
lection and creative destruction that has under-
pinned the rapid growth of transition economies 
and East Asian countries in the past decades is 
weak in most developing countries. This weak-
ness impedes labor and other resources from 
moving toward their most productive uses and 
undermines both job creation and productivity 
growth. Gains from tackling the difficulties faced 
many more firms are born as microenterprises 
and grow substantially in 7 years.51 The major-
ity of firms are born small in India too, but they 
tend to stay small, without displaying much 
variation in employment over their life cycle. 
A revealing comparison involves the size of 35-
year old firms relative to their size at birth. In 
India, the size declines by a fourth. In Mexico, it 
doubles. In the United States, it is 10 times larger 
(figure 3.13a). Productivity growth over a firm’s 
life cycle follows similar patterns in these coun-
tries (figure 3.13b).52
Churning—entering and exiting at a rela-
tively high rate—is much more common than 
growth among the micro- and small enterprises 
of developing countries. In several Sub-Saharan 
African and Latin American countries, about 20 
percent of micro- and small enterprises enter 
and leave the market in the same year. A majority 
of closures occur within three years of starting 
up. Among the survivors, less than 3 percent ex-
pand by four employees or more.53 In Vietnam, 
F I G U R E  3 .13 The majority of firms grew little in India and Mexico
Source: Hsieh and Klenow 2011.
Note: TFP = total factor productivity. Figures show the average employment (or productivity) of firms in different age groups relative to the average employment (or productivity) 
of those same firms had at birth. Figures are computed using 1989–90 and 1994–95 data for India, 1998 and 2003 data for Mexico, and 1992 and 1997 data for the United States.
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Ta B L E  3 .1 Few small firms grew in Mexico
are exchanged among people more effectively, 
making everybody more productive. In clus-
ters, similar firms that locate next to each other 
tend to benefit from a broader pool of qualified 
workers and common support services. Firms 
also connect with foreign businesses through 
trade and investment, and, in integrating with 
global value chains, they can acquire more ad-
vanced knowledge, technology, and manage-
ment know-how. In all these ways, specific jobs 
can contribute to productivity gains of others 
and elsewhere in the economy. But effects can 
be negative as well if jobs overuse natural re-
sources or damage the environment, thus re-
ducing aggregate productivity.
by the start-ups and removing constraints to the 
growth of incumbents could be sizable, but the 
task is daunting (question 3).57
*   *   *
Jobs can have an impact on the productivity of 
others, beyond the jobholder and the economic 
unit where they belong. Jobs that have these ad-
ditional impacts do more (or less) for develop-
ment. These additional impacts arise because 
jobs differ in the way they connect with each 
other, and some of the connections do not oc-
cur through markets. In functional cities, ideas 
 Same firms by size in 2011, %
  Own account 1–4 workers 5–9 workers 10 or more workers
 Own account 51.9 12.4  0.5  0.2
 1–4 workers 22.1 49.2  3.9  1.5
 5–9 workers  7.8 35.1 22.6 13.1
 10 or more workers  4.1 15.2 14.4 44.6
Source: Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Rojas 2006.
Note: Rows do not add up to 100 percent because the owners of some of these firms may become salary workers or unemployed.
Firms by 
size in 
1987, %
  
QUeStION 3
Self-employment is prevalent in developing 
countries, and micro- and small enterprises 
are a major source of livelihood for low-skilled 
workers. Even if only a small fraction of these 
tiny economic units succeeded in building a 
viable business, with the potential to hire others, 
the aggregate effect on living standards would be 
substantial. Their success would also matter for 
productivity reasons. Quite a few currently large 
enterprises in industrial countries started out as 
 micro- and small family businesses. By contrast, 
in developing countries many large enterprises 
are born large, often the result of government 
support or privileged access to finance and in-
formation. Breaking privileges is one more rea-
son why the success of microenterprises is so 
important.
Views differ on whether there is scope to 
help the self-employed succeed. At one time al-
most every self-employed person or owner of a 
microenterprise was seen as a potential entre-
preneur, held back only by regulatory zeal and 
corruption. Substantial rates of return on capital 
for micro- and small enterprises were viewed as 
evidence of a potential to thrive.58 But the pen-
dulum has swung, and the conventional wisdom 
is now rather pessimistic. The large numbers of 
unregistered self-employed in developing coun-
tries are viewed as subsistence  entrepreneurs 
who are trying to make ends meet, not thriv-
ing.59 Evidence on the growth of micro- and 
small enterprises in several countries in Latin 
America and West Africa shows that most micro-
enterprises with at least two years of operations 
remain at their start-up employment levels.60 
Embedded in the pessimism of the conventional 
wisdom is the idea that entrepreneurial ability 
and skills cannot be easily transferred, especially 
not to adults with limited formal education. In 
this view, entrepreneurs are born, not made. If 
this view is correct, attempts to convert survivor-
ship into entrepreneurship are bound to fail. The 
wide dispersion of productivity across firms, in-
cluding across microenterprises, suggests, how-
ever, that reality is somewhere in between the 
optimistic and the pessimistic view: survivor-
ship may be dominant, but entrepreneurship is 
unlikely to be missing altogether. 
Who is an entrepreneur?
Entrepreneurship combines innovative capac-
ity to put new ideas into effect with managerial 
capacity to increase a firm’s efficiency within the 
limits of known technology. Specific psychologi-
cal traits are associated with entrepreneurship, 
such as a personal need for achievement, a belief 
in the effect of personal effort on outcomes, self-
confidence, and a positive attitude toward risk. 
These traits are difficult to observe or measure. 
But surveys comparing entrepreneurs with other 
workers in places as diverse as China and the Rus-
sian Federation show that observable individual 
characteristics such as education, experience, 
gender, location, and age are good predictors 
of entrepreneurship.61 Among microenterprises, 
rates of return on capital tend to be higher when 
their owners are more educated and experienced.
Observable characteristics of the self- 
employed can thus be used to identify individu-
als who have potential to become successful 
entrepreneurs.62 To illustrate the point, a suc-
cessful entrepreneur is defined as someone who 
employs others and is not living in poverty. The 
share of this group in total employment is small 
and relatively stable across countries at differ-
ent levels of development.63 The share of self- 
employed workers without paid employees, on 
the other hand, initially increases and then de-
clines with GDP per capita (figure 3.14a). At its 
peak, which corresponds to low-income coun-
tries, the share of self-employed workers with-
out paid employees reaches almost three-fifths 
of total employment. Among this group, a ma-
jority are individuals with relatively low poten-
tial to succeed. Their characteristics are closer to 
those of wage workers than of employers.64 
However, if each of the self-employed work-
ers with high potential were to create a single ad-
ditional job, total employment would increase 
substantially, somewhat more so in low-income 
countries (figure 3.14b).  As a share of the work-
Can entrepreneurship be fostered?
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Removing obstacles to firm growth is thus a pre-
requisite to foster entrepreneurship. 
Obstacles notwithstanding, entrepreneurial 
capacity varies substantially across microen-
terprises and small firms. A distinction is often 
made between innovative or transformative en-
trepreneurs and replicative or subsistence entre-
preneurs.67 The former correspond to Schumpe-
terian type of entrepreneurs, while the latter, who 
generally manage micro- and small enterprises, 
are followers. Such a distinction, however, does 
not capture the broader gradation of managerial 
performance that lies between the transformative 
and subsistence extremes. A study of the number 
of management practices adopted by the owners 
of micro- and small enterprises in Sub-Saharan 
Africa reveals a large variation of management 
scores (figure 3.15). These scores are closely as-
sociated with business performance.68 A broad 
dispersion of management scores is also found 
among relatively larger firms in India.69
An emerging literature confirms the impor-
tance of management practices in explaining 
firm productivity. Although much of the focus 
is on large firms, recent studies have turned their 
ing age population, such additional job creation 
would amount to 8 percent in Kenya, 5 percent 
in the Arab Republic of Egypt and 4 percent in 
Costa Rica.
While this calculation is hypothetical, several 
studies report that observable characteristics of 
micro- and small informal enterprise owners, 
such as education and gender, are important 
determinants of innovation and employment 
growth.65 In Mexico, after a business registra-
tion reform, informal enterprise owners with 
observable traits similar to those found among 
formal enterprise owners were more likely to 
register their business than those similar to wage 
workers.66
What constrains entrepreneurship?
Even potentially skilled entrepreneurs would 
have difficulty succeeding without access to 
basic infrastructure and financial resources. In 
their absence, managerial capacity alone may 
not be enough to realize productivity gains and 
employment expansion. The investment cli-
mate matters for business performance as well. 
F I G U R E  3 .14 Some among the self-employed have the potential to become successful entrepreneurs
Sources: Gindling and Newhouse 2012 for the World Development Report 2013; World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on data from 36 countries.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. PPP = purchasing power parity. In panel b, each dot represents a country.
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up an offer of a wage subsidy covering 50 percent 
of the cost of hiring a worker for six months and 
25 percent of the cost for another two months. 
Overall, these results suggest that lack of access 
to finance is not the only constraint. 
Entrepreneurial skills, measured by the edu-
cation of business owners and their partici-
pation in training, explain a large share of the 
 differences in productivity across firms and re-
gions in developing countries.71 Yet markets fail 
to nurture entrepreneurship, because knowl-
edge spillovers imply that some of the returns to 
acquiring or developing new managerial ideas 
are appropriated by others. More important 
perhaps, entrepreneurs themselves do not rec-
ognize the relevance of management expertise.72 
Only 3 percent of Brazil’s owners of micro- and 
small enterprises, for instance, see management 
as a binding business constraint.73 This may be 
an area where information and knowledge fail-
ures matter, leading to a vicious circle of low 
productivity, low living standards, and insuffi-
cient job creation.
The capacity to acquire skills and to apply 
them to business seems to be one of the most 
important characteristics of successful entrepre-
neurs. Success also depends on having core skills 
attention to how innovation in small and me-
dium firms takes place. The most telling studies 
involve management training provided for free 
to randomly selected firms whose performance 
is then compared to that of a control group of 
firms. Evaluations of these programs find that 
the training improves the financial literacy and 
basic management skills of business owners. The 
estimated impact is also positive, but less robust, 
when it comes to improved business outcomes 
and job creation. Better outcomes are associated 
with business owners who already had an ini-
tial understanding of the concepts and relatively 
better access to financial resources. 
On the other hand, similarly designed inter-
ventions to provide financial resources to mi-
croenterprises, or to process their registration 
with authorities, or to pay the salary of an ad-
ditional employee, show mixed impacts on busi-
ness performance.70 In Mexico and Sri Lanka, 
grants given to microenterprises increase the 
income of their owners—and then only if they 
are male—but do not result in employment cre-
ation. In Ghana, similar grants given to female 
business owners do not result in significant 
growth of their microenterprises. In Sri Lanka, 
only 22 percent of eligible microenterprises took 
Source: Fafchamps and Woodruff 2012.
Note: The management score measures the degree to which firm owners use and master core management and business techniques. Scores are based on an evaluation of 26 
techniques (26 is the highest possible score). 
F I G U R E  3 .15  Management scores vary widely across small enterprises in  
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from abroad can be found in the case of the gar-
ment industry in Bangladesh (box 3.4).
The case for targeted management 
training
Managerial practices are linked to differences 
in productivity, profitability, firm growth, and 
survival.79 The development experience of the 
garment industry in Bangladesh suggests that 
entrepreneurship can be fostered by exposure 
to advanced management practices and tech-
nologies. But whether managerial capacity can 
be improved through management training is 
more debatable. Creativity, foresight, and risk 
taking are key elements of any innovative pro-
cess, but the question is whether they can be dif-
fused and nurtured.
A substantial number of experiments have 
been conducted in recent years, providing evi-
dence of both successes and failures of man-
agement training interventions. Some patterns 
emerge from a systematic review of the available 
evidence. To be successful, management training 
must be kept simple, appropriate teaching ma-
terials must be available, and the training must 
such as numeracy and literacy, as well as social 
skills. A vast literature highlights the importance 
of entrepreneurs’ schooling as a determinant of 
firm growth, employment, and efficiency.74 Rus-
sian and Chinese business owners have more 
entrepreneurs in their families and among 
childhood friends than otherwise similar indi-
viduals, suggesting that social environment also 
matters.75
Learning can also happen through jobs. 
Nearly half of entrepreneurs managing the 50 
largest manufacturing firms in Ethiopia be-
gan their careers in trading companies, thereby 
learning about the market and what it takes to 
meet demand.76 A large number of founders 
and leading entrepreneurs in the light manu-
facturing industries in Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa were initially traders or employees in the 
marketing division of large enterprises.77 
Integration in supply chains with larger, of-
ten foreign, firms, is receiving much attention 
as a potential source of knowledge transfers.78 
Indian entrepreneurs returning from Silicon 
Valley made Bangalore a hub of the information 
technology industry. Perhaps the most dramatic 
evidence attesting to the importance of learning 
Sources: Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association 2012 ; Easterly 2002; Mottaleb and Sonobe 2011; Rhee 1990.
The garment industry in Bangladesh illustrates how important it is 
to learn advanced management practices, marketing, and technol-
ogies from abroad. When Daewoo Corporation of Korea teamed up 
with Bangladesh’s Desh Ltd. to produce garments for export in Ban-
gladesh in 1979, the South Asian country had no modern industry. 
Little more than 20 years later, the industry was generating more 
than US$12.5 billion in export revenue. Women accounted for 80 
percent of its 3.6 million workers
Arguably, a wide set of factors, from financial innovation to pol-
icy support, contributed to this development success. But it began 
in 1979, when Desh sent 130 newly recruited, educated employees 
to Daewoo’s garment factory in Korea, where they participated in an 
eight-month intensive training course covering topics from sewing 
skills to factory management, quality control, and international pro-
curement and marketing—skills that they then applied in the Desh 
factories in Bangladesh. Within a few years, almost all the trainees 
had left Desh to start their own garment businesses. Some of the 
ex-Desh workers joined new garment factories established by afflu-
ent businessmen, while others founded trading houses, which then 
BOX 3.4   What explains the boom in the garment industry in Bangladesh?
contributed to the proliferation of garment manufacturers by pro-
viding a variety of valuable services including international procure-
ment and marketing, sample making, and design reengineering.
Observing Desh’s good start in exporting, and subsequently the 
success of ex-Desh workers, highly educated people started their 
own garment businesses, and wealthy families actively invested in 
the industry. As a result, the size of garment firms has been quite 
large since the beginning; their average size was 300 workers in 
1983–84 and 700 in 2010–11. As of 2005, owners of garment firms 
had 15 years of schooling on average, and about 60 percent of them 
had completed college or university education. 
Learning from abroad continued. Some entrepreneurs partici-
pated in training programs in Singapore, Japan, and Europe. Beyond 
garment enterprises in Korea, other newly industrial countries in 
East Asia followed Daewoo into operation in Bangladesh and in-
vested in training Bangladeshi workers and managers. Thus, many 
Bangladeshi traders and manufacturers had work experience in gar-
ment trading and production, including the experience of working 
at joint ventures, before starting their current businesses.
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identify those business owners with the highest 
potential to benefit from management train- 
ing. Expert panels may be used to identify and 
rank micro- and small enterprises on their po-
tential to grow, but such methods are expen-
sive and difficult to apply on a large scale. An 
effective alternative is a survey questionnaire 
designed to capture abilities, attitudes, and man-
agement scores of potential trainees.87 Manage-
ment training itself can be used as a screening 
device. Trainees with high potential often under-
take new investments and expand employment 
as a result of their training. Financial institutions 
could view such activity as an indication of po-
tentially high investment returns. Programs that 
combine management training with financial 
support yield better firm performance in devel-
oping countries.88 
Training programs can be implemented by 
private providers and financed by private inves-
tors with a significant interest in the success of 
the entrepreneurs in whom they have invested. 
But as long as there are knowledge spillovers 
and the importance of management expertise 
is undervalued, governments have a role to play. 
Given the differing capabilities among business 
owners, proper targeting is crucial to ensure pos-
itive returns to publicly funded programs. Ran-
domized experiments in Ghana, Tanzania, and 
Vietnam indicate that the benefit of such pro-
grams generally outweighs the cost, even though 
the costs of implementing training programs 
vary greatly.89 If the overall investment climate is 
not conducive to private sector growth, however, 
targeted training programs for better business 
skills will most likely return meager results.
last for a certain minimum length of time. Com-
plementing classroom teaching with instructors’ 
visits to trainees on the job can yield significant 
positive effects.80 In Mexico, for example, such 
on-site visits improved sales, profits, and pro-
ductivity.81 But in Ghana, on-site visits and sup-
port for microenterprises were not successful.82 
It is also possible that key entrepreneurial skills 
are gained more effectively through work expe-
rience in large productive firms than through 
training programs.83
Entrepreneurship training for women has 
had mixed results. Nurturing female entrepre-
neurship has the potential to create wider social 
benefits associated with female employment, 
such as changes in the household allocation of 
resources that improve family well-being, espe-
cially of children. Female entrepreneurship often 
provides employment opportunities to women 
that allow them to balance work and family 
roles. Yet providing classroom training to female 
microentrepreneurs in Peru had no effect on key 
business outcomes such as sales and profits, even 
when some business practices improved.84 Class-
room training complemented with on-site visits, 
though, yielded positive results.85 In Pakistan 
and Tanzania, management training improved 
management practices and business outcomes 
for male but not female entrepreneurs.86 These 
mixed results can also reflect wider constraints 
facing women in societies, including access to ef-
fective learning in schools.
A common finding of training evaluations is 
that the potential to absorb management prac-
tices differs greatly among beneficiaries. Readily 
observable individual characteristics can help 
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Chapter 4
Jobs influence who we are and our relations with others. In most societies, jobs are a fundamental source of self-respect and 
social identity. Historically, family names in 
some cultures were associated with specific oc-
cupations because people defined themselves 
by what they did: Miller in English, Hurudza 
(master farmer) in Shona, and Suthar (carpen-
ters) in Hindi.
Jobs connect people with others through 
networks. The workplace can be a place to en-
counter new ideas and information and to inter-
act with people of different ethnicities. The dis-
tribution of jobs within society and perceptions 
about who has access to opportunities and why 
can shape people’s expectations and aspirations 
for the future, their sense of having a stake in 
society, and perceptions of fairness. 
These individual influences of jobs may 
have collective consequences. Having or not 
having a job may affect key elements of social 
cohesion, the capacity of societies to manage 
collective decision making peacefully. While 
the frustration of unemployed youth during 
the Arab Spring suggests that the lack of jobs 
can be a source of social unrest, that does not 
mean that the relationship between jobs and 
social cohesion is straightforward, immediate, 
or direct. Rather, the relationship is contextual 
and shaped by individuals, their values, atti-
tudes, and behaviors, and the institutions that 
surround them. And it goes both ways: social 
cohesion can also influence jobs by shaping 
the context in which entrepreneurs make in-
vestment decisions. 
Empirical evidence of a connection between 
jobs and social cohesion is limited by data con-
straints, the complexity of measuring social 
interactions, and the multiple factors that can 
contribute to social cohesion. However, cross-
country analysis of values surveys finds that job 
loss or lack of access to jobs is associated with 
lower levels of trust and civic engagement. This 
is not only a rich-country phenomenon, as is of-
ten suggested. Unemployment can cause depres-
sion, increase mistrust in others, and lead people 
to drop out of community life. Migrants without 
social ties may be excluded from job opportuni-
ties that would allow them to succeed in their 
new environments. In extreme cases, if people, 
particularly youth, lack jobs and hope for the fu-
ture, they may turn to violent or criminal activ-
ity to compensate for the absence of self-esteem 
and sense of belonging that a job might other-
wise provide. Similarly, jobs offering limited op-
portunities for future growth or lacking access 
to voice can lead to alienation and frustration.
Some jobs are positively correlated with so-
cial cohesion. Jobs that are empowering, build 
agency, and provide access to voice can increase 
trust and people’s willingness to participate in 
civil society. Jobs can create economic and social 
ties and have the potential to build incentives 
to work across boundaries and resolve conflict. 
Jobs and social cohesion
Jobs can shape social interactions and the ways societies manage  
collective decision making. They connect people with others  
and can provide access to voice.
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And people’s trust in government and their con-
fidence in institutions may increase if they be-
lieve that job opportunities are available to them 
either now or in the future. Jobs can influence 
social cohesion through their effects on social 
identity, networks, and fairness.
Jobs can help manage social 
tensions 
News reports about the financial crisis and the 
Arab Spring have broadcast a common senti-
ment that unemployment, especially among 
young people, can ignite unrest and violence.1 
In September 2010, a Telegraph headline re-
ported that the “IMF Fears ‘Social Explosion’ 
from World Jobs Crisis” ahead of a summit 
of the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO).2 In 
2011, Le Monde linked jobs and social unrest 
in Tunisia to concerns about social justice: 
“protesters aren’t asking the Government to 
find them a job, but denouncing the lack of 
transparency and justice in the labor market.”3 
The revolution in Tunisia was sparked by the 
protests of a fruit vendor frustrated by his in-
ability to get a permit to do his job. High lev-
els of youth unemployment were a significant 
contributing factor to the riots in the United 
Kingdom in the summer of 2011.4 
These events suggest that jobs can contrib-
ute to social cohesion, including how societies 
handle differences and manage tensions among 
different groups, and how they avoid and resolve 
conflicts. There are many possible ways to de-
fine social cohesion (box 4.1). But overall,  social 
cohesion refers to the capacity of societies to 
peacefully manage collective decision making.5 
Social cohesion thus relates to the processes and 
institutions that shape how groups interact. It 
does not follow that collective decision making 
should be imposed from above, but rather that 
channels for voice, accountability, and inclusive 
participation of diverse groups can contribute 
to a cohesive society.
Trust and civic engagement matter . . .
The capacity of a country to support peaceful 
collective decision making involves multiple 
factors including the quality of institutions, 
intergroup relations, and the effectiveness of 
channels for resolving conflicts. Cross-country 
data on political stability, the absence of vio-
lence, and voice and accountability can be used 
to construct an index of social cohesion at the 
country level.6 The Nordic countries, Swit-
zerland, and New Zealand, score high on this 
index. Although the index is a static measure, 
the capacity for peaceful decision making can 
evolve over time as societies change, through 
urbanization, more female employment, and 
the growth of a middle class.
The nature of the interactions through jobs 
affects the degree of social cohesion in commu-
nities and societies. Trust and civic engagement 
are two measurable indicators of social cohe-
sion at the individual level. These indicators are 
associated with the country-level index of the 
capacity for peaceful collective decision making 
(figure 4.1).
Trust refers to the extent to which individu-
als have confidence in people whom they know 
personally, including family and neighbors.7 It 
can also refer to trust in people met for the first 
time and in people of different religions and 
nationalities. Civic engagement captures the 
extent to which people participate voluntarily 
in civil society by joining community organiza-
tions, unions, political parties, or religious or-
ganizations, and by engaging in civic life. These 
forms of involvement and activism include 
nonviolent activity, such as participating in pro-
tests, that can be constructive for social cohe-
sion. Civic engagement relates to social capital, 
 participation, and the agency that motivates in-
dividuals to be part of collective action.
. . . and they are influenced by jobs
Trust and civic engagement can be linked to 
jobs. Having—or not having—a job may af-
fect the way people view the world by influenc-
ing their values and attitudes, including trust in 
others and in institutions. Jobs can also provide 
channels for people to interact across diverse 
groups. Jobs with certain characteristics may 
contribute more to trust and civic engagement 
than others. 
Not having a job is associated with less self-
reported trust in high-income countries (figure 
4.2a). The relationship is stronger with civic 
engagement, where unemployment is linked to 
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In developing countries, the type of job, the op-
portunities the job provides, and the way jobs 
connect people may be more relevant for social 
cohesion.
Further indications of a connection between 
jobs and social cohesion comes from looking 
at job characteristics. The 2005 wave of the 
World Values Survey asks people whether their 
jobs involve manual or cognitive, routine or cre-
ative tasks, and how much independence they 
have at work. An index of these self- reported 
characteristics captures how motivating a job 
is. The index is positively associated with trust 
lower participation in associations and dem-
onstrations, and signing petitions (figures 4.2b, 
c, and d). With the exception of low-income 
countries, the relationship between unemploy-
ment and active membership in an association 
is significant and negative. The mixed findings 
on trust and unemployment underscore that 
unemployment may not always be a meaningful 
concept in low-income countries. Open unem-
ployment is frequently low in developing coun-
tries and is not always concentrated among the 
worse-off, because most people work to make 
ends meet in the absence of social safety nets. 
The concept can be traced as far back as the writings of Ibn Khaldun, 
a Muslim scholar born in Tunis in the 15th century, whose idea of 
asabiyah is generally translated as “social cohesion.” Living during 
times of manifold conflicts, Khaldun regarded asabiyah as the soli-
darity of small groups (tribes) that has the power to promote 
broader social integration.a
Four centuries later, Emile Durkheim considered cohesion in 
the context of societal transformation.b He was particularly con-
cerned with two different types of solidarity that he observed 
emerging through industrialization in Europe. Primitive societies, 
he found, were marked by mechanical solidarity and a strong col-
lective ethos based on relatively homogeneous patterns of life 
and work. Advanced capitalist society, in contrast, with its complex 
division of labor, was marked by organic solidarity based on merit, 
respect for different roles within the labor force, and the need for 
moral regulation.
More recently, social cohesion has been related to social capital. 
In the 1990s, Pierre Bourdieu and others focused on the benefits 
that accrue to individuals through their participation in groups and 
the need for individuals to invest in these relations. Robert Putnam’s 
analysis of the conditions for creating responsive, effective, and rep-
resentative institutions builds on this theme. Famously, northern 
Italy had more of these institutions than southern Italy, and Putnam 
concluded that the central enabling condition was the existence 
of more social capital, measured through the density of local 
associations.c Social cohesion can be understood as a broader con-
cept than social capital in that it considers intergroup relations in 
a wider context. Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock define social cohe-
sion (or lack thereof) as “the nature and extent of social and eco-
BOX 4.1   What is social cohesion?
nomic divisions within society (income, ethnicity, political party, 
caste, language).”d
Although social cohesion has multiple definitions with differ-
ences in focus and emphasis, some common threads emerge:
•  Social cohesion is generally viewed as a positive concept. It can be 
an end in itself, as well as a means. The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development describes a cohesive society as 
one that “works towards the well-being of all its members.”e The 
French Commissariat General du Plan defines social cohesion as “a 
set of social processes that help instill in individuals the sense of 
belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are 
recognized as members of the community.”f
•  Social cohesion relates to the interactions among individuals, 
groups, and societies. These interactions are seen as “the forces 
holding the individuals within the groupings in which they are” 
and as linking diverse groups together.g
•  Social cohesion contributes to sustainable social development. 
According to the Club de Madrid, “shared societies are stable, safe 
and just and based on the promotion and protection of all human 
rights . . . , including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and 
persons.”h
•  Last, some definitions of social cohesion relate the concept to pro-
cesses and institutional characteristics. For example, social cohesion 
can refer to “the capacity of societies (not just groups, networks) 
to peacefully manage collective action problems.”i This definition 
links social cohesion to participation and civic engagement.
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Norton and de Haan 2012 for the World Development Report 2013; OECD 2011.
a. Weiss 1995. 
b. Durkheim 1893.
c. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993.
d. Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock 2006, 105.
e. OECD 2011, 17.
f. Jenson 1998, 4.
g. Moreno and Jennings 1937, 371. 
h. OECD 2011, 53.
i. Woolcock 2011.
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ciety. Moreover, trust and civic participation are 
influenced by peer and social interaction effects 
(such as the trust or participation of others), 
which can make it difficult to draw conclusions.
While the primary focus is on how jobs can 
contribute to trust and civic engagement, this re-
lationship goes in both directions. There are ways 
in which social cohesion can affect jobs. Trust and 
social capital (an element of civic engagement) 
may create an economic and political environ-
ment that is conducive to economic growth.11 
Trust can reduce transaction costs and overcome 
market failures that arise because of uncertainty; 
it can reduce costs related to search and informa-
tion, policing and enforcement, and bargaining 
and decision making; and it can be the basis for 
the transmission and exchange of knowledge 
and allow for innovation, coordination, and co-
operation among firms.12 Meanwhile, factors 
such as mistrust, discrimination, fragmentation 
along ethnic lines, or inequality can also influ-
ence whether jobs are created, and what kind.
in high- and upper-middle-income countries 
(figure 4.3a). This relationship is not significant 
in lower-middle- and low-income countries. 
Holding a job with perceived cognitive, creative, 
and autonomous attributes is positively linked 
with civic engagement indicators in all but 
low-income countries (figures 4.3b, 4.3c, and 
4.3d).9 Similarly, in surveys conducted in 2012 
in China, Colombia, and the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, workers who perceived that their jobs 
involved more autonomy and greater creative 
and cognitive content were more likely to report 
helping other people.10
More than correlations?
As suggestive as they are, these relationships be-
tween jobs and social cohesion do not establish 
causality. While unemployed people may be less 
likely to trust others or join associations, people 
with less trust in others may also be more likely 
to be unemployed or not participate in civil so-
F I G U R E  4 .1  Trust and civic engagement go together with peaceful collective decision making
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team, based on World Values Survey 2005 (database), World Values Survey Association, Stockholm; Worldwide Governance Indicators 
2005.
Note: The analysis includes 56 countries (panel a) and 49 countries (panel b). “Index of peaceful collective decision making” is an average of indicators of “voice and accountability” 
and “political stability and the absence of violence” from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. “Index of civic engagement” is the average of responses to questions from the World 
Values Survey on (a) active membership in associations; (b) whether the respondent participated or would participate in a demonstration; and (c) whether the respondent would 
sign a petition.
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Controlling for other factors, men and 
women who were working in 2000 but not in 
2007 were less likely to be participating in com-
munity activities than others. Conversely, men 
and women who were not working in 2000 but 
were working in 2007 were significantly more 
likely to be involved in community activities 
than those who were not working in 2007.15 
Reasons not controlled for in the analysis could 
explain these findings; for example, people who 
Evidence of a directional link between em-
ployment status and civic engagement comes 
from a survey in Indonesia that tracked partici-
pation in community meetings and volunteer 
activities and interviewed the same respondents 
in 2000 and 2007.13 On average, participation 
in community activities increased 8 percent 
during the period, but it increased at different 
rates among people with different work histo-
ries (figure 4.4).14 
F I G U R E  4 . 2  People who are unemployed trust and participate less
Source: Wietzke and McLeod 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
Note: The analysis includes 54 countries. The vertical axis shows the marginal probability (d-probit coefficient) of individuals’ self-reported trust or civic engagement on being 
unemployed. The estimates control for the income, education, and demographic characteristics of respondents. Trust is based on the question, “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Civic engagement variables are (a) whether the respondent is an active member of 
one or more of nine different associations; (b) whether the respondent attended or would attend a demonstration; or (c) whether the respondent signed or would sign a petition. 
The line indicates the 95 percent confidence interval of each coefficient. If the line crosses the horizontal axis, the corresponding coefficient is not statistically significant. 
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employment can break economic and social 
ties, breed mistrust, and damage people’s sense 
of community and hope for the future. Not hav-
ing a job can mean losing social status as well 
as not being able to provide income for one’s 
family. A man laid off after 24 years of work in a 
factory in Serbia explained, “I automatically lost 
everything. I lost any freedom and power I had. 
Every thing was lost.”17 Ethnographies of com-
munities in Argentina, Bulgaria, and Guyana 
get sick lose their jobs and their ability to partici-
pate in the community. New cross-country anal-
ysis from Europe and Latin America suggests a 
casual relationship between employment status 
and trust in others and institutions (box 4.2).16
The empirical results relating unemploy-
ment, trust, and civic engagement imply that 
losing a job means more than losing income. 
Job loss can undermine feelings of self-worth 
and strain family and social relationships. Un-
F I G U R E  4 . 3  People with motivating jobs trust and participate more
Source: Wietzke and McLeod 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
Note: The analysis includes 54 countries. The vertical axis shows the marginal probability (d-probit coefficient) of individuals’ self-reported trust or civic engagement on an index  
assessing whether respondents think their job is cognitive, creative, or independent. The estimates control for the income, education, and demographic characteristics of the 
respondents. Trust is based on responses to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?” Civic engagement variables are whether the respondent is an active member of one or more of nine different associations and whether the respondent attended or 
would attend a demonstration, or signed or would sign a petition. The line indicates the 95 percent confidence interval of each coefficient. If the line crosses the horizontal axis, 
the corresponding coefficient is not statistically significant. 
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that experienced widespread job losses in con-
texts of limited new job creation are remarkably 
consistent in their accounts of the social impli-
cations of long-term unemployment (box 4.3).
For communities, job loss appears to foster 
mistrust not only toward former employers or 
government authorities suspected of being in-
different or responsible for the lack of employ-
ment opportunities but also among neighbors, 
former colleagues, and friends. This frustration 
may contribute to general dissatisfaction with 
the political environment. An empirical study 
using the World Values Survey in 69 countries 
finds that joblessness can be linked with nega-
tive views about the effectiveness of democracy 
and preferences for a rogue leader.18 Insecure 
jobs or jobs that people find demoralizing can 
have effects similar to those of unemployment. 
The lack of status, job security, or voice at work 
can lead people to feel disempowered and hope-
less about the future and to stop participating in 
social networks.19
In extreme cases, unemployment can con-
tribute to violence or social unrest. Youth in 
particular may turn to gangs or other violent 
groups to compensate for the lack of ties in eco-
nomic and social life.20 A longitudinal study of 
youth in Ecuador found that members of gangs 
An analysis using the Latinobarómetro and Eurobarometer values 
surveys during the 2000s makes it possible to study the evolution of 
trust and jobs and links in both directions. The surveys include ques-
tions on interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. Cohorts are 
defined and examined in the different survey years. The analysis 
looks at how social cohesion and employment conditions for the 
cohorts evolve over time, controlling for certain country characteris-
tics that could be correlated with both trust and employment 
status.
The dataset captures important features of the formation of 
social cohesion, because perceptions of trust and civic participation 
are highly influenced by peer and social interaction effects. For 
instance, an individual’s propensity to trust other people or the 
state depends on the perceived or actual trust of others belonging 
to similar sociodemographic groups. 
The model simultaneously allows group level job conditions, 
including unemployment and self-employment, to influence trust 
and vice versa. The empirics quantify how earlier changes in group-
level employment conditions predict their trust in society and its 
BOX 4.2   Do jobs cause trust? Analysis of Eurobarometer and Latinobarómetro Surveys 
Source: Arias and Sosa 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
a. Perry and others 2007.
institutions over time. The estimated effects measure how a per-
centage change in, say, the unemployment rate for a cohort in a 
given year predicts changes in the percentage of individuals of that 
same cohort reporting to trust in the subsequent year.
This analysis finds that increases in unemployment are fol- 
lowed by increases in trust among Europeans, but the opposite is 
true among Latin Americans. At the same time, increases in self-
employment lead to higher trust in Europe while the opposite is 
true in Latin America. These results hold in Latin America for trust 
both in government and in others. Conversely, the analysis finds 
little evidence of a causal link from trust to jobs, except for a small 
negative impact of self-employment on trust in government in 
Latin America. These results may reflect the higher coverage of 
social protection in Europe and the lower importance of open 
unemployment in Latin America than in Europe. They are consis-
tent with evidence that in Latin America self-employment, while a 
last resort for many unable to find wage employment, is valued by 
some for the independence it provides.a
F I G U R E  4 . 4  Having a job means more community 
participation in Indonesia
Source: Indonesia Family Life Survey (database), Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
Note: Community participation includes joining in a community meeting; cooperative, voluntary labor; 
neighborhood improvement; neighborhood watch (men); or women’s association.
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placed persons, can be particularly disorient-
ing. It can influence status and identity, for 
example, for migrants who had better jobs in 
their places of origin. The social effects of un-
employment among dislocated populations 
may be especially isolating for people lacking 
family or other ties in their new communities. 
It can have implications for psychological well-
being, as well as the ability to participate in civil 
society. Even migrants who find work may be 
vulnerable if their jobs do not provide adequate 
channels to integrate within the new society or 
if the migrants lack voice or information about 
their rights.
involved with drugs and guns had joined “be-
cause they were searching for the support, trust, 
and cohesion—social capital—that they main-
tained their families did not provide, as well as 
because of the lack of opportunities in the lo-
cal context.”21 Similarly, analysis in the United 
States has found that gangs provide youth with 
the income, respect, and social ties that they 
were unable to find in jobs, particularly given 
the limited opportunities available in cities such 
as Chicago and New York that had lost stable, 
unionized manufacturing jobs.22
The lack of jobs among dislocated popula-
tions, including migrants, refugees, and dis-
Downsizing of bauxite mines in Guyana 
The downsizing of bauxite mines in the absence of new opportuni-
ties has contributed to a deterioration in family and community 
relationships in Linden, Guyana.a Between the early 1970s and the 
mid-1980s, bauxite mining near Linden was cut by half, and layoffs 
continued throughout the 1990s. By 1999, formal unemployment in 
Linden stood at about 40 percent, and residents complained of ris-
ing crime.
Once among the best-paid workers, miners were respected for 
their work and seen as drivers of the economy. People felt particu-
larly demeaned by the downsizing process: “The people off the 
job don’t get any information. They treat us like we don’t exist. 
Yet . . . before we came off, there used to be meetings with us, 
[about] what was happening.”b
Material hardship and insecurity took a harsh toll on identity 
and the relations between men and women. Women directly linked 
men’s inability to retain their authority as breadwinners to domes-
tic violence. “Especially in cases of abuse, you would be surprised 
that after counseling them, the problem comes right back to the 
economic situation. The man can’t provide adequately for the 
home.”c Indigence was linked to shocking forms of child neglect 
and abuse. Some parents were said to be prostituting their chil-
dren. The cultivation of cannabis, the use of cocaine, and involve-
ment in the international transshipment of drugs were said to be 
rapidly increasing among young men.
Downsizing also diminished the economic resources available 
to community organizations such as churches: “The churches are in 
crisis also. As individuals, we are part of the crisis, so we carry it into 
church and it in turn goes into society,” one person said.d
Regime change and unemployment in Bulgaria
Bulgaria massively downsized its unsustainable state enterprises 
following the end of the Communist regime. The disappearance of 
BOX 4.3   Displacement and unemployment can lead to the erosion of trust and ties
Source: Dudwick 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
a. World Bank 2004a.
b. World Bank 2004a, 26.
c. World Bank 2004a, 29.
d. World Bank 2004a, 53.
state jobs entailed the loss of numerous benefits, including health 
care and job security. In focus groups, people linked job loss to poor 
health, social isolation, and crime. Older men, in particular, lost face 
when they had to ask young relatives or employers for work. 
Unemployment did more than simply weaken social ties; it 
 created distrust and mutual suspicion. The restructuring created 
winners as well, and they also suffered from the mutual distrust. 
People who had lost their jobs began to avoid traditional social 
gatherings because they were unable to afford gifts that they were 
expected to provide. People felt that security—once linked to 
good health, the opportunity to pursue personal and professional 
fulfillment, good personal relations, respect in the community, and 
social cohesion—had moved out of reach. In communities that 
were once relatively equal, people identified five or six levels of 
well-being. 
Economic reforms in Argentina
La Matanza is a city of 1.2 million outside Buenos Aires that was 
once a manufacturing center of textiles, diesel engines, household 
appliances, and steel. Economic transformations in the 1990s led to 
increased reliance on technology and skilled workers. Factories in La 
Matanza closed, and job opportunities became scarce. With mobil-
ity low, people had to take up temporary or casual jobs without 
unemployment or health insurance. Those who managed to find 
jobs complained of exploitative pay, abusive treatment, and assaults 
to their dignity.
As elsewhere, job loss affected men and women’s relationships. 
While some men adapted to a more egalitarian role, many re -
sponded to the blow to their self-esteem as breadwinners with 
depression or anger; women complained that violence in the 
household increased. Men felt joblessness undermined their roles 
in the family.
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child care, education, biotechnology, and manu-
facturing define job competencies and give em-
ployees the chance to develop skills, participate 
in training, and increase their responsibility. 
Results from a program implemented in nurs-
ing homes in Massachusetts in the United States 
found that having opportunities for growth im-
proved communication and teamwork, reduced 
turnover, and built self-respect and confidence 
among staff.25 
Jobs can have similar effects for low-wage 
workers in developing countries, and these ef-
fects can have implications for social cohesion. 
The growth of the garment sector in Bangla-
desh brought more than 3 million women into 
the workplace. Although the factory jobs were 
physically demanding and poorly paid, they ex-
panded women’s autonomy and increased their 
opportunities to participate in public life.26 “I 
am braver now,” a 26-year-old worker explained, 
“I understand more things which I did not be-
fore.”27 Observers noted that the sight of women 
walking back and forth to work changed popu-
lar notions about the acceptability of women in 
the public space and their right to access public 
institutions.28 Coworkers travel together, share 
information about work opportunities, and 
form savings groups.29
The effect of jobs on identity also holds 
for self-employed workers, including farmers 
(box 4.4). Jobs that provide access to voice can 
be empowering and give workers a stake and 
shared interest in their work.30 Informal workers 
lack access to representation on the job and are 
similarly excluded from local government and 
economic associations. Associations of self-em-
ployed workers and farmers help fill these gaps.31 
A core strategy of the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in India has been to em-
power its members and partners by increasing 
their say in communities (box 4.5).
Jobs connect people
Some jobs bring people into contact with others 
whom they might not otherwise encounter, in-
cluding people of different ethnicities and social 
backgrounds (box 4.6). This connecting aspect 
of jobs can contribute to social cohesion. Jobs 
can create opportunities for repeated interac-
tions focused on tasks leading to interdepen-
dent relationships.32 A study of political views 
Jobs (or the lack of jobs) can shape 
social interactions
The link between social cohesion and jobs is not 
necessarily direct or linear. Interactions between 
jobs and societies are contextual and multidi-
mensional; effects can be positive as well as nega-
tive. Having, or not having, a job can influence 
how people view themselves in relation to others, 
with implications for values, attitudes, and be-
haviors. Jobs can connect people with informa-
tion, economic activities, and other people. And 
how jobs are allocated can affect whether people 
think their society is fair and merit-based, believe 
they have a stake in society, and have expecta-
tions and aspirations for the future (Question 4). 
Jobs provide social identity
Some jobs can contribute positively to how peo-
ple view themselves and their relations with oth-
ers. The identity conveyed by a job can influence 
the social categories that individuals associate 
with, their behaviors, and the norms that shape 
this behavior.23 In industrial countries, jobs that 
give people opportunities to learn and develop 
careers can be motivating and strengthen iden-
tity. In the United States, programs that provide 
skill development and growth opportunities to 
low-wage workers aim to strengthen self-esteem 
and motivation.24 Public and private sector ini-
tiatives to establish career ladders in health care, 
David is the owner of a small shop in one of the rural areas of Risaralda. He was 
born in another part of Colombia but has lived in the region of Risaralda for 
some years now. He loves living in this area for the safety and peace that exists. 
He has had his shop, located next to the main street of his village, for around 
15 years. 
One of the things he loves the most about his job is the deep sense of 
belonging to the community that it offers. When necessary, people come to his 
shop and ask for credit for the goods they need. Despite a few unpaid bills 
some of his customers have left him, he does his best to help the villagers. The 
income from the shop provides only enough to subsist, and it is necessary for 
him to engage in other businesses so that he can have an additional income. He 
feels that his shop is a way of giving back to the community and that by being 
there, he is able to provide for the needs of his neighbors. 
BOX 4.4   Jobs, motivation, and identity in Risaralda, 
Colombia 
Source: Bjørkhaug and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
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likely to witness ethnic violence, while riots were 
more frequent in cities with fewer economic ties. 
The existence of civil society organizations, such 
as clubs, political parties, labor unions, and busi-
ness associations, contributed to reducing vio-
lence. But economic interests provided a com-
mon motivation for community members of 
both groups to participate in these associations.37
Jobs can also play a connecting role out-
side of urban environments. Studies in Ghana 
and Uganda illustrate how farmers connected 
through networks can access information and 
increase productivity. In Ghana, pineapple farm-
ers adjusted their use of fertilizer in response 
to the successful or unsuccessful experiences of 
their neighbors. Farmers who were starting to 
cultivate pineapples were more likely to make 
changes based on information they had received 
from other farmers, showing the potential that 
on-the-job interactions and learning from oth-
ers can have.38 In a qualitative survey, youth in 
Ghana who were asked about the characteristics 
that would make a job attractive emphasized 
the importance of jobs as opportunities to meet 
new people and build social networks.39 
and the workplace in the United States finds that 
cross-cutting interactions at work lead to greater 
awareness of the rationales for views other than 
one’s own and for “exposing people to political 
dialogue across lines of political difference.”33 In 
a survey of 200 managers, owners, and sales rep-
resentatives in Trinidad and Tobago, 81 percent 
of the interviewees reported that their working 
lives brought them into contact with people of a 
wider range of races than did their social lives.34
Interactions through jobs can contribute to 
greater trust and positive interdependence be-
tween groups. In the 18th century, Montesquieu 
wrote that “the natural effect of commerce is to 
bring peace. Two nations that negotiate between 
themselves become reciprocally dependent, if 
one has an interest in buying and the other in 
selling.”35 Relations through jobs, whether built 
through trade or other transactions, can influ-
ence social relations.
A 2001 study of multiethnic cities in India 
suggests that economic interdependence, in-
cluding through jobs, can reduce the incentives 
for violence between communities.36 Cities with 
more interlinked economic relations were less 
The Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) began in 1972 with 
a small group of migrant women cart pullers in the wholesale cloth 
market of Ahmedabad City in Gujarat, India. These women worked 
as head loaders, carrying clothes to and from the wholesale market. 
They were paid on a per-trip basis, regardless of the distance they 
traveled or the weight they carried. Often, they were not paid the 
full amount they were owed because no records were kept. Ela 
Bhatt, head of the Women’s Wing of the Textile Labor Association, 
helped organize the group and negotiate with the cloth merchants 
to gain fair treatment.
SEWA is now a member of the International Confederation of 
Trade Unions and has become a model for associations of informal 
workers internationally. In 2011, SEWA had more than 1.3 million 
members across India, of which over 820,000 were in Gujarat, while 
the rest were in eight other states. The members are drawn from 
multiple trades and occupations and from all religious and caste 
groups.
SEWA stresses self-reliance and promotes organizing around the 
central strategies of work security, income security, food security, 
and social security. Primarily a trade union, SEWA now engages in 
a wide range of other areas, including leadership development, 
collective bargaining, policy advocacy, financial services (savings, 
BOX 4.5   Voice can be extended to the self-employed: The case of SEWA
Source: Chen and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
loans, and insurance), social services, infrastructure, and training 
and capacity building.
Of particular concern to SEWA is the fact that the working poor, 
especially women, do not have a voice in institutions that set the 
rules that affect them. The association seeks to expand the voice of 
its members at the local level through representation and by build-
ing capacity to participate in local councils; municipal, state, and 
national planning bodies; tripartite boards; minimum wage and 
other advisory boards; sector-specific business associations; and 
local, state, and national labor federations.
Over the past decade, SEWA has also inspired or cofounded 
national and regional networks of home-workers in other parts of 
South and Southeast Asia, national networks of street vendors in 
India and Kenya, and international networks of domestic workers 
and waste pickers. While some of these networks and organizations 
remain weak, most have been able to collaborate, leverage re -
sources, and influence policies. The regional and international net-
works of domestic workers, home-based workers, street vendors, 
and waste pickers have secured two international conventions (for 
home-workers and domestic workers) and policies, laws, or legal 
judgments in several countries.
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be sufficient to build trust or change behaviors 
and contribute to social cohesion. The literature 
on prejudice suggests that contact across groups 
can alter people’s perceptions of others.41 There 
may also be risks. If cooperation through jobs 
fails, tensions between groups may flare, par-
ticularly if the groups have previously been in 
conflict and blame each other.42
While networks connect people in positive 
ways, they can also exclude. Surveys in indus-
trial and developing countries consistently find 
that people obtain jobs through acquaintances. 
Yet, reliance on networks may have negative 
social consequences if people and groups who 
lack such connections are left out. In Morocco, 
after controlling for education, social status, and 
other factors, people whose fathers did not have 
formal sector jobs were significantly less likely to 
obtain formal sector jobs themselves.43 In addi-
tion to unfairness in access to jobs, family con-
nections can also influence labor earnings. For 
example, in Brazil, sons’ wages are influenced by 
those of their parents.44 
An experiment among farmers in rural 
Uganda found that subsistence cotton farmers 
using social networks can change existing social 
interactions with beneficial results. The ran-
domized intervention compared the impact of 
training on agricultural productivity with the 
impact of being paired with another farmer. 
The pairs were encouraged to discuss farming 
activities, problems, and solutions and to set a 
target for increases in cultivation. The interven-
tion encouraged exchanges of information and 
learning by expanding farmer networks. Farm-
ers who participated in the project, especially 
women, significantly increased their produc-
tivity. Connecting farmers with people outside 
their established social circles helped spread in-
formation that would not otherwise have been 
shared.40
Jobs may not always help overcome differ-
ences and tensions between groups. While in-
centives inherent in jobs can provide people 
with motives to interact across gender, caste, 
and ethnic boundaries, these incentives may not 
Surveys carried out across the world illustrate the ways jobs can connect 
people from different backgrounds.
“In Sadakhlo market in Georgia, next to the borders with Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, one does not hear the virulent expressions of 
mutual hatred one can hear a few miles away across the border. 
‘They fight, we don’t,’ says Mukhta, a trader from Azerbaijan, while 
putting his arm round his Armenian colleague Ashot.”a
“According to one of the stallholders at Ergneti market, on the 
disputed border between South Ossetia and mainland Georgia, 
‘There are no political questions here. The market has one language: 
economic. That is it.’”b
“In Guinea, members of the Malinke ethnic group are wholesal-
ers in the groundnut market chain, while the primary producers of 
groundnuts tend to be Guerse. Malinke wholesalers and Guerse 
farmers are willing to trade with each other. This is helping over-
come ethnic and religious tensions. . . . This willingness to trade is 
due to the mutually recognized possibility of profit.”c
“In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the 
 visitor is the medley of peoples—European, Chinese, Indians, and 
BOX 4.6  Some jobs connect people across ethnic boundaries
native. It is, in the strictest sense, a medley, for they mix but do not 
combine. Each group holds to its own religion, its own culture and 
language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet . . . in the 
market place, in buying and selling.”d
In ancient Cordoba, Spain, the marketplace represented “the 
place of encounter over and above the gender, tribal, and faith 
divides that constituted Islamic urbanization.”e
“You don’t reconcile in a vacuum. There must be a practical pro-
gramme; there must be something that brings people together. As 
they work together, cleaning the coffee, they talk together so they 
start talking business but later they start talking family affairs. It fos-
ters relationships and reconciliation.” f
“If I wasn’t in this job, I might have only Indian friends or African 
friends,” said a sales manager for a processed food manufacturer in 
Trinidad and Tobago. “But now I have plenty, plenty friends. White 
friends in Mayaro. Chinese friends in Port-of-Spain. And real close. 
Closer than if you born with someone, your next-door neighbor. 
And that’s why I wouldn’t swap this job for anything else.”g
Source: Kilroy 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
a. The Economist 2000.
b. Voice of America 2002.
c. Spilsbury and Byrne 2007.
d. Furnivall 1948, 304–12.
e. Vicente-Mazariegos-Eiriz 1985, 763, cited in Briggs 2004, 326.
f.  Fatuma Ngangiza, Unity and Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda, quoted in BBC News 2006.
g. Kilroy 2011.
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Respondents at a focus group explained that, 
“to get jobs, one needs someone to speak for 
him, particularly from Sana’a.” Young people re-
ported that inheriting a civil service post from 
one’s father was not viewed as wrong under the 
country’s civil service rules.47 
Jobs that are allocated based on connections 
and other circumstances beyond the control 
of an individual can influence whether people 
view society as fair. Recent work on the mea-
surement of inequality of opportunities exam-
ines the extent to which access to basic services 
that are essential for human development, such 
as education, health, nutrition, and sanitation, 
is based on circumstances of birth or arises be-
cause of inequality within society (box 4.7).48 
Application of this approach to access to jobs 
considers the extent to which opportunities are 
related to circumstances at birth, including gen-
der, ethnicity, and parental educational attain-
ment and political affiliation, or to attributes, 
including educational attainment and age.49 Re-
sults from 29 countries in Europe and Central 
Asia indicate that inequality across groups based 
on circumstances and attributes varies between 
3 and 20 percent. The share of inequality attrib-
utable to circumstances is substantial in most 
cases, contributing to more than half of the 
overall inequality (figure 4.5).
Circumstances at birth contribute the most 
to inequality in Azerbaijan, followed by Uz-
bekistan, Georgia, Turkey and Albania. In these 
countries, such factors contribute the most to 
inequality in access to jobs. Education plays an 
outsized role in inequality in some countries—
Armenia stands out in particular, along with Al-
bania, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
Similar analysis for 18 countries in Latin 
America using the 1990 Latinobarómetro sur-
vey confirms these findings. On the whole, the 
education of the worker and the circumstances 
he or she was born into play important roles 
in explaining inequalities in access to jobs, and 
the role of education is especially important for 
regular employment in the formal sector.50
*   *   *
The interaction of jobs and social cohesion is not 
linear or simple to disentangle. This is an emerg-
ing area for further research across disciplines. 
The effect of jobs on trust and civic engagement 
at the individual level suggests that exchanges 
The exclusionary nature of networks is high-
lighted by the experience of migrants moving 
from rural areas to cities. Migrants often choose 
destinations where they have connections. But 
if they do not, they can be uprooted from fam-
ily and community ties that provide economic 
and social support, including access to jobs. 
They may also lack the information needed to 
integrate into their new destinations. Migrants 
moving across borders or regions, internally dis-
placed persons or refugees fleeing from conflict 
or returning after a peace agreement, and sol-
diers demobilized after conflict may be particu-
larly vulnerable to exclusion from job opportu-
nities. This is a concern in conflict situations as 
well as in contexts of structural transformation, 
when massive numbers of people move from 
rural to urban areas.45 Networks also do not 
reach many among the self-employed, especially 
home-based workers who work in isolation and 
domestic workers who lack opportunities to in-
teract with others.
Jobs influence aspirations and 
expectations
The various ways in which jobs are distributed 
can affect expectations and aspirations and in-
fluence whether people believe that they have a 
stake in society. The jobs that other people have 
can contribute to an individual’s values, atti-
tudes, and behaviors. Children’s goals for the fu-
ture may be influenced by whether their parents 
have jobs or not, as well as by the types of jobs 
their parents have. Frustration and even social 
unrest may develop when education and effort 
are not rewarded or when people perceive the 
distribution of jobs to be unfair. 
The Arab Spring was as much or more 
about political voice as it was about jobs. Yet 
widespread disappointment, especially among 
youth, about the lack of job opportunities and 
frustration with the allocation of jobs based on 
connections rather than merit echoed across 
countries. A young person in Egypt commented, 
“To work in a big company, you’ve got to have 
wasta [connections; literally, a middleman]. Re-
gardless of your qualifications, you must search 
for someone to secure the job for you. In some 
cases, you have to pay money.”46 Social assess-
ments in the Republic of Yemen documented 
frustration with the allocation of jobs based on 
tribal, family background, or party affiliation. 
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contribute more to social cohesion than others. 
What matters is not necessarily whether people 
have a job but whether the job and its charac-
teristics can contribute to social cohesion. In 
and relationships established through jobs can 
have broader effects on societies, including how 
they manage tensions between groups and col-
lective decision making. But some jobs may 
The approach
The concept of equality of opportunity, which can be traced back to 
John Rawls and Robert Nozick,a stems from the idea that an individ-
ual’s chances of success in life should not be caused by circum-
stances that are beyond the individual’s control, such as gender, 
ethnicity, location of birth, or family background. John Roemer’s 
1998 work formalized the principle of equality of opportunity and 
argued that policy should seek to equalize opportunities indepen-
dent of circumstances.b Empirical applications of this concept use 
different measures of opportunity and estimate the extent to which 
inequality arises because of circumstances at birth, rather than indi-
vidual attributes such as effort or talent.c 
The Human Opportunity Index (HOI) is one approach that is 
being used across countries and regions to analyze the opportuni-
ties available to children in terms of access to basic goods and ser-
vices such as sanitation, clean water, electricity, and basic education.d 
The HOI captures both the extent to which societies provide these 
goods and services and how equitably access to them is distributed 
among groups with different circumstances in a society.
Recent work has tested the application of the HOI methodology 
to jobs in Europe and Central Asia and Latin America using data 
from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey and the Latinobarómetro 
Survey.e In this case, opportunity is defined as having a job involving 
more than 20 hours of work a week; circumstances are the gender of 
the individual, the educational attainment of the father, parents’ 
past affiliation in the Communist Party (in Europe and Central Asia), 
and self-reported minority status; and attributes are educational 
attainment and age. Those lacking opportunity are people working 
fewer than 20 hours a week, the unemployed, and those who want 
to work more.
The HOI is the coverage rate of the opportunity, adjusted for 
inequality between groups defined by circumstances and attributes. 
Inequality is measured by a “dissimilarity index” (henceforth, D), 
which reflects the share of available opportunities that would have 
to be reallocated to achieve the same coverage rate of opportunity 
across all groups. A decomposition of D indicates how much circum-
stances contribute to inequality between groups (relative to attri-
BOX 4.7   Measuring inequality of opportunities in access to jobs 
Source: Abras and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
a. Nozick 1974; Rawls 1971.
b. Roemer 1998.
c. Roemer and others 2003.
d. Paes de Barros and others 2009.
e.  Life in Transition Survey I (database), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London.
f.  Estimating the indirect channel—the effect of circumstances through education—would be difficult because education depends on a host of factors other than the circum-
stances on which information is available. Moreover, excluding the impact of circumstances through education is justified because we are interested in measuring the extent to 
which inequality in access to jobs is attributable to circumstances. While circumstances may have influenced educational attainment as well, these effects would have occurred 
at a much earlier stage of life (primarily in childhood) and therefore do not reflect inequality of opportunities specific to jobs.
butes), and which circumstances contribute the most. Circumstances 
can affect access to a job involving more than 20 hours of work a 
week through direct and indirect channels. An example of a direct 
channel is when belonging to a minority group can affect the chance 
of getting a job. As for indirect channels, circumstances can influ-
ence the education of a person, which, in turn, influence the chance 
of getting a job. The decomposition of D is intended to measure 
the direct channel, which is to say the inequality attributable to the 
predetermined circumstances, net of the effect attributed to differ-
ences in education and experience among workers.f 
Caveats
A number of questions complicate the exercise and act as caveats to 
the analysis. First, how should opportunity be defined in terms of 
access to jobs? People have different preferences about jobs, so 
part of the measured inequality may reflect voluntary choices 
rather than a lack of access. And people with certain circumstances 
and attributes may be more (or less) likely to be in the labor force in 
the first place. Second, which circumstances should be considered? 
The data only report a limited range of them, and some may simply 
not be observable. Gender, minority status, and parental education 
are commonly considered in the literature; and whether parents 
were affiliated with the Communist Party can be a proxy for social 
status in the European and Central Asian countries, even many 
years later. However, parental education may be correlated with 
unobserved abilities of an individual. Controlling for the individual’s 
education level partially resolves this problem but does not address 
the possibility that among children who receive the same educa-
tion, children with educated parents may acquire better skills stem-
ming from unobservable inputs. The methodology makes no 
assumptions about missing circumstances, which are likely to exist 
since information on all circumstances is not typically available 
from the same survey. The inequality or dissimilarity index has the 
property that the index will always increase with the addition of 
more circumstances or attributes. Despite these caveats, this 
approach is a first step in applying the inequality of opportunity 
analysis to access to jobs.
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influence identity, connect people through 
networks, and increase a sense of fairness and 
meritocracy in access to jobs have the potential 
to contribute to social cohesion.
certain contexts, jobs can transform societ-
ies if they influence social identity and social 
norms; if they shift bargaining power within 
households, communities, or society; or if they 
alter power relations between groups. Jobs that 
F I G U R E  4 . 5 Inequality of job opportunities varies across countries
Sources: Abras and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013; based on the data from the Life in Transition Survey I (database); European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, London.
Note: Opportunity is defined as having a job with 20 or more hours a week. Circumstances include gender, ethnicity, and parental education and political affiliation. The D Index is 
the share of available opportunities that would have to be reallocated to achieve the same coverage rate of opportunity across all groups.
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programs themselves are subject to corruption 
and governance risks. These negative experi-
ences may reveal poor program design, however, 
rather than prove the impossibility for jobs poli-
cies to contribute to social cohesion. 
Access to information, rights, and voice
Policies can take social cohesion into account by 
expanding opportunities for groups who face 
barriers to getting jobs and increasing access 
to voice and rights. People may feel frustrated 
if they perceive that jobs are allocated on the 
basis of privilege and connections rather than 
merit and achievement. Increasing fairness and 
equality of opportunity for jobs involves in-
forming the public about jobs and how to get 
them, and about the existence of legal mecha-
nisms, such as antidiscrimination laws and af-
firmative action programs to reduce discrimina-
tion and support the inclusion of groups who 
lack access. But having laws on the books is 
not enough. Increasing fairness involves institu-
tions for enforcement, and redress mechanisms 
for accountability. Although such measures can 
be motivated by multiple objectives, including 
poverty reduction, they can also be considered 
from a social cohesion perspective.
Transparency and access to information 
about jobs can increase fairness and equality 
of opportunity by ensuring that vacancies are 
widely publicized, together with information 
about accessing public employment programs. 
Access to information about rights is similarly 
important for ensuring that labor practices are 
fair. Farmers, self-employed workers, and work-
ers without formal labor contracts are often not 
knowledgeable about their rights in relation to 
land owners, traders, local authorities, and em-
ployers, or about their options for appeals. Civil 
society organizations such as cooperatives, asso-
ciations of informal workers, and trade unions 
can disseminate information about rights and 
the channels to voice grievances.55 
A related challenge is the extension of effec-
tive legal protection to those who work outside 
of legal frameworks. At the international level, 
In Rabat, Morocco, unemployed college gradu-
ates gather daily in front of government build-
ings to protest the lack of jobs.51 In Juba, South 
Sudan, the fledgling government faces the chal-
lenge of demobilizing 150,000 combatants and 
reintegrating large numbers of internally dis-
placed persons after conflict.52 For policy mak-
ers in countries with high youth unemployment 
and in countries affected by conflict, expanding 
job opportunities has urgency for social and po-
litical reasons, as well as for economic reasons.
In industrial and developing countries alike, 
the conventional wisdom is that having a job is 
what matters for social cohesion—how societies 
peacefully manage collective decision making. 
The idea that jobs can build identity, or might 
be associated with trust or more participation 
in society, is often seen as relevant only for a 
narrow set of occupations in rich countries. 
Those jobs are perceived as a luxury that devel-
oping countries cannot afford. Even those who 
concede that some jobs can do more for social 
cohesion in developing countries are skeptical 
that policies can do much beyond supporting 
job creation. Given that most employment is in 
the private sector, it is unclear how or whether 
the government could influence the nature of 
the jobs. Some even doubt that jobs on their 
own lead to greater social cohesion. They view 
jobs as only one element that can contribute to 
changing values, attitudes, and behaviors within 
a complex web of institutional, historical, politi-
cal, and social factors. Given this multiplicity of 
influences, engineering social cohesion through 
jobs is not an option. 
Negative experiences with publicly funded 
employment programs give some justification 
to this skepticism. Temporary employment pro-
grams that place people into dead-end jobs with 
no hope for future employment may do more 
harm than good.53 Similarly, demobilization 
programs in post-conflict environments risk ex-
acerbating tensions between former opponents 
through divisive targeting.54 Social cohesion 
is actually undermined when jobs in publicly 
funded programs are allocated to friends and 
relatives of government officials, or when the 
QUeStION 4 Can policies contribute to social cohesion?
the obligations of the state. Guarantees are of-
ten complemented by laws addressing job seg-
regation, unequal pay, prejudice in recruitment, 
harassment at work, and lack of education and 
training.60 Affirmative action programs involve 
proactive measures for hiring women, minori-
ties, and other groups subject to exclusion.61 
Such programs can be mandatory or voluntary 
and apply to the public or private sectors.
Affirmative action programs can work, but 
pitfalls are many. Evaluations yield mixed re-
sults.62 The most extensive research is from the 
United States; it finds that programs are most 
 effective when they are temporary and com-
bined with improvements in recruitment, train-
the passage of ILO conventions on domestic and 
home workers has extended coverage for these 
groups (box 4.8). At the national level, countries 
such as Zambia and the Philippines include le-
gal protections of informal workers in domestic 
legislation. Brazil recognizes domestic workers 
within its constitution and has extended social 
protection, including leave and maternity ben-
efits to them. The country’s National Social Se-
curity Institute provides incentives for employ-
ers who register domestic workers. Although 
difficult to enforce in practice, Brazil, the Czech 
Republic, the Philippines, and South Africa 
have established minimum wages for domestic 
workers.56
Similarly, migrant workers tend to fall out-
side legal frameworks. Both sending and receiv-
ing countries can adopt measures to extend legal 
protection. The government of the Philippines 
has a mechanism to protect its overseas work-
ers. The government provides them with pre-
departure information and support services; it 
has also signed bilateral agreements and memo-
randa of understanding recognizing migrant 
workers’ rights with receiving countries. The 
government has also promoted voluntary social 
security schemes for overseas workers.57
The existence and quality of institutions for 
accountability can influence the extent to which 
rights are enforced in practice.58 Legal frame-
works rely on the ability of labor ministries, in-
spectorates, and courts to handle disputes and 
hold the parties accountable. Most countries al-
low labor disputes to be heard in special labor 
courts or civil courts. But court proceedings 
can be lengthy, costly, and cumbersome. In re-
sponse, some countries have established alterna-
tive procedures for dispute resolution, including 
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration before 
court hearings.59 Cambodia introduced an Ar-
bitration Council in 2003 to help manage labor 
grievances and improve industrial relations in 
the growing garment sector (box 4.9).
Antidiscrimination policies
Legal mechanisms such as antidiscrimina-
tion laws and provisions for affirmative action 
can facilitate access to jobs for groups who 
are excluded from opportunities or suffer from 
stigma. Most countries have equality guarantees 
within their constitutions, generally covering 
Domestic work includes cleaning, cooking, gardening, child care, and elder 
care. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that there are 52.6 
million domestic workers worldwide; other estimates are nearly twice as high. 
Women, generally from the poorest sections of society, make up over 80 per-
cent of domestic workers.a Many are migrants, and child labor is common, 
especially for girls. Domestic workers, and especially migrants, are excluded 
from labor and social protection laws in most countries. 
Domestic workers have long tried to be recognized and included in the 
labor laws of their respective countries. In 2006, domestic worker organizations 
began to organize internationally with the support of international trade 
unions and nongovernmental organizations representing informal workers. 
Their main demand was recognition and access to rights, including a campaign 
for an ILO convention on labor rights for domestic workers.
The campaign involved extensive coordination at the country level to 
mobilize workers and gain support from labor ministries, trade unions, and 
employers’ associations. As a result of this campaign, the minimum wage for 
domestic workers was raised by 10 percent in Jamaica, and a memorandum of 
understanding was signed to improve the conditions of Indonesian domestic 
workers in Malaysia.
In 2011, the ILO adopted the Domestic Workers Convention and the Domes-
tic Workers Recommendation. The convention states that domestic workers are 
to be covered under national labor laws and regulations, including those 
related to social protection programs. 
The process of securing an ILO convention contributed to building the 
capacity of organizations and individual leaders and gained domestic workers 
associations status with trade unions. It also created better conditions for rec-
ognition and enforcement of rights. In March 2012, the government of Singa-
pore announced that it would require employers to give one day a week off to 
the country’s 206,000 domestic workers, most of whom come from Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and India.b
BOX 4.8   Domestic workers: The journey to an ILO 
convention
Source: Chen and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013. 
a. ILO 2011a.
b. Kennedy 2012.
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gram might have assisted individuals who were 
already higher up on the skills ladder but not the 
average previously disadvantaged individual.64 
Hiring quotas for underrepresented groups 
can be enshrined in constitutions, as is the case 
for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India and for 
Bumiputras in Malaysia. Both countries have 
shown that quotas work well but can become 
politicized.65 Quotas supported through specific 
programs have been successful. In Bangladesh, 
for instance, where women’s employment rates 
were extremely low, the Employment Gen-
eration Program for the Poorest put in place 
a 30 percent quota for women. This doubled 
women’s participation in the program within a 
year, with participants reporting a high level of 
satisfaction.66
Jobs policies can shape social identity and 
connect people
Access to jobs can bolster self-esteem and pro-
duce benefits for societies beyond incomes. 
Programs that support employment for at-risk 
populations, including youth, can take into ac-
count the ways in which jobs affect peoples’ at-
titudes, values, and behaviors and contribute to 
improved relations between groups. Arguably, 
in countries with high youth unemployment, 
targeted training programs have the potential 
to be designed to strengthen self-esteem, which 
can lead to greater community involvement 
and reduced crime and violence. The evidence 
remains limited and tentative, but emerging 
findings from some training programs targeted 
to youth, including those in post-conflict set-
tings are somewhat encouraging. 
The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 
suggests that combining vocational training, 
life skills, and counseling can increase commu-
nity involvement and reduce aggression among 
youth in a post-conflict setting (box 4.10).67 A 
reintegration and agricultural livelihoods pro-
gram for high-risk Liberian youth led to a mod-
est increase in social engagement and a reduc-
tion in illegal activities. Participants were also 
less interested in recruitment into violent activi-
ties in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. The program 
had no clear impact on reducing aggression 
and violence, however.68 An evaluation of the 
Juventud y Empleo program in the Dominican 
Republic found that a combination of voca-
ing, and on-the-job training.63 Evidence from 
developing countries is more limited. In South 
Africa, affirmative action supporting blacks, 
women, and people with disabilities was com-
plemented with incentives for firms, including 
access to licenses and contracts. An evaluation 
found that programs had limited impact on 
reducing gaps in employment and wages but 
narrowed differentials at the top of the wage 
distribution. This finding suggests that the pro-
The garment industry is Cambodia’s largest formal sector employer. By mid-
2008, the sector had more than 300 factories, with nearly 340,000 workers, 90 
percent of whom were women. Labor conditions including low wages, exces-
sive overtime, poor occupational health and safety, child labor, and antiunion 
practices emerged as a major issue as the sector expanded. The initial response 
was passage of a new labor law in 1997. Enforcement was poor, however. The 
Labor Inspectorate lacked credibility; inspectors were underpaid and underre-
sourced, and were seen as subject to influence. The courts were perceived as 
corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of workers or employers. As a result, 
strikes and demonstrations increased, and major international brands raised 
concerns about the viability of operating in Cambodia.
In this context, Cambodia concluded a 1999 bilateral trade agreement with 
the United States. Building on a similar clause in other trade deals, the United 
States agreed to increase Cambodia’s import quota for garments if a semian-
nual review showed that progress had been achieved in adherence to core 
international labor standards and standards set in Cambodian law. Following 
the agreement, the United States funded two International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) projects to support the implementation of this clause. The first, which 
became known as Better Factories Cambodia, involved monitoring working 
conditions in garment factories.
The second program established an Arbitration Council to prevent and 
resolve labor disputes. The council’s 30 part-time members were nominated 
through a process facilitated by the ILO and endorsed by unions, employers’ 
organizations, and government. The council conducts mandatory but (gener-
ally) nonbinding arbitration of collective labor disputes that cannot be resolved 
through mediation by the Ministry of Labor. Most disputes handled by the 
council involve compliance with labor law related to wages, bonuses, benefits, 
and working conditions. Some cases also relate to rights, including antiunion 
practices, gender equality, freedom of association, and collective bargaining.
Since its establishment in 2003, the council has heard more than 1,200 dis-
putes, 70 percent of which  are reported as successfully resolved. Opinion sur-
veys indicate a high level of confidence in the council’s independence and 
effectiveness. In 2010, the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia 
and major union federations agreed to switch to the council’s arbitration pro-
cedures for disputes over existing labor rights. The result has been an upsurge 
in the rate of awards issued by the council and a decrease in the rate at which 
parties are filing objections. Strikes per factory have fallen to their lowest level 
in 10 years.
BOX 4.9   From laws on the books to laws in action in 
Cambodia’s garment sector
Source: Adler and Hwang 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
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Opportunities for youth in Northern Uganda
Two decades of insurgency, instability, and conflict led to high rates of poverty 
in northern Uganda. By 2005, a measure of peace and stability had returned to 
the region, allowing for the demobilization and reintegration of former com-
batants and other war-affected populations. In 2006, the government launched 
the Youth Opportunities Program to stimulate income generation and employ-
ment growth among young adults ages 16 to 35. The program provided cash 
grants for vocational training and business materials to groups of participants 
with successful grant proposals. Groups had an average of 22 members, and 
most expressed interest in tailoring, carpentry, metal works, mechanics, or 
hairdressing.
An evaluation two years after the intervention found increased investments 
in skills, participation in skilled work, greater incomes, and higher savings. 
Grantees were 4 percent more likely to attend community meetings and 9 
 percent more likely to be community mobilizers. Participants also reported 
receiving more social support from their family and the community. Further-
more, men who received grants reported a 31 percent decline in aggressive 
behavior relative to the control group. This finding is consistent with theories 
that link aggression to stress levels, low social standing, and perceived injus-
tice—all potentially alleviated by higher employment and incomes.
Public works in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province
In Sri Lanka, a cash-for-work program initially established to re settle 100,000 
returnees following internal conflict actually assisted more than 250,000 
returnees and quickly evolved into one of the largest sources of employment in 
the Northern Province. 
Participants noted that in many cases the program meetings were the first 
community-level gathering that they had attended after having arrived from 
camps for internally displaced populations. By many accounts, community 
meetings, shared meals, team work, and the involvement of elders and chil-
dren as indirect beneficiaries of the program promoted a sense of belonging 
among the newly resettled families.
Sachchithananthan Subodhini, 36 years old, from Thervipuram in the 
Puthukkudiyiruppu Division of the Northern Province said that she was “very 
happy. As a result of cash for work, the whole village is working as one; for our 
own community and village.” Reflecting on her life journey since being dis-
placed in 1995, she said that the program “had helped to bring the community 
together. . . . [T]he village seemed abandoned but the shramadana [volunteer 
work] helped to get the community back to its original state.”
BOX 4.10   In post-conflict settings, well-designed programs 
reduce social tensions
Sources: Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2011 (Northern Uganda); Andrews and Kryeziu 2012 for the World 
Development Report 2013 (Sri Lanka).
tional and life-skills training for unemployed 
youth can reduce involvement in gangs and de-
lay teen pregnancy.69 This is an area for further 
research; evidence is thin, and few evaluations of 
employment and training programs incorporate 
social cohesion outcome measures such as com-
munity participation and conflict resolution.
Temporary employment programs can pro-
vide skills training and access to employment 
for youth at risk and vulnerable populations, 
particularly during crises and after conflicts.70 
These programs have a mixed record in support-
ing employability, because they generally involve 
jobs with low status that rarely lead to future 
earnings opportunities. But there are indications 
that programs can be designed to invest in skills 
with benefits for social cohesion. El Salvador’s 
Temporary Income Assistance Program targets 
women and youth in areas with high rates of 
violence. Early results suggest that the program 
has increased the self-esteem of beneficiaries and 
reduced the recurrence of violence. 71
Public works programs frequently rely on 
community participation to identify local proj-
ects, providing forums for collective decision 
making. Community meetings can bring to-
gether people affected by conflict and crisis (box 
4.10). In Rwanda, meetings for the country’s 
public works program discussed peace building, 
security, community development, and recon-
ciliation, in addition to project-related issues. In 
the Republic of Yemen, fuel shortages and price 
increases in building materials stalled public 
works activities in 2011. However, communi-
ties worked together to find creative solutions to 
these obstacles, including using local materials 
and finding alternative modes of transport.72 
Participatory aspects of programs can pro-
vide a channel for voice of excluded groups. In 
a survey of participants in Ethiopia’s Produc-
tive Safety Net Program—which at 7.6 million 
beneficiaries is one of the largest public works 
programs in the world—two-thirds of respon-
dents said that the project had given them the 
first opportunity ever to be involved in a local 
meeting. Many participants had not interacted 
with local government officials prior to the 
program.73 
Employment programs partnering with the 
private sector can connect people through jobs. 
A program in Tunisia uses the process of writing 
an undergraduate thesis to teach students basic 
entrepreneurial skills. Students are mentored by 
professors and private sector coaches to develop 
business plans. The initial results of the program 
show that the program motivated students and 
gave them confidence to take risks. A male par-
ticipant from Tunis explained, “I have become 
more independent. My behavior has changed. I 
use my new skills, I am more disciplined.” Stu-
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ability in the labor market can improve equity. 
They can also increase the extent to which 
people perceive that they have a stake in society. 
This perception can be especially critical when 
risks of social unrest from youth unemployment 
and conflict are high. While policies with weak 
governance or divisive targeting can undermine 
social cohesion, well-designed programs may 
have positive effects. Jobs policies for youth at 
risk can incorporate counseling and training in 
conflict resolution. Public works programs can 
facilitate community participation and engage-
ment between citizens and local governments.
dents also explained that the program expanded 
their professional networks by giving them op-
portunities to interact with mentors. “I now 
have a social network. I know whom to consult,” 
explained a female participant.74
While not all jobs affect social cohesion, 
those that shape social identity, build networks, 
and increase fairness, particularly for excluded 
groups, can defuse tensions. Increasing fairness 
in the allocation of jobs and at work can also be 
important for social cohesion. Measures that 
support inclusion, extend access to voice and 
rights, and improve transparency and account-
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provement; neighborhood watch (men); or wom-
en’s association. These trends were likely driven 
by a set of factors, including political changes after 
1998 that created more space for community dia-
logue and the decentralization of public services 
starting in 1999; the introduction of multistake-
holder forums for consultation on budgeting 
(the Musrenbang) in 2004, which included village 
meetings; school based–management initiatives 
that require parental involvement; and the scaling 
up of development programs that explicitly pro-
mote community participation.
14. Giles, Mavridis, and Witoelar 2012 for the 
World Development Report 2013. Development 
and antipoverty programs such as the KDP 
(Kecamatan Development Project) and its urban 
counterpart, the UPP (Urban Poverty Program), 
explicitly promoted community participation 
from their inception and continue to do so under 
the new and expanded umbrella of the PNPM 
(National Program for Community Empower-
ment). Other poverty programs (including the 
conditional cash transfer program, Program 
Keluarga Harapan) usually have some commu-
nity participation component.
15. These results are similar to findings from the Wis-
consin Longitudinal Study, which tracked nearly 
5,000 people who had graduated high school in 
1957 over 45 years and indicated that the loss of 
a job can lead to withdrawal from associational 
life. Getting laid off even once, especially if it oc-
curred during a person’s prime working years, re-
sulted in “enduring, substantively and statistically 
significant lower probabilities of social involve-
ment over the life course,” particularly in church, 
youth, and community groups. See Brand and 
Burgard 2008.
16. Arias and Sosa 2012 for the World Development 
Report 2013.
17. Petesch 2012 for the World Development Report 
2013.
18. Altindag and Mocan 2010.
19. Helliwell and Putnam 2004.
20. Bell and Blanchflower 2010; Cramer 2010 for the 
World Development Report 2011.
21. Moser 2009, 240.
22. Cramer 2010 for the World Development Report 
2011; Padilla 1992.
23. Akerlof and Kranton 2010.
24. Fitzgerald 2006; Holzer and Lerman 2009; Oster-
man 2005.
25. Wilson, Eaton, and Kamanu, 2002.
26. Dudwick 2012 for the World Development Re-
port 2013; Hossain 2011 for the World Develop-
ment Report 2012.
27. Amin and others 1998, 191.
Notes
 1. The International Labour Organization (2011b) 
estimates the impact of the unemployment rate 
on social unrest to be positive and significant.
 2. Evans-Pritchard 2010.
 3. Solletty 2011. “[L]es manifestants ne demandent 
pas à l’Etat de leur trouver du travail mais dé-
noncent le fait que, sur le marché de l’emploi, les 
choses ne se font jamais dans la transparence et 
avec justice.”
 4. Hudson and others 2011.
 5. This definition is based on Woolcock 2011.
 6. Based on indicators from the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/, and documented in Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010.
 7. Fukuyama 1995; North 1990; Putnam 2000.
 8. Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011.
 9. These aspects of jobs are also correlated with val-
ues that include tolerance for others, preferences 
for gender equality, individual choice, and voice 
(though not controlling for other factors). See 
Welzel 2012 for the World Development Report 
2013.
10. Based on data from the FAFO (Forskningsstif-
telsen Fafo [Fafo Research Foundation]) Good 
Jobs Survey for the World Development Report 
2013. Probit regressions controlling for income, 
age, education, and household characteristics of 
an index of job attributes on the question, “Not 
counting anything you do for your household, 
in your work, or within voluntary organizations, 
how often in the past 12 months did you actively 
provide help for other people?”
11. Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock 2006; Knack and 
Keefer 1997. Fukuyama (1995) notes that trust 
in society shapes the nature of economic trans-
actions and institutions. Similarly, Arrow (1972, 
357) writes that “virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust, 
certainly any transaction conducted over a pe-
riod of time. It can plausibly be argued that much 
of the economic backwardness in the world can 
be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.” 
North (1990) discusses the role of trust and 
informal institutions as the basis for market 
economies.
12. Noteboom 1999; Ostrom 1990; World Bank 2004b. 
See Boschma (2005, 51–52) for an overview.
13. Giles, Mavridis, and Witoelar 2012 for the World 
Development Report 2013. Indonesia Faily Life 
Survey (database), Rand Corporation, Santa Mon-
ica, California, http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/
IFLS.html. The community activities recorded 
covered participation in a community meeting; 
cooperative, voluntary labor; neighborhood im-
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Datta 1999; Deshpande 2008; Funston 2001; 
Gudavarthy 2012; Montlake 2010; Teoh 2008; 
Weisskopf 2004; Yadav 2010.
66. Das 2012 for the World Development Report 
2013.
67. Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2011. 
68. Blattman and Annan 2011.
69. Ibarraran and others 2012.
70. Public works programs can be scaled up quickly 
and reach large numbers of people. In Argen-
tina, a program, Jefes y Jefas de Hogar, intro-
duced after the 2002 crisis was scaled up quickly 
and reached more than 2 million people every 
month. Programs have been launched and scaled 
up after conflicts in countries including Guinea 
and Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, and the Republic of Yemen. 
71. Programs in Kenya, Sierra Leone, and South 
 Africa also provide vocational training and sup-
port for entrepreneurship for youth.
72. Andrews and Kryeziu 2012 for the World Devel-
opment Report 2013.
73. Andrews and Kryeziu 2012 for the World Devel-
opment Report 2013.
74. Brodmann, Grun, and Premand 2011, 3.
References
The word processed describes informally reproduced 
works that may not be commonly available through 
libraries.
Abras, Ana, Alejandro Hoyos, Ambar Narayan, and 
Sailesh Tiwari. 2012. “Inequality of Opportunities 
in the Labor Market: Evidence from Life in Tran-
sition Surveys in Europe and Central Asia.” Back-
ground paper for the WDR 2013.
Adler, Daniel, and Hans Hwang. 2012. “From Law on 
the Books to Law in Action: A Note on the Role 
of Regulation in the Production of Good Jobs in 
Cambodia’s Garment Sector.” Background paper 
for the WDR 2013.
Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. 2010. 
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape 
Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Allport, Gordon. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Read-
ing, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Altindag, Duha Tore, and Naci H. Mocan. 2010. “Job-
lessness and Perceptions about the Effectiveness 
of Democracy.” Working Paper Series 15994, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
MA.
Amin, Sajeda, Ian Diamond, Rushira T. Naved, and 
Margaret Newby. 1998. “Transition to Adulthood 
28. Feldman 2009, cited in Dudwick 2012 for the 
World Development Report 2013; Hossain 2011 
for the World Development Report 2012.
29. Amin and others 1998.
30. Marsden 2000.
31. Chen and others 2012 for the World Develop-
ment Report 2013.
32. Kilroy 2012 for the World Development Report 
2013; Pickering 2006.
33. Mutz and Mondak 2006, 153.
34. Kilroy 2011; Kilroy 2012 for the World Develop-
ment Report 2013.
35. Montesquieu 1951.
36. Varshney 2002.
37. Chandra 2001.
38. Udry and Conley 2004.
39. Anarfi, Anyidoho, and Verschoor 2008.
40. Vasilaky 2010.
41. Allport 1954. Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) pro-
vide a meta-analysis of intergroup studies.
42. Austin and Worchel 1979.
43. Gatti and others 2012.
44. Arias, Yamada, and Tejerina 2004. See also Wang 
2011. 
45. Willman and Makisaka 2010 for the World De-
velopment Report 2011.
46. Singerman 2007, 33.
47. Marc and others 2012, 50.
48. World Bank 2005.
49. Abras and others 2012 for the World Develop-
ment Report 2013.
50. Abras and others 2012 for the World Develop-
ment Report 2013.
51. Amos 2012.
52. IOM 2012. 
53. Assessments of experience with public works 
programs can be found in Betcherman, Olivas, 
and Dar 2004; Harvey 2011; Martin and Grubb 
2001; and McCord and Slater 2011.
54. Dudwick and Srinivasan, forthcoming; USAID 
2009.
55. Chen and others 2007.
56. Fredman 2012 for the World Development Re-
port 2013.
57. Fredman 2012 for the World Development Re-
port 2013; McKenzie, Theoharides, and Yang 
2012.
58. Locke, Amengual, and Mangla 2009.
59. Purcell 2010.
60. Fredman 2012 for the World Development Re-
port 2013.
61. Holzer and Neumark 2000.
62. World Bank 2011.
63. Holzer and Neumark 2000.
64. Burger and Jafta 2010.
65. Bardhan, Mookherjee, and Parra 2012; Das 
2012 for the World Development Report 2013; 
148  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
Program in Northern Uganda.” Yale University, 
Innovations for Poverty Action, New Haven, CT.
Boschma, Ron. 2005. “Social Capital and Regional 
Development: An Empirical Analysis of the Third 
Italy.” In Learning from Clusters, ed. Ron Boschma 
and Robert Kloosterman, 139–68. Dordrecht: 
Springer Verlag.
Brand, Jennie, and Sarah Burgard. 2008. “Job Dis-
placement and Social Participation: Findings 
across the Life Course of a Cohort of Joiners.” 
Social Forces 87 (1): 211–42.
Briggs, Xavier de Souza. 2004. “Civilization in Color: 
The Multicultural City in Three Millennia.” City & 
Community 3 (4): 311–42.
Brodmann, Stefanie, Rebekka Grun, and Patrick 
Premand. 2011. “Can Unemployed Youth Create 
Their Own Jobs? The Tunisia Business Plan The-
sis Competition.” Fast Brief 83 (March), MNA 
Knowledge and Learning, World Bank, Washing-
ton, DC.
Burger, Rulof, and Rachel Jafta. 2010. “Affirmative Ac-
tion in South Africa: An Empirical Assessment of 
the Impact on Labour Market Outcomes.” Work-
ing Paper Series 76, Centre for Research on Equal-
ity, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of 
Oxford, Oxford.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2001. “Civic Life or Economic 
Interdependence?” Commonwealth and Compara-
tive Politics 39 (1): 110–18.
Chen, Martha, Chris Bonner, Mahendra Chetty, Lu-
cia Fernandez, Karin Pape, Federico Parra, Arbind 
Singh, and Caroline Skinner. 2012. “Urban Infor-
mal Workers: Representative Voice and Economic 
Rights.” Background paper for the WDR 2013.
Chen, Martha, Renana Jhabvala, Ravi Kanbur, and 
Carol Richards. 2007. Membership-Based Organi-
zations of the Poor. London: Routledge.
Cramer, Christopher. 2010. “Unemployment and 
Participation in Violence.” Background paper for 
the WDR 2011.
Das, Maitreyi Bordia. 2012. “Stubborn Inequalities, 
Subtle Processes: Exclusion and Discrimination 
in the Labor Market.” Background paper for the 
WDR 2013.
Datta, Nonica. 1999. “Backward Caste Movement 
Gains Ground.” Economic and Political Weekly 34 
(39): 2630–31.
Delhey, Jan, Kenneth Newton, and Christian Welzel. 
2011. “How General Is Trust in ‘Most People’? 
Solving the Radius of Trust Problem.” American 
Sociological Review 76 (5): 786–807.
Deshpande, Satish. 2008. “Changing Social Composi-
tion.” Seminar 587 (July): 23–26.
Dudwick, Nora. 2012. “The Relationship between 
Jobs and Social Cohesion: Some Examples from 
Ethnography.” Background paper for the WDR 
2013.
of Female Garment-Factory Workers in Bangla-
desh.” Studies in Family Planning 29 (2): 185–200.
Amos, Deborah. 2012. “In Morocco, Unemployment 
Can Be a Full-Time Job.” National Public Radio, 
January 27.
Anarfi, John Kwasi, Nana Akua Anyidoho, and Arjan 
Verschoor. 2008. “The Economic Empowerment 
of Young People in Ghana.” World Bank, Wash-
ington, DC. Processed.
Andrews, Colin, and Adea Kryeziu. 2012. “Public 
Works and the Jobs Agenda: Pathways for Social 
Cohesion.” Background paper for the WDR 2013.
Arias, Omar, and Walter Sosa. 2012. “Do Jobs Cause 
Trust? Results from Pseudo-Panel Analysis of 
Euro and Latino Barometer Surveys.” Background 
paper for the WDR 2013.
Arias, Omar, Gustavo Yamada, and Luis Tejerina. 
2004. “Education, Family Background and Racial 
Earnings Inequality in Brazil.” International Jour-
nal of Manpower 25 (314): 355–74.
Arrow, Kenneth. 1972. “Gifts and Exchanges.” Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs 1 (4): 343–62.
Austin, William G., and Stephen Worchel. 1979. The 
Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Mon-
terey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
Bardhan, Pranab K., Dilip Mookherjee, and Monica 
L. Parra. 2012. “The Impact of Political Reserva-
tions in West Bengal Local Governments on Anti-
Poverty Targeting.” Journal of Globalization and 
Development 1 (1): 1948–837.
BBC News. 2006. “Coffee Key to Reconciling Rwan-
dans.” BBC World News, August 30.
Bell, David N. F., and David Blanchflower. 2010. 
“Youth Unemployment: Déjà Vu?” Discussion Pa-
per Series 4705, Institute for the Study of Labor, 
Bonn.
Betcherman, Gordon, Karina Olivas, and Amit Dar. 
2004. “Impacts of Active Labor Market Programs: 
New Evidence from Evaluations with Particular 
Attention to Developing and Transition Coun-
tries.” Social Protection Discussion Paper Series 
0402, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Bjørkhaug, Ingunn, Anne Hatløy, Tewodros Kebede, 
and Huafeng Zhang. 2012. “Perception of Good 
Jobs: Colombia.” Background paper for the WDR 
2013.
Blattman, Christopher, and Jeannie Annan. 2011. 
“Reintegrating and Employing High Risk Youth in 
Liberia: Lessons from a Randomized Evaluation 
of a Landmine Action an Agriculturual Train-
ing Program for Ex-Combatants.” Policy report 
2011.1, Yale University, Innovations for Poverty 
Action, New Haven, CT. 
Blattman, Christopher, Nathan Fiala, and Sebastian 
Martinez. 2011. “Employment Generation in 
Rural Africa, Mid-Term Results from an Experi-
mental Evaluation of the Youth Opportunities 
 Jobs and social cohesion  149
Holzer, Harry, and Robert Lerman. 2009. The Future 
of Middle-Skill Jobs. Washington, DC: Center on 
Children and Families, Brookings Institute.
Holzer, Harry J., and David Neumark. 2000. “Assess-
ing Affirmative Action.” Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 38 (3): 483–568.
Hossain, Naomi. 2011. “Exports, Equity, and Empow-
erment: The Effects of Readymade Garments 
Manufacturing Employment on Gender Equality 
in Bangladesh.” Background paper for the WDR 
2012.
Hudson, Maria, Rosemary Davidson, Lucia Durante, 
Jemma Grieve, and Arjumand Kazmi. 2011. Reces-
sion and Cohesion in Bradford. York, U.K.: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 
Ibarraran, Pablo, Laura Ripani, Bibiana Taboada, 
Juan Miguel Villa, and Brigida Garcia. 2012. “Life 
Skills, Employability and Training for Disadvan-
taged Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Evalu-
ation Design.” IZA Conference Paper, Institute for 
the Study of Labor, Bonn, May 12.
ILO (International Labour Organization). 2011a. 
Global and Regional Estimates on Domestic Work-
ers. Geneva: ILO.
———. 2011b. World of Work Report: Making Mar-
kets Work for Jobs. Geneva: ILO.
IOM (International Organization for Migration). 
2012. “IOM Tracking of Spontaneous Returns 
Project: Total Returns to South Sudan Post CPA to 
June 2009.” Geneva, IOM.
Jenson, Jane. 1998. “Mapping Social Cohesion: The 
State of the Canadian Research.” Discussion Paper 
3, Canadian Policy Research Networks, Ottawa.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mas-
truzzi. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors: Methodology and Analytical Issues.” Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 5430, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
Kennedy, Alex. 2012. “Singapore to Require One Day 
Off a Week for Maids.” Associated Press, March 5.
Kilroy, Austin. 2011. “Business Bridging Ethnicity.” 
PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, Cambridge, MA.
———. 2012. “Jobs to Social Cohesion: Via Interests, 
Attitudes, and Identities.” Background paper for 
the WDR 2013.
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. “Does 
Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 112 (4): 1251–88.
Locke, Richard, Matthew Amengual, and Ashkay 
Mangla. 2009. “Virtue out of Necessity? Compli-
ance, Commitment and the Improvement of La-
bor Conditions in Global Supply Chains.” Politics 
& Society 37 (3): 319–51.
Dudwick, Nora, and Radhika Srinivasan, with Jose 
Cueva and Dorsati Madani. Forthcoming. Creat-
ing Jobs in Africa’s Fragile States: Are Value Chains 
an Answer? Directions in Development. Washing-
ton, DC: World Bank.
Durkheim, Emile. 1893. The Division of Labor in Soci-
ety. New York: Free Press.
Easterly, William, Jozef Ritzen, and Michael Wool-
cock. 2006. “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and 
Growth.” Economics and Politics 18 (2): 103–20.
Eaton, Charles, and Andrew W. Shepherd. 2001. Con-
tract Farming: Partnerships for Growth. Rome: 
Food and Agriculture Organization.
Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. 2010. “IMF Fears ‘Social 
Explosion’ from World Jobs Crisis.” Telegraph, 
September 13.
FAFO (Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo [Fafo Research 
Foundation]). 2012. “Good Jobs Survey.”  FAFO 
Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo. 
Fitzgerald, Joan. 2006. Moving Up in the New Econ-
omy: Career Ladders for U.S. Workers. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
Feldman, Shelley. 2009. “Historicising Garment Man-
ufacturing in Bangladesh: Gender, Generation, 
and New Regulatory Regimes.” Journal of Interna-
tional Women’s Studies 11(1): 268–82.
Fredman, Sandra. 2012. “Anti-Discrimination Laws 
and Work in the Developing World: A Thematic 
Overview.” Background paper for the WDR 2013.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and 
the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press.
Funston, John. 2001. “Malaysia: Developmental State 
Challenged.” In Government and Politics in South-
east Asia, ed. John Funston, 160–202. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Furnivall, John S. 1948. Colonial Policy and Practice: 
A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands 
India. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press.
Gatti, Roberta, Diego Angel-Urdinola, Joana Silva, 
and Andras Bodor. 2012. Striving for Better Jobs: 
The Challenge of Informality in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Giles, John, Dimitris Mavridis, and Firman Witoelar. 
2012. “Subjective Well-Being, Social Cohesion, 
and Labor Market Outcomes in Indonesia.” Back-
ground paper for the WDR 2013.
Gudavarthy, Ajay. 2012. “Can We De-Stigmatize Res-
ervations in India?” Economic and Political Weekly 
47 (6): 55–62.
Harvey, Philip. 2011. “A Job-Led Recovery Strategy 
Achieving Economic Recovery through Direct 
Public Job Creation.” Dēmos, NY.
Helliwell, John, and Robert Putnam. 2004. “The So-
cial Context of Well-Being.” Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society B 359: 1435–46.
150  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
Lucifora, and Wiemer Salverda. 237–252. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cam-
bridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Padilla, Felix M. 1992. The Gang as an American En-
terprise. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Paes de Barros, Ricardo, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, Jose 
R. Molinas Vega, Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. 
Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
Perry, Guillermo E., William F. Maloney, Omar S. 
Arias, Pablo Fajnzylber, Andrew D. Mason, and 
Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi. 2007. Informality: Exit 
and Exclusion. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Petesch, Patti. 2012. “The Exponential Clash of Con-
flict, Good Jobs, and Changing Gender Norms 
in Four Economies.” Background paper for the 
WDR 2013.
Pettigrew, Thomas F., and Linda R. Tropp. 2011. 
When Groups Meet: The Dynamics of Intergroup 
Contact. New York: Psychology Press.
Pickering, Paula. 2006. “Generating Social Capital for 
Bridging Ethnic Divisions in the Balkans: Case 
Studies of Two Bosniak Cities.” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 29 (1): 79–103.
Purcell, Julius. 2010. Individual Disputes at the Work-
place: Alternative Disputes Resolution. Dublin: 
European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions.
Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse 
and Revival of American Community. New York: 
Simon and Schuster.
Putnam, Robert, Robert Leonardi, and Rafaella Na-
netti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-
ditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press.
Roemer, John E. 1998. Equality of Opportunity. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roemer, John E., Rolf Aaberge, Ugo Colombino, 
Johan Fritzell, Stephen Jenkins, Arnaud Lefranc, 
Ive Marx, Marianne Page, Evert Pommer, and 
Javier Ruiz-Castillo. 2003. “To What Extent Do 
Fiscal Regimes Equalize Opportunities for In-
come Acquisition among Citizens.” Journal of 
Public Economics 87: 539–65.
Singerman, Diane. 2007. “The Economic Imperatives 
of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities 
among Youth in the Middle East.” Middle East 
Youth Initiative Working Paper 6, Wolfensohn 
Center for Development, Dubai School of Gov-
ernment at Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC.
Marc, Alexandre, Alys Willman, Ghazia Aslam, Mi-
chelle Rebosio, with Kanishka Balisuriya. 2012. 
Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies 
in Responding to Fragile Situations. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Marsden, David. 2000. “A Theory of Job Regulation, 
the Employment Relationship, and the Organisa-
tion of Labour Institutions.” Industrielle Beziehu-
ngen 7 (4): 320–47.
Martin, John P., and David Grubb. 2001. “What 
Works and for Whom? A Review of OECD Coun-
tries’ Experiences with Active Labour Market Poli-
cies.” Swedish Economic Policy Review 8 (2): 9–60.
McCord, Anna, and Rachel Slater. 2011. Overview 
of Public Works in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: 
Overseas Development Institute.
McKenzie, David, Caroline Theoharides, and Dean 
Yang. 2012. “Distortions in the International Mi-
grant Labor Market: Evidence from Filipino Mi-
gration and Wage Responses to Destination Coun-
try Economic Shocks.” Policy Research Working 
Paper Series 6041, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Montesquieu, Baron de. 1951. 2 Oeuvres Completes: 
De l’Esprit des Lois (2 Complete Works: Spirit of 
the Laws). Paris: Gallimard/Pleiade.
Montlake, Simon. 2010. “Malaysia Cautiously Chal-
lenges Longtime Affirmative Action Policies.” 
Christian Science Monitor, March 30.
Moreno, Jacob L., and Helen H. Jennings. 1937. “Sta-
tistics of Social Configurations.” Sociometry 1: 
342–74.
Moser, Caroline O. N. 2009. Ordinary Families, Ex-
traordinary Lives: Assets and Poverty Reduction in 
Guayaquil, 1978–2004. Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution.
Mutz, Diane, and Jeffery Mondak. 2006. “The Work-
place as a Context for Cross-Cutting Political Dis-
course.” Journal of Politics 68 (1): 140–55.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional 
Change and Economic Performance. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Norton, Andrew, and Arjan de Haan. 2012. “Social 
Cohesion: Theoretical Debates and Practical Ap-
plications with Respect to Jobs.” Background pa-
per for the WDR 2013.
Noteboom, Bart. 1999. Inter-Firm Alliances: Analysis 
and Design. London: Routledge.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New 
York: Basic Books.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development). 2011. Perspectives on Global 
Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting 
World. Paris: OECD.
Osterman, Paul. 2005. “Making Bad Jobs Good: Strat-
egies for the Service Section.” In Job Quality and 
Employer Behaviour, ed. Stephen Bazen, Claudio 
 Jobs and social cohesion  151
Weisskopf, Thomas. 2004. “Impact of Reservation on 
Admissions to Higher Education in India.” Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly 39 (39): 4339–49.
Welzel, Christian. 2012. “The Contribution of ‘Good’ 
Jobs to Development and Cohesion: The Human 
Empowerment Perspective.” Background paper 
for the WDR 2013.
Wietzke, Frank-Borge, and Catriona McLeod. 2012. 
“Jobs, Well-Being, and Social Cohesion: Evidence 
from Value and Perception Surveys.” Background 
paper for the WDR 2013.
Willman, Alys, and Megumi Makisaka. 2010. “Inter-
personal Violence Prevention: A Review of the 
 Evidence and Emerging Lessons.” Background 
paper for the WDR 2011.
Wilson, Randall, Susan Eaton, and Amara Kamanu. 
2002. “Extended Care Career Ladder Initiative 
(ECCLI) Round 2: Evaluation Report.” Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series RWP03-006, Har-
vard University, Cambridge, MA. 
Woolcock, Michael. 2011. “What Distinctive Con-
tribution Can Social Cohesion Make to Devel-
opment Theory, Research, and Policy?” Paper 
presented at the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development International Con-
ference on Social Cohesion and Development, 
Paris, January 20.
World Bank. 2004a. Guyana: A Poverty and Social 
 Impact Analysis of Bauxite Mining Reforms in Guy-
aya. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2004b. World Development Report 2005: A 
Better Investment Climate for Everyone. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
———. 2005. World Development Report 2006: Eq-
uity and Development. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
———. 2011. World Development Report 2012: Gen-
der Equality and Development. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
Yadav, Yogendra. 2010. “Why Caste Should Be 
Counted In.” The Hindu, May 14.
Solletty, Marion. 2011. “Le Chômage des Diplômés, 
Moteur de la Révolte Tunisienne.” Le Monde, Jan-
uary 10.
Spilsbury, John, and Karri Goeldner Byrne. 2007. 
“Value Chain Activities for Conflict-Affected 
Populations in Guinea.” Micro Report, U.S. 
Agency for International Development, Washing-
ton, DC.
Teoh, Shannon. 2008. “Poll Shows Most Malaysians 
Want NEP to End.” Malaysian Insider, October 9.
The Economist. 2000. “An Uncommon Market in the 
Caucasus.” The Economist, June 1.
Udry, Christopher, and Timothy G. Conley. 2004. 
“Social Networks in Ghana.” Discussion Paper 
888, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 
New Haven, CT.
USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development). 
2009. A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict 
Countries. Washington, DC: USAID, Bureau for 
Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade.
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. Ethnic Conflict and Civic 
Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
Vasilaky, Kathryn. 2010. “As Good as the Networks 
They Keep? Expanding Farmer’s Social Net-
works Using Randomized Encouragement in 
Rural Uganda.” Yale University, New Haven, CT. 
Processed.
Vicente-Mazariegos-Eiríz, José Ignacio. 1985. “La 
ciudad hispanomusulmana: Organizacíon social 
y formalizacíon urbana.” In Urbanismo e Historia 
en el Mundo Hispano, ed. Antonio Bonet Correa, 
2: 749–64. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid.
Voice of America. 2002. “South Ossetia Market Im-
portant for Local Economy.” Voice of America, 
Washington, DC.
Wang, Shing-Yi. 2011. “Marriage Networks, Nepo-
tism and Labor Market Outcomes in China.” New 
York University, New York. Processed.
Weiss, Dieter. 1995. “Ibn Khaldun on Economic 
Transformation.” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 27 (1): 29–37.
What are good jobs  
for development?
PART2
Introduction to Part 2
Earnings, benefits (if any), and overall job satisfaction are what matter to individual jobholders. Those earnings and bene-
fits—tangible or otherwise—are the first and 
most direct measure of the value a job has to so-
ciety. But jobs may also affect others, positively 
or negatively. Jobs for women may influence re-
source allocations at the household level and 
benefit their children. Jobs connected to world 
markets may lead to knowledge spillovers and 
make other workers more productive. Jobs that 
provide opportunities may convey a sense of 
fairness to others and help them remain en-
gaged. Spillovers like these have been the focus 
of recent thinking on development. The analysis 
may be organized around concepts such as gen-
der, urbanization, or conflict; but much of the 
action happens through jobs.
Quite often individual and social perspectives 
on jobs coincide; but not always. For instance, 
jobs with perks and benefits may be highly 
coveted by individuals, but they may be less 
valuable to society if their privileges are sup-
ported through government transfers or restric-
tive regulations, undermining the earnings or 
job opportunities of others. Because of gaps 
like these, jobs that look equivalent from an indi-
vidual perspective may be different from a social 
perspective. The contributions jobs make to so-
ciety should be assessed by taking into account 
the value they have to the people who hold them, 
but also the potential spillovers on others— 
positive or negative. Good jobs for development 
are those with the highest value to society.
Conversely, some forms of work are un-
equivocally bad. A set of universal rights en-
dorsed by governments, international organi-
zations, and others seeks to eliminate forced 
labor, harmful forms of child labor, discrimi-
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nation, and the suppression of voice among 
workers. These forms of work should not be 
considered jobs.
How jobs contribute to living standards, 
productivity, and social  cohesion varies with 
a country’s level of development, its demogra-
phy, its endowments, and its institutions. Jobs 
agendas are thus inherently country specific. 
By combining the various features of an econ-
omy, however, it is possible to build a typology 
of jobs challenges. It includes agrarian econo-
mies, conflict-affected countries, urbanizing 
countries, resource-rich countries, small island 
nations, countries with high youth unemploy-
ment, formalizing economies, and aging societ-
ies. Because the nature of the challenges varies, 
what makes a job good for development in one 
context may not be so relevant in another. And 
in some circumstances, tradeoffs emerge. The 
jobs that do the most to defuse tension in the 
short term may not do much for productivity, 
or those with the highest productivity impact 
may not lead to a broad-based improvement in 
living standards. Identifying good jobs for de-
velopment helps visualize these tradeoffs.
Different countries face different jobs chal-
lenges, but two forces—the migration of people 
and the migration of jobs—connect their jobs 
agendas. These two flows have an impact on 
countries at the sending and the receiving ends. 
The arrival of migrants or the outsourcing of 
jobs affects the living standards of both migrants 
and locals. The availability of foreign workers, 
the development of migrant networks channel-
ing savings and ideas, and the arrival of multi- 
national firms bringing in more advanced 
techniques, are all bound to increase productiv-
ity. Family structures and community life are also 
affected by the movement of people and jobs.
Chapter 5
The most important impact of jobs is on the people who hold them. Jobs provide earnings, can give access to benefits and 
insurance, and are often a source of broader life 
satisfaction. Development, in large part, consists 
of increasing these direct effects of jobs on 
individuals. 
Beyond the importance of jobs for those 
who have them, jobs matter for societies be-
cause they can affect the earnings, employment 
opportunities, and the productivity of others, 
as well as the collective capacity to manage ten-
sions. Jobs can also contribute to shared social 
objectives, such as poverty reduction, environ-
mental protection, and fairness. Often, the 
 individual and social values of jobs are similar; 
but these two perspectives may differ. For in-
stance, Vietnam’s poverty rate declined with 
unprecedented speed in the 1990s when land 
was redistributed to farmers and agricultural 
commercialization was liberalized.1 Albeit in-
creasing individual incomes, farming jobs in-
volved difficult working conditions, substantial 
variability in earnings, and no formal social 
protection. But they made a major contribu-
tion to the development of Vietnam. Bloated 
public utilities, on the other hand, often offer a 
range of privileges to their employees even 
when the utilities themselves provide only lim-
ited coverage of the population and unreliable 
services, and are obstacles to economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Such jobs may look ap-
pealing from an individual perspective—but 
less so from a social perspective. Good jobs for 
development are those that make the greatest 
contribution to society, taking into account the 
value they have to the people who hold them, 
but also their potential spillovers on others—
positive or negative. 
Recognizing the multiple effects of jobs 
is important for understanding the possible 
trade offs they entail. Some jobs greatly con-
tribute to productivity growth but do not lead 
to poverty reduction in the short run. In other 
cases, jobs are urgently needed to avoid an un-
raveling of social cohesion, but the job creation 
that can be immediately supported using pub-
lic funds is unlikely to result in rapid produc-
tivity growth. An understanding of the various 
effects of jobs on aggregate well-being, both 
direct and indirect, may help identify when a 
virtuous circle of jobs along all three transfor-
mations may arise, and when a vicious circle 
looms.
The value of a job for the person who holds it 
is a primary indication of its development pay-
off. But assessing the broader value the job has 
to society also requires information on the spill-
overs the job may have on the living standards 
of others, on aggregate productivity, or on social 
Valuing jobs
Jobs are often assessed from an individual perspective. But they can also 
affect the earnings, productivity, and well-being of others—positively  
or negatively. These spillovers should be assessed too.
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Rights as the foundation
While jobs can be transformational, some 
forms of work are harmful. Those that exploit 
workers, expose them to dangerous environ-
ments, or threaten their physical and mental 
well-being are bad for individuals and societ-
ies. Their negative effects can be surprisingly 
long-lasting. An extreme example is the impact 
of the Atlantic slave trade on West Africa. A 
study found that individuals whose ancestors 
had been threatened by slavery were less likely 
to trust relatives, neighbors, and local govern-
ments even more than 100 years after the end 
of the slave trade.2 Today, international norms 
of human rights and labor standards reject 
forced labor, harmful forms of child labor, 
discrimination, and the suppression of voice 
among workers. Yet close to 21 million people 
globally are estimated to be victims of bonded 
labor, slavery, forced prostitution, and other 
forms of involuntary work.3 In 2008, 115 mil-
lion children between the ages of 5 and 17 were 
involved in hazardous work (box 5.1).4 
cohesion. Data from household, plant-level, and 
values surveys, as well as qualitative assessments, 
can be used to determine the existence of rel-
evant spillovers. Although quantifying all the 
gaps between the individual and social values 
of jobs may not be possible, identifying where 
these gaps lie can help make policy trade offs 
transparent. The analytical tools to do so can be 
borrowed from several disciplines in economics 
and the social sciences. These disciplines often 
focus on spillovers from jobs, without necessar-
ily calling them that.
While some jobs may contribute more to 
development than their individual values sug-
gest, some forms of work are likely bad from any 
point of view. All countries have subscribed to 
a set of universal rights. Most governments, as 
well as international organizations and others, 
have ratified or endorsed standards seeking to 
eliminate forced labor, harmful forms of child 
labor, discrimination, and the suppression of 
voice among workers. Thus, some work ac-
tivities are widely viewed as unacceptable and 
should not be treated as jobs.
Much artisanal gold mining in Mali is village based and focused on 
alluvial deposits that require panning for separation. Although child 
labor tends to be relatively controlled in Mali, an estimated 20,000 
to 40,000 children, some as young as age 6, work in artisanal gold 
mining.a Human Rights Watch has documented the perilous nature 
of this work:
“They dig shafts and work underground, pull up, carry and crush 
the ore, and pan it for gold. Many children suffer serious pain in their 
heads, necks, arms, or backs, and risk long-term spinal injury from 
carrying heavy weights and from enduring repetitive motion. Chil-
dren have sustained injuries from falling rocks and sharp tools, and 
have fallen into shafts. In addition, they risk grave injury when work-
ing in unstable shafts, which sometimes collapse.”b
The work is toxic because miners use mercury to separate the 
gold from the rock. Mercury poisoning can cause serious neurologi-
cal disorders, vision impairment, headaches, memory loss, and 
problems with concentration. Often, the children themselves are 
aware of the dangers:
BOX 5.1   Children do perilous work in artisanal gold mines in Mali
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on Human Rights Watch 2011.
a.  The Government of Mali has taken steps to protect children’s rights, including banning hazardous child labor in artisanal mines and adopting a National Action Plan for the  
Elimination of Child Labor in Mali in June 2011.
b. Human Rights Watch 2011, 6.
c. Human Rights Watch 2011, 29.
d. Human Rights Watch 2011, 31.
“It’s my stepmother who makes me work there. I don’t want to. 
My real mother left. My stepmother takes all the money they pay 
me. . . . I don’t get any money from the work. . . . Our work starts at 
8 a.m. and continues the whole day. . . . I take the minerals [ore] and 
pan them. I work with mercury, and touch it. . . . He said mercury was 
a poison and we shouldn’t swallow it, but he didn’t say anything 
else about the mercury. . . . I don’t want to work in the mines. I want 
to stay in school. I got malaria, and I am very tired when I work there 
[at the mine].”
—Mariam D., estimated age 11, Worognan, Sikasso Region, 
April 8, 2011c
“It’s dangerous—there are often collapses. People are injured. 
Three died in a cave-in. The little children don’t come down into the 
hole. . . . I have had problems since working there—my back hurts 
and I have problems urinating. No one says anything to me about 
safety.”
—Ibrahim K., age 15d
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•  Many labor laws and regulations cover only 
workers in formal employment relation-
ships, limiting the extent to which workers 
can appeal to legal mechanisms. The grow-
ing involvement of agencies in hiring work-
ers complicates legal accountability because 
temporary workers often have contracts with 
employment agencies, which, in turn, enter 
into the contracts with the actual employers. 
Often, such workers would not count against 
legal minimum employment levels at which 
labor rights become binding. 11
•  Some labor laws deliberately exclude domes-
tic workers, family workers, or workers in 
small enterprises.12 Exclusions can also ap-
ply in export zones and other areas where 
regulation is suspended to attract investment. 
Unpaid family workers in agriculture and en-
terprises, including children on family farms, 
may also be excluded. Many women perform 
non-remunerated work of this sort.13
•  Tensions may also exist between labor rights 
defined in national and international contexts 
and customary, religious, and indigenous laws. 
Many countries are characterized by legal 
pluralism, whereby multiple legal systems ex-
ist side by side. Overlapping jurisdictions are 
most common in the case of family law relat-
ing to marriage, divorce, and inheritance.14 
Gaps between rights on paper and those 
in practice underscore a substantial agenda to 
eliminate unacceptable forms of work. Nonstate 
actors, including private employers and civil 
society organizations, are increasingly involved 
in efforts to improve compliance with labor 
rights and standards. Multinational corporations 
and industry associations often adopt codes 
of conduct, voluntary standards, and monitor-
ing and auditing strategies.15 Nongovernmental 
organizations monitor factories and firms, pro-
vide training and education to workers, and co-
ordinate domestic and global campaigns. While 
this heightened involvement in rights and stan-
dards does not guarantee that implementation 
will improve, it provides potential channels and 
partnerships for increasing accountability for 
rights at work.
At the international level, the United Na-
tion’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948 establishes that “everyone has the right 
to work, to free choice of employment, to just 
and favorable conditions of work and to protec-
tion against unemployment.” These rights are 
further elaborated in international conventions 
and regional frameworks and are translated into 
domestic laws.5 The global agenda for workers’ 
rights became focused on four fundamental 
principles and rights in the workplace in 1998. 
Back then, a vast majority of members of the In-
ternational Labour  Organization (ILO) signed 
a declaration covering a core set of labor stan-
dards on the elimination of forced and com-
pulsory labor, the abolition of child labor, the 
elimination of discrimination in employment 
and occupation, and freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.6 Other ILO conventions 
cover a range of related subjects including work-
ing time, social security, occupational safety and 
health, and labor inspections.7
International law requires that countries 
bring their domestic laws into compliance with 
the international legal instruments the countries 
have ratified. The core labor standards have a 
special status among ILO conventions because 
the 1998 declaration requires all ILO member 
states to “respect, promote, and realize” the stan-
dards, regardless of whether they ratify specific 
conventions.8 The standards influence other in-
struments for protecting workers’ rights through 
references in national and regional legislation, 
the texts of many bilateral free trade agreements, 
the procedures of international organizations, 
and corporate codes of conduct.9 International 
legal frameworks arguably do not cover some 
fundamental rights. The core labor standards, 
for example, do not directly address working 
conditions including safety and health.10
Gaps remain between rights on paper and 
implementation in practice (box 5.2). Even in 
countries that have ratified the core labor stan-
dards and have laws on the books, children work 
in harmful conditions, discrimination happens 
in access to jobs and in pay, forced labor persists, 
and freedom of association is limited. Commit-
ments in treaties, conventions, and laws may not 
change the institutions, practices, and behaviors 
that affect workers’ rights on their own. A key 
factor driving these gaps is the fact that many 
workers are not covered by laws. For example:
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The number of countries that have adopted the eight core labor 
standards included in the International Labour Organization’s 1998 
Declaration of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work is 
steadily increasing. But compliance gaps with the four principles—
child labor, forced labor, discrimination, and freedom of association 
and collective bargaining—are still apparent.a
Child labor. ILO conventions 138 and 182 require countries to develop 
and monitor action plans regulating work by children under age 18. 
Convention 182, covering the most harmful forms of child labor, 
has been ratified by 175 countries. The largest numbers of children 
in hazardous work are in East Asia and the Pacific, but across regions 
there is evidence that progress is being made.b Brazil and India are 
among the countries showing improvements. In Brazil, between 
1992 and 2008, employment among 7–15 year olds fell over 10 per-
centage points, from 18 percent to 7 percent. At the same time, 
school attendance rose from 85 percent to 97 percent. In India, 
 children’s employment fell from 8 percent to nearly 4 percent, and 
school attendance rose 14 percentage points (from 72 percent to 
86 percent).c 
Forced labor. More countries have ratified conventions 29 and 105, 
the core standards on forced labor, than the other core standards. 
An estimated two-thirds of forced labor takes the form of economic 
exploitation; one-fifth is linked to forced labor imposed by the state 
or the military; and the remainder involves commercial sexual 
exploitation. This last form disproportionately affects women and 
girls.d The long-term effects on individuals, families, and communi-
ties can be severe. Nongovernmental organizations that rescue vic-
tims of forced labor, particularly forced commercial prostitution, 
find that post-traumatic stress, social stigma, and disease can crip-
ple reentry into society.e
Discrimination. Conventions 100 and 111 refer to discrimination by 
gender, ethnicity, disability, or other status as a source of disparities 
in access to jobs, segregation within the labor market, pay gaps, and 
harassment or violence at work. From a legal perspective, discrimi-
nation can be understood as inequality before the law within either 
the formal legal system or customary law. It results from unequal 
treatment on the grounds of race, gender, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction, or social origin; or the unequal impact of poli-
cies, practices, or rules. Employment outcomes are affected by each 
of these layers of discrimination.f Although progress has been made 
in removing legal obstacles that affect women’s access to jobs, bar-
riers remain.g Labor laws in 44 countries restrict the hours that 
women may work,h and 71 countries impose legal limits on the 
industries in which women may work. Such restrictions have often 
BOX 5.2   Compliance with core labor standards is partial
deprived women of equal access to jobs. Inequality in laws relating 
to marriage, inheritance, and property ownership, as well as tradi-
tional and customary laws, also affect the access of women to pro-
ductive assets and business opportunities. 
Discrimination in employment may be the outcome of policies 
not dealing directly with labor issues. For example, in some coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, Roma children are often tracked 
into schools intended for children with special needs, which provide 
limited opportunities for further advancement in education and 
subsequent employment. Roma graduates of special schools in the 
Czech Republic were twice as likely as non-Roma graduates to be 
out of the labor force.i A study of Roma in the Czech Republic found 
that 19 percent of Roma ages 10–19 had attended a special needs 
school, while the share in the non-Roma population was 7 percent. 
The figures in the Slovak Republic were 12 and 8 percent 
respectively.j A 2007 court case involving Roma students in the 
Czech Republic noted that they were more likely to be placed in 
schools for the mentally challenged than non-Roma children. The 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that this overrepresentation 
violated nondiscrimination protections in the European Convention 
on Human Rights.k
Freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB). Although 
conventions 87 and 98 are among the oldest of the core standards, 
they have been ratified by fewer countries than the others. These 
conventions cover the right to establish and join organizations and 
call for mechanisms for negotiations between employers and 
worker organizations. FACB are “enabling rights” in that they give 
workers voice to advocate for other aspects of working conditions, 
including safety and health.l
FACB is curtailed in countries where unions and other associa-
tions are banned, where associations face restrictions on their activ-
ity, or where members are threatened by violence or repression. 
FACB rights of both workers and employers are monitored by the 
ILO Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), 
a universal monitoring mechanism that functions in addition to 
the ILO’s regular supervisory mechanisms for monitoring ratified 
conventions. The CFA handles complaints related to civil liberties, 
including murder, abductions, disappearances, threats, arrests, and 
detentions of trade union leaders and members, as well as other 
acts of antiunion harassment and intimidation and violations of 
freedom of assembly and freedom of expression.m Convention 87 
protects the rights of all workers, including the self-employed. In 
practice, however, implementation of FACB is limited because many 
workers are employed outside traditional employer-employee rela-
tionships or do not work in occupations or sectors that are covered 
by formal unions.
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. ILO 1998; ILO 2012a.
b. Diallo and others 2010.
c. UCW 2010.
d. ILO 2009.
e. Farley 2003.
f. Fredman 2011.
g. World Bank 2011d.
h. World Bank and IFC 2011.
i. World Bank 2008a.
j. World Bank 2012b.
k. European Court of Human Rights 2007.
l. Levi and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
m. ITUC 2011. 
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A job may also matter for others, beyond its 
holder. When asked about their most preferred 
jobs, survey respondents from four diverse 
countries provide different answers from those 
they offer when asked about the most impor-
tant jobs to society (figure 5.1). They frequently 
mention working in the civil service or as a shop 
owner as the jobs they would prefer for them-
selves, while identifying teachers and doctors 
as the most important jobs for societies. China 
is the only country where a job in civil service 
is seen as more important for society than for 
the individual. In the Arab Republic of Egypt, a 
job as a teacher is more valued individually than 
socially. And in Sierra Leone, being a farmer is 
appreciated both individually and socially, while 
in the other countries it is recognized as socially 
valuable but is not a preferred job.
This intuition can be developed into a more 
structured analysis of the reasons why some jobs 
may be more or less valuable to society than they 
are to those who hold them. Those reasons can 
be grouped under three main headings, each 
corresponding to one of the three development 
transformations. Individual jobs can improve 
the living standards of others in society, or they 
The value of jobs to individuals  
and society
The most obvious outcome of a job is the earn-
ings it provides to the worker. These earnings 
can be in cash or in kind and may include a range 
of associated benefits. The earnings the job pro-
vides, as well as the output it generates, typically 
increase with the skills of the worker. Improv-
ing skills is thus one of the most direct channels 
to enhance the value jobs have to individuals 
and society (question 5). Other characteristics 
of the job may also matter from the point of 
view of individual well-being. Stability, voice, 
and fulfillment at work all play a role in overall 
job satisfaction, as do any detrimental impacts 
of jobs on mental and physical health through 
stress and anxiety.16
Several of these dimensions of jobs have been 
combined into the concept of decent work intro-
duced by the ILO in 1999 (box 5.3). Since then, 
many governments have used it to articulate 
their policy agendas on jobs. The concept of de-
cent work has also been embraced by the United 
Nations and several international organizations 
and endorsed by numerous global forums.
Decent Work is defined as “opportunities for women and men to 
obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, 
equity, security and human dignity.”a This definition is based on a 
broad concept of work as encompassing all forms of economic 
activity.b The International Labour Organization has made Decent 
Work for all the organizing principle for its activities and has set 
an agenda for incorporating the goal of Decent Work for all into 
national strategic planning objectives.c The ILO’s Decent Work 
Agenda is a policy approach based on four strategic objectives: fun-
damental principles and rights at work and international labor stan-
dards, productive and freely chosen employment, social protection, 
and social dialogue. 
At the global level, the ILO has defined Decent Work indicators 
to measure the different dimensions of the concept and to track 
progress over time. In 2010, the United Nations (UN) Summit on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) included a new target 
under Goal 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger): “achieve full 
and productive employment and Decent Work for all, including 
women and young people.”d The Decent Work indicators are being 
BOX 5.3   The concept of Decent Work and the Decent Work Agenda
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. ILO 2002.
b. Anker 2003; Ghai 2003; UNECE 2010.
c.  “Decent Work Agenda,” ILO, Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--en/index.htm.
d. UN 2011.
e. “Measuring Decent Work,” ILO, Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/integration/themes/mdw/lang--en/index.htm.
used to help countries measure progress and establish priorities. A 
limited set are used to monitor progress toward the MDG target.e
The ILO’s Decent Work Agenda includes a threshold below 
which no job should fall. The threshold has four components: pro-
ductive employment (not simply any job), basic social protection 
according to national conditions, opportunity for voice and organi-
zation, and rights at work. As an incremental agenda, Decent Work 
indicators can change, depending on the economic, social, and 
institutional progress of countries.
This ILO agenda has gained considerable traction and interna-
tional political buy-in over the past decade. First formulated at the 
International Labour Conference in 1999, it is now part of the ILO 
constitution and has been endorsed by heads of state at the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, the Group of 20, and regional authorities such as the 
European Union, the African Union, the Organization of American 
States, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and the Southern 
Cone Common Market (Mercosur). Many countries use the Decent 
Work concept to define development targets, identify policy priori-
ties, and measure progress toward meeting specified goals.
 Valuing jobs  159
holds it provides a good measure of the value of 
the job to society. But some jobs also have spill-
overs on the living standards of others, on aggre-
gate productivity, or on social cohesion. When 
spillovers are positive, the job has a greater value 
to society than it has to the person who holds 
it, and the opposite is true when the spillovers 
are negative. In principle, the spillovers can also 
be negligible, in which case there is no real dis-
tinction between the individual and the social 
perspective. Nonetheless, the idea that jobs can 
have sizable spillovers is at the core of several dis-
ciplines in the social sciences and has greatly in-
fluenced recent development thinking (box 5.4).
can adversely affect their earnings and employ-
ment opportunities. They can help raise the 
productivity of others, or they can harm them 
through their environmental impacts. And they 
can support more peaceful collective decision 
making, or, alternatively, increase social tensions 
when they are based on privilege.
Spillovers from jobs
Good jobs for development are those with the 
highest payoff to society. As a first approxima-
tion, the value of the job for the person who 
F I G U R E  5 .1 Views on preferred jobs and most important jobs differ
Source: Bjørkhaug and others 2012; Hatløy and others 2012; Kebede and others 2012; and Zhang and others 2012; all for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who would want the job for themselves (individual value) and those who think the job is good for society (social value).
a.  China b.  Egypt, Arab Rep.
c.  Colombia d.  Sierra Leone
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•  Earnings of others. Uneven bargaining power 
or inadequate regulation may result in labor 
earnings that are either too low or too high 
relative to the output generated by jobs. This 
distortion affects the earnings of the employer 
and the job opportunities of other workers. 
Taxpayers may also be affected when jobs are 
supported through transfers. Jobs that do not 
tax others, literally or figuratively, do more for 
development. 
•  Household allocations. Having a job and con-
tributing resources to a household’s budget 
can change the status of the jobholder and 
increase his or her say on how the budget is 
allocated. If the jobholder is a woman, spend-
ing on food and on children may increase, 
which may result in greater well-being for the 
children. Jobs that empower women have the 
potential to generate such positive spillovers.
•  Poverty reduction. The well-being of oth-
ers may be affected if they are altruistic and 
value poverty reduction in general, even when 
their own earnings do not change. Since jobs 
are the main avenue out of poverty, there is 
Fully valuing the contribution jobs make 
to development requires identifying the chan-
nels through which the spillovers may occur. 
Nine of them have received attention as critical 
for development (figure 5.2):
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. As an example, recent World Development Reports on youth (World Bank 2006); geography (World Bank 2009c); conflict (World Bank 2011c); and gender (World Bank 2011d) 
look at spillovers from jobs in different contexts.
Several disciplines in economics and in the social sciences focus on 
the channels through which spillovers from jobs occur, even if they 
may not articulate it that way. One core focus of labor economics is to 
assess earnings differentials and their causes, including discrimina-
tion, uneven bargaining power, regulation, and taxation. The public 
finance literature also evaluates the impact on employment, capital 
intensity, and earnings of taxes and subsidies, including those used 
to finance social insurance contributions. Gender studies examine 
the economic, social, and cultural determinants of gender discrimi-
nation and their relationships to employment. Poverty analyses 
study the poverty and inequality impact of job distributions and 
 different growth patterns. Economic geography uncovers the pro-
ductivity impact of spatial concentration of jobs. International eco-
nomics  analyzes the resource allocation and innovation impetus 
provided by employment in export sectors and foreign-owned 
companies. Environmental economics measures and values the neg-
ative (and positive) impacts of employment in different sectors, or 
using different techniques, on the natural resource base. Identity 
economics researches how behaviors and norms are influenced by 
the relationship between people and their peer groups, including 
through their jobs. The field of equity analysis has started to examine 
BOX 5.4  Economics and the social sciences deal with spillovers from jobs, under different names 
the degree to which job outcomes are shaped by the circumstances 
in which individuals are born, as opposed to their ability or effort. 
Finally,  conflict studies aim to identify the societal conditions that 
underlie tension not being managed constructively and peacefully, 
including access to jobs and fairness in their allocation.
These disciplines bring analytical rigor to the assessment of the 
gaps between the individual and social values of jobs, hence to the 
identification of good jobs for development.a
Although they may not be explicitly articulated around jobs, 
these disciplines have shaped recent development thinking. The 
World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Genera-
tiona shows that opening job opportunities for young people is 
 catalytic for future economic and social development. The World 
Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography  discusses 
reaping the benefits of agglomeration, which happens through 
jobs, as a source of economic growth. The World Development Report 
2011: Conflict, Security, and Development  makes the point that jobs 
are a key element for stabilization in post-conflict societies. And the 
World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development 
provides evidence that jobs are a medium to promote gender 
equity and transform it into social and economic progress.
F I G U R E  5 . 2 Some jobs do more for development
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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•  Sense of fairness. A perceived absence of fair-
ness in the overall access to job opportuni-
ties, beyond one’s own job, can undermine 
the sense of belonging. Job allocations at 
odds with the idea of equality of opportu-
nity may lead to disengagement from collec-
tive decision-making processes. Jobs that live 
up to standards of transparency and merit 
contribute to the sense of fairness in society.
Because a job can affect the well-being of 
others and not only the well-being of the job-
holder, two jobs that may appear identical from 
an individual perspective could still be different 
from a social perspective. In a society that values 
poverty reduction, an informal job that takes a 
household out of poverty should be seen as more 
valuable to society. A job in a protected industry 
that needs support through transfers (either 
by taxpayers or by consumers) is less valuable 
to society, and even less valuable if the need for 
protection is associated with the use of outdated 
technology that results in high environmental 
costs. The opposite holds for a job in an export 
industry that contributes to the acquisition of 
new technical and managerial knowledge from 
abroad and spreads it through interactions with 
suppliers; this job is even more valuable to so-
ciety when the jobholder is a woman and her 
work status empowers her. And the same is true 
for a job that gives a young person a sense of be-
longing in society and conveys to others a sense 
of opportunity (figure 5.3).
The contribution jobs make to develop-
ment varies, depending on the circumstances. 
In low- and middle-income countries, poverty 
reduction carries significant weight. Productiv-
ity effects vary: heavily urbanized and highly 
connected countries such as Singapore have 
internalized a large part of these effects already, 
while urbanizing countries such as Bangladesh 
and Guatemala are still able to reap significant 
benefits. Jobs in illegal mining can cause envi-
ronmental damage, and their net contribution 
to productivity growth is limited as a result. Jobs 
in Turkey’s wind energy parks, in contrast, likely 
contribute to all three transformations in a posi-
tive way: they offer earnings and job satisfaction 
to workers; they position Turkey at the forefront 
of technological developments in new energy; 
and they often contribute to social cohesion by 
creating new livelihood opportunities for villages.
social value in the availability of jobs that take 
others out of poverty. Employment opportu-
nities tilted in favor of the poor do more for 
development.
•  Agglomeration effects. Productivity depends 
not only on the internal efficiency of eco-
nomic units but also on their environment. 
Learning and imitation through labor turn-
over and interaction with suppliers, as well 
as a better matching of skills across a bigger 
pool of workers, can increase productiv-
ity. Hence, jobs in functional cities tend to 
be good jobs for development. Conversely, 
negative effects can arise in overcrowded and 
congested cities.
•  Global integration. Knowledge spillovers also 
occur through international trade and parti-
cipation in global value chains. Firms that en-
gage in export markets tend to become more 
productive and, in doing so, they push other, 
less productive firms out of business. Know-
ledge spillovers from foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) increase aggregate productivity. 
Jobs that connect to global markets are thus 
good jobs for development.
•  Environmental effects. Jobs have negative im-
pacts on aggregate productivity when they 
damage the environment or lead to an over-
use of scarce resources. But they can also have 
positive effects on the environment, as in the 
case of jobs to manage forests and other com-
mon resources. The social value of a job can-
not be assessed without taking into account 
its environmental impact.
•  Social identity. Jobs can impact the well-being 
of others by influencing the values and behav-
ior of those who hold them in ways that affect 
society at large. Jobs can shape the norms that 
influence how the jobholder interacts with 
others, starting with basics such as reliability, 
punctuality, and courtesy. Depending on their 
characteristics, jobs can foster civic engage-
ment and result in greater trust.
•  Networks. Jobs connect people to each other. 
They convey information among coworkers 
and society more broadly. They impact the 
integration of rural migrants in new urban 
settings. Jobs may also contribute to tolerance 
when they increase interactions with people 
from different social and ethnic backgrounds.
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Can the development payoffs from 
jobs be quantified? 
Earnings from labor provide the first and most 
direct measure of the contribution jobs make 
to development. But transformations in liv-
ing standards, productivity, and social cohe-
sion happen at a faster pace when jobs lead to 
investments in children, give people the possi-
bility to acquire new skills through their work, 
or engage them more in society. Because these 
transformational aspects are seldom reflected in 
labor earnings, good jobs for development may 
not be as attractive to individuals as they are im-
portant to society. This is why, even in a context 
of full employment, there may not be enough 
jobs for women in many developing countries, 
or enough jobs connected to world markets, or 
enough jobs for idle young men. Spillovers are 
thus especially relevant in countries where gen-
der equality is far from assured, urbanization 
and global integration are incipient, and conflict 
is still a possibility. 
Fully valuing the development payoffs from 
jobs entails assessing the earnings they provide, 
as well as their possible spillovers. In practice, 
More often than not, however, jobs entail 
tradeoffs. A specific job can entail positive and 
negative spillovers simultaneously. Take, for ex-
ample, a job that requires relatively low-skills 
but that uses outdated technology and hence 
causes environmental damage. From a social 
point of view, such a job has a positive spillover 
because it leads to poverty reduction, but it also 
exhibits a negative spillover through its environ-
mental effect. Similar tradeoffs can exist for a 
job that connects the domestic economy glob-
ally but that has been obtained through connec-
tions, thereby decreasing the sense that the job 
market is fair.
Such tradeoffs can take strategic dimen-
sions: in China, the nature and location of in-
vestments in roads have different implications 
for jobs. The investments yield their highest 
growth returns in the eastern and central re-
gions of China, where the most productive jobs 
are. But their contribution to poverty reduction 
is greatest in the western regions, where living 
standards are lower.17 In such situations, soci-
etal choices are necessary. Assessing and map-
ping spillovers is an important first step toward 
informed decision making.
F I G U R E  5 . 3  The individual and social values of jobs can differ
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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ing standards: jobs can impact the earnings of 
others, they can alter the allocation of resources 
within households in a substantial way, and they 
can contribute to shared social goals such as 
poverty reduction.
Earnings of others. Jobs in subsidized firms and 
in bloated public sector agencies have an im-
pact on the earnings of others, as they lead to an 
excessive tax burden and a reduction of earn-
ings (or the disappearance of jobs) elsewhere 
in the economy. Jobs characterized by uneven 
bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees, or discrimination against women or 
ethnic minority groups, have earnings that are 
too high or too low relative to the output gener-
ated by the job. 
The tools of public finance can be used to 
assess gaps between the individual and the so-
cial values of jobs in the case of jobs supported 
through transfers. Taxation and government 
spending affect earnings and modify incentives 
and thus have an impact on resource allocations, 
including employment. Analyses of the tax bur-
den applying to capital and labor, assessments 
of cross-subsidization between individuals or 
firms, or evaluations of the impacts of payroll 
this amounts to identifying the gaps between 
the individual and the social values of jobs (if 
any) that are relevant in a particular country 
context. Such an evaluation requires data, some 
of which many countries are now collecting 
on a more or less regular basis (box 5.5). Using 
data to measure the full social value of a job 
calls for rigorous analysis too. Patterns in the 
data may result from spurious correlations, and 
the related conclusions may be tainted if indi-
viduals and firms with fundamentally different 
characteristics selected themselves into specific 
jobs or activities. Labor economics, productiv-
ity studies, and other social sciences have devel-
oped analytical tools for the analyses required. 
Sociological and anthropological methods can 
provide texture and context missing in quanti-
tative data. In some cases, randomized trials or 
natural experiments can shed light on the 
mechanisms at play. But methodological pitfalls 
abound, so the safest approach is to triangulate 
the available evidence.
Living standards
Three types of spillovers can enhance or under-
mine the direct contribution jobs make to liv-
Household surveys such as those used for poverty analysis are 
a critically important input for assessing the contribution jobs 
make to society. Regular up-to-date, high-quality data on activity, 
employ ment, and earnings can be used to understand employment 
dynamics. Many countries around the world collect household data 
through living standards surveys and labor force surveys. Social 
security administrations in countries with a high coverage rate of 
social programs record information about their contributors. Unfor-
tunately, few countries trace employment histories. Such histories 
(including employment transitions) are vital to achieving an under-
standing of how long young jobseekers are unemployed, whether 
unemployment scars the middle-aged, or how internal migration 
supports rural families.
Plant-level surveys are another standard input to understand 
the dynamics of job creation and destruction and their implications 
for aggregate productivity. Many countries conduct such surveys 
out of a sampling frame supposed to capture all units in manufac-
turing; in some cases, the coverage extends to units in other sectors, 
such as trade. Other countries collect data on production and 
employment through administrative records; the information is less 
BOX 5.5   Several data sources can be used to quantify the development payoffs from jobs
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
detailed on inputs and therefore has limited potential in the estima-
tion of changes in productivity, but it gives a more comprehensive 
picture of how firms are born, grow, decline and die and how 
employment evolves as a result. Unfortunately, only a few countries 
collect information on the myriad microenterprises in the informal 
sector. This information is vital to understanding where job creation 
occurs in the economy and where it contributes most to aggregate 
productivity.
Special household surveys inquiring about values and attitudes, 
together with qualitative assessments, are important instruments for 
assessing links between jobs on the one hand and beliefs and behav-
iors on the other. These surveys often provide information on trust in 
others and civic participation, and on the characteristics of respon-
dents and their jobs. Information from these surveys can be com-
bined with living standards and labor force surveys to identify popu-
lation groups at risk, and analyze how jobs are associated with 
peaceful collective decision making. Observing individual or cohort 
groups over time allows for an exploration of possible causal links 
among jobs, trust, behaviors, and attitudes.
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ferences between the workers who migrated 
to the cities and those who stayed behind. So, 
even when the gaps are rigorously measured, 
disentangling the reasons behind them is an 
important step before policy conclusions can be 
drawn.
Household allocations. Who holds a job can 
matter for how household earnings evolve and 
are spent. Job opportunities for youth are par-
ticularly important. A difficult transition from 
school to work can lead to scarring—a negative 
impact on long-term earnings prospects, hence 
of future household expenditures. The risk of 
unemployment later in life is higher for those 
with difficult school-to-work transitions.20 
Jobs that go to women might also benefit other 
members of society as well as the woman hold-
ing the job. Women generally have lower labor 
force participation rates than men and typi-
cally earn less than their male counterparts, but 
employment outside the household often em-
powers them.21 A body of evidence has found 
that spending decisions depend on the share 
of household income contributed by different 
members of the household. Women’s control 
over household resources leads to more spend-
ing on food and children’s schooling.
The impact womens’ employment has on 
household allocations can be quantified using 
standard tools in poverty and gender analyses. 
In Mexico, for example, higher women’s income 
shares were associated with more food and chil-
dren’s clothing and less alcohol.22 Similar results 
were observed in Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, 
and South Africa.23 In the Republic of Congo, a 
higher female share in total household income 
was associated with significantly higher expen-
ditures on food and significantly lower expen-
diture on clothing for adults and entertainment 
(figure 5.5).24 However, it should not be assumed 
that impacts are the same everywhere. Providing 
cash transfers in Burkina Faso boosted routine 
preventive care for children, regardless of which 
parent received the money.25 And evaluations in 
Ghana and Sri Lanka show that microcredit was 
invested to a larger extent into a business by men 
than by women.26
Another approach looks directly at the im-
pacts of women’s employment on human de-
velopment outcomes, such as children’s educa-
tional attainment and health. In a rural setting in 
southern India, an increase in annual female in-
taxation can identify a gap between the individ-
ual value and the social value of a job.
A tax wedge does not necessarily imply that 
the individual and the social value of a job dif-
fer, or that employment effects are large. The 
methodological pitfall to avoid in this case is to 
assume that individuals attach no value to the 
taxes or contributions they pay. If workers value 
social security contributions as an entitlement 
to deferred benefits, their net burden is lower 
than the contribution rate suggests. If they value 
the contribution in full, there would be no mis-
allocation of resources. In some systems, con-
tributions and benefits are closely linked; in 
others, the link is looser and redistribution 
stronger. But even when benefits are low com-
pared to taxes, the effects on employment de-
pend on how much of the taxes employers can 
pass on to employees through lower wages. In 
the extreme case, when the number of workers 
seeking wage employment is fixed, the entire tax 
is paid by workers, and employment is the same 
then as without a tax.18 In Turkey, a reduction in 
social security taxes would result in higher net 
wages and lower total labor cost only partially, 
thereby moderating the change in employment. 
The effect is somewhat higher, though, for lower-
skilled workers earning around the minimum 
wage.19
The tools of labor economics can be used to 
measure the gaps between the actual earnings of 
specific groups of workers and the earnings they 
would have in the absence of uneven bargaining 
power or discrimination. Earnings functions (a 
standard tool of labor economics) can provide 
an estimate of the magnitude of those gaps. 
Actual earnings are lower than they otherwise 
would be in the case of women, ethnic minori-
ties, and people working in the agricultural sec-
tor; they tend to be higher in the case of union 
members. Some gaps diminish with economic 
development, others persist (figure 5.4). On the 
surface at least, the gender and occupational 
gaps show no sign of disappearing. 
While these exercises are informative, earn-
ings gaps may result from differences in the 
characteristics of jobs or workers not accounted 
for in the analysis. Gender gaps can stem from 
discrimination but also from choices about the 
work-life balance. Union gaps may signal strong 
bargaining power but could also reflect higher 
productivity of organized workers. Rural pay 
deficits may be affected by unobservable dif-
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Poverty reduction. Job opportunities and em-
ployment transitions are major determinants of 
changes in both individual living standards and 
overall poverty in a country. If societies value 
poverty reduction, a job lifting an individual or 
a household out of poverty increases the well-
being of others. A spillover exists then, as ag-
gregate welfare increases beyond the increase in 
come of US$90 increased schooling by 1.6 years 
for disadvantaged castes.27 In Mexico, a 10 per-
cent increase in labor demand for adult women 
raised the chance of having a daughter in good 
health by 10 percent.28 In addition, the children 
of women who found work in export manufac-
turing thanks to the opening of new factories 
closer to home were significantly taller.29 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on Montenegro and Patrinos 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = purchasing power parity. Elementary occupations involve simple and routine tasks often requiring considerable physical effort. The 
vertical axis indicates the difference in earnings between the two groups depicted in each quadrant, controlling for the characteristics of people in the two groups. The gap mea-
sure is based on country-specific regressions of the logarithms of monthly earnings on years of education, potential years of experience (and its square), and controls for industry, 
occupation, urban/rural sector, ethnicity, and gender. Each dot represents a country.
F I G U R E  5 . 4  Some earnings gaps decrease with the level of development; some do not
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the well-being of the individual or household 
escaping poverty. 
The way new job opportunities are distrib-
uted is of major importance for poverty re-
duction. Poverty profiles, revealing the charac-
teristics of the poor, help identify which types 
jobs—and in which locations—would make the 
biggest difference to them. Microsimulations us-
ing household survey data allow estimating the 
impact of changes in employment on poverty 
rates. For instance, increasing the employment 
rate is of highest priority in Bulgaria and Latvia, 
two aging countries. Consider the poverty alle-
viation effects of raising the employment rate by 
3 percentage points depending on who, among 
those currently not working, gets the additional 
jobs. If the jobs went to the people whose indi-
vidual characteristics make them more easily 
employable, poverty would fall by 1.1 percent-
age points in Bulgaria and by 1.2 percentage 
points in Latvia. If new employment opportuni-
ties instead went to the most employable among 
the poor, poverty would fall by 4.7 percentage 
points in Bulgaria and by 4.1 percentage points 
in Latvia (figure 5.6). 
Source: Backiny-Yetna and Wodon 2011.
F I G U R E  5 . 5  A higher women’s share of household income raises food 
expenditures in the Republic of Congo
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F I G U R E  5 . 6  Who gets the jobs matters 
for poverty reduction in 
Bulgaria and Latvia
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
Note: Figure is based on microsimulations using data from household surveys. In each country, the 
employment rate was exogenously increased by 3 percentage points. The baseline scenario allocated 
the new jobs to those who had the highest likelihood of being employed. Earnings were imputed on the 
basis of individual  characteristics. The alternative scenario brought into jobs all those who had the highest 
employment likelihood among the poor.
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causes employment in specific industrial sectors 
to increase between 3.0 and 7.5 percent (figure 
5.7).35 Enterprise surveys also show that firms 
grow faster in large cities.36 In many develop-
ing countries, however, the poor functionality 
of cities undermines the potential gains from 
proximity. Inefficiencies in labor, land, and 
housing markets may cause poor functionality 
in cities. Poor functionality may also result from 
deficits in transportation and communication 
infrastructure, especially for smaller cities where 
market access is critical.37
But agglomeration can also come with higher 
costs, from more expensive land to worse con-
gestion and pollution in cities with 1 million to 
3 million people. In the United States, between 
1980 and 2000, the number of annual hours per 
person lost to traffic delays increased from 4 to 
22.38 Traffic in central London moves at only 
11 miles an hour.39 In Mexico City, the annual 
cost of traffic delays amounts to US$580 a per-
son, or 3 percent of annual per capita income.40 
Congestion and pollution limit agglomeration 
effects.41 In California, a reduction in ozone 
Productivity
Spillovers from jobs on the productivity of other 
jobs can happen through three main channels. 
Jobs in functional cities lead to greater special-
ization and mutual learning. Jobs connected to 
global markets allow for the acquisition of more 
advanced technological and managerial knowl-
edge. And through the production process in 
which they are embedded, jobs can have nega-
tive—or positive—effects on the environment. 
Agglomeration effects. The spatial concentra-
tion of activity is a strong driver of productivity 
growth in developing countries. Effects can ma-
terialize within sectors (localization economies) 
or between sectors (urbanization economies). 
The sharing of inputs, better labor matching, 
and knowledge spillovers are the main forces 
behind the geographical concentration of in-
dustries and economic activity in urban envi-
ronments. The sharing of inputs facilitates the 
emergence of specialized producers of interme-
diate goods and services. Proximity allows firms 
to more easily find workers to fill positions. 
Knowledge spillovers allow firms to learn about 
new technologies, products, and practices from 
other firms operating in the vicinity. These ag-
glomeration effects signal a difference between 
the private and social values of jobs.  
The tools of urban economics can be used 
to assess the potential gains from agglomera-
tion. In industrial countries, as city employ-
ment increases by 10 percent, wages and firm 
productivity in the city grow by 0.2 to 1.0 
percent.30 To give a sense of the magnitudes 
implied, if wages and productivity were to in-
crease by 0.3 percent, workers moving from 
a city with 5,000 inhabitants to a metropolis of 
5 million would see their earnings increase by 
23 percent.31 Nonetheless, not all workers bene-
fit equally from living and working together in 
cities, nor do they contribute equally to produc-
tivity growth. Workers with better cognitive and 
social skills tend to benefit more.32 Workers also 
enjoy higher wages when they are surrounded 
by a more educated labor force.33
The association between urban scale and 
productivity has also been documented in many 
developing economies, including Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and 
Turkey.34 In Taiwan, China, a 10 percent increase 
in total manufacturing employment in a locality 
F I G U R E  5 . 7  Agglomeration effects vary across 
industrial sectors in Taiwan, China
Source: Sonobe and Otsuka 2006b.
Note: The figure shows the increase in the employment of a specific sector in a specific locality when 
total employment in manufacturing in that locality increases by 10 percent, controlling for other relevant 
factors.
apparel 
plastic products
machinery 
electric appliances
computers
0 2 4
employment growth in response to a 10 percent
increase in manufacturing employment, %
6 8
1986–96 1976–86
168  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
through arms-length trade or through intrafirm 
transactions. Global integration improves do-
mestic resource allocation because it puts greater 
pressure on firms to be competitive. Exporting 
allows the most productive firms to grow. But 
in doing so, they also exert pressure on the least 
productive ones to contract or exit. Global in-
tegration also generates knowledge spillovers. 
These arise through exposure to new tech-
nologies embodied in traded goods or through 
new management practices in companies re-
ceiving FDI. Knowledge spillovers take place 
horizontally, between competitors, and verti-
cally, through buyer-supplier relationships. 
International economics has devoted con-
siderable efforts to quantifying the productiv-
ity impacts of global integration. In Colombia, 
productivity increased faster at the plant level 
during the trade liberalization period than dur-
ing the import substitution period.46 In India, 
industry restructuring immediately following 
the trade reforms of 1991, including the entry 
and exit of firms, contributed significantly to 
productivity increases.47 In Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, 
and Turkey, the lowering of trade barriers led to 
a reduction of markups—a sign of intensified 
competition.48 Productivity-enhancing effects 
of exports have been found in China; Indonesia; 
Korea; Slovenia; and Taiwan, China, as well as at 
the regional level in East Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.49 
A specialized literature focuses on the knowl-
edge spillovers and productivity impacts of mul-
tinationals and FDI. In Indonesia, when a plant 
switched from domestic to foreign ownership, 
its total factor productivity increased by 13.5 
percent within three years. In Brazil, wages of 
incumbent workers in domestic firms were pos-
itively affected by the share of workers who pre-
viously worked with multinationals. In Ghana, 
firms whose owners worked for multinationals 
in the same industry were more productive than 
other domestic firms.50 In developing countries, 
the knowledge spillovers from FDI may be more 
important than their impact on resource alloca-
tion (figure 5.8).51
Research can help assess whether the knowl-
edge spillovers from global integration trickle 
down to small informal enterprises through 
value chains. Larger enterprises are more likely 
to become suppliers to foreign companies or 
to be directly acquired by multi nationals. But 
they tend to contract out noncore businesses 
concentrations of 10 parts per billion would in-
crease worker productivity by 4.2 percent. 42 
Analytical tools from the management litera-
ture can be used to assess the impact of industrial 
clusters on productivity.43 In many low-income 
countries, industrial clusters account for a large 
share of manufacturing employment, includ- 
ing self-employment.44 Clustering is more com-
mon in light manufacturing industries intensive 
in unskilled labor, such as garments, footwear, 
furniture, and metalworking. The formation of 
a cluster often starts with a pioneer, typically a 
former trader or engineer who is able to iden-
tify a new, profitable business. Success leads to 
imitation, and a large number of relatively small 
and similar enterprises emerges in the vicin-
ity. The management literature can help iden-
tify dynamic clusters, where jobs have positive 
spillovers.
Global integration. The fragmentation of pro-
duction across borders is one of the most notable 
features of the global economy.45 Value chains 
connect firms and jobs across borders, be it 
F I G U R E  5 . 8  Knowledge spillovers from foreign direct 
investment increase domestic productivity
Source: Alfaro and Chen 2011.
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment. The figure shows the increase in domestic productivity for different 
country groups when the probability of entry by new multinational firms doubles. The estimates are based 
on data from 60 countries.
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Policies to contain carbon emissions and re-
duce environmental damage rely on price and 
quantity instruments aimed at transferring the 
cost to producers. These policies should increase 
net output per job, accounted for in green terms. 
However, in the short term, they could result in 
fewer jobs if natural resources and labor are 
complements in production.
Policies also try to promote job creation in 
more environmentally friendly industries. Jobs 
in enterprises that produce wind mills for elec-
tricity generation, construct water and soil con-
servation systems, and plant and manage trees 
fall in this category. These are often called green 
jobs, with different definitions attached to the 
term. Industries matching the most common 
definitions of green jobs tend to be relatively 
small in many developing countries, with Brazil 
and China notable exceptions (box 5.6).58
Pending a precise quantification of environ-
mental spillovers from jobs, it is likely that the 
activities with the greatest potential to mitigate 
adverse environmental damage in develop-
for cost efficiency, bringing smaller local com-
panies into the value chain. Contracting out 
provides opportunities for small and microen-
terprises to also reap the benefits of knowledge 
spillovers.52
Research can also shed light on the obstacles 
preventing the productivity spillovers from glob-
ally integrated jobs from materializing. Cross-
country analysis shows that the degree of labor 
market flexibility, barriers to firm entry, and in-
frastructure development substantially influence 
the impact of openness on growth.53 Knowledge 
spillovers hinge on the ability of the local econ-
omy to absorb them—human capital and re-
search and development capacity are important. 
Local firms need a certain level of production 
and technological capabilities to be selected as 
suppliers by foreign companies. When technol-
ogy gaps between local firms and foreign com-
panies are large, productivity spillovers are less 
likely to occur.54 
Environmental impacts. Jobs that overuse natu-
ral resources or damage the environment are 
less productive than their direct output might 
suggest. The environmental damage they create 
imposes a negative spillover on others, resulting 
in a lower net contribution to aggregate output. 
Natural resources such as the atmosphere, wa-
ter, forests, and soil provide services useful for 
economic activities and necessary for human 
life, but they are often overused because their 
cost from a private point of view falls short of 
their true social cost.55 The emission of green-
house gases is an example of a negative spillover. 
The tools of environmental economics can 
be used to quantify the cost of emissions associ-
ated with jobs. Worldwide, industry is respon-
sible for over one-fifth of carbon emission.56 
Globally, the average cost from fuel combustion 
in manufacturing is in the order of US$82 per 
job per year.57 However, this average hides an 
enormous diversity in the emission cost of pro-
duction across countries, industries, and tech-
nologies. Across countries, a negative relation 
can be observed between the annual emission 
cost per job and the emission efficiency of pro-
duction. Richer countries tend to have higher 
environmental costs associated with one job, 
but, in parallel, these jobs have a high produc-
tivity so that the emission intensity per unit of 
manufacturing output tends to be relatively low 
(figure 5.9).
F I G U R E  5 . 9 High emissions per worker can go hand in 
hand with low emissions per unit of output
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on IEA 2011, International Income Distri-
bution Database (I2D2), and the ILO’s Labor Statistics. 
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide; GDP = gross domestic product. Estimates are based on data from the Interna-
tional Energy Agency and methods and emission factors from the revised 1996 Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. The figure considers only CO2 
emissions from fuel combustion associated with productive activities in the manufacturing and con-
struction sectors. Bubbles represent countries. The size of the bubbles represents the comparable size of 
manufacturing GDP in constant prices.
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portant for youth. Jobs can contribute to social-
ization and the process of acquiring values and 
behaviors for the workplace and society.62
Social identity. A job can influence the social 
groups that individuals associate with, their 
behaviors, and the norms that shape those be-
haviors.63 The degree to which a job, or its char-
acteristics, shapes the way individuals perceive 
themselves in their community and society 
varies with traditions, culture, and the level of 
economic development. But when the relation-
ship is significant, a spillover from jobs to social 
cohesion exists.
Quantifying spillovers from jobs on social co-
hesion is bound to be more difficult than for liv-
ing standards or productivity. However, a rough 
assessment is possible using household surveys 
as well as qualitative studies. For instance, about 
half of respondents in China judge their jobs to 
be somewhat or absolutely meaningful, but in 
Sierra Leone the share is 90 percent, potentially 
signaling the social importance of jobs in a low-
income and post-conflict setting.
ing countries lie outside the modern sector, in 
areas such as agriculture and forestry manage-
ment. Agriculture and deforestation account for 
nearly 30 percent of the greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the world.59 Low-productivity agricul-
ture leads to deforestation as cultivated areas 
are expanded.60 As such, efforts to reduce the 
environmental spillovers from jobs in develop-
ing countries are bound to concern rural areas, 
affecting farming and rural livelihoods.61 For 
example, they may involve community partici-
pation in the management of commons such as 
forests and natural habitats.
Social cohesion
If jobs change values, behaviors, and attitudes of 
people, they can influence how societies func-
tion, specifically, how groups in society are able 
to resolve tensions and engage in peaceful col-
lective decision making. Three such spillovers 
from jobs to social cohesion are social identity, 
networks, and a sense of fairness. The effect of 
jobs on social identity can be particularly im-
While the concept of green growth is well developed, there is less 
consensus on the concept of green jobs.a The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses this label for 
jobs linked to environmental industries.b The European Commis-
sion focuses on employment in industries whose products are 
deemed beneficial to the environment.c Examples include jobs in 
renewable energy sectors and low-carbon manufacturing. Several 
national governments are developing their own definitions of 
green jobs, both for statistical purposes as well as to inform policy 
making.
The United Nations Environment Programme defines green 
jobs as “positions in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, 
installation, and maintenance, as well as scientific and technical, 
administrative, and service-related activities that contribute 
 substantially to preserving or restoring environmental quality.”d 
For the United Nations Environment Programme and the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, these jobs must also qualify as Decent 
Work.
BOX 5.6   International definitions of green jobs can be too narrow for developing countries
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. For a detailed discussion, see Bowen 2012.
b. OECD 1999.
c. UNEP and others 2008.
d. UNEP and others 2008, 35–36.
e. Upadhyay and Pahuja 2010.
f. Sander and Dewees 2012 for the World Bank Development Report 2013.
But these definitions can be too narrow. In developing countries, 
some jobs associated with green growth that have prospects for 
substantial expansion, such as biofuel and biomass production, may 
not qualify as Decent Work.e Moreover, the focus on renewable 
energy and low-carbon manufacturing may shift attention away 
from activities with positive environmental impacts that also pro-
vide higher earnings to the poor. 
Consider efforts toward reduced forest degradation and sustain-
able management of trees.f Tree resources outside of closed forests 
are becoming increasingly important to satisfy the demand for 
charcoal, firewood, timber, and nonwood forest products. Locally 
managed reforestation and regeneration of degraded landscapes 
may generate income opportunities for poor people as well as posi-
tive environmental impacts. Trees with the capacity to fix nitrogen 
have been used to improve soil fertility and provide fodder, wood, 
and fuel. Such enhanced tree management has helped increase sor-
ghum yields by as much as 85 percent in some areas and millet 
yields by as much as 50 percent. 
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firms.65 The program has led to a decrease in 
involvement in gangs, violence, and other risky 
be havior, including drug use and unprotected 
sex. Participants described the positive impact 
on their self-esteem and behaviors.
Networks. Jobs can create new contacts and be a 
vehicle to transmit information. On the negative 
side, they can also have an exclusionary effect, 
moving the individual further from the wider 
society. Positive network effects can give people 
a stake in their community or society; negative 
effects can increase social distance.
Again, surveys can inquire about these dy-
namics as a first entry to gauge whether a spill-
over exists. In four countries, participants in a 
survey were asked whether their job was useful 
or not in establishing contacts with other people, 
providing information about societal matters or 
other jobs, or helping with news about good 
deals (on food, for example). Only a quarter of 
respondents in China, but fully three-quarters of 
those in Sierra Leone judged these network ef-
fects to be at least somewhat important (figure 
5.11). While comparisons across countries need 
to be interpreted with caution, comparisons 
across individuals in the same country may be 
informative.
Behaviors and norms can also be changed 
by perceptions about access to jobs—by rais-
ing peoples’ expectations and aspirations for 
the future—and in some cases these changes in 
perceptions can be gauged as well. For instance, 
school enrollments in Bangladesh increased 
among girls after garment factories opened 
within commuting distance of their villages.64 
No such effect was observed among boys, while 
some older girls dropped out of school to take 
up the new job opportunity (figure 5.10). As 
jobs in the fac tories became available to women, 
it is likely that parents saw more employment 
opportunities for their daughters and realized 
the importance of education. The women work-
ing in these garment factories thus set an exam-
ple for other women and girls.
Program evaluations are another source of 
information on the spillovers from jobs on social 
cohesion. For instance, the Programa Juventud 
y Empleo (Youth and Employment Program) in 
the Dominican Republic reaches young people 
who have not finished secondary school, are 
unemployed, and are living in poor households. 
Participants receive a combination of voca-
tional training and training in life skills, includ-
ing self-esteem, teamwork, and communication 
skills, followed by internships at private sector 
F I G U R E  5 .10  Proximity of garment factories stimulates schooling among young 
girls in Bangladesh
Source: Heath and Mobarak 2011.
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atively few people judge jobs to be distributed on 
the basis of merit. In Colombia as well as  Sierra 
Leone, the percentages were significantly higher.
Beyond these subjective assessments, fairness 
in access to jobs can actually be measured rigor-
ously, building on the emerging literature on in-
equality of opportunity. This literature explores 
to what degree factors beyond talent and effort 
matter in accessing jobs. These factors include 
the circumstances in which a person is born: 
location, family background, gender, ethnic-
ity, and language.69 A society that offers equal 
opportunities would record little influence of 
these circumstances on job trajectories much 
later in the life. In some countries, however, the 
share of inequality that arises from such birth 
circumstances is large. In this case, the existence 
of deeply rooted inequities determines the life 
chances from early on and becomes apparent 
later on through the access to jobs and the re-
lated rewards.70 The approach can also be used 
to assess the importance of different factors that 
contribute to inequality in employment oppor-
tunities. Among several countries in Eastern and 
Central Europe, father’s education is a driver for 
inequity in access to jobs, especially in the Rus-
Quantitative methods are necessary to con-
textualize network effects. Surveys in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia have found that the number 
of people willing to work or do business with 
someone of a different ethnicity was greater 
than the number of people in favor of intereth-
nic cooperation in schools or neighborhoods.66 
Focus groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
late 1990s found that the workplace was “the 
area in which there is the greatest support for 
ethnic cooperation.”67 Business people work-
ing in print and packaging, food and beverages, 
construction, and retail in Trinidad and Tobago 
have reported that interactions through work 
with others of different ethnicities have posi-
tively influenced their social life.68
Sense of fairness. Whether access to jobs is fair 
naturally depends on a subjective evaluation. 
Opinion surveys can provide an assessment 
of how fair the job market is judged to be, and 
tracking such evaluations over time can be of 
guidance to policy makers. About 30 percent 
of Chinese respondents feel that the most- 
qualified people get jobs—an indication that rel-
F I G U R E  5 .11  Not all jobs provide social identity, networks, or a sense of fairness
Source: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on Bjørkhaug and others 2012; Hatløy and others 2012; Kebede and others 2012; and Zhang and others 2012; all for 
the World Development Report 2013.
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with a variety of means. Some of them allow 
for an actual quantification, some others for a 
qualitative treatment of the difference between 
the individual value and the social value of jobs. 
Assessing the social value of different types of 
jobs can inform policy discussions about trade-
offs and priorities for developmental policies. 
The relevant spillovers are bound to be different 
in countries at different levels of development 
and with different characteristics, thus leading 
to diverse jobs agendas.
sian Federation and Slovenia, while gender is 
predominant in Latvia, Kazakhstan, and Croatia 
(figure 5.12).
*   *   *
The assessment of the social value of jobs is 
important for the identification of what good 
jobs for development are in a particular coun-
try context. Such assessments can be pursued 
F I G U R E  5 .12  Gender and father’s education account for a large share of 
inequality of opportunity in access to jobs
Source: Abras and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
Notes: The figure shows the contribution of each circumstance to an inequity measure, the D-index. The D-index is the share of available opportunities that would have to be  
reallocated to achieve the same coverage rate of opportunity across all groups. Opportunity is defined as having a job with 20 or more hours per week. Parents’ connections refers to 
parents who were affiliated with the Communist Party. Father’s education is measured in years of completed schooling. 
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QUeStION 5
Since human capital theory first established a 
link between skills and economic performance, 
it generally has been held that education and 
training are wise investments for increasing em-
ployment and earnings—and are hence neces-
sary ingredients for growth and job creation. 
The risk of living in poverty declines with the 
acquisition of basic cognitive skills, especially 
numeracy and literacy, and the associated en-
hancement in earning opportunities. Skills, es-
pecially cognitive abilities, are strongly related 
to productivity growth, more so than school at-
tendance rates.71 They also are closely associated 
with structural transformation, especially for 
low- and lower-middle-income countries where 
they create opportunities for people outside of 
agriculture.72 Across 1,500 subnational regions 
in 110 countries, education emerges as the criti-
cal determinant of knowledge spillovers and 
entrepreneurship.73 And skills can shape how 
jobs link people to neighbors, communities, and 
societies.74
But around the world, available skills are not 
fitting well with the demands of the economy. 
Skills mismatches are arguably growing rather 
than shrinking. Albeit not easy to pinpoint, up 
to one-third of the employed in countries as di-
verse as Brazil, Costa Rica, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
and Tanzania are either under- or over-qualified 
for the work they do.75 Managers of registered, 
formal firms around the world judge workforce 
skills as an obstacle of above-average impor-
tance in the production process.76 In countries 
at all development levels, skills obstacles are also 
judged to be more acute now than in the first 
half of the 2000s (figure 5.13).
Skills shortages are an especially serious con-
straint for the most dynamic entrepreneurs.77 
Larger as well as younger and growing firms 
tend to identify skills as a constraint more than 
medium-sized and smaller firms.78 Export- 
oriented firms in Indonesia and the Philippines 
report skills bottlenecks more than firms pro-
ducing for the domestic market in those coun-
tries.79 Across 106 developing countries, firms 
that adopt technology more rapidly and those 
that are more globally integrated take longer to 
fill job vacancies through external candidates 
than other firms—a sign of skill-related con-
straints being more binding.80 On the other 
hand, farmers and entrepreneurs of unregistered 
firms in both rural and urban environments 
tend to rate skills bottlenecks as less severe.81 
The straightforward response to such mis-
matches would be for private firms or individu-
als to upgrade skills through further education 
or training—but several well-known reasons 
prevent this from occurring. Firms and farms—
especially smaller ones—and workers seldom 
have the necessary funds nor can they borrow 
for this purpose.82 Firms are also reluctant to in-
vest in training employees for fear that workers 
will leave after being trained.83 And both firms 
and workers may lack the information needed 
to identify skills gaps.
Because of such market failures, policy mak-
ers often turn to education and training systems 
to deal with high unemployment or stifled pro-
ductivity growth. Many countries are currently 
making a big push to hone the skills of the 
current and soon-to-be workforce through in-
creased emphasis on on-the-job training and on 
pre-employment (vocational) education. Tur-
key’s Public Employment Agency has expanded 
vocational training enrollment almost tenfold 
since 2007, delivering close to 250,000 courses 
in 2011. India has launched the National Skills 
Mission with a stated goal of training 500 mil-
lion people by 2022.
The pitfalls of skills building
The importance of skills cannot be over- 
stated (box 5.7). But caution is needed before 
jumping from this recognition to the launch-
ing of large skills-building programs. The root 
cause of skill shortages or mismatches might 
not lie with the education and training system. 
Shortages and mismatches may instead result 
from wrong signals generated by market distor-
tions and institutional failures elsewhere in the 
economy. If a civil service career pays overly well, 
young people may study to obtain such jobs, 
even if they need to queue for them. This can 
Skills or jobs—which comes first?
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F I G U R E  5 .13  Relative to other obstacles, skills have become a more severe constraint to business
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on enterprise surveys.
Note: The figure shows the changes in the relative importance of skills obstacles between beginning and end of the 2000s. The relative skill obstacle is defined as the ratio between 
(a) the share of firm managers saying that lack of skills is a major or severe obstacle and (b) the share of firm managers rating other constraints as major or severe. A positive score 
indicates that the skills constraint became more severe relative to others.
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Skills are acquired throughout life. People learn, adapt, and form 
their skills through a multitude of interactions and mechanisms 
within the household and neighborhood, during the formative 
years of schooling, at work, and in training. Cognitive skills include 
verbal ability, working memory, numeracy, and problem-solving 
abilities. Social skills are based on personality traits that underlie 
behaviors such as teamwork, reliability, discipline, or work effort.a 
Technical skills enable the performance of specific tasks. Because all 
jobs require a combination of skills that are formed in multiple ways 
and in diverse circumstances, policy makers face complex chal-
lenges in forging the best path for skills development.
The first months and years of life are the most crucial for skill for-
mation. This is when intelligence and learning abilities, the founda-
tions for the development of core cognitive and social skills, are 
cemented.b Brain maturation occurs in steps, with new skills build-
ing on earlier ones. If the foundation is strong, higher-order cogni-
tive and social skills can be added later on. This leads to higher 
adaptability in rapidly changing job environments and the acquisi-
tion of job-specific techniques. In the slums of Mumbai, a special 
program run in parallel to primary schooling raised children’s self-
BOX 5.7  How skills are formed, and how they can be measured
esteem, self-efficacy, and aspirations, increasing scores on school-
leaving examinations and initial labor market outcomes.c But while 
foundations are laid early on, skills are also shaped after childhood 
and in working life.
Attention to the measurement of skills has gained prominence 
worldwide. Achievement tests provide infor mation for parents, 
instructors, and administrators, and enable a better understanding 
of systemwide performance and achievements. While the skills 
measured on these tests appear to be purely academic in nature, 
test scores reflect more than individuals’ cognitive skills. A good 
part of the variation in achievement tests can be attributed to per-
sonality traits or social skills as well as to incentive systems. These 
personality traits and social skills are critical in predicting individu-
als’ life outcomes, including educational attainment and earnings.
More recently, efforts have gone in the direction of assessing 
adult competencies, by measuring the variety, intensity, and fre-
quency of skills used in the workplace. These measures range from 
assessing different types of manual and workplace skills of a more 
routine manner to complex capabilities, such as problem solving 
abilities.d 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Barrick and Mount 1991.
b. Grantham-McGregor and others 2007; Knudsen and others 2006.
c. Krishnan and Krutikova 2010.
d. OECD 2012; Skills toward Employment and Productivity Measurement Study based on World Bank 2010.
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plague training programs and pre-employment 
education around the world.
What is being taught matters as well. Social 
skills are often the ones missing, but they can 
rarely be acquired in schools or training centers. 
In India, employers of engineers stress reliabil-
ity, willingness to learn, and entrepreneurship 
as more important than specific technical skills, 
or the command of mathematics, science, or 
English.91 In Botswana, theoretical and practi-
cal knowledge of the job, as well as other job- 
specific skills, are generally considered to be 
less important than skills such as commitment, 
communication, and basic problem-solving.92 
In Peru, 40 percent of employers complain about 
the lack of dependable work ethics and personal 
qualities such as team work, persistency, ability 
to reach consensus, or initiative among their 
employees. This subjective assessment is con-
firmed by harder evidence showing that returns 
to the socioemotional trait of perseverance are 
as high as returns to average cognitive ability.93
Learning through jobs
Just as skills are important for jobs, the reverse is 
true as well. Many technical and social skills can 
be built through experience in the workplace—
shaping skills on the job carries sizable returns. 
On average across countries, the return to one 
additional year of work experience in nonagri-
cultural activities is roughly one-half the return 
to one additional year of education at the be-
ginning of work life.94 And managers put a pre-
mium on experience. In five African countries, 
managers identified work experience as more 
important for hiring decisions than technical 
skills and education.95
Apprenticeship programs, fostering the in-
tegration of education and learning through 
jobs, exist in various shapes around the world. 
They range from the informal model of Sub-
Saharan Africa to the dual model of Central 
Europe. Informal apprenticeship, often the 
primary mechanism for technical skills to be 
passed through generations, can be strength-
ened through its gradual integration into na-
tional training systems.96 
The dual model, deeply rooted in Germany, 
combines classroom-based schooling—geared 
to building general and transferable skills—with 
learning on the job in the training company.97 
In France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the 
lead to the acquisition of skills that are irrelevant 
in the private sector and to unrealistic expecta-
tions, as was observed, for example, in the Arab 
Republic of Egypt.84 Similarly, compressed pay 
scales reduce the incentives to invest more in 
education and training.85 Lack of information 
about employment opportunities, transporta-
tion costs, or housing market failures may be the 
real reasons why workers do not take available 
jobs. In all of these cases, constraints that seem to 
be skills related actually reside outside the edu-
cation and training system. 
Besides, the successful delivery of skills-build-
ing services is difficult. Pre-employment and 
on-the-job training show varying success in the 
developing world. On-the-job training is con-
sistently found to go hand-in-hand with higher 
labor earnings and productivity increases, even 
more so in developing than in industrial coun-
tries.86 But only a fraction of workers have access 
to it; those with less education and those work-
ing in smaller and informal enterprises seldom 
have the opportunity to benefit from training. 
Technical and vocational education (TVE) has 
a mixed record: compared with general educa-
tion, TVE led to higher earnings in Rwanda, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand, more or less equal earn-
ings in Indonesia and India, and lower earnings 
in Pakistan.87 The reach of TVE in rural areas is 
often very limited.88 In some countries, TVE has 
actually reinforced socioeconomic inequalities 
rather than fostered social mobility.89 Poor qual-
ity and inequitable access are key constraints in 
many countries.
Accountability and governance arrange-
ments are often the weak link of skills-building 
initiatives, with institutional failures often re-
placing market failures. On the positive side, 
modern and flexible skills-development strate-
gies have generally replaced old-fashioned and 
mechanical manpower planning (box 5.8). 
Many countries have also created oversight en-
tities, such as the Pakistan Sindh Technical and 
Vocational Training Authority, to separate qual-
ity control and management of providers from 
financing. In India, the National Skills Develop-
ment Strategy is based on the principle that the 
institutions in charge of training, certification, 
and accreditation should be strictly separated.90 
On the negative side, scattered responsibilities 
across many ministries, distance from the pri-
vate sector, slow response to rapidly changing 
skill needs, and capture by providers continue to 
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Manpower planning, a technique that used macroeconomic and 
sector forecasts to derive how many workers with specific technical 
skills would be needed was popular in the 1960s and 1970s. It was 
successful in a few cases in which it was closely integrated with the 
overall economic development strategy of the country and bene-
fited from a universal basic education system, as it did in the Repub-
lic of Korea.a But its rigidity soon became stifling. Manpower plan-
ning generally assumed a fixed relationship between labor and 
outputs, implicitly ruling out technological change. It also empha-
sized technical skills to the detriment of cognitive and social skills. 
And it was slow to adapt to rapid changes in the world of work 
brought by globalization.b
Gradually the focus shifted from merely ensuring an adequate 
supply of skills to delivering demand-responsive, quality-skills 
development programs. The Republic of Korea stopped developing 
long-term macroeconomic plans with explicit industrial policies by 
the mid-1990s. Industrial projections of manpower supply took a 
backseat to the country’s new initiatives emphasizing quality and 
relevance of education and skills development.c The scope became 
broader and more integrated, replacing mechanistic forecasting. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, Singapore developed an integrated strategy 
to upgrade, retrain, and provide lifelong learning for its labor force, 
especially for those with lower levels of education and skills.
The rapid pace of globalization increasingly requires the private 
sector to be a driving force in skills development. India’s National 
BOX 5.8   Manpower planning has given way to dynamic skills development
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Kim 2002.
b. Richards 1994. 
c. Kim 2002.
d. Lee and others 2008.
e. Nam 2011.
f. ILO 2010b. See also DFID 2010; Gill, Fluitman, and Dar 2000.
Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) devel-
oped standardized skills assessments and certification arrange-
ments in 2006. The Korea University of Technology and Education 
(KUT) established the Bridge Model, a three-way partnership also 
involving a single major enterprise and clusters of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) that serve as its main subcontractors. The major 
enterprise contributes technical knowledge, the SMEs bring in the 
employees to be trained, and KUT supplies the teaching facilities 
and content.d Samsung was the first “bridge’” in 2006; five other 
major companies have become bridges since then. 
Much can be learned from comprehensive skill-building sys-
tems, especially from those of East Asia. But these systems require 
sophisticated institutional mechanisms that may be out of reach in 
lower-capacity contexts.e Over 100 countries have embarked on 
comprehensive National Qualification Frameworks, built around 
the definition of competencies, certification, and accreditation. But 
with exceptions, results and impact are sobering.f Often, the 
administrative capacity available in low- and middle-income coun-
tries is overwhelmed, and progress is held back by the lack of 
strong buy-in from the most important players: parents, teachers, 
training institutes, and firms. Perhaps the most valuable lesson 
from East Asian countries is that skills-development systems need 
to grow organically from below while being coordinated and fos-
tered from above.
experiences—can also shape behaviors and at-
titudes, including the willingness to contribute 
to society at large.
Importantly, jobs also support the transmis-
sion of knowledge through interactions with 
other people. Knowledge spillovers underlie the 
agglomeration effects observed in cities and in 
production clusters.101 But knowledge spillovers 
from jobs also occur in rural areas. During the 
Green Revolution in India, farmers with experi-
enced neighbors made larger profits than those 
with inexperienced ones.102 Benefits from social 
learning at the village level were substantial.103
Jobs can also ignite skills building by put-
ting people in contact with the outside world. 
Working in foreign-owned companies, or in 
firms integrated in international value chains, 
allows the acquisition of new technical and 
managerial skills. This learning then spurs imi-
dual system is credited with fast and structured 
employment integration.98 But the dual system 
requires more than the right economic incen-
tives—it is based on a social contract between 
employers (to offer places and invest in the fu-
ture career of apprentice as a common good), 
trade unions (to accept below minimum wage 
payment for trainees), and government (to fund 
vocational schools and provide quality con-
trol).99 Private sector commitment, including 
financing of training and continuation even in 
times of economic downturns, is fundamental. 
Given such high institutional requirements, at-
tempts to transplant the dual model in its en-
tirety have seen little success. 
Building skills on the job is promising, be-
cause skills continue to develop and accumulate 
after formal schooling ends, in teenage years and 
during working life.100 Jobs—especially early 
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to meet. The role of policy here is to ensure that 
signals are adequately transmitted, providing 
incentives to continue skill accumulation by the 
young and those of working age alike. In the 
Dominican Republic, providing students with 
information about the actual returns to second-
ary school education led to substantially higher 
school attendance.108 In India, informing rural 
women about job opportunities led to increased 
schooling for girls and delayed marriage and 
childbearing for women.109 On the other hand, 
privilege in access to jobs distorts the signals. It 
hurts and discourages, rather than encourages, 
the building of skills.
Jobs themselves can build skills, especially at 
entry into the labor market. Given the negative 
long-term effects of troubled school-to-work 
transitions, placing emphasis on supporting 
first-time job-seekers should have significant 
payoffs. 
But jobs may neither pull nor build skills 
to a significant degree, even if the founda-
tional cognitive skills are in place. This occurs 
in situations where the benefits from agglom-
eration and global integration are present but 
not adequately exploited. Countries undergoing 
rapid urbanization often have sizable knowledge 
spillovers to reap but may fail to move up the 
value-added ladder. If so, they can be caught in 
traps of low productivity and low skills.110 Such 
traps arise when skills are insufficient to spur in-
novation and the demand for skills is too low 
to encourage their acquisition. In those cases, 
more relevant schooling and skill building at the 
secondary, technical, and likely higher levels are 
needed as a prerequisite for the creation of good 
jobs for development. 
tation and can have cascading ripple effects.104 
In Singapore, India’s Tata group was the first 
international company to partner with the Eco-
nomic Development Board in 1972 to establish 
a company-owned training center for precision 
engineers. This partnership model was success-
fully replicated in subsequent years with other 
foreign companies, eventually leading to the 
consolidation of various institutions in 1993 to 
form Singapore’s Nanyang Polytechnic. Today, 
the polytechnic has become a source of inter-
national expertise on industry-led training.105 
Intel’s decision to establish its semiconductor 
assembly and test plant in Costa Rica has equally 
contributed significantly to that country’s pros-
pects and skill building system.106
Jobs need skills, pull skills, and build skills
Some skills are necessary for productive employ-
ment to emerge in the first place. And they cannot 
be acquired on the job. Without numeracy and 
literacy skills, the prospects of improving employ-
ment opportunities and earnings, whether 
in agriculture or in urban settings, are thin. To-
day, more than one-tenth of 15-to-24-year-olds 
worldwide are functionally illiterate, and that 
does not bode well for their future.107 Also, social 
skills assume an ever more important role as 
complements to basic cognitive skills. Given that 
skill building is cumulative, securing the founda-
tion on which much of the later path of skill ac-
quisition follows remains an absolute priority. 
Many countries are not there yet. 
With this foundation in place, jobs can pull 
skills. Employment opportunities increase the 
demand for education, which systems then have 
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Chapter 6
Countries face different jobs challenges as they move along the development path. In agrarian economies, most people are 
still engaged in agriculture and urbanization has 
not yet picked up. In urbanizing countries, pro-
ductivity growth in agriculture has risen enough 
to free up large numbers of people to work in cit-
ies. Formalizing countries generally have more de-
veloped economies, where the coverage of social 
protection systems is large enough to envision 
extending it to the entire workforce. 
In some countries, the jobs challenge is 
shaped by demography with special circum-
stances affecting particular groups. In coun-
tries with high youth unemployment, prolonged 
joblessness and idleness affect large numbers 
of young people, with many seeing limited op-
portunities for the future. Aging societies also 
face generational issues, but these stem from a 
decreasing share of the working age population 
and increasing costs related to providing and 
caring for a growing number of old people. 
Natural endowments, including geography, 
can create unique jobs challenges. Resource-
rich countries may have substantial foreign ex-
change earnings, but this wealth often does not 
translate into employment creation beyond 
the exploitation of the natural resources. Small 
island nations cannot reap the benefits from 
agglomeration and global integration because 
of the size of the population and geographic 
remoteness.
Finally, the strength of institutions can define 
a country’s jobs challenge. In conflict-affected 
countries, institutions are fragile, private invest-
ment is largely out of reach for the time being, 
and restoring social cohesion through jobs takes 
on particular importance.
These criteria are not mutually exclusive. A 
country may be both resource rich and conflict 
affected, or it may belong to the formalizing 
group and be characterized by high youth un-
employment. Still, focusing on the key features 
associated with each type of country situation 
helps to clarify which jobs would make the 
greatest contribution to development in a par-
ticular context. This allows for a richer analysis 
of the potential tradeoffs among living stan-
dards, productivity, and social cohesion in a 
specific country situation. And it provides clues 
about the nature of the obstacles to job creation 
and how they can be removed (question 6). 
Agrarian economies
In countries where a majority of the popula-
tion lives in rural areas, wage employment is not 
the prevalent form of work. For instance, about 
half of the employed population in Kenya is en-
gaged in farming, whereas self-employment in 
nonagricultural household businesses and wage 
employment in informal enterprises account for 
slightly more than one-third.1
Diverse jobs agendas
Countries differ in where the development payoffs from jobs are greatest. 
These payoffs depend on the country’s level of development, demography, 
endowments, and institutions.
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the civil war, the poverty rate remained basically 
unchanged between 2003 and 2008, at around 
55 percent of the total population.6
Agriculture is the locus of much of Mozam-
bique’s poverty. Over 80 percent of employment 
is in agriculture, yet the sector accounts for only 
30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).7 
Value added per hour worked in agriculture is 
one-seventh that of services and one-twelfth 
that of manufacturing. Yields have been stag-
nant over the past decade. About 95 percent of 
agricultural workers work on small plots, the 
use of modern technology is low, and access to 
extension services is minimal.
Evidence suggests that growth in agriculture 
delivers more poverty reduction than other sec-
tors in lower-income countries, because poor 
people are concentrated in the sector and be-
cause they participate more in the growth in 
agriculture than in the growth in other sectors.8 
Since 1700, virtually every example of mass 
poverty reduction has actually begun with an 
increase in agricultural productivity.9
Constraints on agricultural growth vary 
depending on the availability of land relative 
to the availability of farm labor. Compared 
with other areas of the developing world, Sub- 
Saharan Africa was traditionally seen as a conti-
nent of ample land and scarce labor. While that 
may still be true in some areas, it no longer ap-
plies to countries in the south and east of the 
continent. In Mozambique, the average farm 
size is less than 1.5 hectares. As the area under 
cultivation declines relative to the size of the 
population, producing sufficient food becomes 
a major issue unless yield-enhancing technolog-
ical changes take place. In many agrarian econo-
mies in Sub-Saharan Africa, these changes have 
yet to occur. Unlike many parts of Asia, where 
the Green Revolution has increased cereal yield 
and the poverty incidence has declined, cereal 
yield has remained low and poverty incidence 
high in these Sub-Saharan countries (figure 
6.1). Some Asian economies, such as Cambo-
dia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and 
Myanmar, face similar challenges.
Public sector investments are important driv-
ers of productivity growth and intensification 
of smallholder agriculture. Technology is often 
a public good. Because farmers can reproduce 
improved varieties of rice and wheat, private 
seed companies cannot reap the benefit of in-
Formal employment, including wage labor-
ers in registered private enterprises and the 
entire public sector, typically accounts for less 
than 10 percent of total employment in agrarian 
economies. The share of wage employment in 
manufacturing is much smaller. A comparison 
across several French-speaking Sub-Saharan 
 African countries puts the fraction at less than 5 
percent of total employment even in the capital 
cities—less than 3 percent in Cotonou and Lomé 
to 8 percent in Yaoundé; only Antananarivo has 
more than 10 percent.2 Across Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, one-quarter or less of formal sector work-
ers are women; only in Senegal does the fraction 
exceed one-third.3 If anything, employment in 
the formal sector has trended downward over 
the past two decades as state-owned enterprises 
have been privatized and foreign trade has been 
liberalized. 
In this context, the notion of unemployment 
needs to be interpreted with caution. Unem-
ployment rates can technically be computed, 
but given the prevalence of poverty in agrarian 
economies, a substantive share of the labor force 
is unlikely to remain idle for long. Underem-
ployment and low earnings, rather than open 
unemployment, are the challenges most people 
face in agrarian economies. Household survey 
data from Mozambique show that an astound-
ing 81 percent of those at work were living on 
less than US$1.25 a day in 2003, and 95 percent 
were living on less than US$2.00 a day.4
In agrarian economies, the main avenues to 
improving living standards involve increasing 
productivity in farming, creating a dynamic 
economic environment in cities, and promot-
ing labor reallocation from rural to urban areas, 
thereby sparking a positive spiral of produc-
tivity growth and improvement in living stan-
dards. Together, these approaches should lead to 
the expansion of off-farm employment oppor-
tunities, which are in turn an important driver 
of poverty reduction.
Mozambique illustrates the jobs challenges 
faced by agrarian economies.5 Thanks to im-
portant mining discoveries and a commodities 
boom, as well as Maputo’s privileged position as 
one of the ports closest to Johannesburg, Mo-
zambique has had one of the best growth per-
formances in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past 
decade. Yet, after falling substantially during the 
1990s, probably as a consequence of the end of 
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and Mozambique in particular are compara- 
ble with yields in Asia.12 In such areas, im- 
proved varieties developed in Asia or crossbred 
with local varieties have been adopted. This 
observation suggests that, as far as lowland rice 
is concerned, Asian technology could be di-
rectly transferred to the irrigated areas of Sub- 
Saharan Africa.
While the intensification of crop-based ag-
riculture has been associated with a significant 
increase in the use of inorganic fertilizer, the 
application of fertilizer per hectare is far lower 
in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other re-
gion of the world. One of the major reasons is 
the high fertilizer prices relative to grain prices. 
Fertilizer prices are usually two to three times 
higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia and 
Latin America because of poor infrastructure 
and trade logistics.13 Another major constraint 
on fertilizer application is the lack of credit for 
smallholders, given that land ownership titles 
are seldom secured and hence cannot be used 
as collateral.14 Therefore, productivity growth in 
agriculture also requires a favorable investment 
climate including improved access to infrastruc-
ture and credit.15 
troducing new varieties and so tend not to make 
the effort. Hybrid seeds of maize, sorghum, and 
millet cannot be reproduced by farmers, and, 
hence, the private sector supplies seeds. But even 
in these cases, basic research is carried out by 
the public sector. As a result, public support is 
necessary to develop biological and chemical 
technologies.
These are enduring collaborations between 
advanced agricultural research centers and na-
tional programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. They 
have developed improved varieties of cotton 
and cassava in ways that are reminiscent of 
the long-term collaboration in rice and wheat 
research between international agricultural re-
search centers and national programs in Asia.10 
The recent surge in the production of high-value 
crops for export, including in Mozambique, is 
also encouraging.11 Aside from these examples, 
however, few improved crops appropriate to the 
African climate have been developed.
Gravity irrigation systems are a local pub-
lic good as well. Irrigated land accounts for 
only 5 percent of the total cultivated area in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Lowland rice yields in ir-
rigated areas in Sub-Saharan Africa in general 
F I G U R E  6 .1 In the absence of a Green Revolution, poverty remains high in agrarian economies
Source: Christiaensen and Demery 2007.
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to take off. This approach focuses on identify-
ing activities that may hold latent comparative 
advantage and on removing the constraints 
that dissuade private firms from taking up these 
activities. In fact, there are many informal in-
dustrial clusters in urban areas in Sub-Saharan 
 Africa. They produce garments, leather shoes, 
simple metal products, and furniture, among 
other things, though seldom for export.17 These 
clusters have spontaneously developed, suggest-
ing a potential comparative advantage in these 
industries. Reducing logistics costs, removing 
red tape, and addressing coordination issues 
could create the necessary conditions to attract 
foreign investors to these clusters, especially at a 
time when wage increases in coastal China are 
encouraging the relocation of some industries 
where low labor costs are a key competitive fac-
tor (box 6.1).18 
Jobs, which start to trigger agglomeration 
effects and make connections to the global 
economy, are good jobs for development in 
agrarian countries. To create more of these jobs 
and become centers of economic dynamism, 
cities need to be more functional. But even in 
the most optimistic scenario, it will take time to 
complete the urbanization process, so increas-
ing productivity in agriculture is a priority for 
reducing the high poverty levels.
The job structure in the cities is dominated 
by self-employment, with petty commerce 
growing quickly. If agriculture matters most for 
poverty reduction, successful urbanization may 
hold the key to more rapid productivity and in-
come growth as well as social cohesion. In most 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, however, urbanization 
has failed to create the dynamism observed else-
where in the developing world. Migration from 
rural to urban areas continues, but migrants are 
simply swelling the ranks of the self-employed 
earning subsistence wages. In the absence of dy-
namic cities, migration is driven by despair, and 
not hope. In Mozambique, for example, young 
people are moving to urban areas, but few are 
moving into regular wage employment. Mean-
while, levels of trust are falling and are lowest 
among young workers.16
Some have argued that the jobs challenge 
in these urban areas can be addressed through 
the creation of greater opportunities for self-
employment. For example, building space for 
informal markets around bus stops would allow 
more rural migrants to make a living. But self-
employment of this sort is unlikely to support 
the agglomeration effects and knowledge spill-
overs that make cities thrive elsewhere. 
An alternative approach is to create condi-
tions for labor-intensive light manufacturing 
JOBS
LENS
Agrarian
economies
More productive smallholder farming
Urban jobs connected to global markets
Conflict-affected countries
Jobs are among the most pressing issues in coun-
tries in conflict or emerging from it.19 They are 
critical for restoring the livelihoods of individu-
als and families affected by war and violence, 
reintegrating ex-combatants, and rebuilding ev-
erybody’s sense of belonging in society. They are 
also key to jump-start economic activity, recon-
nect people, and reconstruct networks and the 
social fabric. Alongside security and justice, jobs 
are central to breaking cycles of violence, restor-
ing confidence in institutions, and giving people 
a stake in society.20 
Yet the obstacles to creating jobs in conflict-
affected countries are staggering and confront 
policy makers with overwhelming questions. 
How can jobs be generated quickly for demo-
bilized soldiers, displaced persons, and vulner-
able groups affected by violence or war? What 
kinds of government programs can have a quick 
impact? How can the private sector become an 
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civil wars and other forms of internal conflict. 
Less frequently, they involve hostilities between 
states. When entire countries are affected by in-
ternal or external conflict, the jobs challenge is 
particularly daunting because of institutional 
breakdown and fractured connectivity with the 
outside world. If conflict is localized, constraints 
are less severe where functioning infrastructure, 
services, and institutions can be extended to 
conflict-affected regions once hostilities become 
manageable. Conflict situations are generally 
further complicated by large numbers of dis-
placed people. At the end of 2010, an estimated 
15.4 million people sought refuge from conflict 
outside their home countries, and another 27.5 
million were displaced internally.21 
Conflict can fundamentally disrupt jobs by 
destroying or damaging infrastructure and ac-
cess to markets, as well as through altering in-
centives. In Sri Lanka, conflict in the north dis-
rupted economic activity and created favorable 
conditions for the insurgency to recruit among 
the newly unemployed.22
Even during war, however, people work. Jobs 
disproportionately involve low-pay or unpaid 
work, such as subsistence agriculture or petty 
trading. Youth in rural areas in post-conflict 
Liberia reported working two to four jobs at a 
time.23 Across countries, conflict increases fe -
male labor force participation, as women work to 
help their households cope with income shocks 
and to compensate for the absence of men who 
are fighting (box 6.2).24 In Afghanistan, female 
employment rates were higher in high-conflict 
than in low-conflict areas; in Nepal, they in-
creased more than in high-conflict areas.25 
Some jobs in conflict-affected countries may 
involve illegal activities that persist in the after-
math of conflict because of weak governance 
and lack of legal alternatives. Even if these ac-
tivities are limited in scope, they may under-
mine the creation of good jobs for development 
by distorting incentives and generating rents. 
In Afghanistan, poppy cultivation is an impor-
tant source of income for rural households.26 In 
Somalia, piracy creates jobs for some through 
the employment of speed boat crews and re-
lated land-based operations.27 In Liberia, young 
people in rural areas have supplemented their 
income by working in illegal mining, rubber 
tapping, and logging.28
Jobs are central to recovery in countries 
emerging from conflict, but the barriers to job 
engine for employment creation? Moreover, 
countries affected by conflict are often poor to 
begin with. Their opportunities, resources, and 
capacity are scarce; data for planning may sim-
ply not exist.
Conflict environments range from situa-
tions with high levels of criminal violence to 
The labor productivity of workers in well-managed firms in Ethiopia is compa-
rable with that in China and Vietnam, although wages are only a quarter of 
those in China and half those in Vietnam. Ethiopia thus has the potential to 
compete globally in apparel thanks to a significant and growing labor cost 
advantage. It is also close to a state-of-the-art and well-located container port 
in Djibouti and has duty-free access to the markets of the European Union and 
the United States. The binding constraint on Ethiopia’s competitiveness in 
apparel is poor trade logistics, which wipe out its labor cost advantage and cut 
the country off from the higher-value time-sensitive segments of the market. 
Establishing a fast-track channel for moving apparel through customs, provid-
ing free and immediate access to foreign exchange, reducing the cost of letters 
of credit, and setting up an industrial zone closer to Djibouti would alleviate the 
most important trade logistics bottlenecks. These steps would also put Ethio-
pia in a position to attract investors to lead the industry in the same way that 
China and Vietnam have done.
Ethiopia also benefits from an abundance of natural resources. Raw materi-
als such as skins for the footwear industry and hard and soft timber for the fur-
niture industry are available. But they are expensive. A cubic meter of timber 
costs US$667, compared to US$344 in China and US$246 at most in Vietnam. So 
urban consumers in Ethiopia buy imported modern furniture, which is cheaper 
and of better quality. Yet Ethiopia has enormous unexploited potential in tim-
ber, particularly bamboo. Reforms could make the country’s furniture industry 
competitive in the domestic market, create more productive jobs, and save 
 foreign exchange.
BOX 6.1   Can agrarian Ethiopia compete in manufacturing?
Source: Dinh and others 2012.
Out of necessity, women often intensify their economic activity during periods 
of conflict. Post-conflict programs that target women can help them take 
advantage of the window of opportunity presented by conflict and assume 
new roles that contribute meaningfully to local economic recovery. Women in 
North Maluku, Indonesia, were active participants in the rapid recovery and 
poverty reduction that occurred in the wake of nearly a year of intensely violent 
civil strife. “Since 2002, when the conflict ended, I have run a retail shop for 
extra income to fulfill our family needs. . . . I received support money that I used 
for my business capital from the Ternate city government. . . . Ten years ago, I 
was only a housewife because I didn’t have the capital to run the business as I 
do now,” a 38-year-old married woman reported.
BOX 6.2   Conflict can increase labor force participation 
among women
Source: Petesch 2011. 
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also help manage disputes.30 Programs can be 
tailored to facilitate the reintegration of youth, 
particularly young men, who have been involved 
in conflict. In some cases, such as the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra 
 Leone, young ex-combatants have no memory 
of peaceful times or normal civilian life. 
Ultimately, conflict-affected countries need 
to attract private investment. The state can play 
an enabling role by strengthening regulations 
and institutions, rebuilding basic infrastruc-
ture, and providing security.31 Partnerships 
between the public and private sectors, donors, 
and civil society can help to rebuild markets 
and investor confidence. Connecting farmers 
and entrepreneurs through value chains has 
the potential to spark innovation and employ-
ment growth.32 Business associations can sup-
port entrepreneurship and help solve collective 
action problems by restoring law and order, 
roads, and electricity.33 As security is restored, 
creation can be especially steep (box 6.3). Firms 
in conflict-affected countries report that po-
litical instability is the most severe bottleneck 
to business followed by the lack of electricity 
(figure 6.2). Simply getting basic services up 
and running can be a major issue. Corruption 
and the lack of finance are also among the top 
constraints. Security risks because of high crime 
rates or armed conflict reduce returns to in-
vestment and can persist even after the armed 
conflict has officially ended. Firms may need ad-
ditional funds to hire private security or to pay 
bribes. The loss of skills because of migration 
and disruptions in schooling can also create ob-
stacles for firms.
Demobilization and reintegration of former 
combatants are major challenges for countries 
emerging from conflict. Although ex-combatants 
make up a relatively small share of the total 
population, unemployment and idleness, par-
ticularly of young men, are stress factors that 
can strain and potentially undermine fragile 
post-conflict environments.29 Jobs can compen-
sate for the loss of identity and status associated 
with the dissolution of armed forces and militias 
and the income lost from theft and looting. Jobs 
can also help deter further involvement in gangs 
and violence. Yet not all jobs are alternatives to 
violence, especially if they provide little income 
and the work is drudgery. 
Most disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration programs include some form of 
employment support such as emergency tem-
porary jobs, cash for work, public employment 
services, small grants, or vocational training. 
Temporary employment programs can play 
an important bridging role by providing jobs 
quickly to ex-combatants and other vulnerable 
populations in the absence of other options. Ev-
idence on whether temporary programs reduce 
conflict and contribute to rebuilding communi-
ties is less clear. Cash-for-work programs can be 
costly and may strain stretched public budgets, 
may create poor quality and unsustainable as-
sets, and can be divisive and lead to tensions if 
they are targeted only at certain groups. 
Broadly targeted community-based pro-
grams may be more conducive to stability. In 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, where many 
ex-combatants have had a difficult time finding 
jobs, associations of ex-combatants and com-
munity members share information about em-
ployment opportunities and social support and 
The Republic of South Sudan, the world’s newest country, exemplifies the 
challenges countries face emerging from conflict. South Sudan has natural 
resources, including oil, yet more than four-fifths of the population lives in rural 
areas, and most depend on subsistence farming and cattle raising. Half of the 
population lives in poverty, which is especially deep in rural areas, according to 
the 2009 household survey. Only slightly more than one-fourth of the adult 
population is literate, and prospects for future human capital development are 
dim: almost half of 10- to 14-year-olds are working, with only slightly more than 
one-third in school.a
The International Organization for Migration estimates that 4 million peo-
ple were displaced during the Sudanese civil war, and that nearly 1.9 million 
have returned since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005.b The return of internally displaced persons creates substantial pressures 
on already poor communities. The new government of South Sudan is aiming 
to demobilize 150,000 soldiers over the next six to eight years.c Access to land 
rights and conflict among nomadic groups are also notable challenges for jobs, 
as is the legacy of overemployment in the public sector, which is not sustain-
able given severe fiscal pressures.
Creating jobs is one of the most immediate concerns facing the new gov-
ernment—jobs that can contribute to peace and stability, provide sustainable 
living standards through legal and nonviolent activity, and foster economic 
recovery. Generating these jobs involves building an enabling environment for 
private sector investment. That will take time, however, and alternatives are 
urgently needed for groups whose lack of jobs can threaten stability, including 
internally displaced persons, ex-combatants, and youth.
BOX 6.3   Solving jobs challenges is urgent in South Sudan 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Guarcello, Rosati, and Lyon 2011.
b. IOM 2009. 
c. Republic of South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission 2012.
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economic activity and violence, and that start 
the long process of economic recovery. In 
conflict settings, jobs can also have develop-
ment payoffs for social cohesion by involving 
people in productive activities that strengthen 
self-esteem and give them a sense of identity 
and status, by rebuilding networks, and by giv-
ing people a sense that opportunities are fairly 
distributed. 
however, the jobs focus can shift from targeted 
public programs to employment creation in the 
private sector. But it would be naïve to expect 
conflict-affected countries to become dynamic 
economies overnight.
Tackling the jobs challenge faced by con-
flict-affected countries is a formidable task: it 
requires creating jobs that contribute to peace 
and stability, that are an alternative to illegal 
F I G U R E  6 . 2 Instability and poor infrastructure are severe constraints on 
business in conflict-affected countries
Source: Investment Climate Survey (database), World Bank, Washington, DC.
Note: In this figure, conflict countries include Afghanistan (2008), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), Burundi (2006), Chad (2009), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006 and 2010), 
Côte d’Ivoire (2009), Georgia (2008), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Kosovo (2009), Liberia (2009), Nepal (2009), Sierra Leone (2009), and Timor-Leste (2009). The horizontal axis measures the 
ratio of the average score of a constraint to the average score of all other constraints. Asterisks denote statistically significant differences between conflict countries and others at 
the 1 percent level. 
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maturity, high-yield rice. There has also been 
a pronounced shift away from sharecropping 
into fixed-rent leasehold tenancy. Landless and 
marginal farmers have been the major ben-
eficiaries of this change. Simultaneously, credit 
constraints have been relaxed thanks to the 
country’s well-known microfinance institutions. 
Access to finance has facilitated human capital 
accumulation, especially in women’s educa-
tion and health, and promoted investments in 
microenterprises.
Despite the still considerable labor surplus 
in rural areas, real wages in agriculture have 
increased from the monetary equivalent of less 
than 2.5 kilograms of rice a day in 1983 to more 
than 6.0 kilograms today. The seasonal hunger 
associated with the monga period—between 
transplanting and harvesting paddy—is reced-
ing. Remittances from women working in fac-
tories and from men working in construction 
have also helped reduce rural poverty. 
The movement of labor out of agriculture has 
been facilitated by close urban proximity, result-
ing from Bangladesh’s high population density. 
Special links allowed by proximity also may have 
supported productivity growth among laborers 
engaged in rural nonfarm sectors. The ready-
Urbanizing countries
Urbanizing countries endowed with abundant 
unskilled labor have the potential to enter a vir-
tuous jobs circle. The integration of these coun-
tries into the world economy can lead to the cre-
ation of extensive employment opportunities, 
especially in light manufacturing. These jobs 
may involve hard work, relatively low pay, and 
limited or negligible benefits, but in general they 
are preferable to jobs in agriculture. They can 
also be the entry point to a process of economic 
and technological upgrading that leads to better 
jobs in the future.34 Employment opportuni-
ties for the unskilled thus provide avenues out 
of poverty for large numbers of households. In 
countries in which women’s jobs choices have 
been restricted, new employment opportuni-
ties in urbanizing economies can bring about 
important changes at the household and society 
levels. 
This has been the story of several East Asian 
countries over the past half century. In many re-
spects, it has also been the recent story of Ban-
gladesh, where industrialization is growing in 
large cities such as Chittagong and Dhaka. The 
industrial sector now accounts for nearly 30 
percent of value added, up from 20 percent in 
1990, and the urbanization rate is approaching 
30 percent, double what is was in 1980.35 Exports 
as a percentage of GDP tripled between 1990 
and 2010, with much of the increase in a thriv-
ing ready-made garment industry that is highly 
intensive in female labor. This structural trans-
formation, along with improvements in agricul-
tural productivity, has had a major impact on 
living standards. GDP per capita has doubled in 
the past two decades and the share of the popula-
tion living below US$1.25 a day fell from 70 per-
cent in 1992 to 43 percent in 2010.36 Productivity 
and earnings growth still lag behind some of its 
neighbors, but Bangladesh’s story is remarkable 
because the country was often held out in the de-
velopment literature as a hopeless case (box 6.4).
These successes have been built on modern-
ization in the agricultural sector, an industrial 
sector able to absorb low-skilled surplus farm 
labor, and supportive social policies.
Faster technology adoption has led to pro-
ductivity increases in agriculture. Farmers have 
shifted from growing low-yield, single-crop, 
deep-water rice to double cropping of short-
In 1975, the first book on the economy of Bangladesh commented: “If the prob-
lem of Bangladesh can be solved, there can be reasonable confidence that less 
difficult problems of development can also be solved. It is in this sense that 
Bangladesh is to be regarded as the test case of development.”a In the same 
spirit, a well-known study on famines concluded that Bangladesh was “below 
poverty equilibrium.”b
Such a negative perception of the viability of the Bangladesh economy 
was conditioned by the adverse initial conditions facing the country after 
 independence—high population density, a limited natural-resource base, 
underdeveloped infrastructure, frequent natural disasters, and political 
uncertainty.
This negative perception has given way to optimism in global development 
circles because of Bangladesh’s positive record of socioeconomic development 
in recent decades. Some countries have done well in human development indi-
cators, and others have done well in economic growth, but Bangladesh belongs 
to a rather small group of countries that have done well on both fronts, the ini-
tial pessimism notwithstanding. This is the crux of the surprise.
BOX 6.4  Development pessimism about Bangladesh was 
understandable, but has been proven wrong 
Source: Bangladesh country case study for the World Development Report 2013.
a. Faaland and Parkinson 1976, 5.
b. Alamgir 1978.
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On the social policy front, both governmen-
tal and nongovernmental organizations have es-
tablished pro-poor, pro-youth, and pro-women 
programs. These have been instrumental in 
reducing population growth and encouraging 
more effective public and private investments in 
education and health. 
Agricultural modernization, labor migra-
tion, and social policies have altered the jobs 
landscape of Bangladesh, but these trans-
formations have not involved a substantial 
formalization of the economy. The share of 
jobs benefitting from legal protection or so-
cial insurance has not increased much over the 
past decade. The booming construction sector 
remains largely informal. Corporate social re-
sponsibility among export-oriented corpora-
tions in Bangladesh is making some difference 
in the ready-made garment sector, but worker 
unrest has been recurrent. But corporate social 
responsibility is mainly associated with exports 
to industrial countries and may become less 
relevant if the sector diversifies its exports to 
other developing countries. Corporate social 
responsibility is unlikely to be a workable op-
tion in construction. But while formalization 
has not advanced, the development of entre-
preneurship has been remarkable, leading to 
the creation of thousands of nationally owned 
medium and large firms within a mere two de-
cades (box 6.5). 
Bangladesh stands out as an intriguing case 
that is important to understand, especially given 
its starting point. The government has provided 
some support, with export processing zones, 
bonded warehouses, and special treatment of 
garments at ports. Large infrastructure projects, 
such as the Jamuna Bridge linking the prosper-
ous eastern and lagging western regions, have 
made it easier to move around the country. But 
government has not played the leading role in 
the transformation. Corruption is a problem 
and the cost of doing business is high. Power fail-
ures are frequent, many roads are unpaved, and 
those that are paved are highly congested. De-
spite these obstacles, agricultural modernization 
has occurred thanks to the Green Revolution 
associated with the development and diffusion 
of high-yielding varieties of rice and access to 
finance. Labor has moved out of agriculture 
through industrialization, and social policies 
made garment industry has been an important 
part of the jobs story in urbanizing Bangladesh. 
About 3 million women are working in this 
sector, which has a strong export orientation. 
Construction has been an important employer 
for men moving out of rural agriculture. Many 
low-skilled workers go abroad as well, especially 
to the Gulf countries. Remittances are growing 
by about 10 percent every year.37 
Light manufacturing opens up opportunities 
for large numbers of workers in urbanizing econ-
omies because skill requirements are modest. 
Firms demand some education but it is generally 
limited. In Bangladesh, for instance, 87 percent 
of regular urban wage workers in 2005 had some 
education but only 28 percent had secondary 
schooling or more.38 These education levels are 
considerably higher, though, than the educa-
tional attainment of workers in agriculture, so 
opportunities in the garment industry stimulate 
schooling, especially for girls. Urbanization has 
other beneficial effects on women, as well. Grow-
ing labor earnings increase the opportunity cost 
of raising children, which, in turn, may raise the 
age of marriage and reduce the birth rate. To 
the extent that women’s educational attainment 
and labor market participation rise, the status of 
women in society is enhanced. 
The ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh has grown rapidly over the 
past three decades, and the country now ranks among the largest garment 
exporters in the world. While the early successes have been attributed to an 
initial technology transfer from the Republic of Korea, such a one-time infusion 
of knowledge alone is insufficient to explain the sustained growth. In this 
respect, the pattern of development in Bangladesh is similar to that in East Asia, 
where investment in human capital and the importation and assimilation of 
technological and managerial knowledge from advanced countries played a 
critical role in promoting industrialization.
Primary data collected from knitwear manufacturers and garment traders 
can be used to explore the process of the continuous learning of advanced 
skills and expertise. The data show that the initial infusion of specific human 
capital attracted highly educated entrepreneurs to the industry, that the divi-
sion of labor between manufacturers and traders facilitated the expansion of 
the industry, and that enterprise growth has endured because of the continu-
ous learning from abroad by the highly educated entrepreneurs. These factors, 
taken together, account for the high profitability of garment manufacturing in 
Bangladesh.
BOX 6.5 The entrepreneurs of Bangladesh are local
Sources: Mottaleb and Sonobe 2011; Sonobe and Otsuka 2006.
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Bangladesh.39 The pharmaceutical industry 
has developed, and the different pattern of de-
velopment there relative to that of the garment 
industry is intriguing. But the high skill levels 
required by the pharmaceutical sector and other 
higher value-added export sectors are unlikely 
to make them a source of jobs for the masses of 
youth with only primary education.
have been supportive through family planning 
and social protection.
Urbanizing countries like Bangladesh have 
the potential to exploit several spillovers. But a 
key challenge for them is to find a way to move 
up the value-added chain and diversify manu-
facturing exports. Apart from ready-made gar-
ments, few sectors have grown substantially in 
Resource-rich countries
Investments in extractive industries can repre-
sent a sizable fraction of a developing country’s 
GDP and lead to spectacular increases in export 
revenue, but they do not create many jobs. The 
number of people at work during the construc-
tion phase may be sufficient to generate dyna-
mism at the local level, but once the mines and 
fields are in operation, employment goes down 
dramatically. Perhaps the most extreme example 
is the liquid natural gas project in Papua New 
Guinea. The investment cost of the project ex-
ceeded twice the country’s GDP at project start-
up, and the project may lead to double-digit 
growth rates for many years. But it is unlikely 
to generate more than 1,000 direct jobs in the 
longer term (table 6.1).
Links to the rest of the economy tend to be 
weak as well. Port facilities, transport corridors, 
and logistical, financial, and accounting services 
are needed. In some cases, oil refining and ore 
processing can also be carried out within the 
country. All these services are bound to generate 
high-value-added jobs in major cities and hubs. 
But even after including all backward and for-
ward links, the ratio between the total number 
of jobs generated and the number of direct jobs 
is likely to remain in the single digits. Taking into 
account direct and indirect job effects, extractive 
industries may not account for more than 1 or 
2 percent of total employment in resource-rich 
developing countries.
In addition, extractive industries can have 
important negative impacts on jobs elsewhere in 
the economy. These effects are often considered 
manifestations of Dutch disease, a reference to 
the experience of the Netherlands after large 
natural gas fields were discovered in the prov-
ince of Groningen in the late 1950s. The ensuing 
export revenue led to strong real exchange rate 
appreciation, deterioration in competitiveness 
in sectors exposed to international competition, 
and a loss of jobs in these tradable sectors.
Some industrial countries confronted with 
resource booms have successfully protected 
or fostered the diversification of their econo-
mies. Norway offers what may be the most 
striking example. With strong backing from 
the labor movement, centralized collective- 
bargaining agreements ensure that real wages do 
not grow more rapidly than the productivity of 
the tradable sectors, excluding oil. Wage mod-
eration supports employment opportunities for 
everybody, to the point that the unemployment 
rate remained close to 3 percent during the re-
cent global financial crisis. Oil revenue is used 
for long-term investments but is not immedi-
ately converted into higher labor earnings.
Among oil-rich countries elsewhere, the 
United Arab Emirates has also managed to di-
versify its economy through financial and logis-
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resource-rich developing countries find it diffi-
cult to reap the benefits of agglomeration. Spe-
cialization in the production of commodities 
(including agricultural products such as  cocoa) 
may be an important reason why urbaniza-
tion has failed to deliver growth in countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.40 These wealthy consump-
tion agglomerations are nonetheless attracting 
rural migrants, thereby fueling local inequal-
ity, discontent, and crime. None of the cities in 
resource-rich developing countries among the 
top 50 in the world according to cost of living 
is among the top 50 according to quality of life.
While extractive industries fail to create 
many jobs, they do contribute to the local econ-
omy through other channels. A recent survey 
of employees of large-scale mining projects in 
Papua New Guinea shows that they make re-
mittances both in kind and in cash to their 
households. Most remittances in kind were for 
construction and building materials (41 per-
cent), followed by transport-related items (28 
percent).41 Cash contributions were used most 
often for school fees (29 percent) and transpor-
tation-related items (12 percent). Employees 
also reported accommodating relatives visiting 
from rural areas. Some of their guests helped 
with housework, and some obtained education 
at the host’s expense.42
tics services. But overall, in the Gulf states, na-
tional citizens have become direct beneficiaries 
of the oil bonanza through well-paid jobs in the 
public sector. In the larger countries, these jobs 
are rationed, with some groups, such as women 
and youth, having less access than those with 
good connections. Menial jobs are performed 
by immigrants on temporary contracts who re-
ceive modest pay and benefits. Jobs are a win-
dow to rent sharing for some but do not give a 
stake in society to others.
This tension between jobs for productiv-
ity and jobs for social cohesion may be even 
more difficult to avoid in developing countries, 
because they lack the institutional strength of 
Norway or the implementation capacity of the 
United Arab Emirates. In resource-rich develop-
ing countries, the concern is not only about los-
ing competitiveness in tradable sectors but also 
about missing out on the benefits of urbaniza-
tion. Indeed, the price of land in major agglom-
erations becomes prohibitively high in resource-
rich developing countries. By one measure, the 
most expensive city in the world is Luanda (ta-
ble 6.2). According to this measure, 3 of the top 
5, and 9 of the top 50 most expensive cities in the 
world are in resource-rich developing countries.
Because they do not have the economic den-
sity of London, New York, or Tokyo, cities in 
 Country Project (sector or resource)
Investment, % 
of 2010 GDP
Direct employment, 
number
Papua New Guinea LNG Project (natural gas) 237.0
9,300 during construction; 
1,000 afterward
Mongolia Oyu Tolgoi (copper, gold) 74.2
14,800 during construction;  
3,000 to 4,000 afterward
Botswana Jwaneng Cut 8 Project  (diamonds) 20.2 1,000
Papua New Guinea Ramu Mine (nickel) 19.0
5,000 during construction; 
2,000 afterward
Mozambique Benga Mining (coal) 13.6
currently 150; 
4,500 afterward
Tanzania Mchuchuma  (coal) 12.2 5,000
Namibia Husab Mine (uranium) 11.9
5,200 during construction; 
1,200 afterward
Zambia Lumwana Mine (copper) 9.3 4,700 during construction
Pakistan Reko Diq Mining (copper, gold) 4.0
2,500 during construction; 
200 afterward
Peru Conga Mine (gold) 2.6
6,000 during construction; 
1,700 afterward
Source: World Bank Development Report 2013 team based on project information. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; LNG = liquid natural gas.
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for some: each hard rock miner could earn 
the equivalent of US$50,000–$75,000 a year, 
and each alluvial miner could make around 
US$10,000 a year. This income became the 
main contribution to the local economy, to-
gether with remittances sent by those ex-Mis-
ima Mines Limited employees who found work 
in large mines elsewhere.44 
And even in mining areas, social impacts are 
more mixed than the positive effect on living 
standards suggests. The influx of money from 
mining enclaves has enabled men to pay high 
prices for brides and marry multiple wives on 
an unprecedented scale, which might have 
contributed to a decline in women’s status. 
Around Porgera Mine, the abandonment of 
older wives and the increasing number of 
women taken from other tribal groups are con-
sidered factors in the increased incidence of 
domestic violence and tension with neighbor-
ing groups. In Lihir, when groups of landown-
ers received compensation and royalty pay-
ments, no women were given authority to 
control the accounts.45 In addition, children 
normally help out in artisanal and small-scale 
mines. In Misima, because of clear restrictions 
and training by the Wau Small-Scale Mining 
Center, children are less involved in mining 
than before, but child labor remains a con-
Artisanal mining can flourish in parallel with 
major investments and raise the living standards 
of local communities. In Papua New Guinea, the 
number of grassroots alluvial miners is two to 
three times greater than the number of people 
working in the formal extractive industries sec-
tor, even if contractors and temporary workers 
are counted among the latter. Some of the large 
extractive projects, such as Ok Tedi Mine, hap-
pen to be in poor areas. Thus, the artisanal min-
ing taking place around them helps spread the 
wealth.
But poverty maps show a significant level of 
spatial dispersion in living standards and a per-
sistence of poverty over the past three decades.43 
The deepest and most persistent rural poverty 
in Papua New Guinea occurs in areas with no 
known mineral resources.
When large extractive projects close, arti-
sanal and small-scale mining can also contrib-
ute to the local economy by cushioning the 
decline in earnings. For example, in Misima in 
Papua New Guinea, local people had become 
used to making a living around the only large 
mine project, Misima Mines Limited. When the 
project closed in 2004, the economy of Misima 
ground to a halt, and local residents found it 
hard to make ends meet. Artisanal and small-
scale mining provided an avenue for income 
 Rank in 2011 City Country
1 Luanda Angola
2 Tokyo Japan
3 N’Djamena Chad
4 Moscow Russian Federation
5 Geneva Switzerland
12 Libreville Gabon
14 Sydney Australia
18 London United Kingdom
23 Niamey Niger
27 Paris France
29 St. Petersburg Russian Federation
32 New York United States
41 Lagos Nigeria
44 Khartoum Sudan
48 Baku Azerbaijan
50 Amsterdam Netherlands
Source: Mercer 2011.
Note: Cities are ranked from most to least expensive based on the cost of a consumption basket for expatriates. Cities from developing 
countries are highlighted.
TA B L E  6 . 2 Cities in resource-rich developing countries are among the most expensive 
in the world
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cern.46 Finally, land disputes often take place 
among artisanal miners as people tend to tres-
pass on other’s land to find minerals.47 
Beyond local communities, the boom in ex-
tractive industries is affecting jobs in the main 
agricultural sector of Papua New Guinea. Palm 
oil exports have been growing steadily in recent 
years and now exceed the exports of all other ag-
ricultural crops combined. Remarkably, the pro-
duction of palm oil fruit involves 18,000 small-
holder blocks around the main plantations.48 
While this sector makes a significant contribu-
tion to the economy, improving rural livelihoods 
and generating employment, the extractive in-
dustries boom is undermining the competitive-
ness of palm oil exports through higher wages 
for skilled employees and higher logistics costs.
The higher wages paid to skilled workers are 
also eroding the effectiveness of the public sec-
tor. Entire departments in government and in 
education and training institutions have been 
depleted because their staff leaves for more at-
tractive opportunities in the extractive industries 
sector. Mining companies complain about the 
shortage of skills at the same time as they poach 
people away from the education and training 
system, where they could help build skills. For 
instance, among 181 interviewees in a recent 
survey on large-scale mining projects, 58 work-
ers (or 32 percent) had at least a university de-
gree.49 Raising salaries in the public sector may 
be needed, but that would create other problems. 
Absenteeism is rife and service delivery is poor. 
Without strengthened accountability, higher sal-
aries would only transform many public sector 
jobs into a window for rent sharing.
An encouraging development has been the 
success of some landowner companies around 
mining enclaves. These companies may have 
built up a good work ethic and developed ef-
fective business practices in places that were far 
removed from the modern economy only a few 
years ago. Not all landowner companies have 
been successful, however, and this model may 
fail to spread the wealth from extractive indus-
tries beyond the surrounding areas (box 6.6).
The challenge of resource-rich economies is 
often framed in terms of transparency, which is 
certainly important for social cohesion. How-
ever, accounting for the money involved in ex-
tractive industries is only part of the solution. 
Equally important is ensuring that resources 
flow from booming enclaves and hubs to the 
poorer parts of the country, especially in the 
form of basic infrastructure and service deliv-
ery. Focusing the flow of resources on the de-
mand side rather than on the supply side (for 
example, on health insurance rather than pub-
lic hospitals) may contribute to productivity 
rather than to the creation of new windows for 
rent sharing.
Beyond public finance, the concentration 
of wealth in mining enclaves and urban hubs 
requires attention to spatial pricing issues. The 
benefits of agglomeration cannot be reaped if 
urban land becomes prohibitively expensive. 
Active efforts are needed to increase the avail-
ability of urban land and keep urban housing 
affordable. Despite such efforts, the cost of la-
bor is bound to be much higher in mining en-
claves and urban hubs. Labor policies need to 
take these disparities into account and avoid 
making workers too expensive in poorer and 
more remote areas through minimum wages 
or mandated benefits that mimic the wages and 
benefits available in the booming parts of the 
country.
The main challenge facing resource-rich 
countries is to spread the wealth in ways that do 
not undermine productivity growth and social 
cohesion spillovers. Good jobs for development 
in this context are those that generate output (as 
opposed to just absorbing it) outside the extrac-
tive industries sector. Incentives for firms to cre-
ate jobs and for people to work are important 
if the economy is going to diversify its export 
base. The abundance of foreign currency can 
be a constraint because of exchange rate appre-
ciation. The experience of some countries, most 
notably Norway, shows how sovereign funds 
that are used for long-run investments can man-
age this foreign currency problem.
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problems of scale. Exporting to larger foreign 
markets is difficult, however, as the disadvan-
tage of smallness manifests itself in the form 
of higher production costs. Given that small 
countries are price-takers in world markets, 
these cost premiums are hard to pass on to 
customers. The only way these economies can 
export is by accepting lower profits and labor 
earnings. But in industries such as electronic as-
sembly and clothing, even if capital earns nega-
tive returns and wages are zero, the unit cost of 
production in a tiny economy would still exceed 
prevailing world prices. 50 
A number of small island nations, especially 
those located in the Pacific Ocean, are also con-
fronted with the challenge of remoteness. When 
small islands are located far away from economic 
Small island nations
The jobs agendas of small island nations are 
shaped by their market size and their geography. 
Because of their size, these countries cannot 
exploit economies of scale or reap the benefits 
of agglomeration or specialization. As islands, 
many of them are characterized by fragmen-
tation—an already-small population spread 
thinly over large areas. For example, Fiji has a 
population of around 860,000 people and a 
total territory of 18,274 square miles, but this 
land is fragmented across a total 332 islands. Yet 
jobs in cities and clusters rely on scale and den-
sity to create positive spillovers. 
With limited domestic markets, small is-
land nations need to look outward to overcome 
Firms linked to local landowner groups in Papua New Guinea are 
developing increasingly diversified businesses and are able to 
compete regionally, even nationally, thereby generating jobs with 
a range of skill levels. The origin of these firms is the communal 
ownership of land in Papua New Guinea, which has meant that 
mining companies have had to pay compensation for land to com-
munities rather than to individuals. As a result, some of the land-
owner companies have up to 300,000 shareholders. National 
agencies negotiate with individual resources projects for local 
landowning groups to have privileged rights to supply selected 
services to the project. 
The most successful landowner companies, including Trans 
Wonderland, Anitua, the iPi Group, National Catering, and Star 
Mountain, are locally managed. Their business activities extend 
beyond the core job streams of the extractive industries sector in 
exploration, construction, and extraction. For example, they pro-
vide logistical services through a franchise truck-ownership struc-
ture and catering services that reach out to all Papua New Guinea 
including to customers outside the natural resource sectors.
BOX 6.6   Landowner companies can build capacity while spreading the wealth
Source: Blacklock and Bulman 2012.
The key to the successes of these companies may be the clear 
separation between their social roles and their business model, 
which builds on solid corporate governance. The landowner origins 
and commercial focus allow them to partner with landowner groups 
in other resource project areas, which helps them to build scale and 
management depth. Expatriates with a genuine interest in develop-
ment seem to have played an important part in achieving the 
proper balance.
Not all landowner companies have been equally successful. Most 
exist purely to distribute rents from mines to communities and have 
no ambitions of building sustainable economic opportunities for 
their members. Two of four companies established in Central Prov-
ince never gained a foothold because the funds that were supposed 
to serve as equity vanished. Even the successful landowner compa-
nies may be unsustainable beyond the construction phase of extrac-
tive industries, during which the demand for support services is 
exceptionally high. Skeptics wonder whether building work skills 
through the development of these businesses is really more valu-
able than investing in service delivery through local infrastructure.
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with higher income levels among small island 
nations.53 
Migration is one of the key channels for eco-
nomic integration. As workers move to larger 
economic centers, they gain access to larger 
markets, cheaper inputs, and more investment. 
Thus, the labor force is put to more productive 
use and can earn higher incomes. In turn, re-
mittances from migrants improve living stan-
dards at home. Moving labor to larger markets 
also allows workers and entrepreneurs to inter-
act with more dynamic firms, thus acquiring 
better and more diversified skills and gaining 
exposure to new ideas. 
Emigrants account for over 20 percent of the 
total population in a majority of these countries. 
On average, remittances are responsible for over 
8 percent of GDP in Pacific island countries 
and for 5 percent in other small island nations 
(figure 6.4). In fact, migration is behind several 
success stories. Samoa has a long history of mi-
gration into New Zealand, through a treaty of 
friendship in existence for more than 30 years, 
and the Cook Islands are in a free association 
with New Zealand. Both have been able to reg-
ister sustained growth in contrast to the experi-
ences of other Pacific island nations.54
It may take time for the benefits from migra-
tion to materialize, as a comparison of Tonga 
and Fiji illustrates. Tonga has more than 40 years 
of substantial migration and receives large per 
capita remittance flows. In Fiji, international 
migration is a much more recent phenomenon. 
Household surveys show that more than 90 
percent of households receive remittances in 
Tonga, compared with 43 percent of households 
in Fiji.55
The different historical paths influence the 
impact of migration on the domestic economy. 
In countries with a more mature migration, 
household behavior at home is more tilted to-
ward business activities. In both Tonga and 
Fiji, migration and remittances lead to higher 
savings, but they have a different impact on 
household income generation. In Tonga, both 
the number of emigrants and the level of remit-
tances received are associated with increasing 
income from business activities. In Fiji, by con-
trast, remittances do not seem to affect business 
income and have a negative relationship with 
wage earnings—as if migration just served as a 
substitute for wage employment in the domestic 
economy. 56 
centers, the cost of trading with them may be-
come prohibitive. In the case of Pacific island 
nations, the average GDP-weighted distance 
to trading partners is about 11,000 kilometers, 
compared with about 8,000 kilometers for small 
countries in the Caribbean (figure 6.3).51 Not 
surprisingly, these Pacific island nations also 
trade less relative to other small countries.
Smallness and fragmentation further raise 
the costs of public services and infrastructure. A 
road, an energy network, or a government min-
istry that serves 100,000 people is likely to have 
a higher cost per user than one serving 10 mil-
lion people. High fixed costs have to be spread 
across a smaller number of people, and often 
across a larger number of locations, which im-
plies higher costs of doing business. 
These geographic challenges are fundamen-
tal to the economic experience of these small is-
land nations. Unfortunately, policies cannot al-
ter these disadvantages, but they can be partially 
offset through integration with bigger econo-
mies. Canada’s seasonal agricultural worker 
program with Caribbean and Latin American 
countries is an example. Several other similar 
bilateral agreements have been introduced.52 
In fact, tighter political relationships with large 
economic centers are found to be associated 
Source: Gibson 2006.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; km = kilometer. The figure shows the weighted average distance 
from the islands to 218 other countries, weighted by the GDP of those countries.
F I G U R E  6 . 3 Small island nations are located 
far away from economic centers
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capital stock once the migrants return.59 Evi-
dence from Fiji suggests that migration oppor-
tunities increase the probability that household 
members will acquire tertiary education.60 Re-
sults from qualitative surveys in Fiji also indicate 
that workers are prompted to acquire special 
skills for migration.61 
Viable jobs in small islands are traditionally 
associated with the exploitation of natural re-
sources including fisheries, forestry, mining, and 
tourism. When niche opportunities exist, low 
business costs become less critical for attract-
ing investment. In Fiji, sugar production and 
tourism are the largest sources of employment. 
As the most important agribusiness, sugar pro-
duction contributes about 8 percent of exports 
and employs over 10 percent of total popula-
tion. Annually, half a million visitors come to 
Fiji, while the local population is less than one 
million. Tourism has become a main source of 
employment growth in the formal sector.62 
The reliance on natural resources, however, 
raises the vulnerability of these countries. These 
sectors tend to be more susceptible to natu-
ral shocks—both natural disasters and volatile 
rainfall patterns. As with geographical disadvan-
tages, policies cannot eradicate the vulnerability. 
Migration does not always lead to a win-win 
situation, however. For example, large remit-
tance flows raise the prospect of Dutch dis-
ease—the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
due to the abundance of foreign currency. Brain 
drain is also a salient feature in these countries, 
at least in the short term. Their migrants are 
more educated than their general population. In 
12 of 19 small island nations, more than 30 per-
cent of total emigrants are skilled workers; in 14 
of them, skilled emigrants represent more than 
40 percent of the domestic skilled population.57 
While these migrants experience large income 
gains, send substantial remittances back, and do 
transfer knowledge, they do not appear to trade 
with their home countries or invest in them to 
any large degree.58 In Caribbean countries, the 
outmigration of health personnel has raised 
particular concerns because of its negative im-
pact on health systems.
On the other hand, migration and remit-
tances can promote human capital accumula-
tion. The possibility to migrate may motivate 
greater investments in education, and remit-
tances may finance them. Short-term migration 
can offer workers better training and education 
opportunities, which adds to domestic human 
F I G U R E  6 . 4 Migration matters for small island nations, even more so in the Pacific
Source: World Development Report 2013 team calculations based on World Bank migration database and remittances database.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. Nineteen small island nations are included in panel a on migration and 15 small island nations in panel b on remittances. The variation of 
remittances in Pacific Island countries over time is driven by missing data from Samoa.
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intensive services in tourism, finance, and in-
formation communication technologies.64 
Many explanations have been offered for the 
Mauritius miracle. There is no doubt that the 
focus on trade and foreign direct investment, 
and on using export processing zones to target 
light manufacturing industries, has been a criti-
cal element of Mauritius’ success. The country 
also boasts low corruption levels and a favorable 
regulatory environment, coupled with strong 
public-private sector cooperation and flexible 
institutions.65 But the circumstances that al-
lowed Mauritius to embark on this remark-
able development path were exceptional. They 
included the quota system that used to govern 
garment exports. Other small island nations 
may not enjoy such opportunities these days.
Small island nations face unique difficul-
ties because they cannot benefit from the gains 
of scale or specialization. These difficulties are 
intensified in places such as the Pacific island 
countries, which are far from major centers of 
economic activity. The experience of Mauritius 
shows what might be possible with strategic pol-
icies, strong institution building, and a dose of 
luck. But for many small island states, establish-
ing links with nearby economic centers, maxi-
mizing the benefits of migration, and exploiting 
niche markets while preserving their fragile eco-
system point the way forward.
But jobs exploiting natural resources should not 
undermine the fragile ecosystem of the islands. 
When conducted in a sustainable manner, tour-
ism and fisheries have positive environmental 
impacts.
Ensuring a broad distribution of the rents 
from jobs in the natural resource sectors is 
challenging. For example, Vanuatu’s impres-
sive growth has not had an impact on the lives 
of most residents. The country’s development 
has been driven by foreign investment in tour-
ism, financial services, and land development, 
and only a relatively small proportion of the 
urban population is reaping the gains. This has 
increased inequality and may lead to disruptive 
social trends.63 
A closer look at the Mauritius miracle 
shows how small island nations might be able 
to diversify into activities not based on the ex-
ploitation of natural resources. Between 1977 
and 2009, real GDP grew at 5.1 percent a year 
in Mauritius, compared with 3.2 percent for 
Sub-Saharan Africa overall. The World Eco-
nomic Forum ranks Mauritius as the second-
most-competitive country in the region. This 
sustained growth has been accompanied by a 
profound structural transformation over time. 
Poor at independence in 1968, Mauritius has 
transitioned from a sugar economy to manu-
facturing textiles and apparel to knowledge-
Countries with high youth 
unemployment
Young people are much more likely to be un-
employed than older adults. In most countries, 
unemployment rates for youth, defined as 15–
24 years old, are usually between two and three 
times the overall unemployment rate (figure 
6.5). And the unemployment rate captures only 
one aspect of the problems young people face in 
their transition from school to work. In agrarian 
countries, for example, open unemployment is 
low and youth employment difficulties are likely 
to manifest themselves in poor job quality and 
low earnings. In countries with high youth un-
employment, job quality may be a problem for 
those young people who do find work. In the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, informality is two times 
more common among 15- to 24-year-old work-
ers than among 35- to 54-year-olds.66 Highly 
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segmented labor markets offer limited scope 
to make the transition from informal to formal 
jobs. In Tunisia, even in those sectors that largely 
employ youth labor, employment is often tem-
porary and informal.67 
The stakes in youth unemployment are 
high. Recent events in the Arab world and in 
southern Europe have highlighted the discon-
tent of educated youth whose employment op-
portunities are falling short of expectations. 
The Arab Spring may boost transparency and 
accountability in the region, but if jobs do not 
follow, greater instability may result.68 Youth 
employment problems have economic costs, 
not only in the short run but also in the lon-
ger term. Unemployment among young people 
can lead to permanent scarring effects in the 
form of lower future earnings.69 The lack of 
job opportunities may also lead to discourage-
ment. Some of the decline in youth unemploy-
ment in the aftermath of the global crisis is ac-
tually driven by young people dropping out of 
the labor force.70
Many countries with youth unemployment 
problems have very large youth cohorts. In 
Zimbabwe, where 43 percent of the working-
age population is between 15 and 24, the youth 
unemployment rate is three times higher than 
the overall unemployment rate. The Middle 
East and North Africa, which has especially high 
youth unemployment, is an overwhelmingly 
young region. More than 100 million people are 
between the ages of 15 and 29, making up 30 
percent of the region’s population and about 47 
percent of the working-age population. Youth 
cohorts this large are not only likely to face 
higher unemployment rates but also tend to ex-
ert downward pressure on labor earnings.71
But demography is far from the whole story. 
Not all countries with pressing youth employ-
ment problems have “youth bulges.” In Sri 
Lanka, less than one-quarter of the working age 
population is between 15 and 24, but the youth 
unemployment rate is more than three times the 
overall rate. And even where youth cohorts are 
large, young people may encounter other bar-
riers to employment. Poor information on job 
seekers and on employment opportunities is 
one reason why young people face more diffi-
culties than adults in finding jobs. Where private 
and public agencies and other sources of labor 
market information are not well developed, 
personal networks are important for match-
F I G U R E  6 . 5 Youth unemployment rates are extremely high 
in some countries
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Note: Unemployment rates are averages for 2000–10.
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ing people and jobs. A majority of workers in 
most Middle Eastern and North African coun-
tries have found their jobs through family and 
friends.72 Adults tend to have better networks 
than young people going through the transi-
tion from education to employment. If a large 
percentage of a person’s network is unemployed, 
the chances of that person finding a job are low.
A skills mismatch is the other common 
explanation. Close to 40 percent of the firms 
 surveyed through investment climate assess-
ments in the Middle East and North Africa 
report that the limited availability of skilled 
labor is a major constraint on business. Lack 
of formal schooling, which has increased sub-
stantially in the region, is not the cause. In fact, 
youth unemployment rates tend to rise with 
educational attainment in many countries. In 
Morocco, young people with a university edu-
cation had an unemployment rate in 2009 of 
17 percent, 3.7 times the rate for those with 
primary education or less. In Tunisia, 23 per-
cent of university-educated youth were unem-
ployed in 2010, compared with 11 percent for 
nongraduates.73 In Tunisia, it takes graduates 28 
months on average to find a job, compared with 
19 months for nongraduates.74 Not only has un-
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ployment usually build on these two explana-
tions. The poor flow of information between 
employers and jobseekers is seen as a justifica-
tion for active labor market policies that focus 
on improving the match between labor supply 
and demand. Counseling can help jobseekers 
understand what they have to offer and where 
the opportunities are. Temporary employment 
programs may provide a first job and make em-
ployers realize the value of a young worker. As 
for skills, the contrast between high educational 
attainment and high unemployment rates is 
seen as an indication of a disconnect between 
the quality and relevance of schooling and the 
actual needs of the labor market. Improving 
youth employment prospects, it is argued, will 
critically depend on restructuring education 
and training systems to produce marketable 
skills rather than credentials.78 In the short term, 
training programs are indeed the most obvious 
response to provide unemployed youth with the 
practical skills employers need.
The potential impact of these prescriptions 
is limited, however. Better information, coun-
seling, and temporary employment programs 
can certainly help some jobseekers, but whether 
employment been increasing, but the employ-
ment deficit is expected to grow more among 
university graduates than among people with 
less education (figure 6.6). 
The paradox of high unemployment among 
the highly educated is related to the growth 
path of countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa, where the civil service and state-owned 
enterprises have long been the employers of 
choice and education systems were built to 
feed them with staff. Students aspire to public 
sector jobs, where benefits are generous and 
employment is stable, and focus on obtaining 
academic credentials rather than skills that en-
hance employability.75 There is a striking dif-
ference between the preferred educational path 
of youth in the region and that of youth in the 
high-performing East Asian countries. In 2009, 
one-quarter or less of the university students in 
Algeria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia were major-
ing in science, technology, or engineering.76 In 
some East Asian countries, such as China, the 
Republic of Korea, and Malaysia, that share was 
more than two-fifths.77 
Prescriptions on how to address the jobs 
challenge in countries with high youth unem-
F I G U R E  6 . 6 Having higher education does not bring better employment chances in Tunisia
Sources: Angel-Urdinola, Brodmann, and Hilger 2010; Government of Tunisia, L’Institut National de la Statistique.
Note: The employment deficit indicates the difference between predicted annual labor force increase and predicted annual employment increase for the 2010–14 period.
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ployment rate remained at 14 percent or above, 
and the rate for university graduates exceeded 
30 percent. 
The key questions are why growth in Tunisia 
and other countries with high youth unemploy-
ment has not been more labor intensive and 
why the sectors that have expanded the most 
rely on unskilled workers. The answers may be 
in the product market more than in the labor 
market. Although many countries in the region 
have implemented reforms to reduce red tape 
and improve the overall business climate, dis-
cretion, arbitrariness, and unequal treatment 
still hinder competition and private sector de-
velopment, especially in skills-intensive sectors 
such as telecommunications. In many countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa, connec-
tions with political power may matter more 
for success than entrepreneurial capacity.82 The 
perks often extend to the workers in these cos-
seted businesses, under the form of job security 
and other benefits, adding to the frustration of 
those left out.
Firm dynamics provide some evidence of 
the difficulties associated with job creation and 
employment growth in these countries. Rates 
of new firm registration are low in most coun-
tries in the region.83 And even when they do get 
started, small firms face barriers in growing into 
sizable companies. The vast majority of Tuni-
sian formal firms are small: 86 percent of them 
are one-person entities, and only 0.4 percent 
have 100 workers or more. But these large firms 
account for more than one-third of all jobs, 
more than all the one-person firms combined. 
A study of their dynamics over a decade shows 
that micro- and small firms hardly ever become 
large firms. Moreover, one-person firms only 
very rarely graduate into the small size category, 
and many are likely to shut down.84
While countries with high youth unemploy-
ment may face a large youth bulge or education 
quality issues, problems are often on the de-
mand side, with limited competition reducing 
employment opportunities, especially for highly 
skilled youth. Many countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa would have greater scope to 
generate more jobs for young people if the bar-
riers to firm entry and growth were eased. This 
prospect is unlikely to materialize, however, as 
long as political connections remain more im-
portant than entrepreneurial capacity to enter 
they would make a major dent in the aggregate 
unemployment rate is unclear. Better matches 
between jobseekers and employment oppor-
tunities would result in large increases in total 
employment only if there were many unfilled 
vacancies. But that is not the case in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Part of the high unem-
ployment rate among graduates stems from 
the fact that the demand for skilled labor de-
rives mainly from public administration, where 
growth is constrained by budgetary issues, and 
by increasing privatization and deregulation.79 
Meanwhile, the main sources of private sector 
growth (such as construction and low-value-
added services) demand unskilled workers, for 
the most part.80
The problem is similar with training pro-
grams. Educated youth have the capacity to 
learn quickly. If employers wanted it, they could 
even provide on-the-job training as needed. But 
training may not change aspirations.
Despite its diminishing absorption capacity, 
the public sector in the Middle East and North 
Africa region remains the main client of the 
higher education system and thus shapes stu-
dent expectations and choices. The public sector 
still accounts for about one-third of overall em-
ployment in countries such as the Arab Republic 
of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the Republic of Ye-
men.81 In some of these countries, public sector 
employment has recorded modest growth in 
recent years, but budgetary pressures will inevi-
tably result in a severe contraction in the future. 
Aspirations remain, however, and, for many of 
the unemployed youth who have pursued uni-
versity education in the expectation of getting 
a public sector job, there is a sense of a broken 
promise.
Information, counseling, and training are 
unlikely to overcome this frustration. Addressing 
the jobs challenge of countries with high youth 
unemployment rates requires a dynamic private 
sector that can create employment opportuni-
ties commensurate with the education and aspi-
rations of new entrants to the labor market.
Growth alone may not be enough. After all, 
few countries have had a better economic per-
formance than Tunisia, the first country in the 
Arab world in which jobs discontent erupted 
into political turmoil. Between 2000 and 2010, 
its GDP expanded at an average annual rate of 
almost 5 percent; meanwhile, the overall unem-
210  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
would result in higher living standards by re-
ducing the burden protected activities put on 
others. And it would reinforce a sense of fair-
ness in society—a sense that young people can 
get ahead by what they know rather than who 
they know. 
into the modern sector. Ending privilege, more 
than improving labor market matching or up-
grading skills, is thus the priority for countries 
with high youth unemployment. Dynamism in 
more skills-intensive sectors would lead to faster 
growth by putting educated youth to work. It 
Formalizing economies
The challenge of formalization is present in 
economies where a large share of the labor force 
is already covered by labor legislation and social 
protection programs, and reaching universal 
coverage seems attainable. But going in that di-
rection raises serious tradeoffs. Formalization 
is often seen as necessary to strengthen social 
cohesion. It is also bound to increase the living 
standards of those who get under the purview 
of labor law and gain access to social protection. 
But formalization may reduce productivity if it 
distorts incentives or puts a burden on firms.
Formalizing economies are characterized 
by already large or growing urban populations 
where many residents have incomes well above 
poverty levels, yet where many still work in 
informal employment. The emerging middle 
classes in these economies demand advanced 
public services, including tertiary education, 
health care, and pensions. They are often frus-
trated by poor governance. They may perceive 
taxes and public sector benefits as useless or 
unfair and resent the weak physical and in-
stitutional infrastructure, as well as the exces-
sive regulatory load. These frustrations beget 
avoidance and evasion of regulations, and, in 
such a climate, informal jobs not only persist 
but can even proliferate.85
This state of affairs, sometimes described as 
an informality trap, reflects a weak social con-
tract.86 That a large share of a country’s urban 
labor force is informal is sometimes interpreted 
as a sign that the state is unable to enforce regu-
lations and citizens are unwilling to comply with 
them.87
The prevalence of informal employment in 
these relatively advanced economies can nur-
ture poverty and social exclusion.88 Almost by 
definition, informal workers lack legal job pro-
tections and social insurance coverage, making 
them more vulnerable to workplace abuses, 
health risks, and the vagaries of the business 
cycle. Informal workers face a higher probabil-
ity of poverty and often perceive themselves as 
poor.89 Men represent a majority of informal 
workers, but the probability for them to work 
in the informal sector is generally lower than 
for women, making informality another source 
of gender inequality. In Peru, informality rates 
are 76 and 66 percent for women and men, re-
spectively. In South Africa, the corresponding 
rates are 37 and 30 percent. The Arab Republic 
of Egypt is a notable exception, with rates of 23 
and 54 percent, respectively.90
Informality is also associated with low pro-
ductivity. Most informal workers are either 
 self-employed or work for small unregistered 
firms, with low capital per worker, limited tech-
nology, and no scale economies. In Turkey, the 
differential in total factor productivity between 
formal and informal firms is 19 percent in man-
ufacturing and 62 percent in services.91 A study 
in six Latin American countries finds that labor 
productivity is 30 percent higher in formal firms 
than in informal firms.92 The use of public ser-
vices by the informal sector, without proper tax 
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you have to go around asking people if you can 
cut their yard . . . and you work in the sun”).
In the long run, the informal sector tends to 
be larger in countries where labor productivity 
is lower, government services are weaker, and 
the business environment is less flexible.100 A 
controversial question is how much labor mar-
ket and business regulations actually contribute 
to informality.101 Responses by firms surveyed 
in investment climate assessments suggest that 
labor legislation is not necessarily the main 
cause of informality, not because the laws and 
regulations are irrelevant, but because they are 
regarded with irreverence. Corruption and taxa-
tions are seen as the most vexing obstacles firms 
face (figure 6.7). Recent research also indicates 
contributions, puts a burden on formal firms 
and lowers their productivity as well.93
It does not follow that formalization alone 
would increase productivity. Evidence shows that 
firms do not become more profitable simply by 
formalizing.94 Low productivity may reflect self- 
selection by workers and firms, who choose 
whether to formalize depending on the balance 
between the associated benefits and costs. For 
many workers, the poor quality of social protec-
tion and the possibility of relying on others in 
case of adverse shocks may make informal sector 
employment a preferred alternative. An analysis 
of labor market dynamics in Brazil and Mexico 
confirms that a substantial part of the informal 
sector workforce, particularly the self-employed, 
appears to voluntarily exit from the formal sec-
tor.95 Self-selection also occurs in the case of 
firms. A business tax reduction and simplifica-
tion adopted in Brazil in 1996 led to a significant 
increase in formality among microenterprises.96 
In other cases, workers with limited access to 
asset accumulation find themselves trapped in 
low-productivity informal jobs or use this sec-
tor as a last resort to escape unemployment. In 
Colombia and Argentina, evidence shows that 
a large share of workers, particularly low-skill 
workers, are systematically less likely to work in 
the formal sector despite being willing to work in 
it.97 In any case, informality is clearly a multilay-
ered phenomenon with some workers trapped 
in this sector and others self-selecting into it.98
Personal views about informality are actu-
ally very diverse.99 For example, some partici-
pants in a focus group of young women from a 
better-off neighborhood in Durban, South 
Africa, associated good jobs with formal occu-
pations such as doctor, lawyer, teacher, nurse, or 
police woman: “Being a police-woman is a good 
way to make a living because they get benefits 
and they help protect the community.” Other 
participants, from a poorer neighborhood, iden-
tified good jobs as those in farming (“because 
you can sell the veggies”) or sewing (“because 
you can make a lot of money”). But other infor-
mal sector jobs were seen as bad because they in-
volved financial precariousness and hard work-
ing conditions. Among them were working as a 
domestic worker (“because you have to go door 
to door asking people if they have a job for you. 
. . . [They] would pay you R30 and say because 
you are just helping”) or cutting grass (“because 
F I G U R E  6 . 7 Labor regulation may not be the biggest 
obstacle to formalization
Source: Investment Climate Survey (database), World Bank, Washington, DC.
Note: Formalizing countries in the sample include Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Cape 
Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guyana, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and República Bolivariana de 
 Venezuela. The horizontal axis measures the ratio of the average score of a constraint to the average score 
of all other constraints. The asterisk denotes statistical significance of the difference between formalizing 
economies and others at the 1 percent level.
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Efforts to reduce informality have taken a new 
twist in recent years. In several Latin American 
countries, sweeping changes in the organization 
of social protection are being implemented or 
proposed. First, transfer programs have esca - 
lated. Brazil and Mexico introduced cash trans-
fer programs in the late 1990s that now cover 
nearly one-fifth of their populations.103 Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico have also introduced non-
contributory programs for senior citizens, and 
other countries are following suit. More radi-
cally, policy makers are debating whether to 
make the coverage of social insurance universal, 
that it is business regulations, more than labor 
regulations, that help explain changes in infor-
mality and unemployment.102
Addressing the jobs challenge faced by for-
malizing economies requires extending social 
protection and the purview of labor laws with-
out choking off economic dynamism. Previous 
attempts by Latin American countries to for-
malize through heavy-handed regulation, man-
dated benefits, and ill-designed social insurance 
programs led to populist enthusiasm but also to 
lower productivity and eventually to economic 
stagnation and poor quality of social protection.
Having at least one member working in the formal sector allows 
Mexican families to have a regular source of income, health cover-
age for all, and, through these, access to the support of social net-
works. A case study, based on both ethnographic and statistical 
evidence, makes the case that households whose members fail to 
secure formal jobs are more likely to fall into poverty because of the 
risk of catastrophic health expenses. They are also less likely to 
secure social support from relatives and neighbors.a Formal employ-
ment is thus critical for living standards in Mexico.
Despite a GDP per capita around US$14,000 in purchasing 
power parity terms, Mexico’s informal employment has ranged 
from 50 to 62 percent of total employment depending on the defi-
nition used. This rate is considered high given the country’s devel-
opment level and has not shown consistent signs of decline in 
nearly two decades. Several studies argue that restrictive labor leg-
islation is a factor explaining Mexico’s large informal economy.b The 
country has tried unsuccessfully to reform its main labor law, which 
was enacted in 1973 and which is tied to rights enshrined in the 
1917 constitution. 
Weak enforcement is another factor behind informality in Mex-
ico. The government announced a doubling of inspectors at the 
Ministry of Labor in 2012, from 300 to 600. This number still com-
pares unfavorably with other countries.c Labor courts are also over-
stretched: cases may take between three and six years to reach a 
conclusion.d
This stagnation in the reform of legislation and enforcement 
contrasts with the expansion of a successful cash transfer program, 
Oportunidades, and a noncontributory social insurance program, 
BOX 6.7   The debate on how to reduce informality is intense in Mexico
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Gonzalez de la Rocha 2012.
b.  Botero and others 2004; Heckman and Pagés 2004; Levy 2008; Venn 2009.
c.  Brazil has 3,000 inspectors, according to Pires (2011); France has 2,100, according to Piore and Schrank (2008). Piore and Schrank (2007) estimate that while Mexico 
has 1.72 inspectors per 100,000 workers, Brazil has 2.45, Argentina 3.05, and Chile 19.25.
d. Kaplan, Sadka, and Silva-Mendez 2008. 
e. http://www.seguro-popular.gob.mx.
f. Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés 2011.
g. Anton, Hernandez, and Levy 2012, Perry and others 2007; Villarreal 2012.
h. Villarreal and Rodriguez-Oreggia 2012. 
i. Calderon 2012.
j. Martinez and Aguilera 2012.
Seguro Popular. Oportunidades covers nearly one-fifth of the total 
population and nearly all the rural poor, making it one of the best-
targeted poverty reduction programs in the country. Seguro Popu-
lar is the most rapidly growing program, claiming a coverage of 
more than 50 million by April 2012.e But some preliminary research 
finds that non-contributory programs in general, and Seguro Popu-
lar, in particular, may induce informality or, at least, discourage for-
mal employment.f
Meanwhile, the debate about the universalization of health 
insurance is very much alive in Mexico. Academics and policy mak-
ers argue over it, and it is also a topic of political controversy. Much 
 pivots on how much universalization will cost. Estimates vary widely 
from no incremental costs because of efficiency and tax collection 
gains to relatively large costs when accounting for long-term demo-
graphic changes. These differences originate from different meth-
odologies, which indicate the complexity of the topic and the diffi-
culty in gauging the full implications of the reform.g 
Mexico’s debate on formalization needs to be cast in a broader 
context. In recent years, poverty and unemployment have increased 
while real wages have been stagnant. But other measures of well-
being, such as access to education, health, and social security, have 
continued to improve.h Average productivity has been growing, but 
slowly, which can be due to an excessive churning of jobs and firms.i 
Demographic trends still show high fertility rates for a large share of 
the population, which leads to a social reproduction of poverty and 
informality.j Whether sweeping changes in labor and tax legislation 
as well as in the organization of social protection would substan-
tially reduce informality is still an open question.
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lation, a three-pronged strategy may be war-
ranted.107 For those who clearly work outside 
the purview of regulations, the reach of human 
development and social protection services and 
activation policies should be expanded. For 
those who work in stunted firms that legally 
avoid becoming formal, regulations should be 
simplified and their burden eased. Finally, for 
those in firms that evade regulations, enforce-
ment should be strengthened. For this three-
pronged strategy to have a chance of success, 
workers and employers need to perceive the 
state as a reliable and fair partner. If the state 
is not able to generate a sense of trust through 
the provision of efficient and good-quality ser-
vices, neither regulatory reform nor increased 
enforcement will succeed in increasing formal-
ization substantially. 
The key is to build formal institutions and 
programs that are not too costly and that are 
valued by workers. The jobs agenda of formal-
izing economies is closely linked, then, to the 
development of effective regulation and social 
protection systems.
moving away from the current contributory 
systems toward the funding of benefits from 
general tax revenue.104 This reform would cer-
tainly expand the number of beneficiaries, but 
whether it would encourage firms to formalize 
is a matter of intense debate, especially in Mex-
ico (box 6.7).105
So far, few countries have managed to sub-
stantially reduce informality. Rapid growth and 
strengthening institutions in Brazil and Chile 
have made them recent exceptions. In both 
cases, changes in labor market regulation have 
had limited effect. Patient accumulation of hu-
man capital and sustained growth have paid off. 
But strengthened rule of law, effective policies, 
and a better perception of the role of the state 
have also helped.
Those who see informality as the outcome of 
a weak social compact argue that the way for-
ward involves a combination of enhanced en-
forcement of regulations, improved quality of 
public services, and greater policy coherence.106 
If informality is associated with production 
units that evade, elude, or stay outside regu-
Aging societies
Declining fertility rates and, in many countries, 
rising life expectancy have led to rapidly aging 
populations in several regions of the world. To-
day’s aging societies are concentrated in indus-
trial countries, in Eastern Europe, and in the 
Southern Cone of Latin America. China entered 
the aging phase in 2010; and India, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Singapore, and Thailand will 
experience significant aging in the relatively 
near future.108 
The old-age dependency ratio measures the 
number of people 65 years or older in relation 
to the number of people in the working-age 
population (15 to 64 years). When this ratio is 
high, the working-age population faces pressure 
to generate income to meet the needs of the el-
derly generation. The old-age dependency ratio 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Singa-
pore will rise almost fivefold between now and 
2050. These two countries will have four and six 
 elderly people, respectively, for every ten 15- to 
64-year-olds. China’s old-age dependency ratio 
will rise by a factor of almost four. Many already 
aging societies in Eastern Europe as well as in 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, will experience 
a rise in the ratio—a doubling or even more in 
most cases—between now and 2050. 
The reasons for these surges in dependency 
ratios vary across countries. In most, the elderly 
live longer; in some, there are fewer people of 
working age. Low fertility rates in Bulgaria con-
tributed to a population decline of 15 percent 
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between 1990 and 2010—and by 2050, the 
country is projected to have lost almost 40 per-
cent of its population compared with its peak in 
the mid-1980s. Other Eastern European coun-
tries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, 
Romania, and Ukraine, are expected to follow 
the same pattern; China’s population will be 50 
million less in 2050 than it is now. In India and 
Singapore and in the Southern Cone countries 
of Latin America, population growth is slowing 
down and will start to decline by the middle of 
the century.
If the labor force participation rates of older 
workers are significant today and if these lev-
els can be maintained, the impact of aging on 
average income can be cushioned considerably. 
But that may not be enough. If age-specific par-
ticipation rates remain constant, some coun-
tries, such as Thailand, would be able to limit 
the absolute decline in its labor force, but many 
others would not. The impact in many Eastern 
European countries, Cuba, and China would be 
stark because of the decline in the size of the 
working age population. Between 2011 and 
2050, Bulgaria would face a 40 percent drop in 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on United Nations population statistics.
Note: The simulation assesses the decrease in the total labor force based on the assumption that age-specific labor force participation rates remain constant between 2011 and 
2050.
F I G U R E  6 . 8  The labor force will shrink if age-specific participation rates 
remain constant
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its workforce, Poland 28 percent, and China 17 
percent (figure 6.8).109
Aging affects jobs through several chan-
nels.110 Lower fertility may imply higher num-
bers of women ready to seek and take up jobs, 
although little evidence of this has been  observed 
in Eastern Europe over the past 20 years. Smaller 
cohorts of young people could reduce innova-
tive capacity. Disability rates increase in older 
age groups and thus further affect the labor 
supply in aging populations.111 Understanding 
how aggregate savings will be affected is also 
important, given that savings drive investment, 
growth, and job creation. Savings typically de-
cline among older age groups. This decline 
could be offset if young people were to build up 
additional buffers to support their longer life 
spans, especially if public retirement schemes 
prove unsustainable or are absent. Expenditure 
patterns also vary with age. The rapid rise in the 
long-term care industry in high-income coun-
tries is an example. In the United States, the in-
dustry now counts more than 3 million formal 
jobs, and an estimated 10 million Americans 
50 years or older (roughly one-quarter of this 
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rial hardship for elderly people. The adjustment 
process itself is likely to be painful economically, 
socially, and politically. The experience of sev-
eral high-income countries shows that imple-
menting the necessary reforms can stretch social 
cohesion to the limit.
Aging also can make a society less mobile, 
which can have economic consequences. In 
Ukraine, for example, aging is taking place 
against a relatively high pre-crisis level of 
growth with very little creation of jobs. Some 
firms, though, are desperately looking for work-
ers, both highly skilled and manual. The elderly 
are usually less mobile than the young, and the 
housing market makes changing residence dif-
ficult. Low internal mobility represents a sig-
nificant bottleneck to increasing activity and 
raising productivity (box 6.8).
In aging societies like Ukraine, good jobs for 
development are those that keep labor force par-
ticipation rates high, especially for the elderly. 
These jobs can contain the decline in average 
income while at the same time protecting the vi-
ability of the social insurance system, which, in 
many countries, is under significant fiscal stress. 
Through these two channels, such jobs would 
also contribute to supporting social cohesion. 
age group) provide care to one or both of their 
parents.112
Raising productivity is ultimately essential 
for maintaining living standards in aging soci-
eties where fewer people are working. In many 
Eastern European countries, the productivity 
gains required would be substantial (figure 6.9). 
If they do not materialize, falling living stan-
dards will threaten those population groups that 
are vulnerable to poverty.113
Through jobs, aging also impacts intergen-
erational relations and social cohesion. Migra-
tion and aging have put stress on the traditional 
family-based support systems for China’s ru-
ral elderly, raising the possibility that they will 
have to continue working at later ages and will 
not have assistance, financial or otherwise, from 
their children.114 The older generation can feel 
not only neglected, but also excluded. In Poland, 
a 55-year old man felt that “age is a great barrier. 
I’ve submitted my CV and they tell me I am too 
old, they tell me if you were 35 years old we could 
hire you. I have 20 years of experience and they 
expect me to be 35 years old?”115 
Social security and health systems in many 
aging middle- and higher-income countries 
are barely sustainable as currently designed. 
Systems inspired by the Bismarckian model, 
where social welfare and insurance are financed 
through labor taxes on a pay-as-you-go basis, 
are particularly vulnerable. A decline in the con-
tribution base shrinks the resources available 
for pensions and health care at the same time 
that an increasing elderly population makes 
more claims on both systems. The health care 
cost for people age 70 years and above, with 
higher disability prevalence rates, is two to three 
times higher than the cost for people of prime 
working age.116 While education expenditures 
may fall in many aging countries in the medium 
term, that in itself will bring about further—
and often painful—adjustments as schools close 
and teachers lose their jobs.
The magnitude of adjustments needed in 
social welfare systems is daunting. In a repre-
sentative Eastern European country, the public 
pension system alone could reach a deficit of al-
most 7 percent of GDP in 2050 compared with 
2 percent today.117 To balance the accounts, the 
retirement age would need to increase or the 
ratio of pension benefits to earnings at retire-
ment would have to be cut, or some combina-
tion of the two. Such changes could cause mate-
F I G U R E  6 . 9 Labor productivity has to increase to avoid 
declines in living standards
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on United Nations population statistics and national 
household surveys.
Note: The simulation assesses the labor productivity increase necessary between 2011 and 2050 to main-
tain constant gross domestic product per capita given the expected decline in employment rates. 
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financing of the welfare system, but not all 
groups have the same life expectancy. Typically, 
professional, technical, and skilled workers 
can expect to live longer than manual work-
ers, especially those in hazardous occupations. 
Keeping the skilled at work longer is a way to 
increase average labor productivity and offset 
the decline in employment rates. 
The development of home-care models for the 
elderly can also support the twin objectives of 
keeping a high employment rate and containing 
social insurance costs. Proactively attracting—
and integrating—migrants and managing to 
create virtuous circles with the diaspora prom-
ises equally large returns.
Measures such as raising the retirement age 
can contribute to labor force participation and 
Ukraine’s population is shrinking. This country, which stretches from 
the heavily industrialized Russian-speaking east to the more agricul-
tural and predominantly Ukrainian-speaking west, was home to 52 
million people when the Soviet Union broke apart. Today, there are 
6 million fewer people; by 2050, the population will have fallen to 35 
million. Fertility rates are sharply down, from about 2.0 at the end of 
the 1990s to below 1.5 today, albeit with an upward tick in recent 
years. The elderly dependency ratio is 22 percent and will reach 
more than 40 percent over the next 30 years.
The effect of this population aging on jobs is amplified by inter-
national migration. Between the turbulent transition years and the 
middle of the last decade, about 2.5 million Ukrainians emigrated, 
mainly to the Russian Federation and Western Europe. Every year, 
around 80,000 people leave the country,a and recent studies have 
shown that the possible positive impacts of migration through 
remittances, return migration, and diaspora involvement have not 
(yet) shown their desired impacts.b People ages 25–29 years, espe-
cially women, are withdrawing in large numbers from the labor mar-
ket: the female participation rate dropped from 78.1 percent to 70.9 
percent between 2001 and 2010.c
Achieving high degrees of efficiency in the labor market is key to 
counterbalancing the impact of aging. But regional labor markets 
BOX 6.8   In Ukraine, the impact of aging is compounded by migration and declining fertility
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. World Population Prospects online database, United Nations, Geneva.
b. Ukraine country case study for the World Development Report 2013.
c. Statistical Service of Ukraine.
d. Komarov 2011.
e. Ukraine country case study for the World Development Report 2013.
f. Ukraine country case study for the World Development Report 2013.
show little integration, as reflected by the high dispersion of unem-
ployment rates. In some parts of the country, employers complain 
bitterly about the lack of workers with adequate skills, and at the 
same time they cannot fill available unskilled jobs. Yet, internal 
mobility is low in Ukraine by international standards and has 
declined in recent years. The lack of affordable housing has emerged 
as major barrier to mobility, also hindering registration for benefits 
in new locations. Rental property is scarce, often expensive, and can 
absorb up to 50 percent of household incomes in the big cities.d
Eventually, Ukraine may face a vicious jobs circle. A declining 
labor force and a lackluster productivity performance put the social 
insurance and welfare systems at risk of becoming unsustainable. 
The inability to provide benefits to an aging population, and the 
stress that reforming the system could bring about, could become a 
source of social tension. As participants in focus group discussions 
mentioned, this tension would be amplified by the perception that 
the distribution of jobs is unfair and that jobs in the public sector 
require bribes.e The decline in employment rates could also under-
mine civic engagement. Although low, the level of political and 
community participation among the employed is about twice as 
high as among the unemployed and 25 percent higher than among 
the inactive population.f 
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QUeStION 6
Creating an investment climate conducive to job 
creation in the private sector is a top policy pri-
ority. The question is whether the government 
should aim for a level playing field or focus its 
efforts on the specific areas, types of activities, 
firm sizes, and sectors with the greatest poten-
tial to create good jobs for development. Jobs 
challenges vary depending on a country’s level 
of development, its endowments, its demogra-
phy, and its institutions. Ensuring free entry and 
competition across all sectors is a fundamental 
requisite for growth. But given the often lim-
ited fiscal space and administrative capacity of 
developing countries, creating an enabling busi-
ness environment across the entire economy can 
be challenging, and the relevant question is how 
policy priorities should be set. 
The conventional wisdom views targeting 
with a skepticism that stems from often disas-
trous experiences with industrial policy. While 
targeting was common in Latin America during 
its import substitution phase, by the 1980s the 
consensus was that interventions favoring spe-
cific sectors led to rent seeking, economic stag-
nation, and external vulnerability. Slow growth 
in India until the 1990s was also attributed to 
policies that favored local industrial groups and 
undermined competition. The success of several 
East Asian countries in industrializing has reig-
nited the debate on the merits of targeting and 
the role of the state, but the potential for institu-
tional failures remains the main concern.118 The 
dominant view holds that policy makers lack 
both the information and the capacity to “pick 
winners” when they select activities to target. In 
the absence of a solid information base, and tak-
ing into account the institutional failures com-
mon in developing countries, a risk exists that 
potential beneficiaries from targeted support 
could unduly influence the decision process.
Targeting is not necessarily industrial 
policy
The investment climate is the set of public goods 
and public policies that shape the opportunities 
and incentives for firms to invest productively, 
create jobs, and expand.119 It encompasses a wide 
range of policy levers: ensuring stability and se-
curity, enhancing financial markets, providing 
infrastructure services, reducing regulatory and 
tax burdens, and improving the quality of the 
workforce. The natural inclination is to equate 
a targeted investment climate with industrial 
policy. If some activities result in large produc-
tivity spillovers (because of learning-by-doing, 
for instance, or because of greater specialization 
and integration), targeting can imply support-
ing such activities. In recent years, productivity 
spillovers associated with various activities have 
been reexamined from different viewpoints, 
with both academics and practitioners propos-
ing practical approaches for their identification 
(box 6.9). 
The targeting of the investment climate 
may not necessarily be aimed at industrial sec-
tors, however. Targeting can focus on gender, as 
when policies aim to increase labor market par-
ticipation by women, or on spatial concerns, as 
in urbanization policies or policies for regional 
development. Or it can focus on firm size, as 
when policies support the development of small 
and medium enterprises. Good jobs for devel-
opment differ across countries. The jobs agenda 
may involve making smallholder farming more 
productive in an agrarian economy, preserving 
international competitiveness in a resource-rich 
country, or fostering competition in activities 
employing skilled labor in a country with high 
youth unemployment. In each case, the logic for 
targeting lies in tackling market imperfections 
or government failures that are preventing jobs 
from contributing more to development.
An example is targeting in the agricultural 
sector. The underlying logic is based on the 
notion of public goods. The biggest obstacles 
to agricultural development are the lack of 
appropriate technologies and adequate infra-
structures. As arable land becomes scarce, the 
development of yield-enhancing technologies is 
indispensable.120 But incentives to generate these 
technologies are undermined because they can 
be replicated freely.121 Thus, public policy plays 
a role by supporting the development and dis-
semination of such technologies. Because yield-
enhancing technologies are fertilizer intensive 
A targeted investment climate?
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port for public-private partnerships. More effi-
cient logistics and public investments in major 
infrastructure facilities usually complement the 
package of incentives. A recent version of spatial 
targeting is the idea of charter cities: to attract 
businesses to a country with low credibility in 
the eyes of foreign investors, sovereignty of a 
city could be handed over to another country in 
exchange for the enforcement of a credible set 
of rules.123 The objective is to strengthen the in-
vestment climate in a small part of the country, 
potentially providing a demonstration effect for 
further reforms, while not threatening the rents 
of powerful local elites elsewhere.
The information base for targeting exists
When there is clarity on the challenges faced 
by a country, it is also possible to determine 
which types of jobs would help address these 
and sensitive to the availability of water, public 
investments in infrastructure—including roads 
and irrigation facilities—are often essential. The 
Brazilian government, for example, viewed in-
vestment in adaptive agricultural research as a 
prerequisite for development. It therefore sup-
ported a research corporation (EMBRAPA) that 
focused on technology generation and transfer 
and played a critical role in the success of the 
Brazilian agribusiness sector.122
The emergence of dynamic cities is another 
case in point. From Dublin to Shanghai, com-
petitiveness initiatives increasingly involve cit-
ies, more than countries. This shift is a result 
of agglomeration effects: the level playing field 
evokes a flat world, whereas urbanization poli-
cies correspond to a world with spikes of eco-
nomic activity. Dynamic cities may offer more 
favorable tax treatment, easy access to land, 
simplified administrative procedures, and sup-
Industrial policy is an approach to state economic stewardship in 
which direct support is given to particular sectors in pursuit of 
national goals. Industrial policy fell out of favor in the 1980s, but 
today it is getting recognition again. The emerging views, however, 
draw criticism and have led to a new round of debate. 
Arguments for industrial policy rest on three types of market 
failures: knowledge spillovers and dynamic scale economies, coor-
dination failures, and information externalities. In the first, industrial 
policy is derived from the observation that knowledge spillovers 
and dynamic scale economies differ across industries. Coordination 
failures arise when markets fail to correctly signal the future payoffs 
of investment projects, such as large-scale infrastructure projects, 
and the private sector tends to underinvest on its own. Information 
externalities exist when knowledge on the profitability of invest-
ment opportunities is limited and the risk of free riding discourages 
investment and innovation. 
Building on these rationales, several approaches further develop 
thinking on industrial policy. The New Structural Economics stresses 
the shift in comparative advantage that results from changes in 
endowments. The large productivity spillovers from infrastructure 
and associated coordination failures justify a leading role for the 
state. To identify the industries to be supported, this approach pro-
poses to learn from countries with similar endowments but some-
what higher income levels. Exports with a solid track record by 
these countries indicate which sectors could have a comparative 
advantage as the economy grows.a 
BOX 6.9   Once again, the debate rages over industrial policy
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Lin 2009, 2012; Lin and Monga 2011.
b. Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 2010 ; Rodrik 2004, 2007.
c. Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz 2009; Hausmann and others 2011; Nuebler 2011 .
d. Noland and Pack 2003; Pack and Saggi 2006. 
A second approach emphasizes the policy process and espe-
cially public-private partnerships. In this view, the dialogue between 
the government and businesses can help to overcome coordination 
failures and elicit information from the private sector on the most 
relevant productivity spillovers.b 
For a third school of thought, what matters is not just any coordi-
nation failure or externality, but spillovers of productive knowl-
edge—mastering ways of doing things. Such knowledge is different 
from codified, public knowledge and is acquired and accumulated 
through experience. This approach claims that spillovers of produc-
tive knowledge associated with different industries can be sizable. 
To identify industries worth supporting, the approach proposes to 
rank products by how much productive knowledge is embedded in 
them and to focus on products that are similar to what is being pro-
duced currently but embody a higher knowledge content.c 
Opponents of industrial policy cast doubts on its alleged ratio-
nales, but above all, they question the practicality of its implemen-
tation. For instance, while admitting the existence of potentially siz-
able knowledge spillovers and dynamic scale economies in certain 
industries, skeptics question the whether the public sector has the 
capacity to identify these industries. A related concern is the ability 
of the public sector to make industrial policy a dynamic process: 
applying credible sunset clauses to old industries, and reallocating 
resources to new industries. More generally, skeptics believe the 
knowledge and skill requirements for successful implementation 
exceed the capacity of the public sector. d
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requires the inflow of foreign direct investment, 
enterprise surveys indicate that foreign compa-
nies are less concerned about finance, but view 
customs administration, transportation, and 
licensing as more severe impediments to firm 
activity and growth (figure 6.10b). One coun-
try may choose to focus on microenterprises, 
because their success contributes to poverty 
reduction, and another on young and large 
firms, because they tend to be the most inno-
vative. In both cases, enterprise surveys can be 
used to uncover the most relevant constraints 
(figure 6.10c, 6.10d). For example, shortages of 
skilled labor, delays in customs, and stringent 
labor regulations are viewed as more severe con-
straints by medium and large enterprises than 
by smaller companies. In contrast, micro- and 
small enterprises consider access to finance and 
competition to be more serious obstacles to 
their growth. Recently, enterprise surveys have 
been conducted for household enterprises op-
erating in rural areas in selected countries. They 
can serve as additional tools for countries to fos-
ter nonagricultural sectors in rural areas.128
The effects of removing those constraints 
also differ across businesses. Reducing barriers 
to entry fosters the growth of industries that ex-
perience higher natural turnover rates. Improv-
ing access to finance stimulates the development 
challenges. Thanks to efforts in research and 
data collection, the information set for decid-
ing whether and how to support the creation of 
more of those good jobs for development is far 
from empty. 
Consider jobs in farming. Among staple 
crops, rice, wheat, and maize are more promis-
ing than sorghum and millet, but the latter crops 
are grown in drier and harsher conditions where 
farmers are particularly poor.124 Modern cereal 
varieties are high yielding primarily in favorable 
rain-fed and irrigated areas.125 Thus, agricul-
tural policies are bound to affect the well-being 
of the rural population differently in different 
regions. The choice depends on the country’s 
natural endowments and societal goals.126
In nonagricultural sectors, the main obsta-
cles to job creation can be identified through 
quantitative and qualitative assessments of the 
constraints faced by enterprises. While these as-
sessments need to be interpreted with caution, 
differences in responses across enterprises reveal 
patterns that can also be used for developing 
targeted policy interventions (box 6.10).127
If creating competitive cities is a feature of 
a country’s jobs agenda, enterprise surveys can 
provide information on how different the con-
straints faced by businesses are in cities of dif-
ferent sizes (figure 6.10a). If the jobs agenda 
Surveys of entrepreneurs and senior managers can provide feed-
back on what the private sector sees as significant constraints to 
private sector development. Some care in interpreting their 
responses is necessary, however. The respondents will give answers 
that reflect constraints on their bottom line—without regard to the 
broader societal or welfare implications. Almost every entrepreneur 
will complain that taxes and interest rates on loans are too high. But 
that does not necessarily mean that taxes should be lowered or that 
interest rates are out of line with risks faced by creditors. Constraints 
to the individual respondents need to be weighed against the 
broader social goals.
In addition, enterprise surveys only target incumbent enter-
prises. The surveys do not reach discouraged entrants and so do not 
ask about the constraints to entry they could not overcome; nor do 
they reach those who recently closed down to ask why they are no 
longer in business. Thus the issues that may have an important role 
in shaping who is even asked the questions are unlikely to be 
identified.
BOX 6.10   Caution is needed when interpreting results from enterprise surveys
Sources: Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido 2009; World Bank 2004b.
Any survey that asks subjective questions has to address issues 
of comparability of responses. Where possible, more objective 
questions are preferable. Thus, instead of asking how constraining 
the supply of electricity is on a scale of one to five, questions can ask 
for the frequency and length of outages, or the costs of running a 
generator. These responses can more easily be compared across 
respondents and over time.
One further complication in interpreting responses from enter-
prise surveys and linking them to enterprise outcomes is the poten-
tial for a two-way causal relationship between them. It could be that 
more onerous conditions are hindering an enterprise’s ability to stay 
in business. But a firm’s poor performance, perhaps stemming from 
weak management, could also be affecting the degree to which the 
respondent complains. Performance also affects which dimensions 
of the investment climate matter the most; for example, the avail-
ability of skills may be more constraining to expanding firms, 
whereas labor regulations may be of greater concern to firms that 
are contracting and facing the need to shed workers.
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companies are more likely to withdraw from the 
market than private local firms.130
Not all targeting is vulnerable to capture 
by interest groups
Capture by vested interests is arguably the most 
important concern about targeting. The risk 
of industries that rely more on external funding. 
The impact of removing constraints also var-
ies across firm size, age, ownership, and other 
characteristics.129 For example, infrastructure 
bottlenecks tend to stunt the growth of medium 
and large businesses but do not affect microen-
terprises significantly. Similarly, when the judi-
ciary system is viewed as a hindrance, foreign 
F I G U R E  6 .10 The assessment of constraints to business varies across enterprises
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 2006–10.
Note: The analysis is based on a city-level enterprise survey of China in 2005 for panel a, and surveys of more than 60,000 urban enterprises in 104 countries in 2006–10 for other 
panels. The bars indicate differences in the rating of constraints between firms in two groups. Ratings in the surveys range from 1 (no constraint) to 5 (severe); they are net of the 
average rating of constraints by each firm, to assess relative severity. The analysis controls for firm age, size, ownership structure, export orientation, industry, and year.
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farmers, urban businesses, and female micro-
entrepreneurs are all bound to benefit from 
targeted policies aimed at their group. But indi-
vidually they do not have the power to influence 
such policies, and they may not be able to orga-
nize as effective interest groups.
Targeted government interventions are justi-
fiable only if they are based on a solid under-
standing of what good jobs for development are 
in a particular context and only if they can be 
designed to be resistant to capture. One example 
is the involvement of the private sector in the 
design and management of special economic 
zones (box 6.11).
that the potential beneficiaries could unduly 
influence the decision process is a real one. A 
too-cozy relationship between businesses and 
government can make it extremely difficult to 
remove support, even in the event of a blatant 
failure. Policy capture by vested interest groups 
could undermine the often weak capacity of 
governments in many developing countries. 
Targeted activities that involve a large num-
ber of beneficiaries are less subject to capture. 
For example, support for smallholder farming, 
competitive cities, or female microentrepreneurs 
is less likely to be influenced by beneficiaries. 
In every country, thousands, if not millions, of 
Special economic zones (SEZs) are demarcated geographic areas 
within a country’s boundaries where the rules of business are differ-
ent from those that prevail in the national territory. These differen-
tial rules principally deal with investment conditions, international 
trade, and customs. The zones have a business environment that is 
intended to be more liberal from a policy perspective and more 
effective from an administrative perspective.
Before the 1970s, most SEZs were operated by developed coun-
tries. Then, starting with East Asia and Latin America, developing 
countries began to use SEZs to attract foreign direct investment, 
often as a part of export-led growth strategies. The objectives 
broadened over time, as SEZs became instruments of trade, invest-
ment, industrial, spatial, and even broader economic policies. In 
1986, there were 176 zones in 47 countries; by 2006, there were 
3,500 of them in 130 countries.
SEZs have a mixed record. Their rates of return are still a topic of 
heated debate among economists. Their performance critically 
depends on their design and management. SEZs are more likely to 
be successful when they are an integral component of the country’s 
development strategy, are aligned with the country’s comparative 
advantage, are cluster-based, and establish linkages with the rest of 
the economy. 
BOX 6.11   Special economic zones have a mixed record 
Sources: Akinci and Farole 2011; Kingombe and te Velde 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
For example, in Bangladesh, the SEZ program initially aimed to 
attract high-technology investments, but the government shifted 
the focus to garments, where the private sector had shown signs of 
success. The shift proved to be critical for the performance of the 
SEZ program. Building effective partnerships with the private sector 
is an important mechanism through which coordination challenges 
can be overcome. Institutionally, the partnership can be established 
through representation of the private sector on the board of the 
SEZ, as in the Dominican Republic and Lesotho.
A common element of many successful SEZs is the technical 
competency of the bureaucracy responsible for constructing and 
implementing them. While this cautions against targeting when 
government capacity is weak, several Latin American countries 
have recorded successes by relying on private sector ownership 
and management. In the Dominican Republic, where public and 
private zones coexist, there are no clear differences in employment, 
investment, or exports by zone ownership. But the private zones 
generally offer higher-quality infrastructure and more value-added 
services than the government-run ones and, accordingly, charge 
higher rents.
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Chapter 7
Different countries face different jobs challenges, but their jobs agendas are interconnected by two forces—the mi-
gration of people and the migration of jobs. 
These two flows have consequences for living 
standards, productivity, and social cohesion in 
sending and receiving countries. The arrival of 
migrants or the outsourcing of jobs abroad af-
fects the living standards of both migrants and 
locals. The availability of foreign workers, the 
development of migrant networks channeling 
savings and ideas, and the arrival of multina-
tional firms bringing more advanced techniques 
are all bound to increase productivity. But fam-
ily structures as well as community life are af-
fected by the movement of people and jobs. The 
potential gains are considerable, but there are 
also tradeoffs.
Even if development strategies succeed in 
addressing jobs challenges at the country level, 
mismatches between employment opportuni-
ties at home and abroad are bound to occur, 
encouraging people to leave their communities 
and try their chances elsewhere. Almost inevi-
tably, the international migration of people will 
be one of the policy levers to consider in South 
Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa, given the pro-
jected rapid growth in the labor force in these 
regions over the coming decades. Migration 
trends will be driven not only by demographic 
pressures but also by cultural and geographic 
proximity, as well as economic factors. 
Jobs agendas are also connected through 
the international migration of jobs. The splin-
tering of production tasks has facilitated their 
delocalization and outsourcing to developing 
countries, resulting in greater trade volumes 
and lower prices of final goods. But it has also 
led to a global redistribution of jobs in manu-
facturing, and the same trend is increasingly 
visible in services as well. So far, the migration 
of jobs out of industrial countries has mainly af-
fected blue-collar workers, but white-collar jobs 
are following. These are not once-and-for-all 
moves. Growing labor costs in Asia may open 
up opportunities for other developing countries 
to jump-start industrialization.
Migration of workers
Precise figures on the global number of inter-
national migrants are not available, an unsur-
prising fact given that a number of them cross 
borders illegally or do not return once their visas 
and permits expire. That is why estimates tend 
to rely on population censuses and household 
surveys. Even then, differences across countries 
in the way that data are gathered, and in the way 
legislation defines nationality and migratory 
status, make accurate counts difficult.1 The or-
ders of magnitude are relatively uncontroversial, 
however. There are more than 200 million mi-
grants worldwide, and 90 million of them are 
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The migration of people matches opportunities across borders.  
Globalization is leading to a growing international migration of jobs  
not only in manufacturing but also, increasingly, in services.
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(map 7.1). In a few relatively small recipient 
countries, the foreign-born population makes 
up more than 40 percent of the total population. 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Singapore are 
in this group. Among bigger recipient countries, 
those with the largest share of immigrants in 
their population are Saudi Arabia (27.8 per-
cent), Canada (21.3 percent), Australia (21.0 
percent), and the United States (13.5 percent). 
In absolute numbers, the United States is the 
largest recipient of migrants, with 42.8 million, 
workers. Migrants represent between 2.5 and 3 
percent of the world’s population and the global 
labor force.2 Many are temporary or seasonal 
workers and return to their home country.
Global patterns of migration
Global figures hide important differences across 
countries. Some countries are mainly recipients, 
while others are sources, and yet others neither 
host nor send significant numbers of migrants 
M a p  7.1 Only in some countries are migrants a substantial share of the population
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on Özden and others 2011 and Artuc and others 2012, using census data from around 2000.
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with at least some tertiary education among im-
migrants increased from 15 to 25 percent in the 
United Kingdom, and from 25 to 30 percent in 
the United States. Stark country differences are 
also present in skilled labor migration. Some de-
veloping countries explicitly promote emigra-
tion of skilled workers, while others complain 
about “brain drain.” More than 70 percent of 
citizens with tertiary education in Haiti, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago live abroad. The share 
of skilled workers among migrants is particu-
larly high in African countries (map 7.2).6
Highly skilled migrants fall into a range 
of categories including technology and busi-
ness creators, scientists, scholars, students, and 
health and cultural workers. At 10 percent, their 
share of total migration is still relatively small, 
but 90 percent of them live in industrial coun-
tries.7 In some occupations, the concentration 
of skilled migrants is substantial: 27 percent 
of all physicians in the United States, 21 per-
cent in Australia, and 20 percent in Canada are 
foreign-trained.8 
Impacts on sending and receiving 
countries
The most direct impact of international migra-
tion is on living standards. Through their work 
in receiving countries, and through remittances 
to sending countries, migrants increase their in-
comes and those of their families. Migrants also 
contribute to global output if their productiv-
ity abroad is higher than it was at home, which 
may often be the case. They can even contribute 
to output in the sending country, as networks 
of migrants and returnees serve as channels for 
investment, innovation, and expertise. Social ef-
fects are mixed, however. On the positive side, 
migration connects people from different cul-
tures in ways bound to widen their horizons. 
On the negative side, separation from family 
and friends can be a source of distress and iso-
lation in the recipient country. Large numbers 
of immigrants can also exacerbate frustration 
among vulnerable groups in recipient countries, 
if foreigners are seen as competitors for jobs and 
public services.
The increase in earnings from migration 
may amount to tens of thousands of dollars per 
worker per year. After controlling for worker 
followed by the Russian Federation (12.3 mil-
lion), and Germany (10.8 million). Among the 
sending countries, those with the largest num-
bers of migrants are Mexico (10.1 million), In-
dia (9.1 million), and Bangladesh (6.0 million).3 
Russia is so high on the list, because many eth-
nic Russians live in countries that were formerly 
part of the Soviet Union.
Political turmoil and globalization acceler-
ated migration flows in the first half of the 20th 
century. The partition of Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan involved large numbers of people liv-
ing in countries different from their birthplace. 
The decline of transportation costs, the growth 
of Persian Gulf economies following surges in 
oil prices, and the entry into world markets of 
developing countries with large populations 
have all stimulated a surge of migrant workers 
worldwide.
Differences in expected earnings between the 
country of origin and the country of destination 
are an important reason for people to migrate. 
Earnings gains, however, are offset to varying 
degrees by the direct costs of migration (such 
as transportation fees and intermediation ser-
vices) as well as by indirect costs associated with 
the difficulties of adapting to a different culture 
and society and leaving family and friends be-
hind. These costs also help explain aggregate 
migration flows. For many migrants, physical 
and cultural proximity (including a common 
language, religion, or way of life) are important 
when choosing a host country. Concerns about 
employment opportunities and personal safety 
in the sending countries are other important, 
sometimes crucial, drivers of migration. More 
than 10 million migrants are refugees, and 
nearly 2 million are asylum seekers.4 
The growth rate in the global number of mi-
grant workers peaked between 2005 and 2008 
and then decelerated because of the impact of the 
global economic crisis. During previous decades, 
the growth in migration flows came primarily 
from South-North flows; that is, from develop-
ing to developed countries. South-South mi-
gration, although numerically larger, remained 
stable over that period.5
Skilled workers represent a growing share of 
international migration. Developed countries 
increasingly implement policies to attract talent. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the share of workers 
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ing migrants a particularly vulnerable group. 
In others, intermediaries are informal agents 
who provide market-priced migration services 
in the absence of other formal mechanisms to 
address the existence of demand and supply 
for migration.11 Migrants also face psychologi-
cal and physical health risks, often without ac-
cess to health insurance.12 The persistent flows 
characteristics, the gain may range from 50 
percent to more than double the difference in 
income per capita between the host and the 
sending countries.9,10 Transportation costs and 
rents taken by intermediaries can reduce these 
gains, however. In some cases, these intermedi-
aries are part of illegal organizations linked to 
trafficking of people and criminal abuses, mak-
M a p  7. 2 Many migrants are highly skilled
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on Özden and others 2011 and Artuc and others 2012.
Note: Highly-skilled migrants are those with at least some tertiary education.
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.  
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
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tions for developing countries. Some fear a brain 
drain, whereby developing countries would suf-
fer from the loss of valuable human resources. 20 
According to this view, developing countries put 
considerable fiscal resources into the education 
of these workers, with the intention of enhanc-
ing their productivity and creating an elite of in-
novators, thinkers, and administrators. Thus the 
migration of skilled workers not only creates a 
fiscal and distributive concern in the short term, 
but it also impairs the growth capacities of the 
country in the long term. In this view, develop-
ing countries should create incentives for skilled 
workers to return to their home country, for ex-
ample, through financial reforms of secondary 
and tertiary education. 
Others, however, see a “brain gain,” whereby 
developing countries benefit from networks, 
return migration, and the incentives for young 
people to improve their skills. Returning mi-
grants bring home entrepreneurial and technical 
capacities that enhance productivity in sending 
countries. Experience acquired abroad has been 
found to induce higher wages among salaried 
workers and higher productive efficiency among 
entrepreneurs in several countries.21 Beyond the 
individual benefits are societal benefits that may 
extend to the proliferation of a whole industry 
and the creation of new jobs in an entire local-
ity. Bangalore and Hyderabad in India illustrate 
this point: returning migrants set up informa-
tion technology and communication companies 
to take advantage of their previous experience 
and their links with international companies.22 
The presence of highly qualified Indian engi-
neers and executives in U.S. corporations paved 
the way for the rise of the Indian software indus-
try.23 The activities of migrant networks are not 
restricted to skilled migrants or corporate activ-
ities. Networks of Mexican low-skill workers in 
the United States have worked with the Mexican 
government to redirect and enhance public in-
vestment in infrastructure in their communities 
of origin.24
Networks of migrants can also be impor-
tant sources of foreign direct investment and 
know-how, both of which promote productivity 
growth in sending countries. It is estimated that 
Chinese migrants contributed more than half 
of all foreign direct investment in China.25 The 
of migration would indicate, though, that the 
large gains, actual and expected, more than 
compensate for the costs.
Evidence on the impact of migration on la-
bor outcomes in sending countries is scattered. 
If employment opportunities for those who mi-
grate were limited, earnings and employment 
would remain unaltered. If they were plentiful, 
earnings rise and the participation rates of previ-
ously inactive persons would increase. Studies 
for Mexico, Pakistan, and the Philippines show 
that out-migration did affect wages and unem-
ployment rates in the sending country, but no 
discernable effects on labor outcomes have been 
found in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka.13 
The net effects of migration flows on em-
ployment opportunities and labor earnings de-
pend on the skills and the jobs of those who 
move abroad. A recent study using data for high- 
and  middle-income economies shows that im-
migration of high-skill workers has positive ef-
fects on wages of both high- and low-skill local 
workers. On the other hand, emigration of more 
educated workers is associated with declines in 
wages for both low- and high-skill workers who 
remain in the country of origin.14 
Remittances are an important source of in-
come for households in sending countries, al-
though they do not necessarily reach the poorest 
of the poor. In different countries, an increase 
in international remittances is associated with 
declines in the share of people living in pov-
erty.15 Remittances also increase savings and 
investment in recipient families.16 And they are 
more resilient than is generally believed. Recent 
studies show that despite tougher conditions for 
migrants during the 2009 recession, remittances 
dipped only slightly.17 Results are mixed on the 
impact of remittances on income inequality. 
Some studies find that migrants come from the 
middle of the income (or wealth) distribution 
and that, in the short term, remittances leave 
overall inequality unaltered. Others show that in 
the medium term inequality decreases, because 
of the higher economic activity in localities with 
migrants.18 Most studies also report that remit-
tances reduce labor force participation among 
migrants’ relatives.19
The growing migration trend among the 
highly skilled raises concerns about the implica-
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secluded in segregated occupations or neigh-
borhoods, preventing their genuine integration 
in society.32 It may also occur when migrants are 
perceived as competing for “nonmigrant” jobs. 
Prejudice and tensions may result in distrust of 
migrants and lead to the hardening of legal re-
quirements for entering the host country, forced 
repatriations, and even the building of physical 
walls to prevent migration. These policies may 
not ease tensions unless a more comprehen-
sive approach is adopted. Irregular or undocu-
mented migration is growing, partly in reaction 
to the lack of legal alternatives to migration 
given the mounting mismatches between em-
ployment opportunities in sending and receiv-
ing countries.33
Migration of jobs
Quantifying the international migration of jobs 
is even more difficult than estimating the global 
number of international migrants. The past four 
decades have been marked by the delocalization 
and outsourcing of manufacturing tasks from 
industrial countries to the developing world, 
especially to East Asia. More recently, the same 
pattern is observed for tasks in the services sec-
tor. In fact, exports of services are the fastest-
growing component of global trade. And the 
share originating in developing countries has 
been growing steadily over the past two decades. 
But counting how many jobs are affected glob-
ally is not feasible, because the process involves 
job destruction in some countries and job cre-
ation in others, in ways that cannot be easily 
matched with each other. 
Global trends
The share of manufacturing in total employ-
ment in industrial countries declined by 
roughly one-third between 1970 and 2008, as 
did its share in gross domestic product (GDP) 
(figure 7.1).34 Although starting from higher 
levels, the pattern was the same in Japan as in 
Europe and North America. The Republic of 
Korea industrialized in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
the share of manufacturing in its employment 
and GDP started declining in 1992. Meanwhile, 
impact of returning migrants on their commu-
nities may be more modest in smaller countries 
that lack the scale for the development of new 
vibrant businesses.26
The increase in talent migration may also 
bring a brain gain through its impact on human 
capital accumulation in sending countries. The 
prospect of migration raises the returns to edu-
cation and, thus, fosters investment in human 
capital. However, these positive effects depend 
on the size of skill migration and the relative size 
of the country. Recent evidence indicates that 
large countries with low rates of high-skill emi-
gration experience a net gain in human capital. 
In contrast, small countries with high rates of 
high-skill emigration suffer a net loss.27 
Social impacts are more diverse. In sending 
countries, researchers find changes in gender 
and family relations as well as in political at-
titudes. But the nature of these changes de-
pends on the country. In some cases, women 
and children are empowered by the migration 
of spouses and parents; in others, they become 
more vulnerable.28 Migrants to societies that 
value liberty and democracy come to appreciate 
these values, whereas those in more traditional 
host countries may become more traditional 
themselves.29 
In host countries, most studies have concen-
trated on the influence of migrants on the em-
ployment and earnings of locals, as well as on 
the fiscal consequences of migrant inflows. The 
majority of these studies finds either no effect 
or a very small negative effect on the average la-
bor earnings of the locals. But the composition 
of employment between locals and migrants 
shifts, creating winners and losers.30 The fiscal 
consequences for host countries depend on the 
characteristics of the migrants. The younger 
and more skilled they are, the higher the tax 
revenues. The impact of government spend-
ing in host countries varies, depending on the 
duration of migration and the family composi-
tion of the migrants. Computations of the net 
effect on the welfare systems of recipient coun-
tries are sensitive to hypotheses and estimation 
methods.31 
Last but not least, migration may also bring 
racial prejudice and exacerbate social tensions in 
host countries. This happens when migrants are 
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the share of manufacturing in total employment 
increased steadily in other East Asian countries, 
including China, for four decades. In South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, the share has been low 
and stagnant, whereas it has declined in Latin 
America and increased in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. The overall pattern is one where 
manufacturing jobs migrated primarily from 
Western Europe and the United States to North-
east Asia and then to the rest of East Asia.
The East Asian trends are consistent with the 
“flying geese” pattern of development, where 
economic transformation is consistent with 
dynamic changes in comparative advantage. 
Industrialization in East Asian countries began 
with the development of labor-intensive sectors, 
gradually shifted to capital-intensive sectors, and 
then to knowledge-intensive activities. In paral-
lel, wages rose and skills increased.35 First Japan, 
then Korea, and more recently China followed a 
similar pattern. As labor costs increase further, 
light manufacturing jobs are likely to migrate 
away from coastal China, where most industries 
have concentrated. By some estimates, nearly 
100 million jobs are at stake.36
The migration of light manufacturing jobs 
out of coastal China could open a once-in-a-
generation opportunity for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia to jump-start 
their industrialization. But some observers pre-
dict that the migration will go mainly to the in-
land areas in China, where wage rates are lower 
than on the coast. This would be consistent 
with the patterns of industrialization in Japan; 
Korea; Taiwan, China; and the United States, 
where the initial geographical concentration of 
industries was followed by dispersion within the 
same country.37 However, China’s labor market 
is relatively integrated to the point where even 
unskilled wage rates in rural areas have been in-
creasing rapidly.38 Therefore, an overall decline 
in the manufacturing share of GDP in China 
might be unavoidable, opening up the oppor-
tunity for labor-intensive industrialization in 
other developing countries.39 
The rapid growth of labor productivity in 
manufacturing is resulting in the stagnation or 
even the decline of the number of manufactur-
ing jobs worldwide (figure 7.2). Global employ-
ment in manufacturing increased by only 30 
percent from 1990 to 2008, with most of the ex-
pansion taking place in Asia, especially in China. 
Given that manufacturing jobs connect to ex-
Source: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on data from the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) database and United Nations Statistics Division.  
Note: Japan is not included in panel a. GDP = gross domestic product.
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ing share of employment and GDP in services, 
some of which are sold across borders.41 New 
ways of delivering services, often broken down 
into small tasks and driven by information and 
communication technology (ICT), are trans-
forming where service activities can be located 
(box 7.2). The world share of developing coun-
tries in global exports of services increased from 
11 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 2008. Ser-
vices are now the main contributor to economic 
growth in many developing countries, including 
India.42 
The rapid expansion of trade in services is 
bound to increase productivity on a global scale. 
But it also is raising fears in developed countries 
that service sector jobs will migrate to develop-
ing countries through offshoring or interna-
tional outsourcing, much the same as manufac-
turing jobs did over the past four decades.
A telltale sign of the potential for offshor-
ing and outsourcing is the substantial number 
of service sector tasks already being performed 
remotely within industrial countries.43 In the 
United States, service occupations that are trad-
able by nature, such as computer systems design 
and management consulting, display a heavy 
geographic concentration. This concentration 
results partly from agglomeration economies, 
port markets and global value chains more than 
other jobs and are thus more likely to generate 
productivity externalities, this stagnation or de-
cline raises the prospect of a fierce international 
competition ahead (question 7). If aggregate 
numbers of manufacturing jobs are bound to 
remain relatively stable, successful industrializa-
tion in one region may come at the expense of 
industrial employment in another region.
Manufacturing could take off in South Asia 
or Sub-Saharan Africa if technology and man-
agement knowledge were transferred there. Such 
a transfer, however, is not simple: fostering en-
trepreneurship, nurturing a more skilled work-
force, creating a stronger investment climate, 
and establishing a more favorable institutional 
environment would be necessary. There is also 
a risk of focusing on industries that are not in 
line with the potential comparative advantage 
of these regions.40 Combined with poor logistics 
and weak government capacity, that could mean 
that few manufacturing jobs would actually mi-
grate to these regions. Studies on the locational 
decisions of multinational corporations show 
that many factors come into play (box 7.1).
Services were once regarded largely as non-
tradable, but this is no longer the case. Both 
 country-specific and global trends show a grow-
F I G U R E  7. 2 The global number of manufacturing jobs has not varied much
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on ILO 2010; Industrial Statistics Database: INDSTAT2-2011 Edition, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
Vienna, and World Development Indicators.
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Where multinationals locate provides insights into the critical char-
acteristics in a host country that firms want or need. Traditionally, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) was categorized either as horizon-
tal—multinationals seeking better access to larger markets over-
seas—or vertical—multinationals moving part of their production 
to a lower-cost location. As trade barriers and transportation costs 
have fallen and supply chains involve ever more specialized tasks, 
the importance of locating near the final market has diminished. But 
the empirical patterns show that “costs” need to be determined 
over a range of dimensions. 
The location-decision question has been examined empirically 
by looking at how the characteristics of host countries predict the 
inflow of FDI and entry of multinationals. Significant macroeco-
nomic instability or conflict disqualifies most locations. Low wages 
can be attractive, but given that labor is often a small share of over-
all manufacturing costs, they are often not the predominant consid-
eration. And labor costs cannot be evaluated separately from the 
quality of skills; developed countries remain significant destinations 
of FDI in part because of their highly skilled workforces. Access to 
land, particularly in parts of Africa and Asia where land access is 
more regulated, can be a significant consideration. Poor or inconsis-
tent public services, including electricity, security, and transporta-
tion infrastructure, can quickly raise costs—through delays, lost 
production, and the expense of privately providing these services. 
BOX 7.1   Why do multinationals locate where they do?
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Alfaro and Chen 2011, Helpman 2006, and Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 2009.
Costs associated with complying with business regulations and with 
taxes can also be important, as are the reliability and cost of contract 
enforcement institutions. The literature shows that the relative 
importance of these dimensions often varies by different types of 
sectors, the degree of capital intensity, and technological sophisti-
cation. The presence of other firms is also a consideration. Quick and 
reliable access to suppliers can reduce costs and delays.
In addition to the academic literature, a number of consulting 
firms provide analysis and rankings of the attractiveness of coun-
tries based on the views of top executives of multinationals. A.T. 
Kearney has published a Foreign Direct Investment Index since 
1998. Three dimensions emerge as critical in its analysis: well- 
functioning financial markets, a strong business environment, and 
strong labor skills. A separate index for the location of services also 
emphasizes skills, particularly language skills, and the degree of 
global integration. Labor typically accounts for a larger share of 
overall costs in services than in  manufacturing.
The evolution of supply chains into more specialized tasks oper-
ating across more diverse locations can offer opportunities for an 
increasing number of developing countries. Multinationals are not 
looking for a strong business environment across the board; they 
care about inputs and services that are specific to their needs and 
thus are location-specific. 
Internet services are becoming ever more accessible, including in 
the developing world. Crowd sourcing tools help businesses to 
break up larger tasks into many smaller discrete steps. These are 
then offered to a global online community through competition. 
The platform TopCoder, for example, brings together close to 
400,000 programmers globally.
A special type of online outsourcing, branded impact sourcing 
by some, aims to bring employment and supplementary income to 
low-income areas. Impact sourcing is estimated to represent 4 per-
cent of the entire business process outsourcing industry, account-
ing for US$4.5 billion in total revenues and employing around 
140,000 people around the globe. Sama source is a nonprofit organi-
zation based in San Francisco, working with major technology cli-
ents. It splits large projects into “micro work”—small tasks that can 
be done online using inexpensive computers—and distributes the 
tasks largely to women working with partner service providers in 
the poorest parts of the world, including remote villages, slums, and 
BOX 7.2   E-links create job opportunities in developing countries, but the scale is still modest
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Monitor Inclusive Markets 2011 and Selim 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
refugee camps in countries, such as Haiti, Pakistan, Uganda, and 
others. Data workers develop skills in  English, computers, and a vari-
ety of project-specific tasks. Samasource has reached 1,600 women 
and youth over the past three years. 
Similarly, RuralShores aims to bring rural India into the global 
knowledge world. It provides remote processing of noncritical busi-
ness transactions such as data entry, simple bookkeeping, expenses 
handling, and document digitalization and archiving. RuralShores 
runs 10 centers in 7 Indian states, employing about 1,000 people. 
The centers, run as for-profit entities, are all located in remote Indian 
villages. While most employees are high-school graduates, the com-
pany gives preference to people with disabilities and young job-
seekers from poor, agrarian families. Impact sourcing does face 
challenges that include access to clients and contracts, sustainable 
demand, robust infrastructure, effective recruitment, and identifica-
tion of investors. 
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Some researchers claim that a “revolution” is 
under way that is turning services sectors into 
the main engine of economic growth in devel-
oping countries.53 Others argue that developing 
countries such as India and the Philippines are 
successful in exporting relatively skill-intensive 
services not because of their comparative ad-
vantage in such services but because of policies 
preventing their manufacturing sectors from 
taking off.54 Given the stagnation of global em-
ployment in manufacturing and the growing 
trade in services, a relevant question is whether 
developing countries can successfully skip the 
industrialization phase of development.
Winners and losers
The obvious winners of globalization are the 
workers and entrepreneurs in countries to 
which industries and splintered tasks have mi-
grated. Outsourcing and offshoring, along with 
the attendant transfer of new technologies and 
advanced management methods, contributes 
to productivity growth and improvements in 
living standards. The development of more ef-
ficient industries and services encourage a real-
location of labor toward more productive uses. 
It also stimulates the subsequent development 
of other interrelated industries and sectors 
through backward and forward linkages. The 
development of a modern services sector can 
lead to greater coordination in value chains and 
make a further subdivision of tasks and the re-
organization of production possible, leading to 
economies of scale.55 Multiple actors—includ-
ing multinationals, civil society organizations 
and consumers in industrial countries—are 
increasingly active in efforts to improve work-
ing conditions and workers’ rights in developing 
countries. To the extent that such efforts bear 
fruit, enhanced export opportunities improve 
workers’ well-being.56 In all these ways, signifi-
cant trickle-down effects can have widespread 
benefits for recipient countries. 
The hidden winners from the migration of 
jobs are consumers at large. The improved in-
ternational division of labor expands the global 
availability of goods and services, improving 
living standards around the world.57 This point 
can be easily understood by thinking how the 
world would look if China and India could not 
supporting specialization. But simple geo-
graphic imbalances between the local supply 
and demand for services also contribute to re-
mote provision.
Trade in services can be expected to expand 
rapidly in the coming years. Until recently, it was 
thought that only labor-intensive tasks would 
be relocated to developing countries, allowing 
production in industrial countries to focus on 
capital- or skill-intensive tasks.44 However, de-
veloping countries are now exporting not only 
traditional services, such as transportation and 
tourism, but also modern and skill-intensive 
services, such as financial intermediation, com-
puter and information services, and legal and 
technical support.45 Skilled jobs performed by 
accountants, programmers, designers, archi-
tects, medical diagnosticians, and financial and 
statistical analysts are increasingly outsourced 
by firms in industrial countries.46 In India, the 
number of such skilled white-collar jobs has 
grown rapidly.47 However, some of the service 
jobs seen as skilled in developing countries are 
considered unskilled in industrial countries.48
India was a developing world pioneer in 
building a modern export-oriented services sec-
tor, but other countries—Brazil, Chile, China, 
and Malaysia, to name a few—have also seized 
the opportunity.49 But outsourcing does not 
only happen between industrial and develop-
ing countries. In the United States (the largest 
offshoring economy), 85 percent of the service 
trade is with other industrial countries.50 Two-
thirds of service sector exports from developing 
countries are actually South-South trade.51 
Developing countries tend to specialize in 
certain activities within the services sector. For 
example, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are 
strong in professional and ICT-related services; 
Chile in distribution and transportation ser-
vices; Mexico in communication and distribu-
tion services; and Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries in professional services.52 This diversity in 
specialization will likely lead to both competi-
tion and cooperation, involving different seg-
ments of the services sector, rather than a head-
on collision between industrial and developing 
countries. 
This new phase of globalization is bound to 
influence views and interpretations about struc-
tural transformation and the migration of jobs. 
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income gap created by the international migra-
tion of jobs. But jobs tend to migrate more eas-
ily than people. 
*   *   *
The migration of people and the migration of 
jobs make clear that jobs challenges, despite being 
country specific, can also be global in scope. Both 
sending and recipient countries can benefit from 
these international movements in a variety of 
ways, from higher labor earnings to remittances, 
from greater productivity to broader networks. 
Consumers worldwide also benefit from less ex-
pensive consumer goods. Tensions and costs are 
associated with these two migrations, however. 
Migrant workers may suffer discrimination and 
segregation or lose their family and cultural con-
nections and identity, disrupting not only their 
own sense of well-being but also have an impact 
on communities in origin and host countries.
The migration of people and the migration 
of jobs may transform entire communities, cre-
ating winners and losers. Many see their lives 
improve, but those who lose their jobs to out-
sourcing and offshoring may experience perma-
nent declines in well-being, especially if they are 
unskilled. These spillovers, positive and nega-
tive, are powerful motivators for the political 
and social groups that promote or oppose the 
migration of people and of jobs. But these spill-
overs are international in nature, so coping with 
them only through national policy instruments 
may prove unsatisfactory. 
provide cheap goods and services to the rest of 
the world.
The obvious losers are those who have lost 
their jobs because of the declining competi-
tiveness of the industries and services where 
they used to work. While skilled workers may 
easily find similar occupations in other indus-
tries without a loss in salary, many low-skilled 
workers are not so fortunate. Low-skilled 
workers or those with industry- or occupation- 
specific skills that are no longer in demand are 
more likely to be forced to accept lower-paying 
jobs in different industries or remain unem-
ployed.58 Job losses could become a serious is-
sue not only in industrial countries but also 
in dynamically growing developing countries, 
such as China, as their labor costs increase.
There are also hidden losers. These are the 
workers and entrepreneurs in countries which 
have failed to develop new industries and ser-
vices connected to world markets and the jobs 
that go with them.59 Workers in those countries, 
however, may not perceive the lost employment 
opportunities.60
One way to mitigate the welfare losses from 
globalization, both apparent and hidden, is 
through the international migration of work-
ers. Income differentials across countries, 
which reflect differences in the growth rates of 
different economies, are important drivers of 
this migration. By reallocating workers from 
stagnant or slowly growing economies to rap-
idly growing ones, the international migration 
of workers contributes to the reduction in the 
QUeStION 7
Many developing countries face a jobs agenda. 
In some, it involves offering avenues to rural 
populations to move out of poverty. In others, 
it aims at leveraging the gains from urbaniza-
tion and from integration in global markets. Yet 
in others, the goal is to prevent youth from be-
coming disenfranchised or to reduce the risk of 
conflict. These agendas are addressed through 
national policies that stimulate job creation by 
the private sector, especially in the areas and 
activities where development payoffs are high-
est. But jobs agendas of individual countries are 
connected through globalization: trade in goods 
and services, investment flows, and migration of 
workers. This begs the question: if jobs can mi-
grate from one country to another, do policies 
to support job creation in one country become 
policies affecting jobs in other countries—poli-
cies competing for jobs globally? 
Among economists, the conventional wis-
dom is that the number of jobs is not deter-
mined by international trade and investment 
but by the total number of people in the labor 
force. And in general, openness to international 
trade and foreign direct investment is beneficial 
for all the countries involved. Thus, globaliza-
tion is not a zero-sum game. From this point 
of view, policies to support job creation are not 
policies competing for jobs, even as they may 
alter the global flows of trade, investment, and 
workers. 
The general public seems to have a less san-
guine view of the situation. Representative pub-
lic opinion polls show that firm relocation and 
tasks outsourced abroad are seen as a threat to 
employment in industrial countries (box 7.3). 
Globalization is perceived as a head-to-head 
competition in which employment gains in one 
country can be achieved only at the expense of 
jobs in other countries.
There is merit to both views. Past the short-
term impact of outsourcing and delocalization, 
the total number of jobs in one country should 
not be substantially affected by policy decisions 
in other countries. Some firms may close or start 
activities, others may expand or contract their 
business, but total employment will be roughly 
determined by the size of the labor force. How-
ever, the composition of employment is bound 
to change. The concern is that the share of 
good jobs for development may decline in one 
country and increase in another. Whether that 
happens depends on the nature of good jobs 
for development and the types of national 
policies being adopted to support job creation. 
While the public’s concern is legitimate, not all 
measures to support job creation amount to a 
 beggar-thy-neighbor policy. 
Not a competition for total employment 
but for its composition 
International trade and investment can be ex-
pected to lead to greater prosperity. Globaliza-
tion, including firm relocation and outsourcing, 
may result in job losses at home in the short 
term, but the demand for labor should increase 
in the longer run, as specialization generates ef-
ficiency gains in both industrial and developing 
countries.61 Lower prices for goods and services, 
and a growing consumption demand from 
emerging countries as they prosper, can only re-
inforce the upward trend in the global demand 
for labor. 
Empirical evidence to a large extent con-
firms this upbeat assessment. Labor earnings 
and working conditions improve as countries 
grow richer, and global integration has been 
good for growth. Across developing countries, 
a 1 percent increase in a country’s openness, 
measured as the share of its foreign trade in its 
output, has been associated with a 1 percent in-
crease in GDP per capita.62 Gains may reach up 
to 1.5 percentage points on average in the case of 
openness in financial services and telecommu-
nications.63 Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
trade liberalization was viewed with skepticism, 
the increase in output growth rates could be in 
the range of 0.5 to 0.8 percent.64 Evidence also 
shows that firms engaged in global markets pay 
higher wages. This is true of exporting firms 
from Colombia to Morocco and from Mexico 
to Korea. It is also true of foreign-owned com-
panies, whether they operate in Cameroon or 
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Note:  The figure is based on the following question and answer: Question: “There are multiple consequences of the globalization of trade. When you 
hear the word ‘globalization,’ what comes first to mind?”; and Answer: “Relocation of some companies to countries where labor is cheaper.” Data are from 
surveys conducted in 2008.
Across European countries, popular perceptions can be inferred 
from the Eurobarometer surveys. One of its questions is the follow-
ing: “What comes first to mind when you hear the word ‘globaliza-
tion’?” The options for answering this question are opportunities for 
domestic companies in terms of new outlets; foreign investments 
in the country; relocation of some companies to countries where 
labor is cheaper; increased competition for the country; and other. 
The third option reflects perceived job insecurity. Even before the 
option, between one-third and three-quarters of the respondents saw 
globalization as a threat to jobs.
Based on opinion polls, policies for jobs are often perceived as a 
zero-sum game in which gains for one country can be achieved only at 
the expense of others. The chairman and CEO (Chief Executive Officer) 
of Gallup put it as follows: “If you were to ask me, from all the world 
polling Gallup has done for more than 75 years, what would fix the 
BOX 7.3   Globalization is often viewed as jobs migrating abroad
global crisis and the European debt crisis, when concerns about un-
employment were not exacerbated, about one-third to one-half of 
respondents see globalization as a relocation of companies abroad.
The survey also asked: “Which of the following two propositions is the 
one which is closest to your opinion with regard to globalization?” 
Possible answers included good opportunity for domestic companies; 
threat to employment and companies; and “do not know.” With the 
exception of Denmark, where only a small minority chose the second 
world—what would suddenly create worldwide peace, global well- 
being, and the next extraordinary advancements in human develop-
ment, I would say the immediate appearance of 1.8 billion jobs—for-
mal jobs.” In his view, “this raises an important distinction—not only do 
we need to create more jobs, we need to increase the number of good 
jobs. And we can’t see that quest for good jobs as an internal skirmish 
between warring political ideologies. It’s an international war.” a
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of more sophisticated goods. In the 1970s and 
1980s, Japan not only began exporting steel, 
semiconductors, and automobiles but turned 
into a leading supplier. As the major exporter of 
these products, the United States suffered from 
Japan’s expansion.67 The United States had been 
characterized by its fluid labor markets. Yet, the 
potential welfare loss from the decline of Pitts-
burgh, Detroit, and other industrial centers 
could be substantial, even if labor was reallo-
cated smoothly.68 This competition was resolved 
by “voluntary export restraints”—a special form 
of quota that actually granted all quota rents to 
Japan but prevented a complete decline of such 
employment in the United States, indicating the 
importance attributed to these industries.69 
Concerns are similar for developing countries 
nowadays. Consider the opportunities opened by 
the increase in labor earnings in the coastal areas 
of China.70 Some labor-intensive manufactur-
ing jobs connected with global value chains will 
migrate out of China in search of lower produc-
tion costs. Given rapid technological progress, 
the global number of jobs in light manufactur- 
ing is unlikely to increase much. Low-income 
countries in both Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia aspire to attract some of those jobs, so a 
competition is involved. Tension is not limited 
to labor-intensive manufacturing jobs. A simi-
lar logic underlies government efforts to attract 
high-tech companies, as Costa Rica successfully 
did with Intel.71 This is also the logic behind 
government efforts to foster services exports, 
exemplified by the success of Brazil, Chile, India, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines.72
Because technological progress and global-
ization connect markets to an unprecedented 
level, they also result in competition over other 
types of jobs with high development payoffs. 
Jobs located in a global hub can generate large 
productivity spillovers. London stands as one 
of the most economically vibrant cities in Eu-
rope largely because it serves as an international 
financial center. The financial industry entails 
scale economies and is supported by density. 
Therefore, the number of global financial cen-
ters is limited, and their formation is shaped by 
location, history,  and national policies. Similar 
logic applies to international transportation 
hubs such as Singapore, clusters of information 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Indonesia 
or Zambia.65 
Admittedly, the dispersion of earnings 
within countries has also increased, for instance 
in the form of higher returns to education, and 
it is tempting to attribute this trend to global-
ization. Low-skill jobs in industrial countries 
are often high-skill jobs from the perspective of 
developing countries, and exporting itself is a 
skill-intensive activity. Therefore, international 
trade and offshore outsourcing can be expected 
to increase the relative demand for skills at both 
ends, favoring better-off workers. The empiri-
cal results on this possible effect vary widely, 
however.66 For sure, all policies create winners 
and losers, and the distribution of labor earn-
ings has widened in parallel with globalization, 
but a causal relationship is difficult to establish. 
Overall, widening disparities may have more to 
do with technological progress and financial lib-
eralization than with globalization. 
A different perspective arises when consid-
ering the composition of employment, rather 
than the level or dispersion of labor earnings. 
Globalization provides developing countries 
with the opportunity to connect to world mar-
kets and derive productivity spillovers boosting 
their economic growth. Manufacturing jobs in-
tegrated in global value chains, as well as jobs 
in technologically advanced services and in fi-
nance, are often seen as tickets to rapid devel-
opment. However, rapid technological progress 
and economies of scale may mean the global 
number of some of these jobs will not increase 
much. For jobs in manufacturing, the experi-
ence of the last few decades has shown a relative 
stability of their global numbers together with a 
dramatic change in their spatial distribution. If 
so, policies for job creation could lead to a com-
petition not for the level of employment but for 
the jobs with the highest development payoffs.
The experience of Japan and the United 
States illustrates the point. In the 1950s, Japan 
exported cheap labor-intensive products in 
exchange for goods embedded with more ad-
vanced knowledge and technology. This strat-
egy generated much needed revenue for Japan’s 
post–World War II recovery. More importantly, 
it contributed to Japan’s productivity growth 
and built the foundation for the production 
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or an adverse effect on the social welfare of an-
other country.
A key question to ask is what purpose poli-
cies serve (figure 7.3). For instance, policies 
for jobs may aim to improve compliance with 
rights, prosecuting forced labor and harmful 
forms of child labor. Because fundamental la-
bor rights and principles have been endorsed 
by most countries, promoting compliance with 
rights amounts to providing a global public 
good. Thus, interventions against human traf-
ficking or child prostitution in one country are 
unlikely to have adverse effects in other coun-
tries and do not lead to a competition for jobs. 
In the absence of a global public good di-
mension, the second question is what market 
imperfection or institutional failure is being 
addressed by the policy intervention. Tackling 
the institutional failures that lead to conflict, 
discrimination, or lack of voice might have an 
effect on the international flows of goods, ser-
vices, and finance, but only indirectly. The risk 
that government interventions in these areas 
will result in a competition for jobs with other 
countries is limited. The risk is also limited in 
the case of interventions aimed at providing 
jobs opportunities for the poor. In all of these 
cases, there should be gains in well-being in the 
developing country, and no substantial loss in 
well-being in other countries. Therefore, jobs 
policies focused on strengthening social cohe-
sion and improving living standards should be 
acceptable as well.
The answer is less clear when government in-
terventions aim at enhancing productivity spill-
overs from jobs. These interventions typically 
include urban development policies, invest-
ments in infrastructure and skills, or the pro-
motion of entrepreneurship. Because these in-
terventions are likely to affect the international 
flows of goods, services, and finance, the range 
of possible outcomes is broader. While no gen-
eral rule is available, interventions that under-
mine an open trading system most likely reduce 
aggregate well-being—probably more at home 
than abroad. On the other hand, interventions 
aligned with a country’s dynamic comparative 
advantage could result in mutual gains. Admit-
tedly, assessing what “aligned” means in practice 
is bound to involve an element of judgment.76 
and computer technology–related industries 
such as Silicon Valley and Bangalore, and so on. 
Policies for jobs: Different degrees of 
competition
Even if globalization may result in a competition 
for good jobs for development, not all efforts 
to support job creation amount to beggar-thy-
neighbor policies. Whether they do so depends 
on the type of instruments used and the nature 
of the spillovers from jobs.73
Because globalization involves international 
trade and foreign direct investment, it is natural 
to first consider trade- and investment-related 
instruments. Some of them, such as import tar-
iffs, export subsidies, and local content require-
ments, are ruled out by multilateral trade agree-
ments; others, such as improving access to credit 
for private exporters and identifying and remov-
ing specific constraints faced by foreign inves-
tors, are not. But in reality these are just a nar-
row subset of policies for jobs. When bidding to 
attract foreign direct investment, governments 
can compete directly through tax holidays or 
through dedicated physical infrastructure and 
human resources. They can also compete indi-
rectly, as when they take actions that appeal to 
both local entrepreneurs and foreign investors. 
For example, they can contain increases in the 
cost of labor by keeping mandated benefits af-
fordable. Or they can improve the availability 
and quality of factors of production, such as 
worker skills and public infrastructure. In South 
Asia, for example, the quality of physical infra-
structure and the education of the workforce are 
the strongest predictors of entry of new firms.74
When considering good jobs for development 
more generally, and not just jobs connected to 
world markets, the set of policy options is even 
broader. Urban policies are another important 
instrument to stimulate job creation by the pri-
vate sector. Given the potential agglomeration 
of economies, relatively small interventions can 
have large effects.75 In low-income countries, 
enhancing extension services may have a large 
impact on farm productivity and, thus, on pov-
erty reduction. Whether this broader set of poli-
cies leads to a competition for jobs depends on 
whether policies in one country have a positive 
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countries followed their dynamic compara-
tive advantage under the “flying geese” pattern 
of development, there were few instances of an 
open competition for jobs between them. 
But the East Asian experience, with jobs in man-
ufacturing migrating from Japan to Korea and 
Taiwan, China, and subsequently to China, and 
then to Vietnam, provides some hints. As these 
F I G U R E  7. 3  Policies for jobs may or may not harm other countries 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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Policies through
the jobs lens
PART3
Introduction to Part 3
Most jobs are created by the private sec-tor. While public works and targeted employment programs are justified 
in certain situations, the primary role of govern-
ment is not to directly provide employment. It is 
to set the conditions for job creation by the pri-
vate sector, and especially to remove the obsta-
cles to the creation of more of the jobs with the 
highest development payoffs, given the circum-
stances of the country.
When faced with jobs challenges, policy 
makers tend to look first at labor policies as ei-
ther the solution or the problem. It is important, 
then, to understand the role and the impacts of 
policies and institutions like labor market regu-
lation, collective bargaining, active labor market 
programs, and social insurance. But the main 
constraints to the job creation often lie outside 
the labor market, and a clear approach is needed 
to support appropriate policy responses.
• Fundamentals are necessary for growth and 
are a precondition for strong job creation by 
the private sector. Macroeconomic sta bility, 
an enabling business environment, human 
capital, and the rule of law, including the 
progressive realization of rights, are the key 
policy fundamentals.
• Labor policies need to be adequate for growth 
to translate into jobs. Policies should seek 
to avoid the distortive interventions that 
stifle labor reallocation and undermine the 
creation of jobs in functional cities and 
global value chains. But policies should also 
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ensure voice and social protection, especially 
for the most vulnerable. 
• Policy priorities have to be established in sup-
port of good jobs for development. Ideally, 
policies should aim at removing the market 
imperfections and institutional failures pre-
venting the private sector from creating more 
of those jobs. If the constraints cannot be 
easily singled out or are difficult to remove, 
offsetting policies may be considered. 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
FUNDAMENTALS
LABOR POLICIES
PRIORITIES
Chapter 8
Labor markets have imperfections in the form of inadequate information, uneven bargaining power, limited ability to en-
force long-term commitments, and insufficient 
insurance mechanisms against employment- 
related risks. Imperfections like these create gaps 
between the individual and the social value of 
jobs. They can thus result in a level and compo-
sition of employment that are not optimal from 
a social point of view. 
Labor policies and institutions—regulations, 
collective representation, active labor market 
 programs, and unemployment insurance—can 
in principle be used to address these imperfec-
tions. Other policies, such as pensions and other 
forms of social insurance, address imperfections 
elsewhere in the economy but can have impor-
tant implications for the functioning of the labor 
market. 
Labor policies and institutions are bundled 
in different ways in different countries (fig-
ure 8.1).1 Their configuration tends to vary by 
level of development, with policies and insti-
tutions generally more developed in industrial 
countries. This is especially so for institutions 
providing a vehicle for collective voice, such as 
bargaining between employers and employees, 
and for social insurance. But the nature of the 
labor policies and institutions in any country is 
affected by more than just the level of develop-
ment and must be seen in the context of the 
country’s legal traditions, politics, and social 
norms and values.
The impact of labor policies is often the sub-
ject of heated debates. In the past decade, im-
proved data and methods have generated a great 
deal of new information not only in industrial 
countries but increasingly in developing coun-
tries as well. The analyses of these data have led 
to fresh insights. Estimated effects prove to be 
relatively modest in most cases—certainly more 
modest than the intensity of the debate would 
suggest. Excessive or insufficient interventions 
can certainly have detrimental effects on pro-
ductivity. But in between these extremes lies a 
“plateau” where effects enhancing and under-
mining efficiency can be found side by side and 
most of the impact is redistributive. Overall, 
labor policies and institutions are neither the 
major obstacle nor the magic bullet for creating 
good jobs for development in most countries.
Labor policies revisited
Labor policies can address labor market imperfections. But interventions 
can hinder dynamism in some cases, while the lack of mechanisms for 
voice and social protection affects the most vulnerable.
FUNDAMENTALS
LABOR 
POLICIES
PRIORITIES
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F I G U R E  8 .1  The mix of labor policies and institutions varies across countries
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team estimates based on Eurostat Public Expenditure on Labour Market Policy (LMP) Interventions (database), European Commission; 
InstitutionaI Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) (database), Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, Amsterdam; 
Pallares-Miralles, Romero, and Whitehouse 2012; Public Expenditure and Participant Stocks on Labour Market Programmes (database), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris; Robalino, Newhouse, and Rother, forthcoming; and World Bank, forthcoming.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Figures are averages across OECD member countries. Labor regulation indicates the ratio of minimum 
to average wage. Active labor market programs is the share of gross domestic product spent on them. Collective representation is the coverage of collective bargaining agreements 
divided by the labor force. Social insurance indicates workers contributing toward old-age pensions as a percentage of the labor force. Countries were classified in the eight groups 
by the World Development Report 2013 team. One country can belong to several groups. The figure shows unweighted averages across countries.
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fining the degree to which job security is guar-
anteed (box 8.1). Virtually all countries regulate 
hiring and termination in some way—severance 
payments, for example, are mandated by law or 
through collective agreements in 170 countries.2 
Similarly, more than 100 countries have rati-
fied International Labour Organization (ILO) 
conventions regarding minimum wages, and 
many others have established minimum wages 
even though they have not ratified these con-
ventions.3 However, the specific nature of labor 
regulations reflects the society for which they 
are written. Important determinants include a 
country’s legal tradition, as well as civic attitudes 
toward solidarity, inequality, and trust.4 The 
content, as well as the impact of regulations, is 
also influenced by interactions with other po-
tentially complementary institutions such as 
collective representation and social insurance. 
Views on labor regulations can be polarized, 
with contrasting implications for policy mak-
ing. Fundamental questions, such as whether 
labor policies should protect jobs or workers, 
often spark heated debates (question 8). 
For some, these regulations provide neces-
sary guarantees for workers against economic 
volatility and the strong bargaining power of 
firms.5 EPL can offer job security, deterring pre-
carious forms of employment. Minimum wages 
can prevent extreme poverty among workers 
and address the inefficiencies that stem from 
Labor regulations:  
A “plateau” effect
Labor regulations can be designed to address 
labor market failures that result in inefficient 
or inequitable outcomes. Difficulties in enforc-
ing long-term contracts between employers 
and employees may lead to excessive churning 
and underinvestment in training. Inefficiencies 
in the organization of insurance schemes may 
leave workers unprotected in the case of dis-
missal, which could force them to curtail their 
job search before finding the right match. Un-
even market power can enable firms to set wages 
that are lower than would be agreed upon un-
der more competitive conditions. Discrimina-
tory practices can have the same effect. Uneven 
power or incomplete information may lead to 
an unsafe workplace. These market imperfec-
tions and institutional failures can affect job 
creation and lead to gaps between what workers 
gain from employment and the social value of 
their jobs.
Employment protection legislation and 
minimum wages
Employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
minimum wages have been widely adopted to 
address some of these failures. EPL consists of 
rules governing hiring and termination and de-
Employment protection legislation, or EPL, can be classified into 
two main groups of rules, one pertaining to hiring, the other to 
 termination. Rules on hiring dictate what types of labor contracts 
are permissible under what conditions—for instance, open-ended, 
fixed-term, part-time, and apprenticeship contracts. Rules on ter-
mination govern the ending of contracts including causes (volun-
tary and involuntary, justified or unfair), end-of-service compen-
sation (severance pay), and procedures (for instance, third-party 
notification or approval, advance notice, and vesting periods). The 
mix and stringency of these rules result in a continuum of regula-
tion across countries, which has been subject to different measure-
ment efforts.a 
BOX 8.1   Employment protection legislation covers more than firing rules
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Measures attempting to summarize EPL include those proposed by Botero and others 2004; Employment Protection indicators (database), Organisation for Economic  
Co- operation and Development, Paris; and Doing Business Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC.
Other types of labor policies can also have implications for job 
security. Some regulations set specific conditions for the employ-
ment of women and young workers. They include maternity leave, 
the need for child care facilities, first-contract waivers, or reduced 
minimum wage for apprentices. The aim of these policies is to facili-
tate the  participation of more vulnerable population groups and to 
protect them once they are employed. Antidiscrimination regula-
tions address socially unaccepted  differences in the treatment of 
workers, with the goal to reduce inequality and enhance social 
cohesion and fairness in employment.
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Modest impacts overall . . .
New data and more rigorous methodologies 
have spurred a wave of empirical studies over 
the past two decades on the effects of labor reg-
ulation.11 These studies examine the influence 
of EPL and minimum wages on employment, 
wages, the distribution of wages, and to a lesser 
extent, productivity. Few have looked at wider 
impacts on social cohesion.
Based on this wave of new research, the 
overall impact of EPL and minimum wages is 
smaller than the intensity of the debate would 
suggest (tables 8.1 and 8.2).12 Most estimates 
of the impacts on employment levels tend to 
be insignificant or modest.13 Studies of EPL in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, 
report mixed results: negative employment ef-
fects of job security rules have been found in 
Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, while no sig-
nificant effect was evident in Brazil and some 
Caribbean countries. Different studies for Chile 
have reached both results.14 Overall, the ma-
noncompetitive labor markets.6 By establish-
ing a reference wage, minimum wages can even 
benefit uncovered workers through the so-called 
lighthouse effect.7 EPL and minimum wages are 
also seen as creating the conditions for human 
capital accumulation and associated productiv-
ity gains.8 
Critics of strong EPL and minimum wages 
hold that they tend to reduce employment, 
hinder productivity growth, and can lead to 
divisions in society between those who benefit 
from the regulations and those who do not. Ac-
cording to this view, to the extent that EPL and 
minimum wages raise labor costs, they can in-
crease poverty by pushing low-skilled workers, 
young people, and women into unemployment 
or into informal sector jobs.9 Hiring and termi-
nation restrictions can slow down labor reallo-
cation and hence constrain productivity growth. 
Finally, because they are often perceived as part 
of the social contract, labor market regulations 
can be difficult to reform, when circumstances 
change, generating discord and even conflict.10 
TA B L E  8 .1 There is a wave of new empirical evidence on the impacts of EPL
 Dimension Indicator Findings Comments
 Living standards Aggregate employment and 
unemployment
Either no impact or modest negative 
(positive) impact on employment 
(unemployment)
Evidence for both industrial and developing 
countries (largely Latin America)  
Results tend not to be robust.
Employment for particular 
groups
Prime-age males favorably affected  
Youth, women, and low-skilled unfavorably 
affected
Partial reforms for two-track labor markets lead 
to more precarious employment for affected 
groups.
Employment dynamics Longer durations in employment, 
unemployment, and out of the labor force 
Smaller flows between different types of work 
status
Adjustments to shocks Increases in negative impact of shocks Consensus not strong
Wage distribution Reduces wage dispersion
 Productivity Labor and multifactor 
productivity growth
No consistent conclusion Very little evidence for developing countries
Training Positive effect Longer-duration employment spells and 
greater human capital investments
Technological change Negative effect Few studies
Reallocation of labor Negative effect because smaller labor flows
 Social cohesion Fairness Signals social responsibility of employers Depends on enforcement and coverage  
“Two-track” regulations can be seen as unfair.
Security Positive because of longer tenure Depends on enforcement and coverage
Equality Greater wage equality has modest equalizing 
effect on income distribution.
Evidence mostly for industrial countries
Source: Betcherman 2012 for the World Development Report 2013 based on a review of empirical studies of EPL.
Note: EPL = employment protection legislation.
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In many developing countries with large 
informal sectors, the generally modest impacts 
of EPL and minimum wages may stem in part 
from poor coverage and weak enforcement. In 
Brazil, employment effects of strong job secu-
rity provisions were negative in municipalities 
where enforcement was strong.22 Mechanisms 
for voice and representation and the capacity 
of government to effectively administer regu-
lations influence the effectiveness of enforce-
ment. Certainly, poor rules coupled with weak 
enforcement are not a desirable combination to 
address labor market imperfections.
But many countries appear to set EPL and 
minimum wages in a range where impacts on 
employment or productivity are modest. Within 
that range, or “plateau,” effects enhancing and 
undermining efficiency can be found side by 
side, and most of the impact is redistributive. 
The distributional effects tend to be equalizing 
among those who are covered by these regula-
tions, but divisions can be accentuated between 
those covered and those who are not. With ef-
ficiency effects relatively modest on the plateau, 
countries can choose where they want to be 
depending on their normative preferences for 
redistribution.
. . . but cliffs at the edge of the plateau
However, when the edge of the plateau is 
reached (either on the too-strict or too-loose 
side), impacts are more negative. Some studies 
have found that Indian states with more restric-
jority of minimum wage studies do find nega-
tive employment effects, especially on young 
workers. But magnitudes tend to be small and 
a number of studies report no effect, or in some 
cases, even positive effects.15 EPL and minimum 
wages can shift employment away from young 
people, women, and the less-skilled and toward 
prime-age men and the better educated.16 Their 
effects can vary within a country. In Indonesia, 
increasing minimum wages during the 1990s 
had a negative effect on employment among 
small firms but not on large firms.17 Across 
countries, both EPL and minimum wages are 
associated with a reduction in wage inequality.18 
EPL has clear dynamic effects, reducing labor 
market flows and increasing durations in both 
employment and unemployment.19 In this way, 
strong job security rules slow down labor real-
location and limit the efficiency gains from cre-
ative destruction. Studies on the overall impact 
of EPL on productivity are mixed, however, with 
some finding negative productivity impacts and 
others finding positive or no significant effects.20 
This mix of findings may be caused by other in-
fluences of job security rules, such as incentives 
to invest in training, which can counteract the 
lower rates of labor reallocation. Some coun-
tries have tried to reduce EPL by implementing 
partial (“dual-track”) reforms that increase the 
scope for nonpermanent employment. How-
ever, unless accompanied by  reductions in the 
protection of permanent jobs, this approach 
seems to result in the more vulnerable groups 
ending up in more precarious employment.21
TA B L E  8 . 2 The impacts of minimum wages are a favorite research topic in labor economics
Dimension Indicator Findings Comments
 Living standards Aggregate employment Either no impact or modest negative impact Both industrial and developing countries  
Some studies show positive employment effect.
Employment for particular 
groups
Negative employment impacts concentrated on 
youth and low-skilled
Some studies show positive employment effect.
Wages Positive effect Effect strongest around minimum  wage 
Some evidence of positive effect in informal 
sector
Wage distribution Reduces wage inequality
Poverty Reduces poverty Some studies find no effect.
Productivity Labor and total factor 
 productivity 
No consistent conclusion Rarely analyzed
 Social cohesion Fairness Provides “decent” wage Depends on enforcement and coverage
Source: Betcherman 2012 for the World Development Report 2013 based on a review of empirical studies of minimum wages.
 Labor policies revisited  263
the business that would be relevant and useful 
for workers. Information sharing can gener-
ate additional efficiency gains by providing a 
mechanism for resolving conflicts and reducing 
wasteful turnover.
Collective representation and bargaining can 
also address problems of uneven market power 
whereby firms may be able to impose lower 
wages or inferior working conditions on indi-
vidual workers than would be the case under 
competitive conditions. 
Bargaining between firms and workers
The coverage of unions and collective bargain-
ing varies considerably around the world (fig-
ure 8.2). Coverage rates are generally low in 
developing countries, where few workers out of 
the civil service or protected sectors belong to 
a trade union. In most countries where regular 
data are available, the coverage of collective bar-
gaining agreements has declined during the past 
two decades.27 The shift of employment toward 
the services sector, globalization, technological 
progress, evolving social values, and legislative 
changes have all been advanced as causes of this 
decline.28 
The vast majority of the evidence confirms 
the existence of a wage premium in favor of 
union members and other workers covered by 
collective agreements. Estimates of the adjusted 
union wage effect (controlling for other factors) 
range from around 5 percent in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, up to 15 percent in countries 
as varied as Brazil, Canada, Germany, Malaysia, 
Mexico, and the United States.29 South Africa 
stands at the upper end, although there is con-
troversy on how high the union wage effect ac-
tually is (box 8.2). Wage effects tend to be stron-
gest for women and in countries where union 
membership is high. It is also clear that unions 
and collective bargaining have an equalizing ef-
fect on earnings distributions by compressing 
wage differentials. Research has shown that wage 
inequality falls during periods when union den-
sity is increasing and rises when union member-
ship is in decline.30 Little evidence exists on the 
impact of unions on poverty.
One relevant question is whether union wage 
gains come at the expense of reduced employ-
ment. Unfortunately, few studies have addressed 
this question in developing countries. In in-
tive EPL have significantly lower employment 
and output, and this effect is strongest where 
dispute resolution is ineffective or costly.23 Large 
increases in the minimum wage in Colombia 
in the late 1990s led to significant employment 
losses, exacerbated by weak labor demand at the 
time.24 At this edge of the plateau, which can 
vary according to the country situation, labor 
regulations can slow down job creation in cities, 
or in global value chains, and can cause coun-
tries to miss out on jobs supporting agglomera-
tion effects and knowledge spillovers. Forgoing 
the development payoffs from urbanization and 
global integration would be one way to fall off 
the cliff. 
It does not follow that minimal regulation is 
the answer. If rules are too weak, or not enforced, 
the problems of poor information, unequal bar-
gaining power, or inadequate risk management 
remain unaddressed. This cliff may be less vis-
ible than excessive labor market rigidity, but it 
is no less real.
The main challenge is to set EPL and mini-
mum wages so that they address the imperfec-
tions in the labor market without falling off the 
plateau. The edges of the plateau vary across 
countries and even within countries over time, 
as conditions change. In Brazil, for example, 
minimum wages had negative impacts on em-
ployment in the 1990s but not over the past 
decade, even though they were increasing rela-
tive to average wages.25 It is important, then, to 
monitor impacts closely and reflect on the de-
sign and implementation of regulations and 
their interaction with other institutions.26 Al-
though EPL and minimum wages may not ad-
dress labor market imperfections effectively, in 
most countries good jobs for development are 
lacking for other reasons. 
Collective representation:  
New forms of voice
Collective bargaining and other forms of “voice” 
can address information failures at the work-
place in ways that enhance productivity as well 
as employment security and earnings. For in-
stance, workers may have knowledge about the 
details of production and operations that those 
making decisions do not have. Employers are 
likely to be informed about certain aspects of 
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ter. The evidence collected on productivity in 
the United States and Europe is not conclusive.32 
In developing countries, effects are positive in 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Uruguay, but negative in 
Brazil.33 Findings suggest that unionized firms 
undertake more training than nonunionized 
firms. But differences in the introduction of new 
technologies are not significant.
The institutional structure for collective bar-
gaining can differ considerably across countries, 
especially in the degree of centralization and co-
ordination. Arrangements vary from firm-level 
bargaining with no influence on other firms to 
industry-based bargaining to centralized bar-
gaining with national coverage. Prior to the 
1990s, researchers found that both centralized 
and decentralized bargaining led to better em-
ployment performance. Analysis has been less 
conclusive since then, however.34 
With policy changes, some developing coun-
tries and emerging economies have extended 
worker representation and are seeing new forms 
of collective bargaining. In China, for example, 
a number of legislative reforms appear to have 
dustrial countries, studies are divided between 
those finding that unions reduce employment 
(or increase unemployment) and those finding 
no significant effect. Where negative impacts are 
found, the magnitude is modest. The most re-
cent estimates by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) find 
that a 10 percentage point decline in union cov-
erage is associated with an increase in employ-
ment of 0.8 percentage points.31
Industrial relations and productivity
The impact of collective bargaining on pro-
ductivity reflects the balance of two opposing 
forces. On the one hand, voice may lead to bet-
ter information sharing, while higher labor costs 
under unionization may encourage manage-
ment to invest more on training and technol-
ogy, leading to higher productivity. On the other 
hand, unions may also be able to negotiate re-
strictions in hours worked and pay rules that 
reduce effort, hindering productivity. The net 
effect of these forces is then an empirical mat-
F I G U R E  8 . 2 The coverage of collective bargaining is low in developing countries
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on ICTWSS database, Visser 2011, and World Bank 2011b. 
Note: The reported variable is either union membership or collective bargaining coverage as a share of total employment.
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Solidarność, a Polish trade union federation, 
was prominent in the fight against Communist 
rule, while the Confederation of South African 
Trade Unions played a leading role in the fight 
against apartheid.
In some countries, especially developing 
countries, the political involvement of unions 
can overshadow their activities at the work-
place.35 Because their membership is strong in 
the civil service and in protected sectors, unions 
have often opposed reforms involving fiscal 
consolidation, privatization, or liberalization. A 
comparison of economic performances in times 
of reform shows that developing countries with 
higher union membership and higher shares of 
opened the door to a proliferation of unions 
and collective bargaining agreements (box 8.3). 
Voice beyond the firm
Employers’ organizations and unions also play 
roles as social and political agents. They may in-
fluence the laws that regulate labor markets and 
even policies beyond the sphere of labor rela-
tions. The nature of such involvement depends 
on the norms and institutional framework in 
the society in which they operate. Historically, 
labor unions have contributed to the establish-
ment of social and labor rights, as well as to po-
litical change, in many countries. For instance, 
With unemployment rates well above 20 percent, the South African 
labor market is very different from that of other developing coun-
tries, usually characterized by low or moderate levels of open unem-
ployment. Diverse explanations have been put forward, including 
growth concentrated in low-labor-intensity sectors, skills deficits, 
work disincentives created by social benefits, and various legacies of 
apartheid. South Africa’s distinct collective bargaining arrangements 
are also frequently mentioned as a possible explanation for the lack 
of jobs. 
Since the 1920s, bargaining over wages and working conditions 
in most of South Africa’s manufacturing sector has taken place 
through industrial councils, now known as bargaining councils. 
 Bargaining councils can request that agreements be extended to 
their entire sector, including to employers and workers who did not 
participate in the negotiations. Extensions are common but vary 
considerably across sectors and areas. Firm-level bargaining also 
occurs. It has been argued that sectorwide extensions of bargaining 
council agreements impose a heavy labor cost burden on small 
firms, undermining employment creation.a 
Estimates of wage premiums as high as 60 percent for union 
members appeared to provide some credence to this argument.b A 
substantial part of this wage effect was associated with industries 
that could possibly reflect the influence of the councils. Subsequent 
research using more recent data and better methodologies has con-
cluded that early studies overestimated the real wage effect of the 
bargaining council agreements. The latest research suggests the 
wage premium is in the 10–20 percent range.c This level is signifi-
BOX 8.2   Are bargaining councils the cause of unemployment in South Africa?
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Butcher and Rouse 2001.
b. Schultz and Mwabu 1998.
c. Magruder 2010.
d. Bhorat, Goga, and van der Westerhuizen 2011.
e. Magruder 2010.
f. Godfrey and others 2010; Magruder 2010.
g. Banerjee and others 2007; Kingdon and Knight 2004.
cant but more in line with union wage  differentials observed in 
other countries. Evidence also suggests that bargaining council 
extensions do have effects as well, adding around 10 percent to the 
wages of nonunion workers within the bargaining council system.d 
These results imply that the South Africa’s wage-setting institu-
tions do have some employment effects, especially among small 
firms, whose contribution to total job creation is small by interna-
tional standards. Bargaining councils are estimated to be associated 
with 8–13 percent lower employment in the firms they cover directly 
and with 7–16 percent lower employment in small firms.e 
While these effects are not trivial, bargaining councils can 
explain only a small part of South Africa’s unusually high unemploy-
ment rates. Given the number of workers employed in industries 
covered by collective agreements, eliminating the employment 
effect of bargaining councils would reduce the unemployment rate 
by 1.5 percentage points, at the most.f So the main constraints to 
job creation may lie elsewhere.
One clue is the relatively small size of the informal sector com-
pared to other countries at a similar development level. South Africa 
is different from these countries in other ways, too. During the 
apartheid period, slum clearance, harsh licensing, and strict zoning 
regulations rid cities of black-dominated informal sector niches. 
Two decades after the end of apartheid, spatial segregation remains, 
and investment in black-dominated areas is low.g The legacy of sep-
aration also results in high transportation costs for the unemployed, 
who tend to live far from where the jobs are. So South Africa’s job 
creation problems may stem primarily from urban issues.
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tions and institutional failures they address do 
not involve conventional employer-employee 
relationships or workplace-based production 
structures. They are often organized to represent 
members’ interests with a particular municipal 
authority or local government. 
Associations of self-employed workers are 
emerging as a vehicle to demand and protect 
their members’ rights and improve their work-
ing conditions. Some of them have drawn their 
inspiration from India’s Self Employed Wom-
en’s Association (SEWA), which was created 40 
years ago. In many cases, groups such as street 
vendors in Lima, Peru, or garbage collectors in 
Pune, India, may not only negotiate with gov-
ernment authorities but also resort to litigation 
in the courts. Waste pickers in Bogotá, Colom-
bia, organized to defend their right to provide 
services to municipalities (box 8.4). Street ven-
dors associations in Durban, South Africa, filed 
cases in court against the construction of malls 
employment in the public sector (where most 
unionized workers are) experienced deeper de-
clines in economic activity before the adoption 
of major reforms and slower recoveries after-
ward.36 This finding is consistent with the re-
forms being adopted late, and their implemen-
tation being watered-down. On the other hand, 
the level of minimum wages and social security 
benefits did not affect performance, suggesting 
that trade unions made a difference because of 
their political activities, more than because of 
their impact on labor costs. 
Trade unions organized around the employer- 
employee relationship are less suited to provid-
ing voice to those who do not work for a wage. 
The high incidence of self-employment in most 
developing countries, and the persistence of in-
formality more generally, have created impetus 
for innovative institutions for collective repre-
sentation. These institutions are different from 
traditional unions because the market imperfec-
Since the turn of the century, China has undergone important 
changes in labor policies, including enactment of new laws regard-
ing trade unions (in 2001) and employment promotion, labor con-
tracts, and labor dispute mediation and arbitration (in 2007). These 
changes have been accompanied by rapid growth in the number of 
unionized workers and workers covered by wage or collective 
agreements (more than 150 million at present). In addition to the 
spread of unionization and  collective agreements, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) has documented the gradual spread in 
the direct election of union representatives by workers. Such 
changes reflect a policy shift that “is intended to bring better pro-
tection of workers’ rights, to create a new balance between flexibil-
ity and security and to facilitate a dialogue between employers and 
workers on issues of mutual concern.”a
Another notable change over the past decade has been the 
introduction of local, sectoral-based collective bargaining agree-
ments. The first of these agreements was negotiated in 2003 in the 
wool-sweater manufacturing industry in the Xinhe district of Wen-
ling in Zhejiang province.b This is a district known as an example of 
transparency and local democracy. Since then, these agreements 
have been most prominent in Zhejiang, but have also spread to 
some other coastal provinces.c For the most part, local, sectoral-
BOX 8.3   New forms of collective bargaining are emerging in China
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. Lee and Liu 2011a; 2011b, 8.
b. Wei and others 2009. 
c.  The Xinhe district of Wenling has also led the country in increasing transparency in local budgeting through introducing public deliberation in the process. See Ministry of 
Finance of the People’s Republic of China 2011.
d.  workercn.cn 2011.
e. Liu 2010.
f. Liu 2010.
based bargaining has emerged where industries cluster around a 
district or village. By the end of 2010, this form of bargaining cov-
ered over 5 million workers through 73,000 agreements.d 
The spread of local, sectoral collective bargaining agreements 
has occurred against the backdrop of a vibrant private sector 
increasingly facing labor shortages and an inadequately regulated 
labor market that has led to many disruptive labor disputes. In 
some cases, these agreements appear to protect workers’ rights 
more effectively.e At the same time, the private sector can also ben-
efit from a more stable relationship with workers, a more reliable 
supply of labor, and more regular and transparent changes in labor 
costs. 
The forms of collective representation in China are diversifying, 
with government encouragement. Although evidence is only grad-
ually emerging about the consequences of these changes, some 
research suggests that sectoral bargaining at the district or local 
level holds the most promise.f Centralized “top-down” efforts have 
been made to spur the proliferation of these agreements, with lim-
ited success. But the spontaneous spread of this spatial organization 
of collective bargaining suggests that it matches well the interest of 
the private sector in coordinating the operation of industrial clus-
ters with the interest of workers to have voice in the workplace.
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works programs such as the Mahatma Gan-
dhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (MGNREGA), offering work to millions in 
rural India, to tailor-made life-skill courses for 
small groups of young participants in the Do-
minican Republic. All ALMPs strive to foster 
new job opportunities, often for those with the 
fewest chances in the labor market. 
A panorama of programs
Job search assistance. These are services provid-
ing information on job vacancies and jobseekers 
and offering counseling and placement support. 
Evaluations indicate that job search assistance 
can improve employment and earnings at a low 
cost—but only when job vacancies exist. By pro-
viding information and making the labor mar-
ket more meritocratic, more effective matching 
can have positive productivity effects. But job 
search assistance is less relevant in countries 
where a majority of the workers are farmers and 
self-employed.
In many high-income and some middle- 
income countries with largely formal labor mar-
kets, job search services have been overhauled in 
the past 10 years. Although public financing re-
mains the norm, private provision of services has 
become more common. Performance contracts 
are being used to create incentives for provid-
ers. These contracts must ensure that providers 
reach those in most need and do not concen-
and against harassment and confiscation of their 
inventories of goods by municipal authorities.37 
These nontraditional workers’ organizations 
are increasingly participating in global institu-
tions such as the ILO. For instance, the Interna-
tional Domestic Workers Network attended the 
International Labour Conference in 2009 in or-
der to prepare for discussion and vote on a new 
ILO convention on domestic work at the Inter-
national Labour Conferences in 2010 and 2011.38
Active labor market programs: 
Effective within limits
Active labor market programs (ALMPs) can 
improve the efficiency of job matching by 
transmitting information on job openings 
and worker characteristics between employ-
ers and jobseekers. They can fill the gap when 
employers or workers underinvest in training 
because of various market failures, and they 
can mitigate the impacts of economic down-
turns by providing workers with temporary 
employment or creating incentives for employ-
ers to hire. ALMPs are politically attractive for 
governments eager to do something about job 
creation.
The most common active labor market 
 programs are job search assistance, wage sub-
sidies, training, and public works.39 In terms 
of size, interventions range from huge public 
Waste pickers, or recicladores, in Colombia’s capital earn a living 
by  recycling metals, cardboard, paper, plastic, and glass and sell- 
ing them through intermediaries. Efficiency considerations aside, 
their experience shows how associations of informal workers can 
use legal frameworks to access rights. 
When reforms for the tendering of public services allowed 
municipal governments to give exclusive contracts to private com-
panies for collecting, transporting, and disposing waste and recy-
clables, the recicladores organized and filed legal claims. Organiza-
tions such as the Asociación de Recicladores de Bogotá (ARB), an 
umbrella association of groups representing more than 25,000 
waste pickers, played a key role in aggregating claims and taking 
cases forward. In making its case, the ARB appealed to the constitu-
tion’s provision of the “right to equality,” arguing that waste pickers 
BOX 8.4   Recicladores forced changes in Bogotá’s solid waste management policies
Source: Chen and others 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
need preferential treatment and judicial affirmative action in the 
tendering and bidding process for government contracts to man-
age waste.
In 2003, the Constitutional Court ruled that the municipal gov-
ernment’s tendering process for sanitation services had violated the 
basic rights of waste pickers. Subsequent cases have referred to 
constitutional provisions including the “right to survival” as an 
expression of the “right to life.” Article 11 of the constitution was 
invoked to argue the right to pursue waste picking as a livelihood 
and the “right to pursue business and trade.” Article 333 was invoked 
to argue that cooperatives of waste pickers, not just corporations, 
can compete in waste recycling markets. The most recent case in 
December 2011 halted a US$1.37 billion contract for the collection 
and removal of waste in the city.
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to demonstrate their skills, or the long-term 
unemployed who are at risk of suffering “scar-
ring” effects.43 But many studies show that they 
often do not have their intended effect of creat-
ing new jobs in a cost-effective fashion.44
The real costs of wage subsidies are often hard 
to calculate; the direct toll on the public purse 
is only part of the story. To access the subsidies, 
firms might replace ineligible workers with 
eligible ones or dismiss and then hire the same 
worker under the subsidy program. If firms 
would have hired anyway, the employment ef-
fect of a subsidy is zero. Design can help increase 
cost-effectiveness. Improvements in the target-
ing and other features of a subsidy program in 
Turkey reduced this “deadweight loss,” although 
somewhere between 25 and 50 percent of all 
subsidized jobs would have still been created 
without the subsidy.45 Proper cost accounting 
can reduce the estimated employment impact of 
wage subsidies by up to 90 percent.46 Aggregate 
employment effects are hence low at best. Alter-
native designs, especially to reach the young and 
low-skilled, can include a wage subsidy linked 
to other active labor market programs such as 
training.47 The Jóvenes programs and similar in-
trate only on those who are easy to place.40 Job 
search support is increasingly being integrated 
with a range of complementary services such 
as profiling to assess opportunities, life skills, or 
other training. “Activation” strategies requiring 
job seekers to be brisk, are also becoming more 
common. Ultimately, the success of job search 
services depends on the capacity of providers to 
reach out to employers’ needs.41 
Potentially game-changing technological in-
novations are now extending the reach of tra-
ditional intermediation.42 Mobile phones and 
the Internet have opened up possibilities for 
inclusive information access, connecting un-
registered firms and hard-to-reach youth. New 
actors, including both businesses and nonprofit 
organizations, have emerged and run services in 
various country settings (box 8.5). 
Wage subsidies. These are direct transfers to 
employers or reductions in their taxes or so-
cial contributions to encourage them to hire 
new workers or to keep employees who might 
otherwise be laid off. Wage subsidies work best 
when they are targeted to particular groups, 
such as young people who need an opportunity 
New technologies are revolutionizing how people connect with 
jobs. Mobile phones have spread widely and have penetrated 
low-income households around the world. Over 4 billion people 
have cell phone access, and 1.5 billion have regular access to the 
Internet.
Text messaging, voice, and mobile applications give jobseekers 
and employers access to information and job counseling  services 
that improve résumés and interview skills and establish networks. 
Voice-based services are particularly important for illiterate job-
seekers. Companies or nonprofit organizations such as Souktel, 
Assured Labor, Babajob, and Labournet, operating in places as 
diverse as Latin America, India, and the Middle East, have estab-
lished thriving job matching networks. Souktel, for example, has 
17,000 jobseekers and 600 companies registered in West Bank and 
Gaza alone. Sixty percent of registered employers reported they 
had cut recruiting time and costs by more than 50 percent. 
Some organizations, such as Assured Labor, specifically focus on 
services for middle- to low-wage workers, most without college 
degrees. Currently, Assured Labor has 150,000 registered jobseekers 
and 2,000 employers in Mexico. Similarly, Babajob and Labournet in 
India serve 200,000 and 100,000 jobseekers who can search for 
em ployment in databases containing 40,000 and 45,000 employers, 
respectively. Labournet is unique in that it serves the informal labor 
BOX 8.5   E-links to jobs: New technologies open new frontiers
Sources: Based on Selim 2012 for the World Development Report 2013 and Monitor Inclusive Markets 2011.
market, focusing on sectors such as construction and facility 
management. 
While these companies and organizations have been successful, 
others such as Konbit in Haiti and PULS in Pakistan had to overcome 
significant difficulties. Challenges have included attracting sufficient 
numbers of jobseekers and employers, building trust among users, 
and ensuring adequate assurance on the quality of jobseekers. In 
response, Konbit has tried to increase the number of users by part-
nering with a locally famous radio disk jockey and mobile phone pro-
vider to advertise its service. Through these efforts, the company 
was successful in attracting 10,000 jobseekers in one month.
The Internet also brings together jobseekers and employers 
through online platforms. The large and fast growing oDesk con-
nects about 350,000 companies (mainly small and medium enter-
prises) with individual contractors worldwide. From April to June 
2012, oDesk posted online close to 450,000 jobs and more than 
280,000 job applications. Jobs range from typing, web research, and 
translation to software development and back-office legal services. 
Wages range from US$1 to several hundred US$ per hour. While this 
new phenomenon has the potential to create many new jobs and 
generate substantial new wealth, online platforms generally serve 
people with specialized and technical skills, and as such, reach few of 
the most vulnerable.
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organizations allows, public training funds can 
be directed to private and nonprofit providers in 
competitive terms. Performance-based tender-
ing can create incentives for more relevant train-
ing, while contracting can be designed so that 
the toughest-to-reach groups do not lose out. In 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, and Slove-
nia, public employment services purchase train-
ing programs from various providers through 
public tenders.
Research shows that at least some training 
programs help build trust and civic engage-
ment, but information about how that happens 
is scant. In Tunisia, the inclusion of entrepre-
neurship training in education curricula reform 
improved participants’ optimism about the 
future.55 In the Dominican Republic, partici-
pants in the Juventud y Empleo program were 
more likely to have higher expectations for the 
future, higher job satisfaction, and more inten-
sive search attitudes.56 In northern Uganda, par-
ticipation in a comprehensive intervention that 
combined grants, vocational training, life skills, 
and psychosocial counseling was successful in 
increasing community participation.57
Public works. These programs offer short-term 
employment for wages or food. The evidence 
terventions in several Latin American countries 
have employed this model with positive results.48
The impact of wage subsidies tends to rise 
with tight targeting and the extent of the disad-
vantage of the beneficiary group. In Morocco, 
the Idmaj youth wage subsidy effectively eased 
labor market entry for beneficiaries.49 Argen-
tina provided wage subsidies to employers hir-
ing former participants in large public works 
programs. These workers exerted more effort 
in searching for jobs and were perceived as 
more trustworthy than other similar workers. 
That was true especially for women and young 
participants.50 But the narrower the focus, the 
higher the potential stigma effects. In Poland, 
men eligible for the wage subsidies were actually 
less likely to be employed.51 
Training for jobseekers. Training is the most 
widely used active labor market program. The 
growing body of impact evaluations underlines 
the importance of aligning the skills taught with 
labor demand. These evaluations show that 
positive benefits are not guaranteed and pro-
gram costs can be substantial. When programs 
are well conceived and implemented, however, 
they can benefit those furthest from jobs the 
most. In Latin American countries, and in tran-
sition economies such as Romania, youth and 
women record significantly higher success rates 
from training than do middle-aged men.52
Some design features are critical for suc-
cess. Integrated programs that include both on- 
the-job and classroom components pay off. 
Especially in developed and Latin American 
countries, training for job seekers now often 
follows this integrated model, sometimes with 
complementary services such as life skills train-
ing and counseling. Such combinations increase 
success rates (figure 8.3).53 The Jóvenes pro-
grams in Latin America, which combine life- 
skills and technical training with work experi-
ence, are a case in point. In Colombia, Jóvenes 
en Acción has increased employability of train-
ees, with an estimated rate of return of 13.5–25 
percent for female participants.54
In addition, providers need incentives to en-
sure that the training they offer is relevant for 
the needs of employers. Public training agencies 
often respond too slowly to changing demands 
from firms and jobseekers alike. Where a coun-
try’s institutional capacity and supply of training 
F I G U R E  8 . 3  Combining work and training increases the 
success rates of programs
Source: Fares and Puerto 2009.
Note: The figure shows the correlation coefficient between type of training and reported success of a 
program, with success defined as improving employment or earnings and being cost-effective. 
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many others have not succeeded in improv-
ing outcomes for participants. Moreover, while 
some programs are affordable, others are expen-
sive. Outcomes for ALMPs depend on their de-
sign but also on the institutional capacity of the 
country to provide services on a national scale 
and on a continuous basis. 
Program and policy design has been re-
vamped in many countries in recent years to 
achieve better performance. Public funds in-
creasingly finance private or nonprofit provi-
sion. In aging and formalizing countries, a forth-
coming attitude by jobseekers is increasingly 
required for them to remain eligible for unem-
ployment and other social benefits. Such activa-
tion measures create incentives for job search 
through participation in training or education 
courses, counseling and other employment ser-
vices, or public works. 
Many industrial countries are implement-
ing such policies through “one-stop shops” for 
the administration of both social benefits and 
ALMPs. Germany’s Jobcenter and the United 
Kingdom’s JobCentre Plus are examples. This 
integrated approach can in principle help work-
ers maintain or create links in society, albeit evi-
dence here is scant.63 The one-stop-shop model 
is gaining momentum in a number of develop-
ing countries as varied as Argentina, Azerbaijan, 
and Bulgaria.
Another important delivery reform is the 
growing investment in identifying the employ-
ment constraints faced by jobseekers. Obstacles 
to finding jobs may range from inadequate skills 
to health issues to difficulties balancing family 
responsibilities with work. Statistical profiling, 
where individual characteristics of beneficiaries 
are linked with likely constraints and appropri-
ate remedies, has become an important tool, 
especially in countries with significant institu-
tional capacity.64 Comprehensive programs like 
Chile Solidario invest heavily in linking ben-
eficiaries to the most appropriate programs de-
pending on their constraints.
In sum, ALMPs can make a difference, but 
they need to be well aligned to the needs of the 
labor market and designed to address the mar-
ket imperfections and institutional failures that 
hinder desired employment outcomes. Overall, 
evaluations of programs with youth partici-
pants show that developing countries have bet-
ter results than industrial countries in fostering 
employability. 65 The time horizon also matters: 
from impact evaluations shows that public 
works programs can be useful as a safety net, 
especially when targeted toward those in the 
greatest need.58 Careful setting of the wage level 
can be a self-targeting tool as has been done in 
Colombia’s Empleo en Acción and Argentina’s 
Trabajar programs. A similar targeting approach 
is being used in India’s MGNREGA program, 
which is notable not only for its scale and cost 
but also for its rights-based approach in guaran-
teeing employment (box 8.6). 
But seldom are public works a springboard 
for better jobs in the future. There is little evi-
dence that they help participants get a job after 
they leave the program.59 Compared with other 
ALMPs, public works programs have the lowest 
placement rates after completion and the high-
est costs per placement (figure 8.4). In Poland 
and Romania, public works have even adversely 
affected employability.60 Their productivity im-
pact, hence, tends to be very low at best.
To become a jobs ladder, public works pro-
grams need to go beyond poverty relief—a 
route some countries already are taking. In El 
Salvador and Papua New Guinea, participants 
in public works programs obtain additional 
technical and life-skills support. In Sierra Leone, 
the package comes with compulsory literacy 
and numeracy training, and in Liberia with life-
skills training. In Bangladesh, the beneficiaries 
of a rural employment scheme were referred to 
microfinance institutions; three years after the 
program closed, almost 80 percent were still 
self-employed in microenterprise activities.61 
But overall, very few public works programs 
succeed in improving the long-run employabil-
ity of participants. 
Public works have the potential to contribute 
to social cohesion though, especially in conflict-
affected countries. Soon after the conflict ended 
in Sierra Leone, a workfare program was launched 
to help rebuild infrastructure and provide short-
term employment opportunities to the poor and 
ex-combatants. Public works programs have also 
been launched and scaled up in Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Liberia, and the Republic of Yemen. 
In Serbia, participants felt socially more included 
as a result of a public works program.62
Striving to deliver better outcomes
While many programs have met expectations 
in countries with very different job challenges, 
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Public works programs have been actively used in India since the 
1950s. Yet no scheme has had a scope or budget on the scale of 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA). Launched in 2006 and implemented in three rollout 
phases, this program guarantees jobs to all districts with rural popu-
lations. The program aims to provide wage employment, improve 
the purchasing power of the rural poor, create assets for the com-
munity, strengthen natural resource management, and foster social 
and gender equality.a 
The program guarantees up to 100 days of employment a year to 
rural households with adult members willing to do unskilled work at 
a wage that is roughly the state statutory minimum wage.b Rural 
households wanting to participate in the program are required to 
register with their respective village council (gram  panchayats) and 
are issued a free job card with photographs of all members living in 
it. A job card holder may apply for employment and the government 
must provide it within 15 days. If the government fails to do so, in 
principle a daily unemployment allowance must be given to the 
applicant. Each household decides how to distribute employment 
among its members. Daily wages are based on the amount of work 
done and are paid directly into post office or bank accounts. The 
program includes some provision for adequate worksite facilities, 
including access to safe drinking water, shade, a first aid kit in case of 
accident, and crèches for women to leave their children. The pro-
gram encourages the participation of women through a mandate 
that they should account for 33 percent of employed workers. In 
addition, wages have to be equal for men and women, work has to 
be provided within five kilometers of the applicant’s village, and 
gender discrimination of any type is forbidden.c 
Most of the public works carried out under MGNREGA are labor 
intensive; contractors and machines are not allowed on work sites. 
Projects are meant to be chosen in open village meetings (gram sab-
has) to reflect village priorities, and local councils play a substantive 
role in planning, implementing, and monitoring them. The projects 
mainly focus on developing and maintaining community assets 
such as water conservation and water harvesting, irrigation chan-
nels, and rural roads. Drought proofing, flood control, and land 
development are also supported by the program. The central gov-
ernment bears 90 percent of the total cost, covering participants’ 
wages in full and 75 percent of materials and administrative 
expenses.d State governments pay for 25 percent of materials and 
administrative costs, the daily unemployment allowance, and the 
expenses of the state employment guarantee council. The act also 
calls for accountability through the use of information and commu-
nication technology, social audits, and third-party monitoring.e
BOX 8.6   The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act launched the biggest public 
works program in the world
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
Notes: GDP = gross domestic product.
a. Ministry of Rural Development 2012; World Bank 2011d.
b.  Ministry of Rural Development 2012. Initially, the statutory minimum wage varied 
across states. But in 2009, the central government delinked MGNREGA wages from 
the state-level statutory minimum and established a uniform daily wage of Rs. 100, 
which is adjustable for state-specific inflation. 
c. Ministry of Rural Development 2008; World Bank 2011d.
d. World Bank 2011b.
e. Ministry of Rural Development 2008.
f.  World Bank 2011b. In terms of budget as a percent of GDP, the MGNREGA is com-
parable to the largest cash transfers programs such as PROGRESA/Oportunidades 
(0.4 percent GDP in Mexico) or Bolsa Família (0.36 percent GDP in Brazil). Yet in 
terms of household coverage, the massive scale of the MGNREGA stands out. 
g.  Basu 2011; Basu, Chau, and Kanbur 2009; Dutta and others 2012; World Bank 2011b.
h. Dutta and others 2012.
i. Dutta and others 2012.
j. Ravi and Engler 2009.
k. World Bank 2011d.
During the program’s first phase in 2006–07, the budget outlay 
was US$2.49 billion. The program issued 37 million job cards and 
provided on average 43 person-days of work to 21 million house-
holds, totaling 0.9 billion person-days of work. Since then, the pro-
gram has expanded substantially in its coverage and budget. Dur-
ing fiscal year 2010–11, 55 million households were provided an 
average of 47 person-days of work, totaling 2.5 billion person-days 
at a cost of US$8.7 billion (0.51 percent of GDP).f That makes MGN-
REGA the largest workfare program in the world. Participation of the 
poor and vulnerable has been quite significant according to admin-
istrative data.
Critics argue that MGNREGA may be affecting the functioning of 
rural labor markets. By setting the wage paid by the program at 
roughly Rs 100 (US$1.80) a day, it may help to enforce a sort of mini-
mum wage for all casual rural work. If that is above the normal wage 
offered, the program may be altering the supply of casual labor and 
crowding out private employers.g It may also be constraining the 
process of labor reallocation out of agriculture and into more pro-
ductive sectors. 
The program has received considerable media attention be -
cause of alleged corruption, leakage, inadequate implementation, 
and the like. But few studies have attempted to assess its impact on 
rural households, rural labor markets, and productivity in a system-
atic way. Among the emerging evidence, a striking finding is that 
participation rates in areas where the program is most needed are 
not the highest.h Household surveys show evidence of rationing 
and unmet demand, limiting the poverty alleviation impact of the 
program. Yet, despite the rationing, the program is reaching poor 
people and attracting women and disadvantaged castes into the 
workforce.i One study in the state of Andhra Pradesh suggests the 
program increases expenditure on food and nonfood goods.j Evi-
dence of effects on wage levels in rural labor markets and on labor 
reallocation is still inconclusive. Studies on non-labor-market effects 
of the program are scant. 
Several challenges face the MGNREGA program. Addressing 
 leakage and transparency is one. The government has taken this 
challenge seriously, for example, through the adoption of 
 biometric-unique identification cards. Improving the quality and 
relevance of the communal assets to generate wider and long-term 
effects is another challenge. But the biggest one is ensuring that 
demand for work is met, and that wages are paid fully and on time. 
Also, if the program’s objective is to lift the poorest, the program 
should accommodate those whose physical conditions do not allow 
them to perform hard manual work.k
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cause individuals can influence that level of risk 
(moral hazard), markets do not provide ade-
quate risk pooling. Social insurance is a package 
of programs that can potentially address mar-
ket failures such as these. But social insurance 
programs are also shaped by history, values, and 
politics, so their design is not exclusively aimed 
at improving efficiency.
Some countries have introduced public un-
employment insurance systems to help work-
ers mitigate the risk of job loss. Many have 
disability insurance to cover situations where 
illness or injury affects employment opportu-
nities. Most countries also have social safety 
nets that, while not directly tied to employ-
ment status, can provide a coping mechanism 
when earnings are insufficient to meet a basic 
living standard.
Other social insurance programs not directly 
related to labor market risks are often tied to the 
jobs that people have or to their employment 
status. The most important of these are old-age 
pensions and health insurance programs that 
are financed by payroll taxes (social security 
contributions) from employers, employees, or 
both. These benefits are publicly provided be-
cause of imperfections in the insurance market, 
not in the labor market. However, they can have 
important consequences for the types of jobs 
that are created and thus for productivity. Fi-
nancing them through payroll taxes can affect 
labor demand and employer choices on whether 
to provide insurance coverage as part of the em-
ployment contract. It can also influence work-
ers’ behavior, including their incentives to take, 
keep, and switch jobs, to work in the formal or 
the informal sector, and to engage in work with 
higher risks and returns.
From a jobs perspective, the major questions 
are twofold: how to manage labor market risks 
and how to design the financing of other types 
of social insurance to have the most favorable 
impact on employment. 
Managing labor market risks
In low-income countries, managing income 
loss is more important than managing the loss 
of a job. When most people are engaged in sub-
sistence agriculture or are self-employed, open 
unemployment is not a common occurrence. In 
these contexts, social safety nets, including non-
F I G U R E  8 . 4  In Romania, public works programs have  
the lowest placement rate and highest 
placement costs
Source: Rodriguez-Planas and Benus 2010.
Note: The placement rate is the percentage of program participants who get a job.
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in industrial countries, training programs show 
their real value only in the medium to longer 
run.66 But a thorough understanding of the jobs 
challenge faced and a good sense of institutional 
capacities are critical when deciding whether a 
specific ALMP could be part of the solution.
Even with these innovations, expectations for 
active labor market programs need to be kept in 
check. Job search and intermediation can work 
only if firms are creating jobs. Short training 
courses cannot solve a fundamental problem in 
the education system. Activation incentives will 
be fruitless if deep-rooted discrimination causes 
people to withdraw from a job search. 
Social insurance: The challenge of 
expanding coverage
Many people are unable or unwilling to save 
against major risks such as job loss, disability, 
the death of a breadwinner, or aging without 
resources. Because insurers cannot accurately 
assess individual risk (adverse selection) and be-
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insurance-based programs. But insurance sav-
ings accounts do not allow for risk pooling, so 
that young workers and workers with frequent 
unemployment spells may not have adequate 
savings. To address this concern, some plans 
have a redistribution feature. For example, 
Chile’s program includes a Solidarity Fund to 
support workers whose account balances are 
too low to provide adequate income support 
during unemployment.
In all countries, disability is an important la-
bor market risk. According to recent estimates, 
the prevalence of disability is about 15 percent 
of the adult population. Rates are higher in low-
income countries and in aging societies.73 Al-
though many people with disabilities do work, 
inactivity rates among them are significantly 
higher than for the overall population. In in-
dustrial countries, the inactivity rate for persons 
with disabilities is about 2.5 times higher than it 
is for those without disability.74 
Disability benefits can provide important 
income protection, but costs have mounted in 
some countries and the benefits can create work 
disincentives among the general population. 
Accommodation of workplaces to persons with 
disabilities is an important strategy to encour-
age them to seek employment. Benefit systems 
can be adjusted to this end as well. In-work 
payments, time-limited benefits, and working 
tax credits are all being tested in the European 
Union.75 Countries without disability benefits 
need to emphasize accommodation and rely on 
social safety nets where disability is associated 
with poverty. 
Financing social insurance
A salient feature of social insurance programs 
in developing countries is their low coverage.76 
Across the world only 30 percent of workers 
have access to social insurance; in Africa and 
Asia, the share is less than 25 percent (map 8.1). 
On average, coverage rates are highest in aging 
societies and formalizing countries and low-
est in conflict-affected countries and agrarian 
economies, where less than 10 percent of the 
working population is enrolled in pension pro-
grams. In general, low-income workers are the 
least likely to be covered. In most countries in 
Latin America, coverage rates are below 10 per-
cent in the bottom income quintile but above 50 
contributory cash transfers and public works 
programs, can be critically important to cope 
with adverse shocks.67
However, when wage employment is more 
prevalent, unemployment insurance may be a 
higher priority. Unemployment insurance can 
provide income support to workers who lose 
their jobs and prevent individuals and house-
holds from falling into poverty. By supporting 
a job search, it can result in better matches and 
efficiency gains. Effective coverage is far from 
complete, however; according to the ILO, only 15 
percent of the unemployed worldwide received 
benefits during the recent financial crisis.68 An-
other concern with unemployment benefit sys-
tems is that they may reduce incentives to keep 
jobs, look for jobs, or accept a job offer. Most of 
the evidence on the incentive effects of unem-
ployment benefits comes from industrial coun-
tries and is mixed. Some studies find that more 
generous benefits—either through higher bene-
fit levels, or longer duration of benefits—can in-
crease either the length of unemployment or the 
unemployment rate.69 Exits from unemploy-
ment typically increase when benefits expire.70 
Over the past decade, unemployment insur-
ance eligibility and benefits have been reformed 
in a number of countries to reduce job search 
disincentives. While some disincentive effects 
are inherent in any unemployment insurance 
system, recent studies for Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, and Spain found that even if 
workers remain unemployed for a longer period 
of time, they are eventually able to find more sta-
ble jobs.71 Studies of unemployment insurance 
in Brazil found that benefits did not affect the 
duration of unemployment, except when work-
ers were moving from unemployment to self- 
employment. In this case the transition period 
was shorter, suggesting that benefits may have 
made it possible to start a new business.72 
Concerns about job search disincentives and 
hidden redistribution have led to some interest 
in unemployment insurance savings accounts. 
While the design can vary, workers make con-
tributions to the accounts and can draw money 
from them during unemployment spells. Any 
remaining balance is paid out when the worker 
retires and can be used as a pension top-up. 
Some countries, mainly in Latin America but 
also Austria and Jordan, have adopted these 
savings accounts as an alternative approach to 
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of financing social insurance in most coun-
tries. But whether payroll taxes are the optimal 
model, especially for developing countries, is in-
creasingly being questioned.79 Financing social 
insurance through payroll taxes may exacerbate 
the coverage problem by creating disincentives 
for the creation of formal sector jobs. 
Studies in countries such as Colombia, Tur-
key, and some transition countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia have found that in-
creases in the levels of social insurance contribu-
tions decreased formal employment, by varying 
amounts.80 By contributing to the “tax wedge” 
(the gap between total labor costs and take-
home pay), payroll taxes to fund social insurance 
can discourage both labor demand and the will-
ingness to work. The size of this tax wedge varies 
considerably across countries. It is most signifi-
cant in industrial countries, aging societies, and 
formalizing countries (figure 8.5).
However, a complete assessment needs to 
take into account the value that workers place 
on access to social insurance. Social contribu-
percent in the top quintile.77 Even if workers are 
covered on paper by social insurance, they may 
not necessarily receive benefits. Effective cover-
age can be reduced by fiscal pressures and low 
implementation capacity.
Coverage is low for multiple reasons, includ-
ing limited fiscal space to finance programs, low 
institutional capacity to manage the admin-
istration and delivery of benefits, fragmented 
schemes that cover certain groups and not oth-
ers, and program design providing weak incen-
tives to participate. In many developing coun-
tries, workers and firms in the informal sector 
generally fall outside the scope of programs. 
Reaching the self-employed, farmers, and mi-
grants is particularly difficult. Social insurance 
laws in many countries do not cover micro- and 
small enterprises, or these firms and farms opt 
out because they cannot afford minimum con-
tribution costs.78 Weak enforcement capacity 
also contributes to low coverage.
Payroll taxes (including contributions for so-
cial programs) have been the dominant means 
M A P  8 .1 Coverage of social insurance remains low in many countries
Source: World Development Report team based on Pallares-Miralles and others 2012, and administrative data from Canada.
Note: Coverage refers to number of people who have contributed (at least for one month in the reference year) to an earnings-related mandatory pension scheme, measured as a 
percentage of the labor force.
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.  
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
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tions should not be seen as a pure tax when con-
tributors attach value to the attendant benefits. 
And the evidence largely suggests that they do.81 
When asked to name the essential elements of a 
good job, people in China, Colombia, the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, and Sierra Leone rated access 
to pensions and health insurance equally with 
good wages. In those countries, workers who 
participate in social insurance systems indicated 
that they would require substantial income in-
creases to compensate for losing access to social 
insurance. At the same time, workers outside 
these systems would be willing to contribute a 
significant portion of their pay to participate 
(figure 8.6).82 But design and implementation 
matter, because the value attached to partici-
pation depends to a significant degree on the 
adequacy of benefits relative to contributions 
and the efficiency and transparency of benefits 
administration. The long-term credibility of the 
social insurance system is also a critical factor, 
especially in aging societies.
In trying to extend the coverage of social 
protection in developing countries, two impor-
tant issues need to be addressed. The first one 
is which risks are the priorities to address. In 
low-income countries, pensions for old-age and 
disability and basic health insurance are more 
important than unemployment insurance. 
The second issue is how to extend the prior-
ity programs to workers in the informal sector. 
Some countries are using technology in inno-
vative ways to make participation by informal 
sector workers easier (box 8.7). But technology 
alone cannot overcome the market imperfec-
tions and institutional failures that result in low 
social protection coverage. For instance, mo-
bile phones may make it easier for farmers to 
pay contributions toward health insurance, but 
those less prone to be ill may still choose not to 
enroll. This is why extending social protection 
coverage requires adequate regulations and re-
sources, in addition to modern “technology.” 
One approach is to run a parallel system for 
informal sector workers in conjunction with the 
contributory system. This approach addresses 
the coverage gap, but if the parallel system is 
funded out of general tax revenue, it discour-
ages enrollment in the contributory system and 
can hinder the development of the formal sec-
tor. These problems could be addressed to some 
F I G U R E  8 . 5  Labor taxes and social contributions vary 
across countries facing different jobs challenges
Source: World Bank 2011a.
Note: Labor tax and contributions measured as the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions on labor 
paid by businesses. 
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Well-designed social insurance and social 
protection systems have the potential to en-
hance the three transformations. Mitigating 
labor market distortions and covering priority 
risks can compensate for lost income; it can also 
contribute to subjective well-being by reduc-
ing uncertainty. Portability of benefits from 
one job to another and the capacity of systems 
to manage transitions can help workers move 
to higher-productivity jobs and encourage risk 
taking. And extending coverage can contribute 
to social cohesion through its role in building an 
encompassing social contract.85 
Innovative technology-based approaches are transforming the 
ways in which insurance and other cash benefits are provided. 
India’s new health insurance scheme for the poor uses biometric 
smart cards both to verify that households are eligible and to keep 
track of hospital procedures not involving cash payments. Almost 
30 million households now hold these smart cards. According to a 
recent report from the U.K. Department for International Develop-
ment, “evidence from South Africa, India, Kenya, and Liberia has 
demonstrated that electronic payment systems involving smart 
cards or mobile phones can significantly reduce costs and leakage.”a 
Another report, by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, finds 
significant reductions in transaction costs through electronic pay-
ments in Brazil and Colombia. These “front-end” applications help 
overcome several problems that have plagued service delivery in 
the past, including the need for beneficiaries to go long distances to 
obtain benefits and for middlemen to fill out forms. 
Many developing countries lack robust systems for identifying 
people, allowing fraud of various kinds, and preventing many 
among the poor from accessing social programs. In the Dominican 
Republic, for example, one-quarter of eligible beneficiaries for a 
poverty program could not participate because they lacked proper 
documents. Poor identification also hampers efforts to coordinate 
across government and donor-sponsored programs and leads to 
duplication of costs. To confront this challenge, a growing number 
of countries is moving to biometric technology. India’s unique iden-
tification program, known as Aadhaar, is the most ambitious so far, 
having collected digital fingerprints and iris scans for close to 200 
BOX 8.7   Modern technology can reduce social protection costs, leakage, and corruption
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Bold, Porteous, and Rotman 2012; Devereux and others 2007; DFID 2011; Gelb and Decker 2011; Palacios, Das, and  
Sun 2011. 
a. DFID 2011, 9.
million people. Applications such as mobile phones with fingerprint 
readers that would allow online verification of identity acceptable 
to service providers are now being piloted.
Less glamorous, but just as important, is the “back-end” part of 
social protection systems, which allows tracking of transactions on a 
regular basis and generation of key indicators and reports. The Man-
agement Information Systems (MIS) are arguably even more impor-
tant for complex social insurance programs, especially as popula-
tions age and noncommunicable diseases become more prevalent. 
Keeping track of work histories allows for a better alignment of pen-
sion benefits and social security contributions. Databases of medi-
cal histories support a more efficient design of health protocols and 
payments to health care providers. 
Information is no longer the sole domain of those administering 
the program, however. One of the applications of modern technol-
ogy with the most potential impact is citizen reporting of acts of 
corruption and negligence through social media. Massive mobile 
phone penetration has been an especially empowering tool.
Technology is not a panacea, however, and failed projects are 
common. In most cases, the technology is not matched with a 
re engineering of the processes involved. Other common problems 
include poor planning and procurement practices, asymmetric 
information between government and vendors, and lack of trained 
personnel to operate the systems after they are in place. Despite 
these problems, the future of social protection will inevitably 
include creative ways of applying new technology. 
extent by differentiating the level of benefits be-
tween the two systems and financing the parallel 
system on at least a partially contributory basis.83
Another approach is to partially subsidize 
participation by farmers and the self-employed 
in general social insurance programs. In Viet-
nam, those classified as poor get their health 
insurance cards fully paid by the budget, while 
the “near poor” get a 50 percent subsidy.84 This 
second approach may look similar to the previ-
ous one, as funding relies on general tax revenue 
too. But it has the advantage of not discourag-
ing formalization. From a social cohesion point 
of view it also allows building universal systems, 
rather than two-tier systems.
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where jobs have important productivity spill-
overs, the aggregate loss of output is then more 
than the sum of the losses in individual earn-
ings. Massive job losses can then lead to ghost 
towns and depressed regions, and this prospect 
suggests that the conventional wisdom may not 
always be right.
Turnover versus decoupling
Every day, jobs are created and destroyed. Work-
ers are hired and dismissed, or they quit their 
jobs and start their own businesses; meanwhile 
some firms close and others are born. In indus-
trial countries, this process of creative destruc-
tion affects around 15 percent of all jobs every 
year.86 In normal times, the probability of job 
loss for an individual is largely independent of 
the probability of job loss for another. And the 
probability of landing another job is also inde-
pendent of what happens to other workers. The 
employment shock is then what economists call 
“idiosyncratic.”
But there are exceptional times, when em-
ployment shocks are systemic. Then, a sustained 
decoupling of the normal process of job cre-
ation and job destruction occurs: jobs are lost 
in large numbers but not created at the same 
pace. This is what occurs in times of severe eco-
nomic crises, when a decline in economic activ-
ity affects a broad swath of firms and industries. 
Job destruction accelerates, often sharply, and 
job creation levels off or even decreases (figure 
8.7). This decoupling leads to unemployment in 
formalized economies and under-employment 
in less formalized ones.87 In many countries, 
droughts, floods, or other natural disasters can 
have a similar impact. After the sources of the 
crisis dissipate, job creation picks up and unem-
ployment or underemployment declines. The 
longer it takes for job creation to recover, the 
longer unemployment or under employment 
lasts.
Decoupling can also occur in times of mas-
sive structural change brought about by rapid 
technical progress (for example, the introduc-
tion of computers) or policy reforms (for exam-
Policies that protect people are usually hailed as 
being better than policies that protect jobs. Pro-
viding income support prevents large drops in 
consumption and mitigates the risk of poverty 
among households affected by unemployment, 
underemployment, or loss of labor earnings. 
Relying on transitional income support and, 
in some cases retraining programs, rather than 
measures to protect jobs allows for the realloca-
tion of labor, keeping up the process of creative 
destruction. Resources are thus allocated more 
efficiently and economic growth is enhanced. 
Preserving jobs that are no longer economi-
cally viable through government transfers and 
employment protection legislation prolongs an 
inefficient allocation of resources.
Moreover, job protection also entails a high 
risk of capture. It runs the danger of becom-
ing permanent rather than temporary, creating 
enduringly unproductive, subsidized jobs. The 
development experience is full of examples in 
which explicit job protection has led to little 
other than large rents for business owners and 
workers in the sectors that benefited from it, sti-
fling technological advance, structural change, 
and growth.
The conventional wisdom, then, argues 
against the protection of jobs. But in times 
when many jobs are lost or threatened at once 
and few are being created, such conventional 
wisdom needs to be revisited. The productivity 
of a protected job can still be higher than that 
of the alternative jobs the displaced worker may 
find. And the productivity gap may exceed the 
costs of keeping the job alive. This is likely to be 
the case when the alternative after displacement 
is to be jobless for a long period of time. In this 
case, in addition to the immediate loss in out-
put, prolonged unemployment can depreciate 
skills and undermine social cohesion. 
Importantly, it is the overall productivity of 
the job that needs to be considered, including its 
possible spillovers on the productivity of others. 
When people work together, or when they are 
connected through broader value chains, the 
loss of a large number of jobs may have ripple 
effects on productivity. In areas or activities 
QUeStION 8 Protecting workers or protecting jobs?
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Decoupling hurts
Protecting people should have primacy if shocks 
are idiosyncratic—if the employment disloca-
tion is limited and if turnover continues to be 
the norm. A variety of social protection mecha-
nisms exist that support people in their transi-
tion from one job to another. They concentrate 
on sustaining standards of living through unem-
ployment benefits and public transfers. Learning 
new skills or relocating to where job opportuni-
ties are can also play a role. By moving from an 
adversely affected activity to another job, there 
is a gain in output that over time outweighs the 
cost of the support mechanisms. Protecting peo-
ple is thus good for individuals and for society.
If massive decoupling occurs—through either 
a wider crisis or large-scale structural change— 
protecting workers will rarely be enough. Inter-
mediation services falter because jobs are sim-
ply not available. Training may help individual 
workers land a job, but it does not create many 
jobs at the aggregate level, because it does not 
ple, trade liberalization). Structural change can 
affect entire industries. In transition economies, 
such changes were enormous, as entire sectors 
economies had to cope with uncertainty and 
adapt to new incentives. Public sector restruc-
turing or the privatization of state-owned en-
terprises can cause a similar shock. In all these 
cases, unemployment and underemployment 
can be large and long-lasting. 
Losses in earnings and output are more per-
vasive with systemic shocks than with idiosyn-
cratic shocks. But sometimes these two types 
of employment shocks can overlap. The recent 
financial crisis has led to an unusually deep 
recession in many countries. In the United 
States, high unemployment rates have persisted, 
unemployment spells have lasted longer than 
usual, and new job creation is still sluggish four 
years after the beginning of the crisis.88 Some 
argue that the crisis is not a regular cyclical per-
turbation but the manifestation of a more en-
during shift caused by technological change and 
globalization.89
F I G U R E  8 . 7  Decoupling between job creation and job destruction was massive in the United 
States during recessions
Source: Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger 2012.
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In some circumstances, then, job protection 
can be considered. What is meant by that is not 
permanent restrictions on hiring and firing 
through employment protection legislation, but 
rather time-bound policy measures that miti-
gate job destruction. In other words, these are 
selectively used active labor market policies that 
promote job creation or sustain existing jobs. 
Several countries adopted policies of this sort 
during the recent recession; Germany, which has 
a long tradition with such policies, averted job 
losses through a coordinated reduction of hours 
of work (box 8.8). The United States also took 
measures to protect jobs during the recent reces-
sion, most notably by salvaging its auto indus-
try. But the United States relied mostly on ag-
gregate demand stimulation and on extensions 
of unemployment insurance to protect workers, 
rather than on measures to protect jobs. In rela-
tive terms, changes in employment and unem-
ployment in the United States were much larger 
than in Germany.94
The pitfalls of protecting jobs
There are examples in developing countries 
as well. Chile and Mexico introduced work-
sharing policies and compensatory subsidies 
to moderate the impact of the crisis. But these 
policies had a limited impact in their case. Given 
their novelty, they required new procedures that 
were difficult to implement quickly, resulting in 
very low take-up rates. More important, these 
policies are not well suited to countries where a 
large share of employment is informal, because 
they fail to reach the vast majority of employers. 
The experiences of Chile and Mexico, two coun-
tries with relatively high administrative capacity 
that have made progress in formalization, sug-
gest that the usefulness of work-sharing policies 
is limited in developing “countries.”
There are positive examples as well. The dif-
ferent ways in which China and many Latin 
American countries handled the restructur-
ing of their economies through the 1980s and 
1990s are telling. At the beginning of its reform 
process, China had hundreds of thousands of 
uncompetitive state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
But large-scale labor retrenchment would have 
pushed workers into even less productive jobs 
until the private sector developed sufficiently 
to absorb them. China thus supported its ail-
address the cyclical or structural causes of the 
employment shock. Income support through 
unemployment benefits and public transfers 
may suffer from inadequate funds or seriously 
affect fiscal accounts. Only sustained job cre-
ation can deal with the effects of decoupling, 
but even under the best of circumstances it may 
take several years to offset the employment de-
cline from a systemic shock. The question then 
is whether providing income support on a large 
scale for long periods of time is preferable to 
temporarily supporting employment, while job 
creation picks up.
The long-term consequences and costs of de-
coupling can be higher than is usually thought. 
During periods of massive structural change, 
the reallocation of workers out of declining 
 industries can lead to large output losses be-
cause little alternative employment is available. 
The productivity of jobs in declining indus-
tries may be low, but it can still be higher than 
the alternatives. Similarly, during crises, firms 
might not be insolvent but rather illiquid. Death 
of inherently solvent firms could cause loss of 
firm-specific human capital and intangible as-
sets, disruption of value chains, and damage 
to surrounding communities. While the provi-
sion of credit would be the preferred solution, 
identifying insolvent firms might not always be 
feasible and could be marred by transparency 
problems. Temporary job protection policies 
can be a workable alternative to provide a life-
line for struggling, but inherently solvent, firms.
Long-term unemployment can also erode 
skills and workforce attachment. Aptitudes and 
attitudes to perform a given occupation can be 
lost.90 “Scarring” can occur, with long-run con-
sequences for finding employment with similar 
earnings.91 Human capital and skills depreciate. 
Regardless of whether decoupling is the result of 
severe downturns or major structural changes, 
workers may enter a spiral of unappealing jobs 
and lower living standards. The potential costs 
might be particularly disruptive to social cohe-
sion. Social networks can be undone in ways 
that make it more difficult for the dislocated 
to reengage in work and even in other forms of 
social activity.92 Prolonged periods of high un-
employment are of particular concern because 
they can affect young people’s transition from 
school to work, and may lead to disenfranchise-
ment from society.93 
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industries that can coordinate to engage in rent 
seeking to secure permanent government sup-
port. If such policies are adopted, it is necessary 
to establish and enforce trigger rules and sun-
set clauses that define the extent and size of the 
protection. If the institutional prerequisites to 
ensure that support is temporary do not exist, 
or are not credible, job protection policies can 
be dangerous indeed. And they should not be 
considered at all if job losses do not result from 
a systemic employment shock, involving a large 
decoupling of job creation and job destruction. 
ing SOEs through access to banking credit while 
rapidly modernizing its economy, preventing 
social disruptions in the process.95 Latin Ameri-
can countries also embarked on the dismantling 
of inefficient industries that had developed un-
der import substitution policies. But they did so 
more abruptly. Sudden downsizing may have 
caused a more durable rise in informality and 
led to slower productivity growth.96 
The risk with job protection policies is that 
they can create permanent inefficiency, espe-
cially in countries with weak institutions. Job 
protection policies involve firms or even whole 
Kurzarbeit (which translates to “short work” or “reduced working 
hours”) has been used in Germany for a century. Under this pro-
gram, employees in participating firms can be asked to cut down on 
working hours with a commensurate reduction in compensation. 
The German government, through the Federal Employment 
Agency, covers a percentage of the ensuing wage loss. Participation 
of the firm is tied to the consent of the workers affected.a Thus there 
is an emphasis on social dialogue in the implementation of the pro-
gram. During economic downturns, German employers tend to 
respond by reducing the number of hours worked, thereby mitigat-
ing the loss in jobs.
More than a dozen countries have adopted programs for 
reduced working hours based on the general kurzarbeit model but 
involving a variety of designs and regulations.b The countries 
where these programs were in place before the global economic 
crisis experienced substantial increases in take-up rates during the 
2008–09 period.
As a response to the crisis, several countries implementing a 
work-share program increased the percentage of wages covered, 
extended benefit duration, and relaxed the criteria for qualifying for 
the program. In Germany, the period during which firms could 
request subsidies was extended from 6 to 24 months; the govern-
ment coverage of social insurance costs was increased to 50 per-
cent; temporary help workers were made eligible; and the program 
was allowed to cover up to 67 percent of wage losses incurred by 
BOX 8.8   Kurzarbeit has become a new word in labor market policies
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a. If the adoption of the work-share program was foreseen in a collective agreement, the consent of the employees is not necessary; see Eurofound 2009.
b.  These are Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, and Turkey. See Hijzen 
and Venn 2011
c. Burda and Hunt 2011.
d. Cahuc and Carcillo 2011.
e. Cahuc and Carcillo 2011.
f. Robalino and Banerji 2009.
affected employees.c It is estimated that more than 1 percent of per-
manent jobs were saved in Germany through kurzarbeit.d In 2009, 
more than 3 percent of the labor force was covered by the 
program. 
The program is touted as beneficial in that it is less expensive for 
government to contribute funds toward paying the lost hours of 
work to the employee than to pay unemployment benefits. From 
the point of view of the employer, it helps retain skilled staff and 
reduces churning and retraining costs, thus maintaining firm pro-
ductivity. From the perspective of the employee, the scheme pre-
vents unemployment and the problems that come with it such as 
loss of income, depreciation of skills, decrease in life satisfaction, 
and insecurity. From the societal perspective, it cushions the impact 
of the economic downturn and spreads it more evenly across the 
labor force.
However, work-share programs only benefit formal sector 
employees, and not even all of them. The kurzarbeit is effective in 
saving permanent jobs but has no significant impact on temporary 
employment or on the hours worked by temporary workers.e Work-
share programs are also more effective in countries with less flexible 
labor market regulations, where take-up rates are higher.f Further-
more, long-term reliance on this type of program can lead to signifi-
cant delays in necessary labor reallocation and therefore could hin-
der growth and productivity in the medium term.
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Chapter 9
A prerequisite for improved living stan-dards is a policy environment conducive to private-sector-led job creation. Macro - 
economic stability, an enabling business envi-
ronment, human capital, and the rule of law are 
all necessary ingredients. Adequate macroeco-
nomic policies mitigate aggregate fluctuations 
and keep key relative prices aligned. The busi-
ness environment provides the basic public 
goods needed for the private sector to  operate: 
infrastructure, access to finance, and sound reg-
ulation. Human capital is formed through good 
nutrition, health, and education that builds hu-
man skills. The rule of law ensures the enforce-
ment of contracts; it also includes the progressive 
realization of rights to avoid a situation where 
growth coexists with unacceptable forms of work. 
These are the fundamentals on which policies for 
jobs rest (figure 9.1). 
Fundamentals alone may not be enough 
to facilitate job creation and address the jobs 
 challenges faced by many developing countries. 
Labor policies need to be set within a sensible 
range—a plateau that avoids two cliffs: one is 
the misguided intervention that clogs the cre-
ation of jobs in cities and in global value chains; 
the other, the lack of voice and social protection 
especially for the most vulnerable. 
Markets might work without much friction 
but that may not be sufficient to make small-
holder farming more productive in agrarian 
economies, or to generate enough employment 
opportunities for young men in conflict- affected 
countries.
An active role of government, however, needs 
to be carefully considered. Jobs are mainly cre-
ated by the private sector with government 
intervention justified when individual incen-
tives are misaligned with social goals—when, 
for example, employment is not rewarding for 
women, when young people are “queuing” to 
be civil servants, when cities are too congested 
to productively absorb more rural migrants, or 
when logistics costs are too high for domestic 
firms to engage in international trade. In these 
cases, government policy should aim to remove 
the constraints that prevent individuals, farms, 
and firms from making the best choices for so-
ciety. If constraints cannot be precisely identi-
fied, or reforms are not politically feasible, poli-
cies can aim at offsetting the constraints rather 
than relieving them directly. In most cases, the 
policies to create good jobs for development lie 
outside of the labor market.
Domestic policies for jobs are part of the so-
lution, but there is also scope for international 
coordination. Rights are a global public good—
their violation in one country harms the world. 
But policies for job creation in one country can 
affect employment and earnings in another, 
positively or negatively, while migration policies 
can generate opportunities abroad or shut them 
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Fundamentals need to be in place, and constraints to the creation  
of jobs with high development payoffs need to be removed or offset.  
Policy coordination across borders can help.
 Beyond labor policies  293
on the composition of employment. Economic 
downturns lead to transitions to informal em-
ployment or to household-based activities, and 
not necessarily to joblessness. Hence, research 
focuses on how macroeconomic fluctuations af-
fect the share of informal employment, rather 
than the unemployment rate.3 Country case 
studies of the impact of the global crisis have 
confirmed the resilience of employment in de-
veloping countries. But macroeconomic sta-
bility is not less relevant there: while aggregate 
fluctuations do not greatly affect the number of 
workers employed, they do affect the earnings 
of those at work as well as their access to basic 
social protection instruments.4
Macroeconomic instability is often the out-
come of unsustainable budget deficits and lax 
monetary policy. In the 1980s, Brazil plunged 
into a debt and high-inflation crisis that slashed 
its economic growth and halved the share of ex-
ports in its GDP. Triggered by high international 
interest rates in the late 1970s, the crisis then 
was compounded by the difficulty of keeping 
spending by subnational governments in check. 
Tight budgets and rigid monetary policy rules 
may not be a magic wand, however. Budget defi-
cits are more or less worrisome depending on 
how quickly an economy is growing, whereas 
down. Labor standards, rules for international 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
migration agreements are among the instru-
ments available to manage these international 
spillovers. Inter national organizations have a role 
to play  in coordinating the important global proj-
ect of  producing and using high-quality data on 
jobs, on which sound policy making must rest.
FUNDAMENTALS
LABOR 
POLICIES
PRIORITIES
Establishing the fundamentals
A vast majority of jobs are created by the pri-
vate sector—in formal sector firms as well as in 
microenterprises and farms. The relevant condi-
tions for private sector investment and job cre-
ation are macroeconomic stability, an enabling 
business environment, human capital, and the 
rule of law. 
Macroeconomic stability
In its assessment of the policy ingredients of 
growth strategies across 13 successful develop-
ing countries, the Commission on Employment 
and Growth noted: “No economy can flour-
ish in the midst of macroeconomic instability. 
Wild fluctuations in the price level, the exchange 
rate, the interest rate, or the tax burden serve 
as a major deterrent to private investment, the 
proximate driver of growth.”1 Macroeconomic 
instability also affects employment and earnings 
in the short run. According to a recent estimate, 
a 1 percent decline in gross domestic product 
(GDP) is associated with an increase in the 
unemployment rate of 0.19 percentage point 
in Japan, 0.45 in the United States, and 0.85 in 
Spain.2
In developing countries, where income sup-
port mechanisms are more limited, the short-
term impact of macroeconomic instability is of-
ten not so much on open unemployment as it is 
F I G U R E  9.1  Three distinct layers of policies are needed
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
LABOR POLICIES
FUNDAMENTALS
PRIORITIES
Know your jobs challenge
Remove or offset the constraints
Stay on the efficiency plateau
Avoid misguided interventions
Provide voice and extend protection
Macroeconomic stability
An enabling business environment
Human capital
Rule of law and respect for rights
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tional markets and global value chains.10 A case 
has even been made in favor of currency under-
valuation, on the grounds that the export sec-
tors of developing countries suffer dispropor-
tionately from institutional failures and market 
imperfections.11 However, not all countries in 
the world can simultaneously have an under-
valued currency. And while the argument that 
jobs integrated with world markets have posi-
tive growth spillovers is sensible, these jobs are 
not necessarily the ones with the highest devel-
opment payoffs. Different countries have dif-
ferent jobs agendas, from creating employment 
opportunities for women to supporting the de-
velopment of jobs in cities. The exchange rate is 
only one instrument and would seldom be able 
to deliver on such diverse agendas.
An enabling business environment
Across firms and countries at varying levels of 
development, the most important constraints 
on formal private sector businesses are remark-
ably consistent: access to finance, infrastructure, 
and aspects of regulation including taxation and 
unfair competition (figure 9.2). Skills shortages 
are also key, but mainly in the case of large firms 
and especially in richer countries.
Access to finance provides firms with the 
ability to expand, to invest in new technologies, 
or to smooth cash flow over time.12 Financial 
markets also play an important role in the al-
location of resources toward more productive 
uses.13 Transparency within the financial sector 
avoids resources being channeled to those with 
political connections or economic power, and 
it also supports financial inclusion. Expanded 
credit registries keeping track of positive as well 
as negative episodes in debtors’ histories help 
people demonstrate that they are creditworthy. 
But regulatory oversight is needed to ensure 
transparency and competition in the alloca-
tion of funds. The financial crisis of 2008 has 
reopened heated debates about the appropriate 
level of regulation of the financial sector and the 
need to balance prudence and stability with in-
novation and inclusion. 
Access to affordable infrastructure of reason-
able quality is, often, another top constraint to 
firm growth and job creation. Electricity en-
ables the use of more sophisticated technology. 
It also frees up time from domestic chores; in 
the independence of central banks needs to 
be weighed against the overall coherence of a 
development strategy. An assessment of the 
soundness of macroeconomic management re-
quires taking account of the impact of fiscal and 
monetary policies on economic growth.5
Not all macroeconomic instability is self- 
inflicted, however. Turbulence may result from 
shocks over which countries have little con-
trol, from natural disasters to crises originating 
abroad. Precautionary policies can be adopted 
to cushion those shocks if and when they oc-
cur. But most often there is a need to respond 
with short-term stimulus or adjustment pack-
ages. The effectiveness of these responses is a 
matter of controversy. A recent study based on 
the experience of 29 aid-dependent countries 
estimates that GDP increases by close to 0.5 
percentage points for every percentage point of 
GDP in additional government spending. This 
so-called multiplier effect is substantially lower 
than in the United States, where a range between 
0.8 and 1.5 is considered plausible.6
Wild fluctuations are only one way in which 
the macroeconomic context can adversely affect 
employment and earnings. The misalignment of 
key relative prices is another. Surges in a coun-
try’s foreign exchange earnings often lead to an 
overvaluation of its currency, making imports 
more affordable and exports less competitive. 
Resource-rich countries in the developing world 
face similar currency appreciation pressures.7 
The commodity booms of the last few years 
have only strengthened these pressures. Cur-
rency overvaluation can also happen in coun-
tries where large volumes of foreign assistance 
are needed to jump-start development, cope 
with natural disasters, or facilitate recovery af-
ter a conflict. In Afghanistan, for instance, civil-
ian aid from multilateral and bilateral donors 
was estimated at around 40 percent of GDP in 
2010/11.8 Currency overvaluation is a concern 
for many other countries where foreign aid does 
not reach the levels in Afghanistan but still funds 
a significant fraction of the budget. An analysis of 
83 developing countries between 1970 and 2004 
confirms that aid fosters growth (albeit with de-
creasing returns) but induces overvaluation and 
has a negative impact on export diversification.9
Avoiding exchange rate misalignment is nec-
essary to sustain a vibrant export sector and 
hence create jobs that are connected to interna-
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terms and in time needed to comply. Steps taken 
to meet requirements or to pay fees are a burden 
to businesses, as are delays in receiving permits 
or licenses. The time it takes to comply with 
regulations or to receive permits varies greatly 
across firms in the same location, suggesting 
discretionary power and corruption.19 Beyond 
these broader cost measures, regulations affect 
the types of opportunities that are available and 
how widely they are available. Regulations can 
relieve or exacerbate uncertainty and corrup-
tion, but they can also have a deeper influence 
on the degree of competition and thus the struc-
ture of industries in the economy. 
Because business regulations affect the de-
gree of competition, they shape the pressures to 
innovate and increase productivity. Competi-
tion contributes to the reallocation of resources 
from inefficient activities to more productive 
ones. Regulations that serve to protect an in-
dustry or deter new entrants can be particularly 
costly in terms of forgone output and employ-
ment growth.20 Across countries, regulations 
on business entry are inversely correlated with 
productivity and firm creation, with stronger 
effects in sectors that tend to have higher turn-
over rates.21 Easing entry requirements helped 
increase business registration and employ-
ment and drove down prices for consumers in 
Mexico. The effect was achieved largely through 
creation of new firms rather than formalization 
of existing informal firms.22 Combining relaxed 
entry requirements with other regulatory re-
forms, such as investment promotion and trade 
rural areas, it can significantly increase women’s 
employment.14 Telecommunications allows for 
better information flows among suppliers, pro-
ducers, and customers, and the Internet and 
mobile technology facilitate the spread of new 
ideas. Roads provide greater access to markets, 
as do ports and airports.15
In many low-income countries, poor-quality 
infrastructure is an especially severe challenge. 
Part of the problem stems from how infrastruc-
ture services are regulated, however, and not 
only from insufficient resources to build ad-
ditional facilities and roads. By one estimate, 
improved infrastructure was responsible for 
more than half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s recent 
growth.16 But efficiency improvements stem-
ming from better management of spending and 
maintenance, pricing policies, and regulations 
would be needed to close a significant portion of 
the remaining gap in infrastructure services. In 
many countries and infrastructure sub-sectors, 
monopolies—based on political connections—
have resulted in lower quantities of services be-
ing provided, at higher prices and of lower qual-
ity than in areas where competition has been 
allowed to thrive.17 
Regulation is another area that influences 
the opportunities for businesses to grow. Some 
regulations determine the rules of the game, en-
couraging—or discouraging—certain activities. 
Others affect firms at various stages of their life 
cycle, from getting started, to enforcing con-
tracts, to closing down.18 Regulations impact 
on the cost of doing business, both in monetary 
F I G U R E  9. 2 Finance and electricity are among the top constraints faced by formal private enterprises
Source: IFC, forthcoming.
Note: The analysis is based on World Bank enterprise surveys covering 46,556 enterprises in 106 countries. Small firms have fewer than 20 employees, medium firms have 21–99, 
and large firms 100 and more.
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stimulation through a nurturing environment 
from the womb through the first years of life 
raises significantly the returns to later educa-
tion investments.30 Supporting young children 
born into poverty during these crucial develop-
ment phases can significantly improve equal-
ity of opportunities. The later the support, the 
more difficult and costly it is to put that child 
back on a normal developmental trajectory. In 
Romania, during the early transition years, the 
cognitive performance of orphans was lower 
the older they were when they left state orphan-
ages. Social, emotional, and cognitive isolation 
was common in these facilities.31
While foundations are laid early on, hu-
man capital and skills continue to be formed 
throughout childhood, young adulthood, and 
working life. Schooling is fundamental for the 
further development of cognitive and social 
skills until the end of adolescence, but learning 
abilities continue to be shaped by physical and 
mental health. Social skills remain malleable 
through adolescence and early adult years.32 
Young adults can continue into more special-
ized skill-building, including at tertiary levels, 
but their success depends on whether they have 
acquired the generic skills needed to learn and 
adapt to different tasks and problem- solving en-
vironments. These abilities are especially impor-
tant in more dynamic economies.
Unfortunately, the evidence shows that many 
countries are falling short in building up the 
human capital of their children and youth. The 
quality of delivery systems has often failed to 
keep pace with the expansion of access to basic 
social services. In education, for example, by 
2010, the net primary school enrollment rate in 
low-income countries had reached 80 percent, 
primary school completion was at 68 percent, 
and gross lower secondary school enrollment 
exceeded 50 percent.33 But learning outcomes 
were clearly lagging behind. In a large major-
ity of developing countries that took part in 
the Programme for International Student As-
sessment (PISA) in 2009, at least 20 percent of 
15-year-old students were functionally illiterate. 
For a number of countries, including Indonesia, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Tuni-
sia, and the two Indian states that participated in 
the PISA, more than 60 percent of 15-year-old 
students failed to reach this level. Similarly, early 
reading tests taken at the end of second grade 
logistics, tends to be more effective than simply 
easing entry.23
Human capital
Good nutrition, health, and education outcomes 
are development goals in themselves, because 
they directly improve people’s lives. But they 
also equip people for productive employment 
and open job opportunities—and through this 
employment channel, human capital drives eco-
nomic and social advances. According to the 
Commission on Growth and Development, “ev-
ery country that sustained high growth for long 
periods put substantial efforts into schooling its 
citizens and deepening its human capital.”24 
Connections between human capital and 
jobs are manifold. There is robust evidence 
from around the world that each additional year 
of schooling raises labor earnings substantially, 
and that this earnings premium reflects the 
higher productivity of more educated workers.25 
Together, nutrition, health, and education form 
skills and abilities that have been clearly linked 
to productivity growth and poverty reduction 
in the medium to longer run.26 Better health 
also brings, directly, higher labor productivity. 
For example, where malaria is endemic, work-
ers can expect to suffer an average of two bouts 
of fever each year, losing 5 to 10 working days 
each time.27 In rural Ethiopia, onchocercal skin 
disease lowers the earnings of affected workers 
by 10 to 15 percent.28 As such, human capital 
becomes a fundamental ingredient for desirable 
job outcomes. 
Human capital formation is cumulative. It is 
a life-cycle process that proceeds in consecutive 
stages, each of them building on the previous 
one. Of crucial importance are adequate health 
and nutrition during the first 1,000 days of life, 
from inception to two years of age. Brain devel-
opment in this period affects physical health, 
learning abilities, and social behavior through-
out life.29 In the early years, a child develops 
all the basic brain and physiological structures 
upon which later growth and learning depend. 
Stunting in early childhood has been proven to 
have a significant negative effect on cognitive 
development; iodine deficiency can lead to poor 
brain development; and insufficient cognitive 
stimulation reduces learning abilities. Ensur-
ing adequate nutrition, health, and cognitive 
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forcing the rules that govern transactions and 
helping ensure that the costs and benefits of 
growth are fairly distributed.42 The justice sys-
tem can enforce contracts, reduce transaction 
costs for firms, and create a safe and more pre-
dictable business environment.43 The presence 
of effective courts increases the willingness of 
firms to invest.44 
An institutional environment that respects 
rights is another integral part of the rule of law. 
The International Labour Organization’s core 
labor standards provide guidance on what is un-
acceptable in the areas of child labor, forced la-
bor, discrimination, and freedom of association 
and collective bargaining.45 Health and safety 
at work also necessitate attention by govern-
ments and employers. Ensuring that standards 
are enforced in practice requires providing ac-
cess to information to workers and employers. 
Information can increase the extent to which 
workers are able and willing to hold employ-
ers and intermediaries accountable. It can also 
help ensure that all parties involved are aware of 
their obligations. Strengthening institutions for 
enforcement and grievance redress is another 
necessary building block.
revealed that, in diverse countries, a significant 
share of students were unable to read a single 
word: around 30 percent in Honduran rural 
schools, 50 percent in The Gambia and more 
than 80 percent in Mali.34 Enrollment numbers, 
hence, do not necessarily signal actual learning 
and skill building.
The rule of law and respect for rights
Across countries, the presence of institutions 
that uphold the rule of law is associated with 
higher levels of development (figure 9.3).35 
Clear property rights and institutional mecha-
nisms that strengthen governance can create a 
climate in which firms are willing to make in-
vestments, enter into contracts, and create new 
jobs. In such a climate, individuals may be more 
inclined to take the risks needed to set up new 
businesses and become entrepreneurs.36 
The link between respect for property and de-
velopment is well established.37 Property rights 
foster private sector growth by allowing firms 
to invest without fearing that their assets will 
be stolen or confiscated. The ability to enforce 
contracts widens the circle of potential suppliers 
and customers, as personal connections become 
less important in establishing trust.38 Entre-
preneurs who believe their property rights are 
secure reinvest more of their profits than those 
who do not.39 Increasing the security of prop-
erty rights often involves setting up effective 
titling and registration processes. Mechanisms 
for valuing and protecting other types of prop-
erty, including legislation governing intellectual 
property, are also important.
Rampant crime and violence can be devas-
tating for development and for job creation.40 
Lawlessness can drive firms away and discourage 
domestic and foreign investment. Across coun-
tries, investment climate surveys consistently 
find crime and corruption to be obstacles to 
conducting business.41 Inclusive and responsive 
institutions, which lead to a reduction of violent 
behavior, increase safety and security. Strength-
ening efforts to detect and prosecute white-collar 
crime and malfeasance can reduce corruption. 
An effective judicial system is a key ingredi-
ent for enforcing property rights and reducing 
crime and corruption. An independent, ac-
countable, and fair judiciary can contribute to 
private sector growth and job creation by en-
Sources: World Development Indicators 2010 (database) World Bank, Washington, DC; World Governance 
Indicators 2010.
Note:  GDP = gross domestic product. The rule of law score is a measure of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
F I G U R E  9. 3  The rule of law is associated with development
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phy, endowments, and institutions. In some 
circumstances, there are no constraints to the 
emergence of good jobs for development and 
no specific policy is needed. In others, govern-
ments can support the private sector in creating 
more of these jobs. Sometimes removing exist-
ing constraints that impede the creation of jobs 
with high development payoffs is possible. In 
other cases, policies may need to circumvent the 
constraints.
A simple approach to setting policy priori-
ties follows a series of steps. First, the country 
context must be assessed and the particular jobs 
challenge or challenges it faces must be identi-
fied. The second step is examining whether the 
jobs with the highest development payoffs are 
really the most attractive to individuals or the 
most profitable for firms. When incentives are 
aligned—with the individual and social value 
of jobs equal—there should be no shortage of 
good jobs for development and intervention 
is not needed. The third step is determining 
whether the institutional failures and market 
imperfections leading to misaligned incentives 
can be pinpointed or not. The fourth step is un-
derstanding whether politically feasible reforms 
can remove or correct those failures and imper-
fections. If not, the last step involves assessing 
whether incentives should be realigned through 
other policies (figure 9.4).
Step one: What are good jobs for development? 
 Assessing the development payoffs from jobs 
in a particular country context is an important 
first step in identifying priorities. The nature of 
the jobs with the greatest payoffs varies with the 
characteristics of the country, including its phase 
of development, endowments, and institutions. 
Jobs challenges differ in agrarian economies, 
conflict-affected countries, resource-rich coun-
tries, and countries with high youth unemploy-
ment, as well as in other settings. And the jobs 
with the greatest development impact differ as 
well, resulting in diverse jobs agendas. 
Step two: Are there enough of these jobs? A coun-
try may or may not face constraints in creating 
good jobs for development. For example, light 
manufacturing can offer employment oppor-
tunities for women, with significant impacts on 
reducing poverty. If a boom is under way, the 
development payoff of new manufacturing jobs 
Ensuring that rights and standards are up-
held requires a focus not only on implement-
ing acquired rights but also on expanding their 
reach to workers in jobs that fall outside of for-
mal laws and regulations. Associations of infor-
mal workers can play a key role in informing 
them, helping them access legal mechanisms, 
and offering them collective voice. But often, 
information alone is not enough: garment 
workers in the Lao People’s Democratic Repub-
lic reported that they were told about their basic 
conditions of employment, but they did not al-
ways understand the details, nor how to enforce 
their rights.46 Not only can organizations of 
informal workers support workers in learning 
about and accessing rights and standards, but 
they can also bring cases to court on behalf of 
individuals and groups.47 
The quality of institutions for accountability 
affects the extent to which labor rights are en-
forced in practice.48 Because court proceedings 
are often lengthy and costly, alternative mecha-
nisms for resolving disputes, including concilia-
tion, mediation, and arbitration prior to court 
hearings can expand access to justice and griev-
ance redress.49 These alternative mechanisms 
are especially valuable to workers who cannot 
access the court system due to high costs or 
other barriers.
FUNDAMENTALS
LABOR 
POLICIES
PRIORITIES
Setting policy priorities for jobs
In addition to ensuring that the fundamentals 
are in place and that labor policies are set in a 
sensible range, decision makers can help real-
ize the development payoffs that come from 
jobs. Some jobs do more than others for living 
standards, productivity, and social cohesion. 
What those jobs are depends on the country 
context—its level of development, demogra-
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footprint and pollution created by various types 
of jobs. And analysis of values surveys can dis-
cover which types of jobs link to networks and 
provide social identity.
Step three: Can the constraints be identified? 
Understanding why the individual and social 
values of specific types of jobs differ is next. 
Gaps of this sort indicate the presence of unex-
ploited spillovers from jobs. The gaps typically 
arise from market imperfections and institu-
tional failures that cause people to work in jobs 
that are suboptimal from a social point of view, 
lead firms to create jobs that are not as good for 
development as they could be, or connect peo-
ple less through jobs than would be socially de-
sirable. But identifying where those constraints 
are is not always easy. For instance, a broad set 
of cultural, social, and economic forces may 
result in insufficient employment opportuni-
ties for women. Similarly, it may be difficult to 
pinpoint whether the key obstacles to making 
cities functional lie in the land market, or in the 
institutional arrangements to coordinate urban 
development, or in the ability to raise revenue to 
finance infrastructure.
might materialize. If so, it is difficult to justify 
government interventions beyond establishing 
the fundamentals and adopting adequate labor 
policies.
Misaligned incentives exist when good jobs 
for development are not rewarding enough to 
individuals or profitable enough to farms and 
firms. Data and analysis can be used to identify 
gaps between the individual and the social value 
of jobs. Arguably, many key areas in develop-
ment economics deal with these gaps. For in-
stance, the tools of public finance can be applied 
to measure the tax burden on capital and labor 
and to assess the extent of cross-subsidization 
between individuals or firms. Labor economics 
methods can be used to uncover gaps between 
the actual earnings of specific groups of work-
ers and their potential earnings. Poverty analy-
ses help in identifying the kinds of jobs that are 
more likely to provide opportunities to the poor, 
or the locations where job creation would have a 
greater impact on poverty reduction. Productiv-
ity studies can help quantify the spillovers from 
employment in FDI companies, in firms con-
nected to global markets, or in functional cities. 
Environmental studies shed light on the carbon 
F I G U R E  9. 4 A decision tree can help set policy priorities 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
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and physical infrastructure (box 9.1). Simi-
larly, if politically charged regulations slow the 
reallocation of labor toward more productive 
activities, urban infrastructure and logistics 
could enhance the attractiveness of jobs in cit-
ies and jobs connected to world markets (ques-
tion 9). But there are cases when constraints can 
neither be removed nor offset. An engagement 
strategy involving a deeper analysis of the op-
tions and buy-in by key stakeholders is needed 
then.
Policy making to remove or offset constraints 
has to be selective and supported by good public 
finance principles. The costs and benefits of pol-
icy options need to be assessed, but the calcula-
tions are different when the overall development 
impact is the guiding objective. But they are also 
more difficult. For instance, an employment 
program for ex-combatants in a conflict-affected 
country could be assessed in terms of whether 
the earnings gains of participants justify the pro-
Step four: Can the restraints be removed? If the 
institutional failures and market imperfections 
leading to misaligned incentives can be identi-
fied, reforms should be considered. It is a good 
economic principle to target reforms to the 
failures and imperfections at the root of the 
problem. Where reforms are technically and po-
litically feasible, policy makers should directly 
tackle the major constraints hindering the cre-
ation of more good jobs for development.
Step five: Can the constraints be offset? Reforms 
might not be feasible, technically or politi-
cally. Or perhaps the constraints for jobs are 
not identifiable. An alternative is to enact off-
setting policies that can restore the incentives 
for job creation. For instance, if a diffuse but 
entrenched set of priors and beliefs makes it 
difficult for women to work, efforts could aim 
at increasing their employability through tar-
geted investments and interventions in social 
Source: World Development Report 2013 team based on Amador and others 2011, Chioda 2012, and World Bank 2011i.
Some developing countries have experienced important increases 
in women’s labor force participation over a relatively short period of 
time. Nowhere has the change been faster than in Latin America. 
Since the 1980s, more than 70 million women have entered the labor 
force, raising the women’s labor participation rate from 36 percent 
to 43 percent. In Colombia, the rate increased from 47 percent in 
1984 to 65 percent in 2006. By contrast, in the Middle East and North 
Africa, women’s labor force participation has only grown by 0.17 per-
centage points per year over the last three decades. 
Recent research attributes this rapid transformation to increases 
in labor force participation among married or cohabiting women 
with children, rather than to demographics, education or business 
cycles. Changes in social attitudes contributed to the transforma-
tion, but this is a complex area with limited scope—and justifica-
tion—for direct policy intervention. For instance, women’s partici-
pation rates are very low in the West Bank and Gaza, particularly 
among married women. But this cannot be mechanically attributed 
to religion, as countries like Indonesia have high participation rates. 
Other social norms and regulations prevent women from participat-
ing, despite their willingness and capacity to do so. 
While the scope to influence social attitudes is limited, evidence 
suggests that public policies and programs in other areas have an 
important role to play. It also suggests that a combination of tar-
geted investments and interventions in social and physical infra-
structure can modify women’s labor force participation and the 
BOX 9.1   How does women’s labor force participation increase?
returns to their earnings. These investments and interventions can 
be categorized into three groups. They can address shortages in 
the availability of services (such as lack of electricity or daycare 
facilities) that force women to allocate large amounts of time to 
home production. They can make it easier for women to accumu-
late productive assets, such as education, capital, and land, facili-
tating their entry into high- productivity market activities. And they 
can remove norms or regulations that imply biased or even discrim-
inatory practices, preventing women from having equal employ-
ment opportunities. 
There are successful experiences with targeted investments 
and interventions of these three sorts. Public provision or subsidi-
zation of child care can reduce the costs women incur at home 
when they engage in market work. Examples include Estancias 
Infantiles in Mexico, Hogares Comunitarios in Colombia, and similar 
programs in Argentina and Brazil. Improvements in infrastructure 
services—especially in water and electricity—can free up women’s 
time spent on domestic and care work. Electrification in rural South 
Africa, for instance, has increased women’s labor force participa-
tion by about 9 percent. Correcting biases in service delivery insti-
tutions, such as the workings of government land distribution and 
registration schemes, allows women to own and inherit assets. 
Finally, the use of active labor market policies, the promotion of 
networks, and the removal of discriminatory regulations, are 
important to make work more rewarding for women.
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and famine was not a distant possibility.51 Two 
decades later, Vietnam is the world’s second- 
largest exporter of rice after Thailand; the 
second- largest exporter of coffee after Brazil; the 
largest exporter of pepper; and a top exporter 
of rubber, cashew nuts, and seafood products. 
The poverty rate declined to 16 percent by 2006, 
the fastest reduction in poverty ever recorded. 
These two decades of accelerated progress took 
Vietnam out of the least-developed-country 
category and made it a lower-middle-income 
economy with upbeat growth prospects. 
Vietnam’s transformation from an inef-
ficient agrarian economy into an export pow-
erhouse started with land reform. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the country abandoned 
collectivization by initially allowing local au-
thorities to reallocate communal land to indi-
vidual households and subsequently extend-
ing land-use rights to them. The devolution 
of land to rural households was remarkably 
egalitarian, especially in the north.52 By 1993, 
land-use rights could be legally transferred and 
exchanged, mortgaged, and inherited. Land re-
form was part of a broader package of reforms, 
or Doi Moi, which took Vietnam from central 
planning to a market economy with a socialist 
orientation.53 The package included the gradual 
removal of barriers to entry in most sectors, in-
cluding the commercialization of agricultural 
products. Competition brought farmgate prices 
much closer to international prices. Combined 
with a strong emphasis on agricultural exten-
sion, land reform and deregulation led to rap-
idly growing agricultural productivity on very 
small farm plots.
In parallel, policies aimed to create em-
ployment opportunities outside agriculture. 
Vietnam opened to foreign investors, first in 
selected sectors such as natural resource ex-
ploitation and light manufacturing, and then 
more broadly in the context of its accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007. 
Registered FDI increased fourfold in just two 
years, from 1992 to 1994; by 2007, FDI inflows 
were consistently exceeding 8 percent of GDP.54 
Initially investors partnered with state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), because of the complexity 
of a legal system still in transition. But SOEs 
had gradually been given the flexibility to make 
their own business decisions, and many were 
gram costs. But a full accounting would need to 
incorporate the potentially positive effects on 
peace building. In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the cost of a reintegration program for ex- 
combatants was about US$800 per beneficiary.50 
Such a program would likely be judged as cost 
inefficient by traditional standards. Whether or 
not it is still worth implementing depends on 
the implicit value policy makers attach to its 
social cohesion benefits. These spillovers from 
jobs may not be measured precisely, but at least 
they should be stated, for policy decisions to be 
transparent. 
Diverse jobs agendas,  
diverse policy priorities
Following a protocol to identify constraints to 
the creation of good jobs for development, and 
then remove or offset them, may sound abstract. 
But some countries have successfully done this 
in practice, and it is possible to learn directly 
from their experiences (box 9.2). The stories of 
Vietnam, Rwanda, Chile, and Slovenia, show 
that policy can effectively support the creation 
of jobs with high development payoffs. Each of 
these countries faced a different jobs challenge, 
so their policy choices are relevant for other 
countries confronted with similar jobs agen-
das. Getting the fundamentals right by ensuring 
macroeconomic stability, improving the busi-
ness environment, and adhering to the rule of 
law, featured prominently in all four cases. All 
four countries also embraced labor policies and 
institutions within a reasonable range. But it is 
telling that the main constraints they targeted 
were not in the labor market. 
Agrarian economies: Vietnam
Increasing productivity in agriculture, thereby 
freeing up labor to work in rural off-farm em-
ployment and to eventually migrate to cities, is 
the main challenge facing agrarian economies. 
At the beginning of its economic reform pro-
cess, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Vietnam 
was a clear illustration of this challenge. In 1993, 
the first year for which reliable data exist, over 
70 percent of employment was in agriculture, 
58 percent of the population lived in poverty, 
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by now a rapidly urbanizing economy, which is 
a testimony to its success.
Conflict-affected countries: Rwanda
Rwanda today seems far removed from the war 
and genocide of the mid-1990s, and jobs contrib-
totally or partially sold to private investors. By 
the turn of the century, greenfield FDI invest-
ments had become the norm, especially in sec-
tors such as garments, footwear, appliances, 
and consumer electronics.55 Firms in these sec-
tors are employing workers in large numbers.
Important challenges remain, but Vietnam is 
The Republic of Korea effectively used policies to bring out the 
agglomeration and integration benefits of an urbanizing country.a 
Almost three-quarters of the population was rural in 1960, but by 
2000, four-fifths were urban. Seoul, which has grown to more than 
10 million people today, was a motor for the country’s overall 
growth, especially from the late 1980s until the mid-1990s. Many 
industrial clusters were established in close proximity to the capital 
city. Carefully designed and phased urban development policies 
accompanied the transition from jobs in agriculture to jobs in light 
manufacturing and then to jobs in industries with higher value 
added. Land development  programs were established first, fol-
lowed by a land-use regulation system, and then by comprehen-
sive urban planning. Housing and transportation policies held 
the diseconomies of urbanization in check. The global integration 
of Korea’s urban hubs was a core driver of its growth dynamic. 
The country invested massively in skills to support its structural 
transfor mation. The mean years of education of the adult popula-
tion increased from 4.3 in 1960 to 11.8 in 2010. International test 
scores now place Korea at the top of Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in reading, math-
ematics, and science outcomes for 15-year-olds.
Small island nations are characterized by their size, isolation, and 
exposure to climatic risks. In these circumstances, reaping the pro-
ductivity gains from agglomeration and global integration is espe-
cially challenging. Tonga is using migration as an active instrument 
to connect to the world economy.b Approximately 100,000 Tongans 
live abroad, almost as many as at home. Remittances account for an 
estimated 32 percent of GDP and reach 80 percent of households, 
raising the education levels and productive investments. Migration 
agreements also reach poorer and less-skilled workers. In 2007, New 
Zealand launched the Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) pro-
gram, which provides temporary opportunities for seasonal workers 
from the Pacific to work in horticulture and viticulture. For the house-
holds of participants, the program has led to income gains of up 
to 38 percent, more purchases of durable goods, and a broader 
improvement in well-being. In addition to income, RSE workers 
brought home their newly acquired knowledge of agricultural tech-
niques, computer literacy, and English-language skills.
Formalizing countries can envision increasing the coverage of 
their social protection systems to levels typical of industrial coun-
tries. But costs are high, as is the risk of distoring incentives and 
undermining productivity. Brazil is one country that has been able 
to not only grow quickly but expand the formal sector in the 
BOX 9.2  There have been successes in tackling jobs challenges around the world
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
a.  Park and others 2011; Yusuf and Nabeshima 2006.
b. Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua 2008; World Bank 2010a.
c. Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas 2011; OECD and ILO 2011.
d. Styczynska 2012; World Bank 2011b. 
process.c Benefiting from a booming global commodities market 
and a competitive exchange rate, its economy was growing at 
around 5 percent a year before the 2008 financial crisis. But unlike 
other rapidly growing countries, Brazil’s job creation in the formal 
sector was three times as high as in the informal sector. Just in the 
five years leading up to the crisis, the formal share of total employ-
ment increased by about 5 percentage points. In some ways, Brazil 
is an unlikely “formalizer”—it has a heavily regulated business sec-
tor and a costly labor system. Although its rapid formalization is too 
recent to be fully explained yet, it appears efforts to simplify and 
extend the reach of programs and regulations have been contrib-
uting factors. The government has expanded the coverage of its 
social protection system through noncontributory programs. It has 
also simplified tax rules for small businesses, increased incentives 
for firms to formalize their workers, and improved enforcement of 
tax and labor regulations. 
In aging societies the increase in the old-age dependency ratio 
reduces the average productivity per person, while the growing costs 
of caring for the elderly undermine living standards. But the reforms 
needed to address these challenges are politically difficult to imple-
ment and often involve hard tradeoffs. Poland is an example of a 
country that has taken several successful steps.d By the turn of the 
century, labor force participation rates were declining due to the 
growing incidence of early retirement and disability pensions. But 
several reforms that reduced the inflows of new beneficiaries led to 
an increase in the employment-to- population ratio from 60 percent 
in 2006 to 65 percent in 2009. Changes in the application of eligibility 
rules of disability pensions, enacted in 2005, sharply reduced the 
intake of new beneficiaries. In 2009, a pension reform tackled early 
retirement options. This reform is such that old-age pension benefits 
adjust downward as life expectancy increases. Hence, the country is 
expected to have a fiscally sustainable pension system in the long 
run. That sustainability came at a cost: benefits as a percentage of 
earnings at retirement became significantly lower than the average in 
the European Union. In 2012, a new wave of pension reforms raised 
the retirement age to 67 for men and women from the current 65 for 
men and 60 for women. This increase should help to raise the benefit 
level without adversely affecting fiscal sustainability. Policies and pro-
grams to ease labor market entry for the inactive and unemployed of 
all ages remain modest, however, and their impact still needs to be 
determined. Also, long-term health care continues to rely largely on 
informal arrangements, but reforms are now publicly debated.
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help.65 But the economic reintegration and so-
cial cohesion through jobs have established a 
basis for future progress.66 
Resource-rich countries: Chile
While many countries rich in resources seem 
unable to diversify and are beset by poor gov-
ernance, Chile’s savvy management of its cop-
per riches makes it a notable exception. In 2010, 
Chile was home to 28 percent of the world’s 
copper reserves and about one-third of world 
copper production; for the past two decades, 
it has accounted for 17 percent of world cop-
per exports.67 But despite the prominence of 
copper in its economy, Chile has been able to 
 diversify its exports and its economy while ef-
fectively managing resource-related risks such 
as currency appreciation and macroeconomic 
turbulence. Nonmineral exports increased sig-
nificantly as a share of total exports after the 
1980s, before retreating somewhat during the 
global commodities boom after 2007 (figure 
9.5). Employment in the nonmining sectors 
has grown strongly at more than 2 percent an-
nually over the past two decades.68 The unem-
ployment rate has averaged around 8 percent 
over the past decade, a far cry from the record 
20 percent of the early 1980s.69
A set of macroeconomic, institutional, ex-
port-diversification, and skill-building policies 
contributed to this broad-based job creation 
path. Chile combines the use of a resource sta-
bilization mechanism (since 1987, with the 
current framework adopted in 2006) with a 
transparent fiscal rule (since 1999) that jointly 
regulate how copper extraction rents are used.70 
A structural surplus target is the anchor for de-
termining inflows and outflows into two funds, 
one for pensions and other long-term govern-
ment liabilities, the other for short-term sta-
bilization purposes. The funds are authorized 
to invest their portfolio fully abroad, relieving 
pressures on the exchange rate.71 In parallel, 
governance reforms over the past decades in all 
areas of public sector management have led to 
significant success: Chile climbed 5 percentiles 
in its voice and accountability rating between 
1996 and 2009 and also improved its political 
stability and control of corruption ratings.72 
Further, Chile adopted an active export- 
oriented growth policy, opening up to trade 
and welcoming direct foreign investment, 
uted to such a remarkable turnaround. The con-
flict has had a severe impact on society and the 
economy, with massive loss of life, destruction of 
infrastructure, a crisis of state institutions, and 
a drop in GDP that exceeded 50 percent.56 The 
cessation of conflict and an aggressive package of 
reforms allowed Rwanda’s economy to rebound 
to pre-crisis levels by 2000.57 Growth has contin-
ued, reaching an estimated 8.8 percent in 2011, 
and the poverty rate fell by 12 percentage points 
between 2005 and 2010.58
A precondition for sustainable job creation 
in countries emerging from conflict is securing 
peace and reducing risks of recurring violence.59 
In the wake of the conflict, the Rwandan gov-
ernment supported the reintegration and demo-
bilization of more than 54,000 former combat-
ants. Ex-combatants received a combination of 
cash assistance, counseling, vocational training, 
education, support for income-generating ac-
tivities, and social reintegration activities involv-
ing community members.60 More than a decade 
after the end of conflict, most former combat-
ants were participating in vocational training or 
working, mainly in subsistence agriculture and 
self-employment, similar to the rest of Rwanda’s 
population.61 Although many ex-combatants 
continued to experience social and psychological 
hardships, their relations with their neighbors 
were reportedly good, and trust was improving. 
In 2012, 73 percent of ex-combatants expressed 
satisfaction with their social integration, and 85 
percent of community members felt that there 
was trust between the two groups.62
While the number of ex-combatants only 
represents a small share of Rwanda’s total popu-
lation of 10 million, reintegration through jobs 
had social cohesion payoffs, which established a 
basis for the country to move forward. Rwanda 
has built on this start by rejuvenating the private 
sector through reforms to institutions and busi-
ness regulations.63 A good example of the gov-
ernment’s private sector development strategy 
was its decision to revitalize its coffee industry 
through deregulation and investments in new 
technology, a decision that has led to new job 
creation.64 Rwanda still faces serious jobs chal-
lenges. More than 80 percent of the population 
works in subsistence agriculture and house-
hold enterprises, where productivity needs to 
be improved. Also, opportunities for off-farm 
employment need to expand, and growth in 
the currently small manufacturing sector would 
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young people, European Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso recently highlighted Slove-
nia as an example of best practice in the employ-
ment of youth.79 
Slovenia’s relative success in reducing youth 
unemployment does not strictly follow tradi-
tional recipes. Its spending on active labor mar-
ket policies is about average for transition coun-
tries. Although some reforms have been made to 
liberalize the rules for contract and temporary 
work, Slovenia’s labor regulations remain more 
restrictive than the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) aver-
age, a policy stance that is usually associated 
with reduced job opportunities for young peo-
ple. Minimum wages—also frequently cited as a 
barrier for youth employment—are on the high 
side. But potential distortions from these poli-
cies seem to be somewhat offset by a model of 
consensus-based decision making. In Slovenia, 
trade unions and employers’ organizations, both 
with broad coverage, set wages that respond well 
to macroeconomic trends and sectoral produc-
tivity patterns.80
Sustained growth supported by increased 
competition in product markets, is ultimately 
responsible for much of Slovenia’s decrease 
in youth unemployment. Taking advantage of 
thereby enhancing the productivity spillovers 
from global integration. An ambitious inno-
vation strategy to raise competitiveness was 
developed.73 Public funds were used specifi-
cally to boost education expenditures, which 
almost doubled in real terms between 1990 
and 2009.74 While quality as well as equity in 
the education system are much debated today, 
the share of low-skilled workers declined in all 
economic sectors.75 
Countries with high youth unemployment: 
Slovenia
Slovenia has made inroads into the problem 
of high youth unemployment (figure 9.6). 
Throughout the first decade after the breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia, young people were three 
times as likely as adults to be unemployed. By 
2010, this ratio had fallen to two to one.76 The 
youth employment rate, which was 10 percent-
age points above the European Union (EU) 
aver age in 2000, was lower than the EU  average 
in 2010.77 By then, the share of Slovenia’s youth 
not in education, employment, or training was 
just 7.5 percent among the 15- to 24-year age 
group, well below the EU average of 11.2 per-
cent.78 While the crisis has certainly been felt by 
F I G U R E  9. 5  Chile reduced its dependence on mineral exports
Source: World Development Report 2013 team,  based on  export values data from Chile’s Central Bank and copper price index from IMF’s  International Financial Statistics database.
Note: The figure shows the share of mineral exports in total exports, measured at constant 1990 prices. Total exports and mineral export values were deflated using the export price 
index and the copper price index, respectively.
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through peer pressure or by providing positive 
incentives for governments and firms to comply. 
But it is not certain that these kinds of pressures 
and incentives actually change working condi-
tions on the ground, and the risk that improve-
ments come at the expense of job creation can-
not be ruled out.
ILO conventions provide a framework for 
rights, standards, and conditions at work. At 
the country level, conventions can influence 
domestic legislation if countries do align their 
laws with global standards. They can be a chan-
nel for voice and coordination internationally, 
as demonstrated by the adoption of conven-
tions for home-based and domestic workers.82 
Evidence from the ratification of the eight con-
ventions included in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work 
(the core labor standards) suggests that coun-
tries respond to pressure from the international 
community.83 Yet, the persistence of forced la-
bor, children working in hazardous conditions, 
discrimination, and lack of voice also suggests 
that ratification on its own is not sufficient.
European integration, the economy successfully 
restructured its export sector to access EU mar-
kets. Very good infrastructure and a fairly skilled 
workforce helped as well. This dynamism, re-
quiring the use of more advanced production 
and management techniques in modern sec-
tors, was especially well-suited for youth. While 
the story is a good one in many ways, further 
policy reforms could help Slovenia realize more 
of the development payoffs that flow from jobs 
for young people. Some of these reforms are in 
the labor market, such as removing the incen-
tives created by employment protection laws 
that tilt job creation for youth toward contract 
and temporary work. But others are outside the 
labor market, such as introducing measures to 
encourage more FDI.81 
Connected jobs agendas: Global 
partnerships for jobs
Policies for jobs in one country can have spill-
overs on other countries, both positive and 
negative. An important issue is whether inter-
national coordination mechanisms could in-
fluence the decisions that governments make, 
enhancing the positive spillovers and mitigat-
ing the negative ones. Several areas lend them-
selves to coordination. Promoting compliance 
with rights and labor standards, a global public 
good, is the most obvious one, but the effective-
ness of the mechanisms for doing so is limited. 
Measures to facilitate FDI flows, especially in 
services, would have substantial effects on pro-
ductivity in developing countries but they may 
also have social implications. Migration has im-
pacts on both sending and recipient countries, 
suggesting that bilateral agreements could lead 
to better outcomes for both parties. 
Rights and standards: Pressure goes only 
so far
Several mechanisms operating across borders 
exist to set standards and provide channels 
for improving workers’ rights and their work-
ing conditions. They include the issuance and 
ratification of ILO conventions, bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements, and initiatives in-
volving the private sector, civil society, and other 
stakeholders. These mechanisms operate either 
F I G U R E  9. 6  Unemployment rates for youth have fallen in 
Slovenia
Source: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 2011.
Note: The youth unemployment rate refers to the 15-to-24 age group, whereas the general unemployment 
rate is for people aged 15 and above.
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vironmental concerns into their operations.90 
While some develop their own codes of con-
duct, collective initiatives are increasingly im-
portant for improving working conditions 
in global supply chains. Shared codes enable 
companies to collaborate with other businesses 
in  industry-led platforms, and with trade 
unions and nongovernmental organizations in 
multistakeholder initiatives (sometimes with 
government observers).91 
Almost all such initiatives have defined stan-
dards of practice, but they differ substantially in 
their governance structures, in their procedures 
for implementation, monitoring, and verifica-
tion, and in whether they involve certification 
and labeling.92 CSR initiatives focused on labor 
issues are generally concentrated in sectors rely-
ing on global supply chains that are exposed to 
reputational risk, such as garments, sportswear, 
food and, increasingly, electronics.93 Codes of 
conduct are most frequently adopted by com-
panies based in the European Union and North 
America, which then make compliance with 
labor standards a condition for doing business 
with them. A small number of voluntary initia-
tives have also emerged in developing countries, 
although these are generally a response to exter-
nal pressure more than a reaction to campaign-
ing by local consumers.94 
There is limited evidence to demonstrate 
how far CSR initiatives go beyond good inten-
tions to result in tangible and sustainable im-
provements in rights and working conditions. 
The clearest impacts are found in the area of 
health and safety and, to a lesser extent, in regu-
larization of working hours. Improvements on 
freedom of association and discrimination are 
much less likely. Overall, the benefits are more 
pronounced for permanent workers than for 
migrants, agency workers, and seasonal and 
temporary workers.95 Codes do not operate in 
a vacuum, so the capacity of local actors and 
the quality of domestic laws and institutions are 
critical to the effectiveness of the efforts.96
These findings stress the need for approaches 
to improving working conditions that extend 
to sectoral and national-level engagement with 
governments, employers, trade unions, and civil 
society organizations. Voluntary labor initiatives 
cannot substitute for domestic efforts to set up 
adequate legal protections and put in place insti-
tutions to support compliance and provide av-
Trade agreements have also been used with 
the intent of supporting workers rights. Some of 
them incorporate incentives to improve work-
ing conditions and access to voice. For instance, 
the 1999 bilateral trade agreement between 
Cam bodia and the United States included pro-
visions to increase Cambodia’s quota for gar-
ment imports into the United States market if 
regular reviews showed improvements in work-
ing conditions.
Whether labor clauses actually lead to better 
outcomes for workers on either side of a trade 
agreement is the subject of a running debate. 
Skeptics point out that the agreements, on their 
own, can be weak instruments for improving 
rights and working conditions and cannot sub-
stitute for adequate enforcement of domestic la-
bor laws.84 There are also concerns about politi-
cal capture and pressures from interest groups 
and uneven bargaining power between treaty 
parties.85 Labor clauses could be used as a pro-
tectionist tool, undermining trade and employ-
ment opportunities in developing countries. 
Supporters claim that labor clauses in trade 
agreements not only improve the enforcement 
of existing labor and employment standards 
but also lead to increased FDI to developing 
countries, thus benefiting workers in developing 
countries in both direct and indirect ways.86 
Linking rights to trade agreements may have 
an impact on working conditions if comple-
mented by investments in capacity for enforce-
ment and compliance at the country level. Af-
ter it signed the Central America Free Trade 
Agreement, the Dominican Republic increased 
the number of labor inspectors and invested 
in capacity building.87 And after it entered the 
bilateral trade agreement with Cambodia, the 
United States funded two ILO projects there. 
One of them, Better Factories Cambodia, in-
volved building capacity for compliance and 
monitoring of working conditions in garment 
factories. The other supported an arbitration 
council to resolve collective labor disputes.88 
Subsequent reviews have found improvements 
in working conditions and collective rights.89
Beyond the initiatives of governments 
through conventions and trade agreements, 
there has been a growing emphasis on pri-
vate sector accountability. Under the broader 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda, 
companies voluntarily assume social and en-
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ance with labor standards in the garment sector 
(box 9.3).98
Further liberalizing trade, but managing 
the tradeoffs
International trade in goods has been gradu-
ally liberalized, and the notion that freer trade 
is mutually beneficial for the transacting par-
ties is now widely shared. Various mechanisms 
have been used in the liberalization process, 
including multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
agreements, as well as unilateral commitments. 
At the multilateral level, liberalization has been 
achieved through negotiations under the frame-
work of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) first, and then of its successor, 
the WTO. The most recent round of multilateral 
negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda, 
aims for better market access for the export-
ing industries of developing countries. Average 
bound tariffs would fall from 40 to 30 percent 
for agricultural products, and from 10 to 5 per-
cent for manufactures. Actual tariffs could fall 
by 11 to 14 percentage points for the former, and 
by 2 to 3 percentage points for the latter. Cuts 
could be much sharper in sectors such as tex-
enues for redress. The public and private sectors 
can work together, as in Brazil, where in 2003 
the Ministry of Labor began publishing lists of 
companies found to be using forced labor. The 
increased public awareness led companies to 
subscribe to a National Pact to Combat Slave 
Labor, with civil society organizations establish-
ing a committee to monitor the pact.97
While most jobs in developing countries 
fall outside the scope of CSR initiatives, these 
efforts have the potential for a wider influence 
if they can be expanded to include workers, 
mainly women, who do not have formal con-
tracts. At the same time, local governance and 
institutions could be boosted through activities 
to strengthen the capacity of actors and insti-
tutions and improve processes of dialogue and 
cooperation. Demonstration effects may also 
occur at the country level if CSR efforts increase 
the visibility of activities to improve rights and 
working conditions, and if labor inspectorates 
and third-party monitoring bodies gain expe-
rience and capacity. The potential benefits of 
local capacity building are illustrated by the ex-
perience of Better Work, a partnership program 
between the ILO and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) aimed at improving compli-
The Better Work program seeks to improve compliance with inter-
national labor standards and national laws, while promoting busi-
ness competitiveness. The program operates through partnerships 
with governments, employer and worker organizations, and inter-
national buyers. It currently includes global garment brands and 
retailers with supply chains outsourcing production to Cambodia, 
Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lesotho, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. 
The program involves thorough workplace assessments that 
examine compliance with international labor standards and 
national labor law, as well as advisory services to help employers 
and workers jointly create and implement improvement plans. Tai-
lored training services support workplace cooperation and address 
specific issues, such as supervisory skills, human resource systems, 
and occupational safety and health. The program undertakes public 
reporting, which presents aggregate noncompliance data from all 
participating factories in a country and allows comparisons across 
countries according to specific indicators. A Better Work global 
team ensures quality, consistency, and effective knowledge man-
BOX 9.3   Improving business practices facilitates compliance with labor standards 
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Better Work Programme, International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC, and International Labour Organization, 
Geneva; Robertson and others 2009; and Adler and Hwang 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
agement, supporting country teams with tools for advisory services, 
monitoring and evaluation, and impact assessment. 
Better Work is modeled on the Better Factories Cambodia pro-
gram, which was introduced in conjunction with the bilateral trade 
agreement between Cambodia and the United States. Results of 
evaluations of Better Factories Cambodia, covering more than 90 
percent of participating factories, found that compliance on occu-
pational safety and health improved 20 percent. Correct payment of 
wages, overtime, and benefits increased 37 percent. Initially, incen-
tives to improve working conditions were driven by the quota 
increases called for under the trade agreement; however, with the 
expiration of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), quota increases 
were no longer possible. Nevertheless, the Cambodian garment 
industry has continued to invest in monitoring, having identified 
labor compliance as an important part of its claim to a niche in 
the global garment industry. This niche exists despite the expiration 
of the MFA largely because of the role that reputation plays in the 
supply chain. 
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proposals in the Doha agenda and in regional 
trade discussions offer prospects for significant 
liberalization (figure 9.7). 102 
However, the productivity gains from ser-
vices liberalization would be substantial. Elec-
tricity, finance, telecommunications, and trade 
have a direct impact on production and trans-
action costs, making downstream sectors more 
competitive. By boosting job creation and rais-
ing labor earnings, these productivity gains 
should also lead to improved living standards. 
Social impacts can be more mixed. They are 
clearly positive when cell phones connect people 
(especially the poor) to markets for their prod-
ucts, to employment opportunities, or to gov-
ernment services. They can be negative when 
the disappearance of retail trade leads to the 
decline of traditional urban areas and affects the 
livelihoods of older shopkeepers who may not 
find alternative employment easily.
An adequate sequencing of services liberal-
ization and domestic regulation can help man-
age these tradeoffs and, in doing so, address the 
concerns of developing countries. For instance, 
in telecommunications, enhanced domestic 
competition improves welfare more than hand-
ing over existing providers to better-performing 
foreign operators. Evidence from 86 developing 
countries between 1985 and 1999 suggests that 
both competition and liberalization can inde-
pendently improve performance. But penetra-
tion of telecommunications services, measured 
by main-line access, is lower if competition is 
introduced after liberalization, rather than at 
the same time.103 
A careful design of liberalization, can also 
cushion social impacts. For instance, in its pref-
erential trade agreement with the United States, 
Oman chose a sequential approach for the lib-
eralization of its retail trade. Foreign nationals 
were initially permitted to own up to 100 per-
cent of the equity in established retail enter-
prises valued at more than US$5 million, with 
the threshold subsequently declining to US$1 
million. This agreement allowed for gradual 
adjustment. At the same time, it was gener-
ous in relation to foreign ownership, which is 
restricted to 49 percent in Oman’s prevailing 
multilateral agreements.104 Similarly, concerns 
about the impact of liberalization on urban 
centers are addressed through land-zoning re-
strictions, as some industrial countries do. But 
these restrictions can also be used as entry de-
tiles and clothing. The least-developed countries 
could even benefit from duty-free quota access 
on almost all of their exports to industrial coun-
tries.99 For developing countries, the success of 
the Doha Round could therefore have a substan-
tive impact on the creation of jobs connected to 
global value chains, which are typically good 
jobs for development. But the Doha negotia-
tions are in limbo.
Despite the progress in trade liberalization, 
many developing countries still lack the com-
petitiveness to harness the benefits from global 
integration. Providing them with direct as-
sistance to reduce logistics costs and improve 
the competitiveness of firms and farms is thus 
a priority. The Aid for Trade initiative aims to 
increase aid to developing countries so that they 
can tap existing market opportunities. Aid for 
Trade has increased substantially and now ac-
counts for about a third of total aid to devel-
oping countries. To date, most of the resources 
have been channeled to infrastructure invest-
ments and trade facilitation. But the assistance 
could be made more effective by focusing on the 
export activities most suited to addressing the 
specific jobs challenges facing recipient coun-
tries. Increasing the involvement of the private 
sector would also enhance the effectiveness of 
the assistance provided.100 
In contrast to trade in goods, services liber-
alization has made slow progress, at both the 
multi lateral and the regional levels. Services are 
subject to more pervasive regulations, because 
they are characterized by well-known market 
imperfections. These range from natural mo-
nopolies in the distribution of electricity to net-
work externalities in telecommunications, and 
from asymmetric information and moral hazard 
in finance to market power in retail trade. While 
the liberalization of trade in goods is  associated 
with domestic liberalization, the liberalization 
of trade in services usually requires domestic 
regulation. Setting up markets for electricity, en-
suring universal service in telecommunications, 
adopting appropriate banking supervision, and 
managing the social impacts of large distribu-
tors on retail trade are challenging tasks.101
Not surprisingly, liberalization in services 
is much less advanced in developing countries 
than in industrial countries. The former are 
also reluctant to make additional commitments. 
Neither existing agreements under General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) nor 
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than 1 million people, most of them women. 
Preferential access for developing country im-
ports from sectors with more “brain jobs” can 
thus be used to create employment opportu-
nities for women in countries where gender 
equality is far from being attained.107 However, 
as countries move up the ladder of global value 
chains, women may also lose job opportunities. 
This was the case in Malaysia, where the share of 
women working in manufacturing declined in 
the mid-1980s.108
Migration policies: Toward bilateral 
agreements
Movements of people across borders have elic-
ited diverse policy reactions by recipient coun-
tries over the course of history. These have in-
cluded physical walls that keep foreigners away, 
policies preventing forced and bonded labor 
across oceans, and policies of open migration. 
In addition, there has been a range of specific 
measures including amnesties for irregular mi-
grants, statutes controlling entry by refugees, 
and complex systems for granting visas. In most 
terrents, reducing competition and undermin-
ing job creation.105
The limited traction in services liberalization 
is due largely to the potential tradeoffs involved. 
Developing countries may lack knowledge on 
the gains from opening markets, the on precon-
ditions for realizing such gains in light of existing 
tradeoffs, and on the policy options available for 
maximizing the gains and handling the trade-
offs. Similar to the case of trade in goods, many 
countries also lack the ability to implement poli-
cies and agreements. International collabora-
tion is thus needed to address such knowledge 
gaps and facilitate implementation.106
International agreements can also be used to 
promote global public goods. One case in point 
is gender equality. Trade is not gender neutral. Its 
liberalization, including services trade, changes 
women’s access to jobs. Traditionally men were 
more likely to have “brawn jobs,” involving 
stronger physical requirements. But “brain jobs” 
involving dexterity, attention, or communica-
tion—from stitching garments to processing 
data—present more opportunities for women. 
In Delhi and Mumbai, call centers employ more 
F I G U R E  9. 7 Offers to liberalize services are generally modest
Source: Borchert, Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2010.
Note: GATS = General Agreement on Trade in Services; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The figure compares the applied trade policies in major 
services sectors with countries’ commitments under GATS and the best offers that they have made in the Doha negotiations. The figure is  based on data from 62 countries. The 
country services trade restrictiveness index is a weighted average of a country’s policies or commitments to market access by foreigners in financial, retailing, telecommunication, 
transportation and selected professional services sectors. Weights are sectoral gross domestic product shares. The regional index is a simple average of country indices.
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the large earnings differentials between coun-
tries, suggesting that the free movement of la-
bor would accelerate global productivity growth 
and poverty reduction enormously.111 Another 
perspective focuses on national security and 
the protection of communities and their cul-
tures, implying the need for barriers to contain 
 migration. Yet another highlights the moral 
imperative to protect the human rights of mi-
grants, no matter their legal status, and to give 
shelter to those who suffer any form of perse-
cution.112 None of these views suffices, because 
none of them alone can address the complex 
tradeoffs that migration poses for policy design.
There are many examples of such tradeoffs. 
The more that is spent in protecting the welfare 
of migrants, which sending countries and con-
cerned citizens everywhere demand, the more 
expensive the use of migrant labor will become, 
and the fewer the number of workers who will 
be hired. The more that is done to assimilate 
and integrate the migrants, which some host- 
country groups favor, the less likely migrants 
will be to return to their home countries. The 
more active the policies to attract “talent” mi-
grants, the greater the “brain drain” concerns 
among sending countries. The higher the pro-
tection of sectors such as agriculture by indus-
trial countries, the more likely are migrants 
from developing countries to work in those 
sectors. Conditioning foreign aid on banning 
migration seems unacceptable and would affect 
fundamental rights of workers by constraining 
their freedom to move. Stern visa restrictions 
and deportations usually backfire and may turn 
overstayers into irregular migrants. These exam-
ples indicate that unilateral policies cannot ad-
dress all these dilemmas. However, the adoption 
of global agreements setting the conditions of 
migration and superseding country legislation, 
seems unlikely. This is why an intermediate so-
lution can be more effective.
In many instances, both sending and host 
countries can benefit from migration through 
a collaborative approach. Most abuses perpe-
trated by traffickers, firms, or workers are as-
sociated with illegal migrant flows. The for-
malization of these flows is a basic tool for 
protecting the rights of migrant workers, while 
at the same time having them honor the terms 
under which they were welcomed. This formal-
ization, however, is difficult to enforce without 
cases, these policies have been introduced uni-
laterally by the recipient country and have in-
volved little or no international dialogue or co-
operation with sending countries.
In contrast to the movement of goods and 
services across borders, few international agree-
ments concern migration in general and migra-
tion of workers in particular. Those in existence 
have limited coverage. ILO Conventions 97 and 
143, in force since 1952 and 1978, respectively, 
seek to protect migrants from discrimination 
and abuse, and call for penalties and sanctions 
against those who promote clandestine or ille-
gal migration. But these conventions have been 
ratified by only 49 and 23 countries, respectively. 
Mode 4 of GATS covers exports of services con-
ducted through individuals present in another 
WTO member country.109 It entered into force 
in 1995 and covers all signatories to the WTO, 
but only a limited number of services have been 
liberalized by either developed or developing 
countries, with very few moving ahead in sensi-
tive areas like health services. Finally, the United 
Nations International Convention on the rights 
of all migrant workers and members of their 
families aims to “contribute to the harmoniza-
tion of the attitudes of States through the accep-
tance of basic principles concerning the treat-
ment of migrant workers and members of their 
families.” This convention entered into force in 
2003 but has been ratified by only 22 countries, 
mostly sending countries. 
Growing differences in ages, incomes, skills 
and economic perspectives between countries 
are likely to create mounting pressures for mi-
gration. Despite the interest of both industrial 
and developing countries in “talent” migra-
tion, low-skill migrants will still account for 
the bulk of cross-border flows in the years to 
come.110 But readiness to make the most of 
these growing differences between countries, 
and manage migration in a mutually beneficial 
way, is limited. Multicountry agreements have 
been slow to develop. Bilateral agreements that 
take into consideration geographical and his-
torical trends, protect basic rights of workers, 
and take into account the social impacts of mi-
gration, could benefit both host and sending 
countries.
Migration is an area where a global perspec-
tive is warranted, but views on what needs to 
be done are quite diverse. One view focuses on 
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very diverse production units, including micro-
enterprises. Assessing whether employment ex-
periences affect trust and willingness to engage 
in society requires information on individual 
values and behaviors. Such information is nec-
essary to tackle an emerging research agenda on 
jobs and development (box 9.4).
However, the paucity of empirical analyses 
on the employment impact of the global crisis 
in developing countries and the difficulty of 
comparing measures of informal employment 
across countries suggest that data quality and 
availability are limited. Much effort goes into 
measuring unemployment rates, even with a 
relatively high frequency.116 But open unem-
ployment is not a very telling indicator in coun-
tries where an important fraction of the labor 
force is not salaried. Four indicators are listed to 
monitor progress toward the employment tar-
get under the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) on eradicating poverty. This target calls 
for “achieving full and productive employment 
and decent work for all, including women and 
young people.” But the four indicators con-
sidered only partially capture advances in the 
quantity and quality of jobs in the developing 
world.117 Many available employment figures 
are actually inferred through interpolation be-
tween years and extrapolation using data from 
“similar” countries, but how reliable these 
methods are remains an open question.
These remarks are not meant to criticize 
statistical agencies at the country level or data 
collection efforts at the international level. Their 
efforts are filling important gaps and mobilizing 
expertise to improve definitions, reach agree-
ments on best practices, and provide technical 
assistance to those generating primary data.118 
Despite the limitations, data on informal em-
ployment, the unemployment rate, or the MDG 
employment target serve an important objec-
tive, namely, increasing awareness on the im-
portance of jobs for promoting development. 
However, moving jobs center stage could re-
main an aspirational statement in the absence 
of a sustained effort to improve the amount and 
comparability of data.
Today’s challenges regarding labor statistics 
can be regrouped into three key areas: data gaps; 
data quality issues; and planning, coordination, 
and communication issues. In some countries, 
labor statistics do not exist at all or are collected 
the cooperation of institutions in both sending 
and receiving countries.113 Bilateral agreements 
can include provisions regarding quotas by oc-
cupation, industry, region, and duration of stay. 
They can distinguish between temporary move-
ments of workers and steps to permanent mi-
gration, with conditions and protocols for mov-
ing from one country to another and regulation 
of recruitment agencies and intermediaries. 
They can include considerations about taxation 
and social security, including on benefits to be 
provided, portability of contributions, and cost-
sharing arrangements. These agreements can 
design incentives so that firms, worker associa-
tions, and governments in both sending and re-
ceiving countries have an interest in enforcing 
the provisions.114
Formalizing and extending temporary mi-
gration agreements could capture part of the 
wage gain from migration that is currently ab-
sorbed by intermediaries, to the benefit of both 
migrants and their employers. Agreements in 
the financial sector could lower the cost of re-
mittances to migrants and avoid the prevalence 
of illegal transactions. Reconsidering the financ-
ing of higher education in both developing and 
developed countries could favor a more bal-
anced sharing of the returns to investments in 
the case of talent migrants. More generally, bi-
lateral coordination is a sensible way to manage 
migration and ensure mutual benefits for send-
ing and recipient countries.
Jobs are center stage, but where are 
the numbers?
Policies for jobs need to be based on reliable data 
and rigorous analysis.115 Given that a large share 
of the people at work in developing countries are 
not wage employees, and that even a larger share 
lacks social security coverage, the measurement 
of employment must look beyond whatever for-
mal employment data the country gathers. De-
termining which jobs have the greatest payoffs 
for poverty reduction requires linking informa-
tion on a household’s income or consumption 
with information on the employment of its 
members. Understanding which firms create 
more jobs, or whether labor reallocation leads to 
substantial growth rather than just churning, re-
quires information on the inputs and outputs of 
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ensure that establishment surveys include infor-
mal firms and microenterprises.
A quarter of a century ago, a renewed empha-
sis on poverty reduction as the key objective of 
development policy launched a long-term data 
effort. Across the world, information on house-
hold living standards was collected through 
standardized surveys, the sampling methods 
and the variable definitions used were duly doc-
umented, and the data and documentation were 
made available to researchers and practitioners 
whenever possible. A similar approach should 
be envisioned to move jobs center stage.
only sporadically. Where labor statistics do 
exist, data quality is a concern throughout the 
statistical production chain, from the use of ap-
propriate definitions to questionnaire design, 
from sampling frames to interviewing protocols, 
and from data entry and coding to verification 
and estimation procedures. Planning, coordina-
tion, and communication issues are exacerbated 
when different institutions are responsible for 
collecting and disseminating the data.119 The 
most urgent priorities are to standardize the 
employment modules attached to the house-
hold surveys used for poverty analysis, and to 
aq: no triple 
asterisks here 
like other 
chapters?
Increased reliance on disaggregated survey data, together with rig-
orous program evaluation and controlled experiments, has pushed 
the knowledge frontier on jobs and development in recent years. 
On almost all relevant issues a substantive body of evidence already 
exists. Current efforts of the research community promise its expan-
sion in the coming years, in ways that should contribute to better 
informed policy making. However, knowledge gaps remain in sev-
eral areas.
Jobs and living standards. An abundance of high-quality work 
has been done on the measurement of poverty and the assessment 
of poverty alleviation programs. Less is known on how employment 
dynamics affect household living standards and movements in and 
out of poverty. Research on transitions between different employ-
ment statuses, occupations, industries, and types of jobs can shed 
light on incentives to work and formalize, as well as on impacts of 
jobs on household well-being. Knowledge is also limited on the 
subjective value workers attach to various characteristics of their 
jobs, including to social security benefits such as old-age and dis-
ability pensions. 
Jobs and productivity. Many studies are available on firm dynam-
ics, including births, growth, and deaths. There is also a growing lit-
erature on the impacts of trade liberalization and foreign direct 
investment on productivity and earnings at the plant level. Much of 
this research focuses on formal sector firms, however. Much less 
research is available on the dynamics of micro- and small enter-
p ises in th  informal sector, despite their importance for employ-
ment. There is also some disconnect between studies based on 
plant-level surveys and the growing literature on the effects of 
urbanization. The dialogue between these different literatures is in 
part hampered by different visions of production processes on 
issues such as returns to scale or externalities.
Jobs and social cohesion. Research in this area is tentative and the 
empirical evidence is scarce. The importance of the topic and the 
paucity of robust results mean that the payoffs to high-quality 
research in this area could be very high. Natural experiments com-
bined with longitudinal data spanning relatively long periods of 
BOX 9.4   Knowledge gaps on jobs and development chart the research agenda
Source: World Development Report 2013 team.
time may shed light on the links between jobs and behaviors. Inter-
disciplinary research could provide insights on the broader relation-
ship between jobs and institutional development processes. 
Anthropological approaches may provide insights on the mecha-
nisms at play; for instance on how jobs affect perceptions on fair-
ness and the willingness to trust others.
Spillovers from jobs. Research on the magnitude of spillovers 
from jobs is patchy. The agenda is long, but a promising area con-
cerns the impact of jobs on the acquisition of cognitive and noncog-
nitive skills, and how this impact varies depending on the character-
istics of the job and those of the person who holds it. Evidence on 
agglomeration effects across cities with different characteristics is 
also scarce, as are estimates of the environmental impacts of differ-
ent types of jobs.
Labor policies. A growing number of empirical studies focus on 
the impact of labor policies and institutions, and many of these 
studies are very rigorous. However, a careful review suggests that 
the relationship between policies and institutions on the one hand, 
and outcomes on the other, is not linear. Rather, it evokes a “plateau” 
of modest effects, but with “cliffs” at both ends where the impacts 
on efficiency and the distribution of jobs can be sizeable. Empirical 
work to determine where these cliffs lie and how to identify the 
institutional characteristics that demarcate the limits of the plateau 
would be of much value for policy makers.
Connected jobs agendas. More research is needed on how inter-
national trade, investment at both ends, and migration affect the 
composition of employment across countries. Knowledge gaps are 
common in all of these areas. The ability of national policies and 
supranational mechanisms such as trade agreements to affect jobs 
in different countries is only partially understood. More solid knowl-
edge on the right sequencing of international commitments and 
domestic policies related to services could address the reluctance of 
developing countries to make further progress in the direction of 
liberalization. Rigorous evaluations of migration policies would also 
be helpful.
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QUeStION 9
Creative destruction, the mainstay of economic 
growth, happens to a large extent through la-
bor reallocation. As workers move from jobs 
in low-productivity farms and obsolete firms 
to jobs in more dynamic economic units, out-
put increases and the economy moves closer 
to the efficiency frontier. Differences in pro-
ductivity across economic units underlie this 
creative destruction process. Such differences 
can reflect a healthy ecosystem driven by com-
petition which offers the basis for efficiency- 
enhancing job reallocation. Market imperfec-
tions and government failures may hinder labor 
reallocation, however, resulting in a wider dis-
persion of productivity and many missed op-
portunities for growth.120
Stringent regulations that obstruct the move-
ment of workers from low- to high-productivity 
areas or that prevent their separation from ob-
solete firms are a case in point. These regula-
tions may stem from good intentions, such as 
containing congestion in cities or providing 
earnings stability to workers. But their cost in 
productivity growth can be substantial. Regu-
lations of this kind do not sit on the efficiency 
“plateau” where labor policies are mainly redis-
tributive; they are rather on the cliff, and have 
unambiguously negative effects on economic 
efficiency.
India is arguably an example of a country 
whose complex and cumbersome labor policies 
have pushed it off the “plateau.” The country has 
more than 40 national and state-level labor laws. 
Most of them apply to the organized (or formal) 
sector and to firms above a certain size. As firms’ 
employment increases, they fall under the pur-
view of a growing number of regulations.121 The 
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 is particu-
larly restrictive. Governing employee-employer 
relationships, the IDA makes it extremely diffi-
cult for firms to terminate employment.122
The stringency of labor regulations is con-
sistent with the “missing middle” phenomenon, 
characteristic of India and other developing 
countries, where medium-size businesses make 
up a disproportionately small share of the to-
tal. Also consistent with the stringency of la-
bor regulations is the substantial dispersion of 
productivity. If the dispersion observed within 
each industry narrowed to the point of match-
ing the dispersion observed in the United States, 
India’s average productivity in manufacturing 
could increase by more than half.123 Instead, de-
spite India’s buoyant economic growth during 
the past two decades, the performance of the 
labor-intensive manufacturing sector has been 
sluggish.124 The bulk of the growth in nonfarm 
employment has been in the informal sector.
The conventional wisdom, when a country 
is riddled with misguided labor regulations, is 
to repeal them. This repeal may be easier said 
than done, however. India’s complex labor reg-
ulatory system has been in place for 60 years; 
even the ambitious reform program triggered 
by the balance-of-payment crisis of 1991 left 
 labor regulations largely untouched.125 The IDA 
of 1947 has been amended at the state level but 
not always toward the plateau. Between 1958 
and 1992, seven states amended the IDA to give 
employers more latitude in labor decisions. 
These states subsequently experienced higher 
growth in output, employment, investment, 
and productivity in their formal manufactur-
ing sector. But six other states changed the IDA 
in the opposite direction, which resulted in a 
worsening in firm performance and an expan-
sion of the informal sector.126 Overall, the dis-
persion of productivity in India’s manufactur-
ing sector remained stable, or even increased, 
between 1987 and 1994.127
From bypassing regulatory obstacles . . .
India’s response to these regulatory obstacles has 
been to learn how to live with them, and this has 
been achieved through widespread noncompli-
ance.128 For example, large firms rely on con-
tractors, who in turn hire workers; thus total 
employment is “sliced” into smaller packages, 
each escaping the most stringent labor market 
regulations. Short-term contracts and tempo-
rary employment agencies are other mecha-
nisms used to circumvent the regulations. The 
propensity of firms to hire contract workers has 
increased over time for all firms employing 10 
or more workers and is highest among medium- 
How to accelerate labor reallocation?
sized firms (50–99 workers).129 A 10-year study 
of 1,300 firms also finds insignificant differences 
between medium and larger firms in their hir-
ing of manual workers.130 The share of informal 
workers in total employment in organized firms 
grew from 32 percent in 2000 to 52 percent in 
2005 to 68 percent in 2010.131 
Consistent with noncompliance, the distri-
bution of firms by size does not show substan-
tial discontinuities around the threshold levels 
where regulations become more stringent. Con-
sidering the entire distribution, including infor-
mal firms, the biggest discontinuity is between 
firms employing up to 4 workers and those em-
ploying 5 to 10 (figure 9.8a). However, there is 
no 5-worker threshold in the applicable labor 
market regulations. On the other hand, there is 
no discontinuity in the distribution when cross-
ing the 50-worker cutoff point, despite it being 
the threshold above which firms fall under the 
purview of the IDA (figure 9.8b).
Admittedly, other factors could influence 
India’s distribution of firms by size.132 But over-
all, these patterns are consistent with firms by-
passing labor regulations.
. . . to actively offsetting them . . .
While India has learned how to live with cum-
bersome regulatory obstacles, other developing 
countries with similar constraints have accom-
plished more efficiency-enhancing labor reallo-
cation. Sri Lanka inherited the same labor regu-
lations from the British colonial administration 
as India did. Without reaching the extremes in 
India, many Latin American countries face sim-
ilar regulatory obstacles. Although China’s labor 
regulations were less stringent until the 1990s, 
its household registration (hukou) system rep-
resented the ultimate obstacle to labor realloca-
tion.133 Yet, all of these countries have managed 
to spur growth in high-productivity sectors and 
locations.
Sri Lanka gradually liberalized many of its 
markets during the 1980s and 1990s but did not 
reform its complicated and costly employment 
protection legislation. Under the Termination 
of Employment of Workman Act (TEWA) of 
1971, firms with 15 or more employees cannot 
lay off workers without official authorization 
and are liable for termination payments of up 
to four years of salary, depending on the em-
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F I G U R E  9. 8  Is there a “missing middle” in the distribution of 
manufacturing firms in India?
Source: Hasan and Jandoc 2010.
Note: Data for the organized, or formal, sector are from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) conducted by 
India’s Central Statistical Organisation; data for the unorganized or informal sector are from the National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) Survey of Unorganized Manufacturing Enterprises. Own-account 
manufacturing enterprises are those operating without hired workers employed on a regular basis.
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across state borders to find employment. And 
an estimated two-fifths to one-half of formal 
sector workers change jobs every year.135
Nowhere is the extent of labor reallocation 
more striking than in China, and much of it 
happened under the hukou system. Since its in-
troduction in the 1950s, this system governed 
where people could live, effectively preventing 
rural-to-urban labor flows and reserving em-
ployment in cities for their residents (box 9.5). 
With market-oriented reforms, the system was 
gradually liberalized, and many restrictions on 
internal migration were lifted. But the hukou 
system has not been completely abolished; even 
today it may still inhibit migrant flows and re-
duce the incidence of workers moving with 
dependents. Despite this barrier to labor mobil-
ity, China experienced phenomenal growth in 
labor-intensive manufacturing, involving mas-
sive internal migration from the hinterland to 
coastal areas, and from villages to towns and 
urban centers. This geographically concentrated 
development absorbed an important share of 
rural surplus labor, while integrating China into 
international value chains and making it the 
“world’s factory.”136
ployee’s length of service. Yet the country’s gar-
ment industry was a runaway success. Replac-
ing tea as the country’s major source of export 
revenue, the industry now accounts for half of 
Sri Lanka’s sales abroad, up from almost noth-
ing in the 1970s. It also accounts for much of 
the increase in employment in manufactur-
ing.134 The success of the garment industry has 
been a magnet for rural migrants, with 45 per-
cent of them moving to the western provinces 
where the garment industry is concentrated.
Restrictive labor market regulations are 
a common feature of many Latin American 
countries too. In Brazil, after years of economic 
reforms, hiring workers remains as burden-
some as ever. If anything, the sustained increase 
in formalization over the past decade has made 
compliance with labor regulations more com-
mon. Yet, Brazil’s labor market has been char-
acterized by massive internal migration and 
remarkably high labor turnover rates. Lifetime 
interstate migration is estimated to have dou-
bled between the 1980s and the 1990s, reach-
ing two-fifths of the population by 1999. In the 
1990s, one-third of the workers who changed 
jobs in Brazil’s formal sector had migrated 
A hukou is analogous to an internal passport. Legal residency in a 
city, town, or village is determined by an individual’s birth place. 
Rural and urban populations are registered separately. The hukou 
system regulates many social entitlements of citizens, including 
education, housing, utilities subsidies, and social protection. 
Together with other policies such as urban food rationing during 
the period under central planning the hukou system prevented 
the rural labor force from moving out of agriculture. It maintained 
an exclusive urban labor market with basic social welfare, and 
supported industrial policy, effectively creating rural-urban 
segmentation. 
At the beginning of the reform process, cities and towns could 
afford basic social welfare only for a limited population. Inflows of 
rural workers were therefore seen as a double-edged sword that 
could increase the well-being of rural residents but also lead to con-
gestion and overcrowded infrastructure. After reforms in urban 
areas were under way in the mid-1980s, and the growth of township 
and village enterprises stagnated, farmers were allowed to work in 
small and medium cities—but only on the condition that they con-
tinued to be self-sufficient in terms of staples, in accordance with 
BOX 9.5   China’s hukou system has been partially liberalized
Sources: World Development Report 2013 team based on Cai, Du, and Meiyan 2002; Cai and Meiyan 2011; Cai, Park, and Zhao 2008; Chaudhuri and Datt 2009; and Giles, Wang, and 
Park 2012.
the food ration scheme that was still in force. Restrictions were not 
lifted until the mid-1990s, when reforms were well under way. By 
then, the fast growth of labor-intensive and export-oriented sectors 
and the dramatic surge of private sector activities in urban areas 
generated a substantial demand for low-skilled labor. Only at that 
point was the hukou system substantially liberalized.
The implementation of this liberalization process has been con-
ducted in a decentralized way. Most medium and large cities have 
gradually lowered the criteria for migrants to change hukou identi-
ties, and hence their accompanying entitlements. However, the cri-
teria remain exceptionally strict in major cities and in cities with high 
income levels, including Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou. For 
example, Shanghai was the first city to make the residence permit 
system open to all, but its qualifying conditions are among the 
strictest. Shanghai’s system favors immigrants with college degrees 
or special talents, and those who do business or invest. It also 
requires seven years of social insurance contributions before apply-
ing. In addition, the city has a tight overall quota on hukou conver-
sions, and the actual number of conversions has to date been very 
low.
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ingly left to subnational governments, empha-
sizing the importance of regional hubs and fa-
cilitating a location-specific policy agenda built 
on local strengths. These efforts supported the 
relocation of industries toward previously less-
favored regions. While local policies were largely 
targeted at fostering small and medium firms, 
they also attracted bigger firms and multi-
national companies. The impact on internal 
migration was significant. A 1 percent increase 
in the concentration of FDI in a particular loca-
tion was associated with a 0.2 percent increase 
in the location’s immigration rate. And a 1 per-
cent increase in employment in export sectors 
was associated with a 0.3 percent reduction in 
outmigration.138
In China, labor reallocation is rooted in the 
development of competitive cities. The urban 
share of the population jumped from just 27 
percent in 1990 to almost 50 percent in 2010. 
This transformation is unprecedented, with the 
urban population increasing from 170 million 
in 1978 to 456 million in 2000 and 665 million 
today. The increase was supported through a 
phenomenal expansion of commercial power 
supply, urban infrastructure, highways, and 
ports. In 1988, China had barely 100 kilometers 
of expressways; 10 years later, the total length 
. . . through productivity spillovers
These examples point to a successful second-best 
approach to offset regulatory obstacles. Instead 
of trying to avoid or evade labor regulations, 
this approach involves actively taking advantage 
of productivity spillovers from jobs in industrial 
clusters, dynamic cities, or global value chains to 
make the regulations less relevant in practice. 
In Sri Lanka, the development of export 
processing zones (EPZs) drove the takeoff of 
the garment industry. These economic enclaves 
offered better infrastructure and a more favor-
able regulatory environment than the rest of the 
economy. As a result, they attracted large inflows 
of FDI and became the source of a large fraction 
of Sri Lanka’s exports (figure 9.9).137 Local pro-
ducers in these zones were able to benefit from 
cluster effects. Outperforming competitors in 
many other developing countries, the industry 
has managed to move up the value chain, trans-
forming factories into design centers.
In Brazil, the surge of internal migration is 
closely associated with the country’s continu-
ing integration into the global economy and a 
development policy that favors agglomeration 
effects. In the 1990s, Brazil implemented major 
trade liberalization measures, gradually relaxed 
restrictions on FDI, and devalued its currency. 
In this context, development policy was increas-
F I G U R E  9. 9  Export processing zones were a driver of foreign direct investment in Sri Lanka
Source: Jayanthakumaran 2003.
Note: EPZ = Export Processing Zone; FDI = foreign direct investment. The figure summarizes EPZ activities during the 1980s.
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cordingly, the criteria for changing hukou iden-
tities in these cities are generally defined by 
skills, investments, income, and residence re-
quirements. The numbers of migrants meeting 
these criteria have been small.143
Back to India, then, where the slow pace of 
urbanization is even more striking than the 
 rigidity of its labor regulations. In 1990, the 
share of India’s population living in cities was 
the same as China’s: 27 percent. Two decades 
later, it had grown only to 30 percent.144 The 
functionality of the cities also poses severe 
challenges. For instance, large swaths of Delhi 
or Mumbai have access to no more than four 
to five hours of water supply a day. Energy 
shortfalls have increased in recent years and are 
perceived as the top constraint for doing busi-
ness. A company can expect 17 power shut-
downs a month. The cost imposed on firms 
by the power problem is among the highest in 
the world.145 Judging from the experiences of 
Brazil, China, and Sri Lanka, and after 60 years 
of partial success in making labor regulations 
more flexible, the key for India to accelerate 
labor reallocation and thereby realize its devel-
opment potential may lie in its urbanization 
policy. 
was second to the United States; and by 2009, 
more than 60,000 kilometers were in use.139
Regional competition and experimentation 
in part underpin these successes. In China, lo-
cal governments have substantial autonomy to 
raise fiscal and nonfiscal resources. They thus 
have considerable scope to take responsibility 
for local development. The Chinese Commu-
nist Party also rewards local officials based on 
local performance, prompting them to actively 
engage in economic competition.140 
This decentralized institutional setting al-
lowed cities in China to experiment with re-
forms to the hukou system as a tool for urban-
ization. It has been argued that a large fraction 
of cities in China are too small because of it.141 
But the decentralized implementation of the 
 system allowed major globalizing cities to use 
the hukou system as a screening tool to select 
more skilled migrants and enhance the produc-
tivity spillovers from jobs. Most medium and 
large cities have gradually eased the criteria for 
migrants to change hukou identities. However, 
bigger and richer globalizing cities have em-
braced a more skill-intensive pattern of growth, 
putting more weight on productivity growth 
than on poverty reduction (figure 9.10).142 Ac-
F I G U R E  9.10 Restrictions to hukou conversion increase with city size and income
Source: Wang, Song, and O’Keefe 2012 for the World Development Report 2013.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. The index measuring the threshold for hukou conversion takes into account requirements on investment, employment and family reunion. 
Each dot represents one of 120 cities in 30 provinces.
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Glossary
Jobs
Jobs: While precise definitions vary, jobs are labor activities that generate income, monetary or 
in kind, without violating fundamental rights and principles at work. Jobs can take the form of 
wage employment, self-employment, and farming. They can be formal or informal.
Good jobs for development: These are jobs that contribute the most to societal goals. The 
development payoff of a job is the sum of the value it has to the worker and its spillovers (if 
any) on others. The individual value is the first-order measure of the development payoff, but 
spillovers can be substantial.
Jobs lens: Strategies, policies, and programs adopt a jobs lens if they take into account the 
development payoffs from jobs. The jobs lens involves aims at realizing the untapped develop-
ment payoffs by addressing the constraints that prevent the private sector from creating more 
good jobs for development.
skills
Cognitive skills: They include verbal ability, working memory, numeracy, and problem- 
solving abilities. They are the foundation for the acquisition and building of other skills 
throughout life.
social skills: They facilitate interaction and communication with others. They are based 
on personality traits that underlie behaviors such as teamwork, reliability, discipline, or work 
effort.
Technical skills: They enable the performance of specific tasks. They take the form of knowl-
edge that is specific to a particular occupation or group of occupations.
entrepreneurship: It is the combination of innovative capacity to put new ideas into effect 
with managerial capacity to increase a firm’s efficiency within the limits of known technology.
TransformaTions
Living standards: They encompass the material and subjective aspects of well-being. Jobs con-
tribute to living standards through earnings opportunities that lift people out of poverty, make 
them less vulnerable, motivate them, and contribute to their broader happiness and satisfac-
tion with life.
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productivity: It is the amount of output generated with a given amount of inputs. A higher 
productivity of individual jobs, the creation of more productive jobs and destruction of less 
productive ones, and the reallocation of workers within countries and across borders drive 
changes in aggregate productivity.
social cohesion: Societies are cohesive when they have the capacity to manage collective deci-
sion making peacefully. Jobs can contribute to social cohesion by nurturing trust in others 
beyond the group people belong to. They can also do so by fostering civic engagement.
righTs
Core labor standards: A set of eight International Labour Organization conventions included 
in the 1998 Declaration of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These conven-
tions cover child labor, discrimination, forced labor, and freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.
Health and safety at work: Occupational accidents and work-related diseases can undermine 
workers’ health, are an important source of mortality, and can have high costs to society.
DevelopmenT payoffs
spillovers: Beyond their direct impact on the well-being of the people who hold them, jobs 
can have additional impacts on societal goals. Jobs may influence the living standards of oth-
ers, their productivity, or the way collective decisionmaking works. Spillovers from jobs can be 
positive or negative.
earnings of others: Uneven bargaining power or discrimination may lead to labor earnings 
that are too low or too high, with others gaining or losing as a result. Jobs supported through 
government transfers or restrictive regulations also affect the earnings and employment 
opportunities of others.
Household allocations: Jobs can change the status of their jobholders and increase their say 
on how resources are allocated among household members. Jobs that empower women can 
lead to greater investments in children’s education and health.
poverty reduction: In societies that value poverty reduction, jobs that take people out of hard-
ship increase overall well-being. In these societies, employment opportunities tilted in favor of 
the poor are seen as preferable, even if aggregate earnings or output do not change.
agglomeration effects: Work-related interactions can increase the productivity of others. The 
sharing of ideas; learning from customers, suppliers and competitors; and a better matching 
of skills across a larger pool of workers are among the mechanisms through which these pro-
ductivity gains take place. 
Global integration: Jobs linked to world markets and jobs in foreign-owned companies al-
low acquiring more advanced technical and managerial skills. These jobs can also change the 
industrial structure in ways that favor the most productive economic units and push the least 
productive out of business.
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environmental effects: Jobs have negative impacts on aggregate productivity when they dam-
age the environment or lead to an overuse of scarce resources. But they can also have positive 
environmental effects, as in the case of jobs to manage forests and other common resources. 
social identity: Jobs can impact the well-being of others by influencing the values and be-
havior of those who hold them in ways that affect society at large. Jobs can shape the norms 
influencing how the jobholder interacts with others.
networks: Jobs connect people to each other. They convey information among coworkers and 
society more broadly. Jobs may also contribute to tolerance when interactions at the workplace 
increase direct knowledge among people of different social and ethnic backgrounds. 
sense of fairness: Job allocations at odds with the idea of equality of opportunity may lead 
to frustration and disengagement from society and collective decision-making processes. 
Jobs that live up to standards of transparency and merit can contribute to the sense of fairness 
in society.
Jobs challenges 
agrarian economies: In these economies most people are still engaged in agriculture, often 
in very small family farms, and cities are not yet a source of economic dynamism. 
Conflict-affected countries: These are countries undergoing or emerging from conflict, where 
peace-keeping forces may still be needed or where deaths from conflict may still be high. 
Resource-rich countries: Minerals account for a large share of exports. Exploitation of re-
sources brings dramatic economic growth but undermines competitiveness and encourages 
jobs based on transfers. 
small island nations: Their size and remoteness make it difficult for them to reap the benefits 
of agglomeration and global integration. Their fragile ecosystems add to their vulnerability. 
Urbanizing countries: The share of the urban population is growing rapidly. Cities are a 
magnet for rural migrants but may fail to move up from exports of light manufacturing 
to higher value added products. 
Countries with high youth unemployment: Prolonged joblessness and idleness affect a large 
share of the often sizeable youth population. The allocation of business opportunities and jobs 
is tainted by privilege.
Formalizing countries: The coverage of social protection systems is large enough to envision 
extending it to the entire workforce, but how to do it without undermining productivity is a 
challenge.
aging societies: The share of the working-age population is declining and the costs of pro-
viding and caring for the growing number of elderly is increasing, putting a double burden on 
living standards. 
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General notes 
Indicators 
Tables 1 to 8 include 68 jobs-related indica-
tors. These indicators summarize the level and 
composition of employment in each country, 
including not only wage work but also self-
employment and farming. They cover the con-
nections between jobs and living standards, 
productivity and social cohesion and provide 
measures of migration. Definitions are provided 
in the technical notes.
Sources 
Data for 37 of the 68 indicators in tables 1 to 
8 are from publicly available sources. The pro-
cess of selecting these public sources favored 
cross-country comparability over country cov-
erage. For a majority of the indicators, there are 
a range of additional data sources, including 
national statistical offices, international reposi-
tories, and specific studies. However, only data 
produced using the same criteria in all coun-
tries are retained. In most cases, there is a single 
data source for each of these 37 indicators. For 
instance, the five unemployment indicators in 
tables 1 and 6 are entirely based on the Key In-
dicators of the Labor Market (KILM) database 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Educational attainment in table 2 is an in-
dicator that draws on two sources using differ-
ent criteria: the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) and the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS). These sources are jointly available for 
six countries only, which allows reporting them 
both without much overlap. The specific source 
used in each case is noted in table 2.
The other 31 indicators in tables 1 to 8 are 
based, totally or partially, on micro-data pro-
cessed by the World Development Report 2013 
team. The indicators entirely based on the 
team’s data processing refer to skills as a con-
straint (table 2), the working poor (table 4), 
the gender gap in earnings (table 4), workers in 
micro-enterprises (table 5), wage inequality 
(table 6), and youth not in school or at work 
(table 6). In all other cases, data for Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) member countries, other indus-
trial countries, and European Union accession 
countries, are from the OECD and Eurostat 
websites. For developing countries, the indica-
tors are based on micro-data processed by the 
World Development Report 2013 team, follow-
ing the same criteria and definitions as the 
OECD and Eurostat websites.
The micro-data underlying these 31 indica-
tors are from a large set of household surveys, 
labor force surveys, population censuses and 
enterprise surveys. The World Development 
Report 2013 team relied on four large-scale 
micro-data repositories: the World Bank’s Inter-
national Income Distribution Database (I2D2), 
Eurostat, the Minnesota Population Center’s 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS 
International, version 6.1), and the World Bank 
enterprise surveys database. The team also gath-
ered many additional living standards and labor 
force surveys.
To be considered as a micro-data source for 
any of the 31 indicators, living standards sur-
veys or labor force surveys have to be nationally 
representative. For highly urbanized countries, 
this requirement implies that surveys cover 
secondary cities and towns; for other countries, 
they also have to include rural areas. In all, more 
than 800 household surveys and censuses— 
including data on more than 600 million 
people—were standardized by the World De-
velopment Report 2013 team to ensure the 
comparability of data across countries. Table 9 
summarizes the source of information for the 
indicators that are based on micro-data. Fur-
ther information on sources is provided in the 
technical notes. 
Years 
Data in tables 1 to 8 generally covers three years: 
1995, 2005, and 2010. In a few cases, other years 
had to be retained due to data availability For ex-
ample, the most recent estimate of wages by oc-
cupation (in table 4) is for 2008, and the first set 
of comparable observations for minimum wages 
(in table 7) is for 2007. Similarly, data on edu-
cational attainment (table 2) are presented for 
2003, 2006, and 2009, as these are the points in 
time for which PISA data are available (TIMSS 
data labeled as 2006 are actually for 2007).
For the 31 indicators computed using mi-
cro-data processed by the World Development 
Report 2013 team, 1995, 2005, and 2010 are 
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reference points. The micro-data sources used 
are seldom available on an annual basis. For 
these indicators, data are for the nearest point 
within a five-year window. For example, figures 
reported for 1995 are from the closest year over 
the period 1993–97. The precise year of the sur-
vey data varies from country to country.
Countries 
Tables 1 to 8 include 156 countries or econo-
mies. The word country may refer to any terri-
tory for which separate social or economic sta-
tistics are available. Data are shown for countries 
and economies as they were constituted in 2010. 
Unless otherwise noted, data for China do not 
include data for Hong Kong SAR, China; Macao 
SAR, China; or Taiwan, China. Data for Indone-
sia include Timor Leste through 1999. Data for 
Serbia include Montenegro through 2005, and 
exclude Kosovo from 1999 onwards. 
Symbols 
An empty space means that data are not avail-
able, or that the indicator cannot be calculated. 
A “0” or “0.0” means that the value of the indi-
cator is nil or small enough that it would round 
to zero at the displayed number of decimal 
places.
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Table 1 Labor force
 Population Working age  Participation Unemployment  
 (millions) population (%) rate (%) rate (%)
 Total Total Total Total 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan 22.5 29.9 34.4     48.7         65.2      8.5 
Albania 3.1 3.1 3.2  61.7   69.1      68.1   57.8      13.5 13.8
Algeria 28.3 32.9 35.5                   27.9 15.3 11.4
Angola 12.1 16.5 19.1                     
Argentina 34.8 38.6 40.5  61.0   64.7   65.6   63.5   69.0   67.8  18.8 10.6 8.6
Armenia 3.2 3.1 3.1     66.6         54.3     36.4 28.4 28.6
Australia 18.1 20.4 22.3  66.6   67.3   67.6   74.1   75.4   76.5  8.5 5.0 5.2
Austria 8.0 8.2 8.4  67.1   67.9   67.5   71.5   72.4   75.1  3.7 5.2 4.4
Azerbaijan 7.7 8.4 9.0  63.2         48.0         8.1 6.0
Bangladesh 117.5 140.6 148.7     59.0   60.5         60.0  2.5 4.3 5.0
Barbados 0.3 0.3 0.3  83.9     73.2        19.7 9.1 8.1
Belarus 10.2 9.8 9.5     70.0         70.3     
Belgium 10.1 10.5 10.9  66.2   65.6   65.9   62.1   66.7   67.7  9.3 8.4 8.3
Belize 0.2 0.3 0.3  52.8     58.1       3.1 4.0
Benin 5.7 7.6 8.8     50.4         78.6       
Bhutan 0.5 0.7 0.7   61.7       68.8     12.5 11.0 8.2
Bolivia 7.5 9.1 9.9  55.7   57.2   59.6   71.4   71.8   74.7  3.6 5.4 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.3 3.8 3.8     80.9         58.5      31.8 27.2
Botswana 1.6 1.9 2.0        59.9         68.5  21.5 17.6 
Brazil 161.8 186.0 194.9  62.1   66.6   67.9   72.1   74.0   73.9  6.0 9.3 8.3
Bulgaria 8.4 7.7 7.5  67.0   69.0   68.9   68.7   62.1   66.5  15.7 10.1 10.2
Burkina Faso 10.7 14.2 16.5  48.3   50.5      86.8   86.7     2.6 2.7 
Burundi 6.1 7.3 8.4                     
Cambodia 11.2 13.4 14.1  56.3   62.1   63.4   77.0   84.6   84.8    1.7
Cameroon 13.9 17.6 19.6  51.4   89.7      69.4   67.5     8.1 4.4 
Canada 29.4 32.3 34.1  67.6   69.2   69.4   74.7   77.7   77.8  9.5 6.7 8.0
Central African Republic 3.3 4.0 4.4     51.3         75.4       
Chad 7.0 9.8 11.2     49.0              0.7  
Chile 14.4 16.3 17.1  63.8   67.1   68.7   59.1   59.3   64.8  4.7 8.0 8.1
China 1211.2 1307.6 1340.9  66.7   71.4   74.5      71.7   71.0  2.9 2.7 2.9
Colombia 36.5 43.0 46.3  53.9   62.8   64.5  56.0  69.3   71.9  8.7 11.3 11.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. 44.1 57.4 66.0     50.1         70.9       
Congo, Rep. 2.7 3.5 4.0     57.3         66.0       
Costa Rica 3.5 4.3 4.7  60.5   65.9   68.5   61.7   65.5   65.3  5.2 6.6 7.8
Côte d’Ivoire 14.7 18.0 19.7                     
Croatia 4.7 4.4 4.4     66.9   67.2      63.3   61.5  10.0 12.6 11.8
Cuba 10.9 11.3 11.3                   8.3 1.9 1.6
Czech Republic 10.3 10.2 10.5  68.0   71.0   70.6      70.4   70.2  4.0 7.9 7.3
Denmark 5.2 5.4 5.5  67.4   66.2   65.6   72.3   79.8   79.4  7.0 4.8 7.5
Dominican Republic 7.9 9.3 9.9  58.5   61.9   63.5   63.1   58.2   59.4  15.8 18.0 14.2
Ecuador 11.4 13.4 14.5  58.0   61.1   62.5   72.1   73.4   66.8  6.9 7.7 6.5
Egypt, Arab Rep. 62.1 74.2 81.1  56.2   63.2     48.5  59.8     11.3 11.2 8.7
El Salvador 5.7 6.1 6.2  56.5   58.7   61.1   62.9   63.5   64.8  7.6 7.2 7.3
Eritrea 3.2 4.5 5.3                     
Estonia 1.4 1.3 1.3  65.8   68.0   67.8      70.1   73.8  9.7 7.9 16.9
Ethiopia 57.0 74.3 82.9  49.2   49.4      70.4   84.4     3.1 5.4 
Fiji 0.8 0.8 0.9  61.2    65.7   48.9      54.6  5.4 4.6 
Finland 5.1 5.2 5.4  66.8   66.7   66.4   72.1   74.7   74.5  15.3 8.4 8.4
France 59.4 63.0 64.9  65.3   65.0   64.8   67.6   69.9   70.5  11.8 8.9 9.4
Gabon 1.1 1.4 1.5     58.5         58.4     17.8  
Gambia, The 1.1 1.5 1.7                     
Georgia 4.7 4.4 4.5     66.5   67.6         64.2   13.8 16.5
Germany 81.6 82.5 81.7  68.3   66.9   65.9   70.5   73.8   76.6  8.1 11.1 7.1
Ghana 17.0 21.6 24.4     55.3         75.6      3.6 
Greece 10.6 11.1 11.3  67.5   67.5   66.7   60.4   66.8   68.2  9.1 9.8 12.5
Guatemala 10.0 12.7 14.4     53.8         68.0    3.1 
Guinea 7.6 9.0 10.0  49.4         83.6        3.1  
Guinea-Bissau 1.1 1.4 1.5                     
Haiti 7.9 9.3 10.0                     
Honduras 5.6 6.9 7.6  52.2   55.4   58.2   60.6   63.6   63.2  3.2 4.2 
Hungary 10.3 10.1 10.0  67.6   68.7   68.6  58.9    61.3   62.4  10.2 7.2 11.2
India 932.2 1094.6 1170.9  59.9   61.8   64.5   62.0   62.2   56.6  2.2 4.4 3.6
Indonesia 199.4 227.3 239.9  61.9   66.0   65.4   63.8   64.8   61.6  4.4 11.2 7.9
Iran, Islamic Rep. 59.8 69.7 74.0     65.9         49.0     9.1 12.1 10.5
Iraq 20.9 27.6 32.0  48.6   57.4     43.5  41.5      18.0 
Ireland 3.6 4.2 4.5  64.0   68.2   67.3   61.6   70.8   69.8  12.0 4.3 13.6
Israel 5.5 6.9 7.6  60.9   61.7   62.2   60.8   62.4   64.5  6.9 9.0 6.6
Italy 56.8 58.6 60.5  68.8   66.4   65.7   57.6   62.5   62.2  11.7 7.7 8.4
Jamaica 2.5 2.7 2.7  60.1         86.3        16.2 10.9 11.4
Japan 125.4 127.8 127.5  69.5   66.1   63.8   71.5   72.6   74.0  3.2 4.4 5.0
Jordan 4.2 5.4 6.0    56.0       47.5    14.6 12.4 12.9
Kazakhstan 15.8 15.1 16.3  63.8   70.3      55.9   64.3     11.0 8.1 6.6
Kenya 27.4 35.6 40.5  51.4   53.8      58.7   60.6       
Kiribati 0.1 0.1 0.1   58.4       66.5       
Korea, Rep. 45.1 48.1 48.9  70.7   71.7   73.2  64.9    66.3   65.8  2.1 3.7 3.7
Kosovo 2.0 1.8 1.8     62.5         46.5      41.4 
Kyrgyz Republic 4.6 5.1 5.4  57.9         57.4         8.1 8.2
Lao PDR 4.8 5.8 6.2  52.0      59.5         87.7  2.6 1.4 
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Table 1 Labor force, continued
   Population Working age Participation Unemployment 
 (millions) population (%) rate (%) rate (%)
 Total Total Total Total 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia 2.5 2.3 2.2  65.7   68.7   68.9      69.6   73.2  20.2 8.9 18.7
Lebanon 3.5 4.1 4.2     64.7         47.9     8.5 7.9 
Lesotho 1.8 2.1 2.2                    39.3      25.3 
Liberia 2.1 3.2 4.0     55.6         73.1         5.6   3.7 
Libya 4.8 5.8 6.4                           
Lithuania 3.6 3.4 3.3  65.9   67.8   68.9      68.4   70.5   17.1   8.3   17.8 
Macedonia, FYR 2.0 2.0 2.1  66.6   69.1   70.6     62.2    64.2   36.0   37.3   32.0 
Madagascar 13.1 17.9 20.7  51.8   51.0      89.1            2.6    
Malawi 9.9 12.8 14.9  53.5   49.9       89.2         7.8    
Malaysia 20.7 26.1 28.4                3.1   3.5   3.7 
Mali 9.8 13.2 15.4  62.2   50.7      83.4   57.3      3.3   8.8    
Mauritania 2.3 3.0 3.5        52.2         83.1      33.0    
Mauritius 1.1 1.2 1.3     68.8   69.9      63.6   62.2   5.8   9.6   7.7 
Mexico 92.3 106.5 113.4  59.3   63.5   65.9   61.5   61.9   63.7   6.9   3.5   5.2 
Moldova 3.7 3.6 3.6     67.6         73.5       7.3   7.4 
Mongolia 2.3 2.5 2.8        68.4         68.1      3.3    
Montenegro 0.6 0.6 0.6     68.7         56.9         30.3    
Morocco 26.9 30.4 32.0  55.9   61.7     52.2 54.3     22.9   11.0   10.0 
Mozambique 15.9 20.8 23.4  51.6   50.2   48.2   79.9   83.1   91.2   2.2       
Myanmar 42.1 46.3 48.0                           
Namibia 1.7 2.1 2.3  52.2         56.9         19.4   21.9   37.6 
Nepal 21.6 27.3 30.0  55.0   55.7   57.4   62.3   81.3   75.7   4.5      2.7 
Netherlands 15.5 16.3 16.6  68.4   67.5   67.1   69.2   76.9   78.2   7.2   4.7   4.5 
New Zealand 3.7 4.1 4.4  65.4   66.4   66.5   74.5   77.3   77.5   6.5   3.8   6.5 
Nicaragua 4.6 5.4 5.8  51.6   59.1      65.6   67.3      16.9   5.6    
Niger 9.2 13.0 15.5  47.6         59.2       5.1       
Nigeria 110.0 139.8 158.4  53.3   63.3      62.7   63.7           
Norway 4.4 4.6 4.9  64.6   65.5   66.2      78.3   78.1   4.9   4.6   3.6 
Oman 2.2 2.4 2.8          76.8                 
Pakistan 127.3 158.6 173.6     53.7   55.3      56.7   55.2   5.0   7.4   5.0 
Panama 2.7 3.2 3.5  60.7   62.7   62.6   62.2   67.3   68.4   14.0   9.8   6.5 
Papua New Guinea 4.7 6.1 6.9  55.7      56.2         70.5          
Paraguay 4.8 5.9 6.5  53.1   58.9   61.6   79.7   73.5   72.0   3.4   5.8   5.6 
Peru 23.8 27.6 29.1  59.3   61.3   61.0   74.3   74.4   78.0   7.1   11.4   6.3 
Philippines 69.3 85.5 93.3  58.3   60.7   62.4   64.1   62.1   63.7   8.4   7.7   7.5 
Poland 38.6 38.2 38.2  65.9   70.1   71.3  67.4    64.4   65.6   13.3   17.7   9.6 
Portugal 10.0 10.5 10.6  67.3   67.3   66.9  67.4   73.4   74.0   7.2   7.6   10.8 
Romania 22.7 21.6 21.4  67.3   69.5   69.9   71.5   62.3   63.6   8.0   7.2   7.3 
Russian Federation 148.1 143.2 141.8     52.4               9.4   7.2   7.5 
Rwanda 5.6 9.2 10.6  51.9   53.5      76.3   85.7      0.6       
Saudi Arabia 18.5 24.0 27.4                       6.3   5.4 
Senegal 8.4 10.9 12.4  58.7   53.7      59.3   51.6         10.0    
Serbia 7.7 7.4 7.3        64.5         59.1      20.8   16.6 
Sierra Leone 3.9 5.2 5.9     52.6         67.1         3.4    
Singapore 3.5 4.3 5.1                    2.7   5.6   5.9 
Slovak Republic 5.4 5.4 5.4  66.3   71.3   72.4  69.3    68.9   68.7   13.1   16.2   14.4 
Slovenia 2.0 2.0 2.1  69.4   70.3   69.4  66.3    70.7   71.5   7.2   6.5   7.2 
Somalia 6.5 8.4 9.3                           
South Africa 39.1 47.2 50.0  62.3   62.6      57.6   68.2      16.9   23.8   24.7 
Spain 39.4 43.4 46.1  68.0   68.7   68.2  60.6   69.7   73.4   22.7   9.2   20.1 
Sri Lanka 18.2 19.8 20.9  65.3   67.3   66.9   60.8   58.8   59.1   12.2   7.7   4.9 
Sudan 30.1 38.4 43.6                           
Swaziland 1.0 1.1 1.2  57.1         61.8         21.7       
Sweden 8.8 9.0 9.4  63.7   65.2   65.3   77.7   78.7   79.5   9.1   7.7   8.4 
Switzerland 7.0 7.4 7.8  67.7   67.9   68.0  79.1    80.9   82.4   3.3   4.4   4.5 
Syrian Arab Republic 14.2 18.5 20.4     57.5         51.1      7.2   8.2   8.4 
Tajikistan 5.8 6.5 6.9     57.0         54.4             
Tanzania 29.9 38.8 44.8  48.8   51.3   50.5   77.4   91.4   78.4      4.3    
Thailand 59.7 66.7 69.1  74.1   66.3   67.5   80.7   82.1   81.5   1.1   1.3   1.2 
Timor-Leste 0.9 1.0 1.1     53.7   53.3      63.3   43.0          
Togo 4.1 5.4 6.0     55.1         82.8             
Tonga 0.1 0.1 0.1  55.7     60.6        13.3 1.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.3 1.3 1.3                    17.2   8.0   4.6 
Tunisia 9.0 10.0 10.5  61.0         51.4         15.9   14.2   14.2 
Turkey 58.9 68.1 72.8  63.0   65.5   67.0  56.8    49.8   51.9   7.6   10.6   11.9 
Turkmenistan 4.2 4.7 5.0                           
Uganda 20.8 28.4 33.4     51.4       85.7         2.0   4.2 
Ukraine 51.5 47.1 45.9     67.8         68.3      5.6   7.2   8.8 
United Kingdom 58.0 60.2 62.2  64.7   66.0   66.1   74.7   75.4   75.5   8.6   4.7   7.8 
United States 266.3 295.8 309.1  65.4   67.0   66.8   76.9   75.4   73.9   5.6   5.1   9.6 
Uruguay 3.2 3.3 3.4  62.4   61.6   62.9   71.7   72.7   75.0   10.2   12.2   7.6 
Uzbekistan 22.8 26.2 28.2                           
Venezuela, RB 22.0 26.6 28.8  59.8   63.6      64.0   69.2    10.2   11.4   7.6 
Vietnam 72.0 82.4 86.9  61.9   68.3   69.0   84.4   80.5   79.6   1.9   2.1   2.4 
West Bank and Gaza 2.5 3.6 4.2  51.9    55.6  45.1  42.6   43.0          
Yemen, Rep. 15.1 20.6 24.1     52.1               8.3   16.1   14.6 
Zambia 8.9 11.5 12.9     62.3         64.2      15.3   15.9    
Zimbabwe 11.7 12.6 12.6                    5.0   4.2    
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Table 1 Labor force, continued
   Population Working age   Participation Unemployment 
 (millions) population (%) rate (%) rate (%)
 Men Men Men Men 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan 11.6 15.5 17.8     47.9         85.2         7.6    
Albania 1.6 1.6 1.6  61.0   69.4      73.5   65.8         14.4   12.2 
Algeria 14.3 16.6 17.9                    26.0   14.9   10.0 
Angola 6.0 8.2 9.4                           
Argentina 17.1 18.9 19.8  61.8   64.2   65.4   80.4   81.7   81.0   16.5   9.2   7.8 
Armenia 1.5 1.4 1.4     65.6         64.6      38.0   21.9    
Australia 9.0 10.1 11.1  67.4   67.9   68.1   83.9   82.6   82.9   8.8   4.9   5.1 
Austria 3.8 4.0 4.1  69.9   70.0   69.4   80.8   79.3   80.9   3.1   4.9   4.6 
Azerbaijan 3.8 4.1 4.5  62.1         57.9            8.0   5.2 
Bangladesh 60.3 71.9 75.3     58.5   59.1         89.0   2.7   3.4   4.2 
Barbados 0.1 0.1 0.1  85.6     79.7        16.6 7.3 6.8
Belarus 4.8 4.6 4.4     72.3         72.0           
Belgium 5.0 5.1 5.3  68.2   67.4   67.6   72.3   73.9   73.4   7.3   7.6   8.1 
Belize 0.1 0.1 0.2  51.9     81.9       2.9 2.6
Benin 2.7 3.7 4.4     47.9         77.4             
Bhutan 0.3 0.3 0.4   60.3       76.1     10 7.5 
Bolivia 3.7 4.6 5.0  54.4   55.8   58.9   83.1   82.1   84.5   3.3   4.5    
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.6 1.8 1.8     84.5         73.7         29.5   25.6 
Botswana 0.8 0.9 1.0        59.0         74.7   19.4   15.3    
Brazil 80.2 91.7 95.9  61.5   66.3   67.5   87.7   85.6   85.1   5.1   7.1   6.1 
Bulgaria 4.1 3.8 3.6  67.8   70.7   70.9   71.7   67.0   70.8   15.5   10.3   10.9 
Burkina Faso 5.2 7.0 8.2  45.8   47.9      92.2   91.7         2.9    
Burundi 3.0 3.5 4.1                           
Cambodia 5.4 6.5 6.9  54.0   60.7   62.1   80.7   90.8   89.1         1.5 
Cameroon 6.9 8.8 9.8  49.4   90.5      76.8   70.0      9.5   4.2    
Canada 14.5 16.0 16.9  68.7   70.3   70.3   81.5   82.5   81.5   9.8   7.0   8.7 
Central African Republic 1.6 2.0 2.2     49.5         76.6             
Chad 3.5 4.9 5.6     46.9               1.1       
Chile 7.1 8.1 8.5  64.0   67.6   69.2  80.7   76.7   77.8   4.4   7.0   7.2 
China 618.1 673.8 687.5     70.5   74.1      78.6   78.2      2.4   2.6 
Colombia 18.0 21.2 22.8  52.4   61.9   63.6  80.7  84.1   84.8   6.8   8.7   9.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 21.8 28.5 32.8     48.9         72.2             
Congo, Rep. 1.4 1.8 2.0     55.7         68.0             
Costa Rica 1.8 2.2 2.4  59.3   65.4   67.6   86.4   84.0   82.1   4.6   5.0   6.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 7.6 9.2 10.1                           
Croatia 2.3 2.1 2.1     69.2   69.5      70.0   67.2   9.5   11.6   11.4 
Cuba 5.5 5.7 5.7                    5.4   1.8   1.4 
Czech Republic 5.0 5.0 5.2  69.9   73.1   72.7  80.6    78.4   78.6   3.4   6.5   6.4 
Denmark 2.6 2.7 2.7  69.3   67.5   66.7   85.6   83.6   82.6   5.6   4.4   8.4 
Dominican Republic 4.0 4.7 5.0  57.4   61.9   63.1   85.1   75.6   75.3   10.2   11.1   8.5 
Ecuador 5.7 6.7 7.2  56.9   60.4   61.8   89.3   86.6   81.8   5.5   5.6   5.2 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 31.2 37.3 40.7  56.7   62.8     80.7  78.6      7.6   7.1   5.9 
El Salvador 2.8 2.9 2.9  54.2   56.3   59.1   84.5   81.9   82.6   8.7   8.9   9.0 
Eritrea 1.6 2.2 2.6                           
Estonia 0.7 0.6 0.6  67.9   70.9   70.9  79.9    73.6   76.8   10.5   8.8   19.5 
Ethiopia 28.3 36.9 41.3  47.8   47.3      90.4   91.6      3.0   2.7    
Fiji 0.4 0.4 0.4  60.8    65.3   72.1      75.1  4.8 4.1 
Finland 2.5 2.6 2.6  69.3   68.9   68.4   74.8   76.6   76.4   15.4   8.1   9.0 
France 28.9 30.6 31.6  66.9   66.5   66.2   74.9   75.2   74.9   10.0   8.0   9.0 
Gabon 0.5 0.7 0.8     59.1         66.2      19.1       
Gambia, The 0.6 0.7 0.9                           
Georgia 2.2 2.1 2.1     66.0   68.4         71.9      14.8   16.8 
Germany 39.7 40.3 40.0  71.6   69.3   67.9   79.6   80.6   82.3   7.2   11.3   7.5 
Ghana 8.6 11.0 12.4     53.9         76.4         3.5    
Greece 5.2 5.5 5.6  68.3   68.7   68.2   77.2   79.2   78.9   6.2   6.1   9.9 
Guatemala 5.0 6.2 7.0     51.2         90.9       2.8    
Guinea 3.8 4.6 5.0  45.8         85.7         4.6       
Guinea-Bissau 0.6 0.7 0.8                           
Haiti 3.9 4.6 5.0                           
Honduras 2.8 3.4 3.8  50.6   53.6   56.4   87.6   85.9   85.8   3.2   3.2    
Hungary 4.9 4.8 4.8  69.3   71.1   71.3  67.9    67.9   68.3   11.3   7.0   11.6 
India 484.0 566.6 604.8  59.3   61.1   63.7   85.7   85.1   82.1   2.4   4.1   3.3 
Indonesia 99.7 113.5 119.6  60.9   65.6   64.7   89.1   84.4   83.0   3.8   9.5   7.5 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 30.1 35.5 37.5     64.6         79.3      8.5   10.5   9.1 
Iraq 10.4 13.8 16.1  48.6   56.1      78.0   72.4         19.2    
Ireland 1.8 2.1 2.2  64.7   68.9   67.7   76.1   80.6   77.4   11.9   4.6   16.8 
Israel 2.7 3.4 3.8  61.1   62.0   62.4   69.0   66.8   68.2   5.6   8.5   6.8 
Italy 27.5 28.5 29.6  70.5   68.4   67.6   73.2   74.6   73.3   9.1   6.2   7.6 
Jamaica 1.2 1.3 1.3  61.4         87.7         10.8   7.4   8.5 
Japan 61.5 62.4 62.1  71.2   68.0   65.9   84.5   84.4   84.8   3.1   4.6   5.4 
Jordan 2.2 2.8 3.1     55.8        71.8     12.1   11.8   10.3 
Kazakhstan 7.6 7.2 7.8  63.2   70.3      62.7   71.6         6.7   5.6 
Kenya 13.7 17.8 20.2  50.1   53.0      68.3   68.7             
Kiribati      58.2       70.4       
Korea, Rep. 22.6 24.0 24.4  71.3   72.7   74.7  78.7    78.2   77.1   2.3   4.0   4.0 
Kosovo        61.9         63.9         32.9    
Kyrgyz Republic 2.3 2.5 2.6  57.9         69.4            7.4   7.3 
Lao PDR 2.4 2.9 3.1  50.8      58.3         90.3   2.6   1.3   
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Table 1 Labor force, continued
  Population Working age   Participation Unemployment 
 (millions) population (%) rate (%) rate (%)
 Men Men Men Men 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia 1.2 1.1 1.0  68.0   71.9   72.5      74.4   75.8   20.6   9.1   21.7 
Lebanon 1.7 2.0 2.1     63.3         74.5         7.3    
Lesotho 0.9 1.0 1.1                    30.7      23.0 
Liberia 1.0 1.6 2.0     54.2         77.1         6.8   3.4 
Libya 2.5 2.9 3.2                           
Lithuania 1.7 1.6 1.5  67.5   70.1   71.8      72.1   72.4   15.3   8.2   21.2 
Macedonia, FYR 1.0 1.0 1.0  66.7   69.7   71.4     75.0    77.7          
Madagascar 6.6 8.9 10.3  51.1   49.5      91.6            1.7    
Malawi 4.9 6.4 7.5  53.3   49.7       91.3         5.4    
Malaysia 10.5 13.3 14.4                2.8   3.4   3.6 
Mali 4.9 6.6 7.7  60.3   48.1      88.0   68.0      3.3   7.2    
Mauritania 1.1 1.5 1.7        48.3         89.5          
Mauritius 0.6 0.6 0.6     69.3   70.2      81.9   79.3   4.6   5.8   4.6 
Mexico 45.7 52.6 55.9  58.8   62.9   65.4   85.7   83.1   83.0   6.0   3.4   5.2 
Moldova 1.8 1.7 1.7     67.8         79.0       8.7   9.1 
Mongolia 1.1 1.3 1.4        67.2         73.0      3.0    
Montenegro 0.3 0.3 0.3     69.2         64.2         26.2    
Morocco 13.4 15.0 15.7  54.6   60.9     84.7 83.7     18.7   10.8   9.8 
Mozambique 7.6 10.0 11.4  49.8   48.0   46.4   79.6   82.3   90.6   3.4       
Myanmar 20.9 22.9 23.6                           
Namibia 0.8 1.0 1.1  50.7         64.6         17.9   19.4   32.5 
Nepal 10.8 13.5 14.9  54.4   52.6   53.7   64.2   88.1   81.0         3.1 
Netherlands 7.6 8.1 8.2  70.3   69.0   68.3   79.9   83.7   83.7   6.1   4.4   4.4 
New Zealand 1.8 2.0 2.1  65.9   66.6   66.5   83.7   84.4   83.6   6.4   3.5   6.2 
Nicaragua 2.3 2.7 2.9  50.3   58.3      87.3   88.1  75.0  15.9   5.4    
Niger 4.6 6.5 7.8  47.3         65.7       3.6       
Nigeria 55.4 70.7 80.2  50.2   60.9      82.0   74.2           
Norway 2.2 2.3 2.4  66.4   67.1   67.7  81.2    81.6   80.6   5.1   4.8   4.1 
Oman 1.3 1.3 1.6                           
Pakistan 65.5 81.0 88.2     52.7   54.0      85.1   83.2   3.7   6.2   4.0 
Panama 1.4 1.6 1.8  60.5   61.5   61.9   83.1   84.2   85.3   10.8   7.6   5.3 
Papua New Guinea 2.4 3.1 3.5  54.2      55.2         70.0          
Paraguay 2.4 3.0 3.3  52.7   59.1   61.7   93.7   87.7   86.5   3.1   4.8   4.4 
Peru 12.0 13.8 14.6  58.4   61.1   60.6   86.0   84.3   86.2   6.0   9.6   4.4 
Philippines 35.0 43.0 46.8  57.9   60.6   62.3   80.5   77.6   76.6   7.7   7.7   7.5 
Poland 18.8 18.5 18.4  67.2   72.0   73.3  73.9    70.8   72.4   12.1   16.6   9.3 
Portugal 4.8 5.1 5.2  68.3   68.7   68.5   76.4   79.0   78.2   6.4   6.7   9.8 
Romania 11.1 10.5 10.4  68.3   71.0   71.6   77.7   69.4   71.5   7.5   7.8   7.9 
Russian Federation 69.4 66.4 65.6     47.9               9.7   7.3   8.0 
Rwanda 2.7 4.5 5.2  49.8   51.8      75.4   83.7      0.9       
Saudi Arabia 10.3 13.5 15.2                       4.7   3.5 
Senegal 4.2 5.4 6.2  58.2   50.9      77.8   71.5         7.9    
Serbia 3.8 3.7 3.6        65.9         67.4      16.8   15.3 
Sierra Leone 1.9 2.5 2.9     50.0         66.8         4.5    
Singapore 1.8 2.1 2.6                    2.6   5.6   5.4 
Slovak Republic 2.6 2.6 2.6  67.3   73.0   74.4  77.3    76.5   76.1   12.6   15.4   14.2 
Slovenia 1.0 1.0 1.0  71.7   73.0   72.3  71.1    75.1   75.4   7.4   6.1   7.4 
Somalia 3.2 4.1 4.6                           
South Africa 19.3 23.3 24.8  61.3   61.4      68.0   72.3      14.4   20.0   22.6 
Spain 19.3 21.4 22.8  69.4   70.4   69.9   75.5   80.9   80.7   17.8   7.0   19.7 
Sri Lanka 9.2 9.8 10.3  64.3   66.5   65.5   82.1   80.2   80.9   9.0   5.6   3.5 
Sudan 15.2 19.3 21.9                           
Swaziland 0.5 0.5 0.6  57.0         71.3         20.4       
Sweden 4.4 4.5 4.7  65.4   66.8   66.7   79.6   80.9   82.3   9.8   7.8   8.5 
Switzerland 3.4 3.6 3.8  69.5   69.5   69.5  90.0    87.4   88.3   2.9   3.9   4.2 
Syrian Arab Republic 7.1 9.4 10.3     56.6         81.3      5.5   5.3   5.7 
Tajikistan 2.9 3.2 3.4     56.0         63.5             
Tanzania 14.8 19.4 22.4  46.5   50.1   50.3   83.6   92.0   80.7      2.8    
Thailand 29.7 32.8 34.0  73.5   65.4   66.8   89.8   88.4   88.0   1.0   1.5   1.2 
Timor-Leste 0.4 0.5 0.6     53.5   53.3      77.5   57.9          
Togo 2.0 2.7 3.0     53.6         82.2             
Tonga 0.0 0.1 0.1  54.7     77.6         3.6 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.6 0.6 0.7                    15.2   5.8   3.5 
Tunisia 4.5 5.0 5.3  60.4         77.2         15.5   13.1    
Turkey 29.4 34.0 36.3  63.1   65.9   67.4  81.1    73.0  74.5   7.8   10.4   11.4 
Turkmenistan 2.1 2.3 2.5                           
Uganda 10.3 14.2 16.7     52.9         87.9         1.8   3.1 
Ukraine 23.9 21.7 21.1     69.7         75.8      6.3   7.5   6.6 
United Kingdom 28.2 29.5 30.6  66.3   67.1   67.1   83.3   82.0   81.7   10.0   5.0   8.6 
United States 130.2 145.6 152.5  66.5   68.0   67.8   84.3   81.8   79.6   5.6   5.1   10.5 
Uruguay 1.6 1.6 1.6  62.7   62.3   63.2   86.4   82.9   84.5   8.0   9.5   5.4 
Uzbekistan 11.3 13.0 14.0                           
Venezuela, RB 11.1 13.4 14.5  59.7   63.6      84.1   83.5    9.0   10.3   7.2 
Vietnam 35.3 40.6 43.0  60.4   68.6   69.6   85.9   82.3   81.9   2.2   1.9    
West Bank and Gaza 1.3 1.8 2.1  52.1    56.6  79.0  70.0   65.9          
Yemen, Rep. 7.6 10.4 12.1     50.5               9.3   11.9   11.5 
Zambia 4.4 5.7 6.5     61.3         62.5      14.9       
Zimbabwe 5.8 6.2 6.2                    6.8   4.2   
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Table 1 Labor force, continued
  Population Working age   Participation Unemployment 
 (millions) population (%) rate (%) rate (%)
 Women Women Women Women 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan 10.8 14.4 16.6     49.6         45.1         9.5    
Albania 1.6 1.6 1.6  62.4   68.7      62.3   49.2         12.2   15.9 
Algeria 14.0 16.3 17.6                    38.4   17.5   20.0 
Angola 6.1 8.3 9.6                           
Argentina 17.7 19.7 20.7  61.0   62.8   63.8   47.7   57.2   55.5   22.3   12.4   9.8 
Armenia 1.7 1.6 1.7     67.6         45.0      34.4   35.0    
Australia 9.1 10.3 11.2  65.7   66.8   67.1   64.2   68.2   70.0   8.1   5.2   5.4 
Austria 4.1 4.2 4.3  64.5   66.0   65.8   62.3   65.6   69.3   4.3   5.5   4.2 
Azerbaijan 3.9 4.3 4.6  64.2         39.3            8.3   6.9 
Bangladesh 57.2 68.7 73.4     59.5   61.8         31.0   2.2   7.0   7.4 
Barbados 0.1 0.1 0.1  82.4     67.3        22.7 10.9 9.4
Belarus 5.4 5.2 5.1     68.1         68.9           
Belgium 5.2 5.4 5.5  64.3   63.8   64.3   51.7   59.5   61.8   12.2   9.5   8.5 
Belize 0.1 0.1 0.2  53.6     34.8       3.3 5.3
Benin 2.9 3.9 4.5     53.1         79.8             
Bhutan 0.3 0.3 0.3   62.9       62.1     17.9 17.2 
Bolivia 3.8 4.6 5.0  57.0   58.5   60.3   60.5   62.4   65.8   4.0   6.5    
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.7 2.0 2.0     77.5         43.3         35.7   30.0 
Botswana 0.8 0.9 1.0        60.7         63.0   23.9   19.9    
Brazil 81.7 94.3 99.0  62.6   67.0   68.4   57.4   63.1   63.5   7.2   12.2   11.0 
Bulgaria 4.3 4.0 3.9  66.3   67.5   67.1   65.8   57.3   62.3   15.8   9.8   9.5 
Burkina Faso 5.4 7.2 8.3  50.7   53.0      82.0   82.4         1.7    
Burundi 3.1 3.7 4.3                           
Cambodia 5.8 6.8 7.2  58.4   63.3   64.6   74.0   79.2   80.8         1.8 
Cameroon 7.0 8.8 9.8  53.3   89.0      62.7   65.0      6.5   4.6    
Canada 14.8 16.3 17.2  66.6   68.2   68.5   67.8   72.9   74.2   9.1   6.5   7.2 
Central African Republic 1.7 2.0 2.2     53.1         74.5             
Chad 3.5 4.9 5.6     51.0               0.3       
Chile 7.3 8.2 8.7  63.6   66.7   68.1   37.4   42.3   51.8   5.3   9.8   9.6 
China 593.1 633.8 653.4     72.3   74.9      64.8   63.7      3.1   3.2 
Colombia 18.4 21.8 23.5  55.3   63.8   65.3  33.2  55.4   59.8   11.3   14.9   15.0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 22.2 28.9 33.2     51.3         69.6             
Congo, Rep. 1.4 1.8 2.0     58.8         64.2             
Costa Rica 1.7 2.1 2.3  61.7   66.4   69.3   37.7   47.5   49.2   6.6   9.6   9.9 
Côte d’Ivoire 7.1 8.8 9.7                           
Croatia 2.4 2.3 2.3     64.8   65.0      56.7   55.9   10.5   13.8   12.2 
Cuba 5.4 5.6 5.6                    13.0   2.2   2.0 
Czech Republic 5.3 5.2 5.4  66.3   69.1   68.5      62.4   61.5   4.8   9.8   8.5 
Denmark 2.6 2.7 2.8  65.6   64.8   64.5   64.1   75.9   76.0   8.6   5.3   6.5 
Dominican Republic 3.9 4.6 4.9  59.6   61.9   63.9   73.3   40.7   44.0   26.2   28.8   22.8 
Ecuador 5.7 6.7 7.2  59.6   61.8   63.1   55.3   60.4   52.5   8.8   10.8   8.4 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 30.9 36.9 40.4  55.7   63.6     15.3  40.7      24.1   25.1   19.2 
El Salvador 3.0 3.2 3.3  58.6   60.9   62.9   44.5   48.2   49.7   5.9   4.8   4.9 
Eritrea 1.6 2.3 2.7                           
Estonia 0.8 0.7 0.7  64.0   65.6   65.1      66.9   71.0   8.9   7.1   14.3 
Ethiopia 28.7 37.3 41.7  50.5   51.5      66.5   78.0      3.3   8.2    
Fiji 0.4 0.4 0.4 61.5  66.0 25.3  33.9 7.8 5.9 
Finland 2.6 2.7 2.7  64.4   64.6   64.4   69.4   72.8   72.5   15.1   8.7   7.7 
France 30.5 32.4 33.3  63.8   63.6   63.5   60.6   64.7   66.1   14.1   9.8   9.7 
Gabon 0.5 0.7 0.8     57.9         50.7      16.1       
Gambia, The 0.6 0.8 0.9                           
Georgia 2.5 2.3 2.4     67.1   67.0         57.2      12.7   16.1 
Germany 41.9 42.1 41.7  65.2   64.6   63.9   61.3   66.9   70.8   9.4   10.9   6.6 
Ghana 8.4 10.6 12.0     56.6         74.9         3.6    
Greece 5.4 5.6 5.7  66.7   66.2   65.2   44.3   54.5   57.6   13.8   15.3   16.2 
Guatemala 5.0 6.5 7.4     56.3         49.0       3.7    
Guinea 3.7 4.5 4.9  52.8         81.8         1.7       
Guinea-Bissau 0.6 0.7 0.8                           
Haiti 4.0 4.7 5.0                           
Honduras 2.8 3.4 3.8  53.8   57.2   59.9   35.9   44.0   43.6   3.4   6.2    
Hungary 5.4 5.3 5.3  66.1   66.6   66.3  50.3    55.1   56.7   8.7   7.5   10.7 
India 448.1 528.0 566.1  60.5   62.4   65.5   37.2   38.7   30.1   1.7   5.1   4.5 
Indonesia 99.7 113.8 120.2  62.8   66.4   66.1   39.6   45.4   40.9   5.5   14.2   8.5 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 29.7 34.2 36.4     67.3         19.5      13.4   18.2   16.8 
Iraq 10.5 13.8 16.0  48.5   58.6      9.3   12.8         14.2    
Ireland 1.8 2.1 2.2  63.3   67.5   67.0   47.1   60.8   62.2   12.1   4.0   9.6 
Israel 2.8 3.5 3.9  60.7   61.5   61.9   52.7   58.1   60.9   8.6   9.5   6.5 
Italy 29.3 30.2 30.9  67.1   64.5   64.0   42.4   50.4   51.1   16.1   10.1   9.7 
Jamaica 1.3 1.3 1.4  58.8         84.8         22.5   15.3   14.8 
Japan 64.0 65.4 65.4  67.9   64.2   61.8   58.4   60.8   63.2   3.3   4.2   4.5 
Jordan 2.0 2.6 2.9     56.1         21.6      29.9   16.5   24.1 
Kazakhstan 8.2 7.9 8.5  64.8   70.3      49.7   58.0         9.6   7.5 
Kenya 13.8 17.8 20.3  52.7   54.5      49.9   53.0             
Kiribati     58.6   62.7     3.3 
Korea, Rep. 22.5 24.1 24.5  70.2   70.7   71.8  51.4    54.5   54.5   1.7   3.4    
Kosovo        63.0         28.3         60.5   9.4 
Kyrgyz Republic 2.3 2.6 2.7  58.1         46.0            9.1    
Lao PDR 2.4 2.9 3.1  53.3      60.6         85.3   2.6   1.4   15.7
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Table 1 Labor force, continued
   Population Working age   Participation Unemployment 
 (millions) population (%) rate (%) rate (%)
 Women Women Women Women 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia 1.4 1.2 1.2  63.7   65.9   65.8      65.1   70.7   19.8   8.7    
Lebanon 1.8 2.1 2.2     66.1         22.9         9.5  
Lesotho 0.9 1.1 1.1                    47.1      28.0 
Liberia 1.1 1.6 2.0     56.9         69.4         4.2   4.1 
Libya 2.3 2.8 3.1                           
Lithuania 1.9 1.8 1.8  64.5   65.8   66.5      64.9   68.8   15.9   8.3   14.4 
Macedonia, FYR 1.0 1.0 1.0  66.4   68.5   69.9     49.2    50.4   40.8   38.4   32.2 
Madagascar 6.6 9.0 10.4  52.5   52.5      86.6            3.5    
Malawi 5.0 6.4 7.4  53.6   50.0       87.3         10.0    
Malaysia 10.2 12.8 14.0                3.8   3.7   3.8 
Mali 5.0 6.6 7.7  64.1   53.1      79.2   47.8      3.3   10.9    
Mauritania 1.1 1.5 1.7        55.7         72.7          
Mauritius 0.6 0.6 0.6     68.3   69.7      45.3   45.2   8.2   16.5   12.8 
Mexico 46.6 53.9 57.5  59.7   64.1   66.5   39.5   43.2   46.3   8.6   3.6   5.2 
Moldova 1.9 1.9 1.9     67.4         69.0       6.0   5.7 
Mongolia 1.2 1.3 1.4        69.4         63.5      3.6    
Montenegro 0.3 0.3 0.3     68.3         50.0         35.5    
Morocco 13.5 15.4 16.3  57.1   62.5      21.4   26.4      32.2   11.5   10.5 
Mozambique 8.3 10.7 12.0  53.3   52.3   49.9   80.0   83.7   91.8   1.3       
Myanmar 21.2 23.4 24.3                           
Namibia 0.8 1.1 1.1  53.5         50.4         21.1   25.0   43.0 
Nepal 10.8 13.7 15.1  55.6   58.5   60.5   60.3   75.6   70.9         2.4 
Netherlands 7.8 8.2 8.4  66.6   66.1   65.9  58.3    70.0  72.6    8.7   5.1   4.5 
New Zealand 1.9 2.1 2.2  64.9   66.3   66.4  65.6   70.6   71.8    6.5   4.1   6.8 
Nicaragua 2.3 2.7 2.9  52.9   59.8      45.2   47.8   31.1   19.3   6.0    
Niger 4.6 6.5 7.7  47.9         52.6       8.1       
Nigeria 54.6 69.1 78.2  56.5   65.8      44.9   53.1  75.5         
Norway 2.2 2.3 2.4  62.8   64.0   64.8  72.3    74.9  75.5    4.6   4.4   3.0 
Oman 0.9 1.1 1.1                           
Pakistan 61.9 77.7 85.4     54.8   56.6      28.2   26.8   14.0   13.0   8.7 
Panama 1.3 1.6 1.7  61.0   63.8   63.3   41.5   50.9   52.1   20.1   13.3   8.5 
Papua New Guinea 2.3 3.0 3.4  57.4               71.1          
Paraguay 2.4 2.9 3.2  53.6   58.6   61.5   66.0   59.2   57.2   3.7   7.2   7.5 
Peru 11.9 13.7 14.5  60.2   61.5   61.4   63.4   64.9   70.2   8.7   13.7   8.8 
Philippines 34.3 42.5 46.5  58.8   60.7   62.4   47.9   46.4   50.6   9.4   7.8   7.4 
Poland 19.8 19.7 19.8  64.7   68.4   69.4  55.3    58.1  59.0    14.7   19.1   10.0 
Portugal 5.2 5.4 5.5  66.5   66.1   65.5  59.1    67.9  69.9    8.2   8.7   11.9 
Romania 11.6 11.1 11.0  66.4   68.1   68.3   65.4   67.9  55.0    8.6   6.4   6.5 
Russian Federation 78.8 76.7 76.2     56.0        56.3       9.2   7.0   6.9 
Rwanda 2.9 4.7 5.4  53.7   54.9      77.0   87.4      0.4       
Saudi Arabia 8.2 10.6 12.3                       14.7   15.9 
Senegal 4.2 5.5 6.3  59.3   56.3      43.2   35.0         13.6    
Serbia 3.9 3.8 3.7        63.1         50.9      26.2   18.4 
Sierra Leone 2.0 2.6 3.0     55.0         67.3         2.3    
Singapore 1.8 2.1 2.5                    2.8   6.2   6.5 
Slovak Republic 2.8 2.8 2.8  65.3   69.7   70.5  61.4    61.5  61.3    13.8   17.2   14.6 
Slovenia 1.0 1.0 1.0  67.3   67.7   66.7  61.5    66.1  67.4    6.8   7.0   7.0 
Somalia 3.3 4.2 4.7                           
South Africa 19.8 23.9 25.2  63.2   63.7      48.5   64.4      20.0   28.2   27.3 
Spain 20.1 22.0 23.3  66.6   67.0   66.6  45.8    58.3   65.9   30.8   12.2   20.5 
Sri Lanka 9.1 10.0 10.6  66.3   67.9   68.2   40.4   39.3   39.7   18.7   11.9   7.7 
Sudan 15.0 19.1 21.6                           
Swaziland 0.5 0.6 0.6  57.2         52.8         23.2       
Sweden 4.5 4.6 4.7  61.9   63.6   64.0  75.9    76.3  76.7   8.2   7.6   8.2 
Switzerland 3.6 3.8 4.0  65.9   66.3   66.6  68.3  74.3   76.4    3.8   5.1   5.0 
Syrian Arab Republic 7.0 9.1 10.1     58.4         20.5      14.2   23.8   22.5 
Tajikistan 2.9 3.3 3.5     58.0         45.6             
Tanzania 15.1 19.5 22.4  51.1   52.5   50.7   72.0   90.9   76.2      5.8    
Thailand 30.0 33.9 35.1  74.8   67.1   68.1   72.2   76.4   75.7   1.1   1.2   1.1 
Timor-Leste 0.4 0.5 0.6     53.9   53.4      48.7   27.9          
Togo 2.1 2.7 3.0     56.6         83.4             
Tonga 0.0 0.1 0.1 56.7   43.7    7.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.6 0.7 0.7                    20.6   11.0   6.2 
Tunisia 4.5 5.0 5.3  61.5         25.5         17.3   17.3    
Turkey 29.5 34.1 36.5  62.8   65.2   66.7  32.7    25.2   29.6   7.3   11.2   13.0 
Turkmenistan 2.1 2.4 2.6                           
Uganda 10.5 14.3 16.7     50.1         83.5         2.2   5.1 
Ukraine 27.6 25.4 24.8     66.3         61.5      4.9   6.8   6.1 
United Kingdom 29.8 30.7 31.6  63.2   64.8   65.0  66.0    68.8   69.4   6.8   4.2   6.7 
United States 136.1 150.1 156.6  64.4   66.2   66.3  69.7    69.7  68.4    5.6   5.1   8.6 
Uruguay 1.7 1.7 1.7  62.1   61.1   62.7   58.5   63.6   66.4   13.2   15.3   10.1 
Uzbekistan 11.5 13.2 14.2                           
Venezuela, RB 10.9 13.2 14.4  59.9   63.6      43.6   54.7    12.8   13.0   8.1 
Vietnam 36.7 41.8 44.0  63.3   67.9   68.5   83.1   78.8   77.3   1.7   2.4    
West Bank and Gaza 1.2 1.8 2.0  51.6    54.5   9.9   14.2   18.2          
Yemen, Rep. 7.5 10.3 11.9     53.7               3.9   46.3   40.9 
Zambia 4.5 5.7 6.4     63.2         65.9      15.9       
Zimbabwe 5.9 6.3 6.4                    3.0   4.1   
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Table 1 Labor force, continued
   Participation rate (%)  Participation rate (%) 
 Ages 15 to 24  Ages 25 to 64 
 Men Women Men Women 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan     72.3         36.7         92.3         49.3    
Albania  52.3   39.6      50.9   33.8      82.6   76.8      67.2   55.7    
Algeria                                    
Angola                                    
Argentina     54.7   50.1      36.5   32.4      92.7   92.6      64.5   63.4 
Armenia     30.2         25.6         79.1         53.4    
Australia  73.8   72.0   69.8   69.8   69.6   67.3   86.9   85.4   86.5   62.6   67.9   70.7 
Austria  64.6   63.6   63.6   58.9   54.8   54.1   84.5   82.7   84.6   63.1   67.9   72.6 
Azerbaijan  27.4         26.0         70.1         45.0       
Bangladesh                             
Barbados  62.0         50.5         85.6         72.3       
Belarus     31.2       29.5       87.3       79.9  
Belgium  36.0   37.6   35.2   31.7   32.3   29.8   81.1   82.2   82.1   56.5   65.5   68.9 
Belize  62.3       28.0       93.8       38.6     
Benin     46.3         61.8         93.8         88.0    
Bhutan     45.9         46.7         90.3         70.1    
Bolivia  59.1   55.5   59.0   45.2   44.2   46.1   95.2   95.6   96.7   68.0   71.2   75.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina     52.3         32.7         79.5         46.1    
Botswana        45.2         37.4         88.6         74.0 
Brazil  78.5   74.7   71.3   51.8   55.9   54.0   91.9   90.2   90.1   59.7   65.9   66.6 
Bulgaria  40.9   31.1   33.5   38.4   24.5   24.2   80.4   76.1   79.5   72.8   65.2   70.6 
Burkina Faso  86.1   83.0      77.6   77.5      96.0   97.1      84.3   85.3    
Burundi                                    
Cambodia  58.7   81.1   78.4   68.3   75.7   75.0   92.3   96.4   95.5   76.6   81.0   83.7 
Cameroon  51.7   71.8      43.8   63.2      92.6   69.9      73.7   65.1    
Canada  64.9   66.0   64.4   61.3   65.7   64.6   85.8   86.6   85.6   69.4   74.6   76.5 
Central African Republic     72.1         73.7         79.2         75.0    
Chad                                  
Chile  49.1   38.2   43.8   26.3   24.4   30.4   91.9   90.9   90.5   41.3   48.1   58.6 
China     60.4   59.6      58.7   55.1      90.5   90.8      74.5   74.1 
Colombia     62.5   61.9      42.8   43.4      93.4   94.2      60.5   65.9 
Congo, Dem. Rep.     37.5         47.8         91.3         82.0    
Congo, Rep.     40.5         41.7         84.3         76.4    
Costa Rica  71.7   61.1   57.8   35.1   36.4   36.1   93.3   94.5   93.1   38.9   52.1   54.2 
Côte d’Ivoire                                    
Croatia     43.0  40.2     32.9  27.6     77.0  74.0     62.2  62.0
Cuba                                    
Czech Republic 58.7    38.9   36.2  42.0    28.9   25.3  87.9    87.7   87.8  70.9    69.9   69.1 
Denmark  77.0   70.0   67.6   69.4   66.2   67.4   87.7   86.3   86.1   74.3   77.9   78.0 
Dominican Republic  67.9   51.5   49.0   38.6   26.2   26.5   95.2   87.5   87.9   44.1   47.0   51.8 
Ecuador  78.1   66.7   55.4   45.1   45.6   33.8   95.1   96.4   94.5   60.9   66.8   59.9 
Egypt, Arab Rep.     51.1         25.9         95.0         48.7    
El Salvador  69.8   63.0   62.8   31.9   31.6   31.6   94.0   92.2   93.2   51.5   55.6   57.8 
Eritrea                                    
Estonia 58.3    39.7   42.3  39.7    29.5   34.3  86.1    84.2   86.3  73.1    77.0   79.9 
Ethiopia  81.3   81.7      48.0   72.3      96.4   97.2      53.6   81.3    
Fiji  49.7      44.1   21.2      23.8   82.5      88.0   27.2      37.3 
Finland  51.1   50.9   49.4   48.1   50.4   49.3   79.9   82.2   82.4   73.8   77.9   77.7 
France  37.3   41.8   42.8   33.8   34.3   35.5   84.0   83.4   82.5   67.4   71.9   73.0 
Gabon     26.4         22.2         86.8         68.4    
Gambia, The                                    
Georgia        41.8         23.6         81.8         67.3 
Germany  54.6   52.4   53.7   50.3   46.7   48.9   84.4   86.7   88.2   63.3   71.2   75.2 
Ghana     43.6         44.3         94.8         89.6    
Greece  41.3   37.0   33.4   32.5   30.4   27.2   86.3   88.0   87.1   47.3   59.5   63.0 
Guatemala     80.0       40.9       97.2       53.5  
Guinea  67.9         74.2         95.1         84.8       
Guinea-Bissau                                    
Haiti                                    
Honduras  75.7   73.4   71.9   28.1   33.1   29.5   95.6   94.5   95.3   40.5   50.6   51.6 
Hungary 44.6    30.3   27.7  31.9    23.8   22.1  75.4    76.9   77.4  55.5    62.0   63.9 
India  66.0   63.3   52.1   29.1   27.6   19.1   94.9   94.8   95.1   40.7   43.4   34.4 
Indonesia  65.7   59.5   47.5   35.1   37.9   26.9   98.9   93.9   94.6   41.5   48.1   45.2 
Iran, Islamic Rep.     58.7         16.9         93.2         21.1    
Iraq     51.4         4.7         83.1         16.7    
Ireland  48.3   56.6   43.1   41.4   49.9   41.5   86.5   87.7   85.0   49.1   63.9   66.8 
Israel  35.1   30.4   28.9   34.6   34.4   33.7   83.4   80.3   81.6   59.8   66.3   69.7 
Italy  43.9   38.7   33.2   33.6   28.7   23.4   80.6   81.4   80.8   44.6   54.3   56.0 
Jamaica  62.6         58.7         97.9         94.9       
Japan  48.0   44.5   42.3   47.2   45.0   44.0   94.7   92.6   92.9   61.4   63.9   66.7 
Jordan                                    
Kazakhstan  33.1   32.4      26.5   25.1      74.7   89.6      57.8   70.0    
Kenya  42.6   40.6      35.3   29.2      83.3   88.7      58.6   69.0    
Kiribati     60.0         55.6         75.5         65.8  
Korea, Rep.  31.2   26.7   20.2   41.8   39.0   30.4   92.6   88.8   88.2   54.7   58.2   59.7 
Kosovo     46.8         31.8         72.8         26.7    
Kyrgyz Republic  52.1         32.3         78.1         53.2       
Lao PDR        78.5        80.6        96.2         87.7
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Table 1 Labor force, continued
   Participation rate (%)  Participation rate (%) 
 Ages 15 to 24  Ages 25 to 64 
 Men Women Men Women 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia     43.8   43.0      31.3   37.7      84.0   85.2      74.3   79.0 
Lebanon     43.7         17.8         88.4         24.9    
Lesotho                                    
Liberia     58.5         58.0         87.8         75.8    
Libya                                    
Lithuania     29.5   32.8      20.5   26.3      85.4   84.5      77.0   80.1 
Macedonia, FYR     42.0   42.2      29.3   24.0     85.0   87.9      55.0   57.7 
Madagascar  83.1         80.2         96.9         90.4       
Malawi     80.3         78.7         97.9         93.0    
Malaysia                                    
Mali  80.6   53.5      75.5   42.5      92.1   78.1      81.0   50.9    
Mauritania        81.3         59.9         92.0         78.6 
Mauritius     53.3   45.7      35.6   31.4      90.7   89.8      48.2   49.2 
Mexico  71.8   61.3   61.8   37.3   33.3   33.2   92.6   92.8   92.3   40.6   47.3   51.4 
Moldova     50.9       41.7       87.9       76.9  
Mongolia        41.2         30.7         89.4         80.4 
Montenegro     39.3         27.6         73.0         56.8    
Morocco                                    
Mozambique  59.2   56.1   76.1   68.8   70.0   82.8   91.5   96.7   98.0   86.4   91.9   96.6 
Myanmar                                    
Namibia  37.8         34.3         83.6         61.1       
Nepal  50.0   76.4   58.0   53.5   69.1   52.7   72.1   93.9   91.5   64.1   78.9   80.3 
Netherlands  62.2   71.2   68.6   61.8   70.8   69.4   84.1   86.4   87.1   57.4   69.8   73.3 
New Zealand  71.2   65.6   62.2   63.0   59.4   58.5   87.5   89.7   89.9   66.4   73.5   75.3 
Nicaragua  73.7   76.8      33.1   34.9      95.8   95.9      52.4   54.9    
Niger  54.5       45.6       71.2       55.8     
Nigeria  47.3   30.9    27.2   23.7    97.6   91.0    52.9   64.0  
Norway  54.3   60.5   56.6   55.4   60.1   56.8   87.9   86.1   86.4   76.8   78.1   80.0 
Oman                                    
Pakistan     70.8   64.9      25.5   23.8      93.9   94.5      29.8   28.4 
Panama  62.5   62.1   62.8   28.4   35.3   32.4   92.6   93.1   93.7   47.3   56.8   59.2 
Papua New Guinea        68.3         68.4         70.8         72.4 
Paraguay  86.8   73.5   70.0   56.8   45.0   43.6   96.8   95.2   94.5   70.3   66.3   63.3 
Peru  67.4   64.9   67.2   51.8   51.8   54.6   95.8   93.6   94.7   69.3   70.5   76.4 
Philippines  56.0   52.1   50.3   32.6   31.6   31.9   93.1   90.4   89.5   55.1   53.8   59.4 
Poland 43.9    39.5   39.1  35.6    31.8   29.7  82.2    80.1   80.6  67.9    65.5   65.7 
Portugal  47.2   46.9   38.6   38.9   38.9   34.8   86.4   86.6   86.2   65.0   74.2   76.5 
Romania  50.1   35.9   36.2   42.3   26.5   26.1   86.5   79.1   80.5   72.6   63.3   62.9 
Russian Federation                                
Rwanda  65.1   69.5      66.7   73.5      84.2   95.4      84.7   97.4    
Saudi Arabia                                    
Senegal  60.0   53.8      25.9   24.8      88.6   83.4      55.4   41.4    
Serbia        34.6         21.2         75.0         57.0 
Sierra Leone     35.2         46.5         85.1         77.5    
Singapore                                    
Slovak Republic 52.0    40.7   36.4  40.4    32.4   25.5  86.2    87.4   86.4  68.3    69.9   70.1 
Slovenia 44.6    44.5   44.4  40.7    36.3   34.8  79.1    82.4   82.0  67.7    73.0   73.7 
Somalia                                    
South Africa  30.3   42.5      26.8   43.0      86.5   87.4      58.8   74.1    
Spain  44.6   52.3   45.1   38.6   42.9   40.1   85.4   87.2   87.3   48.1   61.5   70.5 
Sri Lanka  57.9   53.7   50.8   36.8   32.9   28.1   92.7   89.5   90.8   41.9   41.3   43.3 
Sudan                                    
Swaziland  39.4         37.4         90.8         62.4       
Sweden  44.2   49.1   52.1   46.8   51.3   51.4   88.3   88.4   90.1   82.9   82.1   83.1 
Switzerland 65.0    66.6   69.1  62.1    64.7   66.5  95.5    91.9   92.5  69.6    76.2   78.5 
Syrian Arab Republic     63.3         18.9         93.7         21.5    
Tajikistan     43.8         37.0         75.9         50.9    
Tanzania  58.9   80.2   57.0   55.2   81.2   55.3   97.8   97.6   95.3   82.5   95.5   87.8 
Thailand  71.8   58.4   56.0   64.8   45.2   39.9   96.2   95.7   95.4   74.8   83.0   83.0 
Timor-Leste     47.6   17.5      37.8   10.5      94.4   79.8      54.2   36.8 
Togo     63.1         68.8         92.8         90.4    
Tonga  53.9         29.7         91.4         51.1       
Trinidad and Tobago                                    
Tunisia  50.0         27.3         91.0         24.6       
Turkey 63.7    51.7   49.8  34.2    24.5   25.5  89.1    83.3   82.3  37.0    75.5   31.0 
Turkmenistan                                    
Uganda     75.4         70.0         95.2         92.9    
Ukraine     40.6         29.6         86.0         69.2    
United Kingdom  67.9   65.3   61.8   59.2   59.2   56.4   87.1   86.1   86.5   67.6   71.0   72.4 
United States  70.2   62.9   56.7   62.3   58.6   53.5   87.8   86.4   85.1   71.5   71.6   71.8 
Uruguay  72.6   60.3   61.3   52.5   45.8   44.5   91.5   90.9   92.5   60.5   68.9   72.8 
Uzbekistan                                    
Venezuela, RB  64.0   60.1    29.3   35.1    93.9   93.9    50.3   63.1  
Vietnam  79.7   57.6   56.3   80.1   53.8   49.5   89.1   94.9   93.9   84.4   89.2   87.9 
West Bank and Gaza     43.0   42.5      7.2   7.7      86.8   85.8      18.4   26.0 
Yemen, Rep.                                   
Zambia     43.1         55.3         74.4         72.5    
Zimbabwe                                   
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Table 2 Skills
   Average schooling Average schooling  Average schooling Skills as a 
  (years) (years) (years) constraint (%)
 Total Men Women Total
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 2005 2010
Afghanistan 2.2 3.4 4.2 3.4 5.5 6.7 0.9 1.1 1.5  18
Albania 9.4 10.3 10.3 9.8 10.5 10.4 9.1 10.1 10.1 10 
Algeria 6.3 7.7 8.3 7.7 8.8 9.1 4.8 6.7 7.5  
Angola          21 26
Argentina 8.6 9.1 9.3 8.5 9.0 9.1 8.7 9.3 9.5 49 57
Armenia 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.1 9.8 10.3 10.6 11.0 2 23
Australia 11.7 11.9 12.1 11.5 11.5 11.7 11.9 12.2 12.5  
Austria 8.5 9.3 9.5 9.5 10.3 10.3 7.6 8.4 8.8  
Azerbaijan          2 15
Bangladesh 3.7 5.2 5.8 4.3 5.5 6.0 3.1 4.8 5.6 25 
Barbados 8.8 9.3 9.5 8.8 9.2 9.2 8.7 9.5 9.8  
Belarus          7 61
Belgium 9.9 10.5 10.5 10.0 10.6 10.7 9.8 10.4 10.4  
Belize 8.8 9.3 9.5 8.8 9.4 9.5 8.7 9.3 9.5  
Benin 2.6 3.6 4.2 3.6 4.8 5.5 1.6 2.4 2.9 26 26
Bhutan           13
Bolivia 7.8 9.4 9.9 8.6 10.1 10.5 6.9 8.7 9.3 28 37
Bosnia and Herzegovina          4 19
Botswana 8.2 9.2 9.6 8.3 9.4 9.8 8.2 9.1 9.4 20 32
Brazil 5.4 7.2 7.5 5.3 7.1 7.4 5.4 7.3 7.7 40 69
Bulgaria 9.1 9.7 9.9 9.2 9.7 9.8 9.0 9.7 9.9 10 21
Burkina Faso          13 37
Burundi 2.2 2.9 3.3 2.7 3.4 3.9 1.6 2.3 2.7 12 
Cambodia 5.6 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 5.3 5.6 5.8 7 
Cameroon 5.0 5.8 6.1 5.8 6.5 6.8 4.1 5.0 5.4 8 38
Canada 10.8 12.1 12.1 10.8 12.1 12.0 10.7 12.2 12.1  
Central African Republic 3.0 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.7 4.8 1.9 2.4 2.6  
Chad           53
Chile 8.8 9.7 10.2 8.9 9.8 10.3 8.7 9.6 10.1 42 41
China 6.4 7.6 8.2 6.9 8.2 8.7 5.9 7.0 7.6  
Colombia 6.5 7.0 7.7 6.6 7.0 7.7 6.4 7.1 7.7 29 45
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3.2 3.5 3.5 4.6 4.7 4.6 2.0 2.3 2.4 13 65
Congo, Rep. 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.4 6.7 6.9 5.1 5.1 5.2  51
Costa Rica 7.6 8.1 8.7 7.6 8.0 8.6 7.5 8.1 8.8 13 38
Côte d’Ivoire    4.2 5.2 5.5     27
Croatia 8.1 8.7 9.0 8.7 9.2 9.4 7.5 8.3 8.6 7 
Cuba 9.5 10.1 10.6 9.7 10.3 10.7 9.3 10.0 10.5  
Czech Republic 11.4 12.7 12.1 11.6 12.9 12.3 11.2 12.6 12.0 12 29
Denmark 9.7 9.9 10.1 9.9 10.1 10.2 9.5 9.7 9.9  
Dominican Republic 6.3 7.0 7.4 6.5 7.0 7.3 6.1 7.0 7.5 31 
Ecuador 7.2 7.6 8.1 7.4 7.8 8.3 7.1 7.5 7.9 36 34
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.1 6.6 7.1 6.1 7.5 7.9 4.0 5.6 6.3 30 
El Salvador 5.6 7.3 8.0 5.8 7.7 8.3 5.4 7.0 7.7 32 30
Eritrea           1
Estonia 10.4 11.6 11.8 10.3 11.3 11.5 10.5 11.8 12.1 7 30
Ethiopia           
Fiji 10.1 9.4 10.0 10.3 9.4 9.9 9.9 9.3 10.0  14
Finland 9.1 9.8 10.0 9.2 9.7 9.9 9.0 9.8 10.1  
France 8.6 9.9 10.5 8.8 10.2 10.7 8.3 9.6 10.4  
Gabon 6.2 7.7 8.4 5.5 7.1 7.9 7.0 8.2 8.8  43
Gambia, The 2.5 3.1 3.5 3.2 3.8 4.2 1.7 2.3 2.9 12 
Georgia          14 26
Germany 9.2 11.8 11.8 9.9 12.2 12.1 8.4 11.5 11.6 7 
Ghana 6.1 6.8 7.1 7.6 7.7 7.8 4.6 5.8 6.4 5 
Greece 8.7 9.9 10.7 9.2 10.2 10.9 8.2 9.6 10.5 9 
Guatemala 3.9 4.0 4.8 4.3 4.4 5.3 3.5 3.6 4.4 29 33
Guinea          12 
Guinea-Bissau          12 
Haiti 4.0 4.8 5.2 5.6 6.8 7.3 2.6 3.0 3.1  
Honduras 5.6 6.8 7.5 5.7 7.0 7.6 5.4 6.7 7.4 23 28
Hungary 10.4 11.5 11.7 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.2 11.4 11.5 13 6
India 3.8 4.7 5.1 4.9 5.8 6.1 2.6 3.6 4.1 14 
Indonesia 4.7 5.7 6.2 5.4 6.4 6.9 3.9 5.1 5.6 19 4
Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.1 8.1 8.6 7.3 9.3 9.6 4.9 6.8 7.5  
Iraq 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.0 6.4 6.8 3.7 4.4 4.9  
Ireland 10.7 11.3 11.6 10.6 11.1 11.5 10.8 11.4 11.7 16 
Israel 10.9 11.3 11.3 10.9 11.2 11.2 10.8 11.3 11.5  
Italy 8.3 9.1 9.5 8.6 9.5 9.9 7.9 8.8 9.2  
Jamaica 8.1 9.6 9.9 7.9 9.4 9.7 8.3 9.8 10.0 42 20
Japan 10.6 11.3 11.6 11.0 11.6 11.8 10.2 11.0 11.4  
Jordan 7.4 8.7 9.2 8.3 9.4 9.8 6.4 8.0 8.6  
Kazakhstan 8.8 10.1 10.4 9.0 10.2 10.5 8.6 10.0 10.3 9 50
Kenya 6.2 7.1 7.3 6.9 7.7 7.8 5.4 6.5 6.8 3 
Kiribati           
Korea, Rep. 10.6 11.5 11.8 11.4 12.1 12.4 9.7 10.8 11.3 7 
Kosovo           10
Kyrgyz Republic 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.6 8.8 19 28
Lao PDR 3.9 4.7 5.1 4.8 5.4 5.7 3.0 3.9 4.5 11 19
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Table 2 Skills, continued
   Average schooling Average schooling  Average schooling Skills as a 
  (years) (years) (years) constraint (%)
 Total Men Women Total
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 2005 2010
Latvia 8.9 10.2 10.6 9.1 10.2 10.6 8.8 10.2 10.6 18 39
Lebanon          38 
Lesotho 5.1 6.0 6.6 4.1 4.9 5.5 5.9 7.0 7.5 30 17
Liberia 3.0 4.2 5.4 4.3 5.7 7.0 1.8 2.8 3.9  5
Libya 5.7 7.2 7.9 6.1 6.9 7.4 5.3 7.6 8.3  
Lithuania 9.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 10.5 10.9 8.9 10.3 10.9 15 40
Macedonia, FYR          6 15
Madagascar          30 17
Malawi 3.1 4.4 4.7 3.8 5.1 5.2 2.3 3.7 4.2 50 22
Malaysia 8.4 9.7 10.1 8.9 10.0 10.4 7.9 9.4 9.9  
Mali 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.3 1.9 2.3 0.7 1.2 1.7 8 12
Mauritania 3.1 4.1 4.6 4.0 5.1 5.6 2.3 3.1 3.7 23 
Mauritius 6.8 7.3 7.9 7.4 7.7 8.2 6.3 6.9 7.5 43 46
Mexico 7.1 8.4 9.1 7.4 8.7 9.4 6.8 8.1 8.8 10 31
Moldova 8.8 9.4 9.7 9.2 9.6 9.7 8.5 9.2 9.6 12 41
Mongolia 7.8 8.0 8.4 7.8 7.8 8.3 7.7 8.1 8.5 29 15
Montenegro          20 7
Morocco 3.5 4.4 5.0 4.5 5.5 6.1 2.5 3.4 4.0 21 
Mozambique 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.7 2.3 0.6 0.8 1.2 19 
Myanmar 3.1 4.1 4.6 3.1 4.1 4.8 3.1 4.0 4.5  
Namibia 6.1 5.9 6.0 6.1 5.6 5.5 6.1 6.1 6.4 20 
Nepal 2.6 3.4 4.0 3.7 4.1 4.4 1.6 2.7 3.5  6
Netherlands 10.5 10.8 11.0 10.8 11.1 11.2 10.2 10.6 10.8  
New Zealand 12.0 12.4 12.7 12.1 12.5 12.7 11.8 12.3 12.6  
Nicaragua 4.8 6.1 6.7 5.8 6.9 7.5 3.9 5.3 6.0 23 24
Niger 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 18 37
Nigeria          6 
Norway 11.0 12.3 12.3 11.2 12.3 12.2 10.8 12.4 12.4  
Oman          35 
Pakistan 3.4 4.9 5.6 4.6 6.2 6.8 2.1 3.6 4.3  
Panama 8.4 9.3 9.6 8.3 9.1 9.3 8.5 9.5 9.8 14 19
Papua New Guinea 3.3 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.6 4.7 2.6 3.2 3.4  
Paraguay 6.3 7.6 8.5 6.4 7.7 8.6 6.2 7.5 8.5 36 51
Peru 7.8 8.7 9.0 8.3 9.2 9.4 7.4 8.2 8.6 32 28
Philippines 7.9 8.6 9.0 7.9 8.4 8.7 8.0 8.9 9.2 12 8
Poland 9.2 9.7 9.9 9.2 9.7 9.8 9.1 9.7 10.0 15 36
Portugal 7.0 7.6 8.0 7.3 7.8 8.1 6.7 7.4 7.8 12 
Romania 9.6 10.1 10.4 10.0 10.4 10.6 9.2 9.8 10.1 14 43
Russian Federation 10.2 11.3 11.5 10.5 11.5 11.7 9.9 11.1 11.3 13 57
Rwanda 2.6 3.6 3.9 3.0 3.8 4.1 2.3 3.4 3.8 12 
Saudi Arabia 6.3 7.7 8.5 7.1 8.0 8.7 5.1 7.2 8.2  
Senegal 3.8 4.7 5.2 4.9 5.8 6.3 2.8 3.6 4.1 10 
Serbia 8.5 9.0 9.2 9.0 9.4 9.4 7.9 8.7 8.9 20 17
Sierra Leone 2.6 3.4 3.7 3.5 4.3 4.6 1.8 2.5 2.8  16
Singapore 7.4 8.5 9.1 7.8 9.0 9.5 7.0 7.9 8.8  
Slovak Republic 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.4 11.0 11.0 10.7 11.1 11.3 8 30
Slovenia 11.0 11.5 11.7 11.2 11.6 11.7 10.9 11.4 11.6 5 15
Somalia           
South Africa 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.7 9 
Spain 8.2 9.7 10.4 8.5 9.9 10.5 8.0 9.5 10.3 14 
Sri Lanka 9.7 10.8 11.1 9.9 10.9 11.1 9.5 10.7 11.0 21 
Sudan 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.5 3.7 1.9 2.5 2.8  
Swaziland 6.3 7.3 7.6 5.9 7.1 7.4 6.7 7.5 7.8 13 
Sweden 10.8 11.5 11.6 10.5 11.3 11.4 11.1 11.7 11.7  
Switzerland 9.6 9.7 9.9 10.3 10.3 10.4 8.9 9.1 9.4  
Syrian Arab Republic 4.5 4.8 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.5 3.9 4.5 5.0 36 
Tajikistan 9.6 9.3 9.3 9.9 8.8 8.6 9.3 9.8 10.0 5 34
Tanzania 4.4 5.0 5.5 5.1 5.6 6.0 3.7 4.5 5.1 20 
Thailand 5.9 6.8 7.5 6.2 7.0 7.7 5.6 6.6 7.3 30 
Timor-Leste           19
Togo 4.5 5.4 5.9 6.3 7.3 7.9 2.8 3.6 4.0  17
Tonga 9.2 9.2 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.5 9.1 9.2 9.2  59
Trinidad and Tobago 8.5 9.3 9.6 8.5 9.1 9.5 8.6 9.5 9.8  
Tunisia 5.1 6.6 7.3 6.1 7.4 8.0 4.1 5.7 6.6  
Turkey 5.4 6.5 7.0 6.5 7.4 7.9 4.4 5.6 6.1 33 25
Turkmenistan           
Uganda 4.0 4.9 5.4 4.8 5.6 5.9 3.2 4.2 4.8 10 
Ukraine 10.4 10.9 11.1 10.7 11.0 11.2 10.2 10.7 11.0 20 42
United Kingdom 8.6 9.3 9.8 8.4 9.1 9.5 8.7 9.5 10.0  
United States 12.6 12.9 13.1 12.7 12.9 13.0 12.6 12.9 13.2  
Uruguay 7.6 8.0 8.6 8.2 7.8 8.3 7.1 8.2 8.8 25 31
Uzbekistan          5 35
Venezuela, RB 5.5 6.4 7.0 5.5 6.3 7.0 5.5 6.5 7.0 28 25
Vietnam 4.6 5.7 6.4 4.9 6.0 6.6 4.3 5.5 6.3 14 9
West Bank and Gaza           
Yemen, Rep. 1.6 3.0 3.7 2.6 4.2 5.0 0.7 1.7 2.4  24
Zambia 6.0 6.5 7.0 6.2 7.0 7.4 5.9 6.0 6.5 8 
Zimbabwe 6.7 7.5 7.7 7.4 7.8 7.9 6.0 7.1 7.4  
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Table 2 Skills, continued
 Educational attainment Educational attainment Educational attainment
 Reading Mathematics  Science 
 2003 2006 2009 2003 2006 2009 2003 2006 2009
Afghanistan                           
Albania        385         377         391 
Algeria              387*         408*    
Angola                           
Argentina     374   398      381   388      391   401 
Armenia           478*   499*      461*   488*    
Australia  525   513   515   524   520   514   525   527   527 
Austria  491   490   470   506   505   496   491   511   494 
Azerbaijan     353   362      476   431      382   373 
Bangladesh                           
Barbados         
Belarus                           
Belgium  507   501   506   529   520   515   509   510   507 
Belize         
Benin                           
Bhutan         
Bolivia                           
Bosnia and Herzegovina              456*         466*    
Botswana           366*   364*      365*   355*    
Brazil  403   393   412   356   370   386   390   390   405 
Bulgaria     402   429   476*   413   428   479*   434   439 
Burkina Faso                           
Burundi                           
Cambodia                           
Cameroon                           
Canada  528   527   524   532   527   527   519   534   529 
Central African Republic                           
Chad                           
Chile     442   449   387*   411   421   413*   438   447 
China                           
Colombia     385   413      370   381      388   402 
Congo, Dem. Rep.                           
Congo, Rep.                           
Costa Rica                           
Côte d’Ivoire                           
Croatia     477   476      467   460      493   486 
Cuba                           
Czech Republic  489   483   478   516   510   493   523   513   500 
Denmark  492   494   495   514   513   503   475   496   499 
Dominican Republic                           
Ecuador                           
Egypt, Arab Rep.           406*   391*      421*   408*    
El Salvador              340*         387*    
Eritrea                           
Estonia     501   501   531*   515   512   552*   531   528 
Ethiopia                           
Fiji         
Finland  543   547   536   544   548   541   548   563   554 
France  496   488   496   511   496   497   511   495   498 
Gabon                           
Gambia, The                           
Georgia              410*         421*    
Germany  491   495   497   503   504   513   502   516   520 
Ghana           276*   309*      255*  303*    
Greece  472   460   483   445   459   466   481   473   470 
Guatemala                           
Guinea                           
Guinea-Bissau                           
Haiti                           
Honduras                           
Hungary  482   482   494   490   491   490   503   504   503 
India                           
Indonesia  382   393   402   360   391   371   395   393   383 
Iran, Islamic Rep.           411*   403*      453*   459*    
Iraq                           
Ireland  515   517   496   503   501   487   505   508   508 
Israel     439   474   496*   442   447   488*   454   455 
Italy  476   469   486   466   462   483   486   475   489 
Jamaica                           
Japan  498   498   520   534   523   529   548   531   539 
Jordan     401   405   424*   384   387   475*   422   415 
Kazakhstan        390         405         400 
Kenya                           
Kiribati         
Korea, Rep.  534   556   539   542   547   546   538   522   538 
Kosovo                           
Kyrgyz Republic     285   314      311   331      322   330 
Lao PDR
*An asterisk denotes data from TIMSS. All other data are from PISA.
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Table 2 Skills, continued
 Educational attainment Educational attainment Educational attainment
 Reading Mathematics  Science 
 2003 2006 2009 2003 2006 2009 2003 2006 2009
Latvia  491   479   484   483   486   482   489   490   494 
Lebanon           433*   449*      393*   414*    
Lesotho                           
Liberia                           
Libya                           
Lithuania     470   468   502*   486   477   519*   488   491 
Macedonia, FYR           435*         449*       
Madagascar                           
Malawi                           
Malaysia           508*   474*      510*   471*    
Mali                           
Mauritania                           
Mauritius                           
Mexico  400   411   425   385   406   419   405   410   416 
Moldova           460*         472*       
Mongolia                           
Montenegro     392   408      399   403      412   401 
Morocco           387*   381*      396*   402*    
Mozambique                           
Myanmar                           
Namibia                           
Nepal                           
Netherlands  513   507   508   538   531   526   524   525   522 
New Zealand  522   521   521   523   522   519   521   530   532 
Nicaragua                           
Niger                           
Nigeria                           
Norway  500   484   503   495   490   498   484   487   500 
Oman              372*         423*    
Pakistan                           
Panama        371         360         376 
Papua New Guinea                           
Paraguay                           
Peru        370         365         369 
Philippines           378*         377*       
Poland  497   508   500   490   495   495   498   498   508 
Portugal  478   472   489   466   466   487   468   474   493 
Romania     396   424   475*   415   427   470*   418   428 
Russian Federation  442   440   459   468   476   468   489   479   478 
Rwanda                           
Saudi Arabia           332*   329*      398*   403*    
Senegal                           
Serbia  412   401   442   437   435   442   436   436   443 
Sierra Leone                           
Singapore        526   605*   593*   562   578*   567*   542 
Slovak Republic  469   466   477   498   492   497   495   488   490 
Slovenia     494   483   493*   504   501   520*   519   512 
Somalia                           
South Africa           264*         244*       
Spain  481   461   481   485   480   483   487   488   488 
Sri Lanka                           
Sudan                           
Swaziland                           
Sweden  514   507   497   509   502   494   506   503   495 
Switzerland  499   499   501   527   530   534   513   512   517 
Syrian Arab Republic              395*         452*    
Tajikistan                           
Tanzania                           
Thailand  420   417   421   417   417   419   429   421   425 
Timor-Leste                           
Togo                           
Tonga         
Trinidad and Tobago        416         414         410 
Tunisia  375   380   404   359   365   371   385   386   401 
Turkey  441   447   464   423   424   445   434   424   454 
Turkmenistan                           
Uganda                           
Ukraine              462*         485*    
United Kingdom     495   494      495   492      515   514 
United States  495      500   483   474   487   491   489   502 
Uruguay  434   413   426   422   427   427   438   428   427 
Uzbekistan                           
Venezuela, RB                           
Vietnam                           
West Bank and Gaza           390*         435*       
Yemen, Rep.                           
Zambia                           
Zimbabwe                           
*An asterisk denotes data from TIMSS. All other data are from PISA.
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Table 3 Employment structure
   Employment in Employment in Employment in Employment in
 primary sector (%) secondary sector (%) tertiary sector (%) civil service (%)
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan  59.1   12.5   28.4   1.8   3.3   3.2 
Albania 3.0 47.1  40.2 20.5  56.8 32.4   15.9   11.2    
Algeria                  
Angola                  
Argentina 7.3 6.7 5.8 34.6 30.3 29.4 58.1 63.0 64.8  8.7   9.0    
Armenia           10.4   16.5   15.6 
Australia 5.0 3.6 3.3 22.8 21.3 21.1 72.2 75.1 75.5  13.4   14.0   14.6 
Austria 7.4 5.5 5.2 32.0 27.5 24.9 60.6 66.9 69.9  14.9   11.8   11.5 
Azerbaijan 24.8   18.2   57.0    21.7   15.4   14.3 
Bangladesh   39.0   21.0   40.0     2.2    
Barbados                  
Belarus           22.1   24.4    
Belgium 2.7 2.0 1.4 28.3 24.7 23.4 69.1 63.3 65.3  18.9   18.7   18.8 
Belize 29.7   18.7   51.6    12.6       
Benin  45.1   9.2   45.7   1.4       
Bhutan  69.1   7.2   23.7   8.8       
Bolivia 43.8 40.0 35.6 18.2 18.9 18.8 38.1 41.1 45.6  6.2       
Bosnia and Herzegovina  30.4   40.5   29.1          
Botswana   25.5   18.1   56.5  16.0   15.5   15.2 
Brazil 26.3 20.5 17.0 19.8 21.4 22.2 53.9 58.1 60.9  8.9   10.6   11.0 
Bulgaria 23.9 8.9 6.8 33.5 34.2 33.3 42.6 56.6 59.9  18.0   16.3   13.9 
Burkina Faso 89.1 88.0  2.7 2.8  8.2 9.2          
Burundi                  
Cambodia 72.5 62.3 60.1 7.4 12.3 13.1 20.1 25.3 26.8         
Cameroon 68.7   6.1   25.1           
Canada 4.1 2.7 2.4 22.0 22.0 21.5 74.0 75.3 76.5  19.4   17.8   18.6 
Central African Republic  66.9   9.2   23.9          
Chad                  
Chile 15.7 13.2 11.2 26.1 23.0 23.2 58.2 63.9 65.6  8.1   8.5   9.3 
China 52.2 44.8 36.7 23.0 23.8 28.7 24.8 31.4 34.6  5.4       
Colombia 27.0 20.7 18.5 21.8 20.0 19.8 51.2 59.3 61.7  3.2   6.1   5.3 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  71.5   8.0   20.6          
Congo, Rep.  36.4   23.9   39.7   7.6       
Costa Rica 7.2 15.2 11.9 28.8 21.6 20.0 64.0 63.1 68.1  13.3   11.3   11.7 
Côte d’Ivoire                  
Croatia 19.9 17.3 14.9 29.1 28.6 27.3 50.9 54.0 57.6  15.9   16.1   15.5 
Cuba           37.1   41.6   42.5 
Czech Republic 6.6 4.0 3.1 41.8 39.5 38.0 51.5 56.5 57.9     14.0   13.4 
Denmark 4.4 2.8 2.4 27.0 23.4 19.6 68.6 73.5 77.7  30.4   30.6   30.7 
Dominican Republic 16.8 14.8 14.6 23.7 22.3 18.1 59.4 63.0 67.4  9.7       
Ecuador 38.1 31.3 28.4 17.3 17.5 18.6 44.6 51.3 53.0  9.0   7.5   7.9 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 33.3 39.1  22.8 18.8  44.0 42.1      22.8   23.6 
El Salvador 27.0 20.2  26.3 22.1  46.7 57.7   7.2       
Eritrea                  
Estonia 10.2 5.2 4.2 34.2 33.8 30.1 55.6 61.1 65.1  24.2   20.8   22.8 
Ethiopia 81.9 82.8  3.5 6.0  14.5 11.2   1.3   1.7    
Fiji 32.9  26.1 20.5  17.5 46.6  56.4  11.1   11.9   11.4 
Finland 8.0 4.8 4.4 26.8 25.6 23.2 64.9 69.5 71.9  24.3   23.1   22.0 
France 4.9 3.6 2.9 26.9 23.7 22.2 68.1 72.4 74.5     22.8    
Gabon  23.8   21.2   55.0   13.4       
Gambia, The                  
Georgia   53.3   9.7   37.0         
Germany 3.2 2.3 1.6 36.0 29.7 28.4 60.8 67.9 70.0  13.1   11.6   11.2 
Ghana  57.4   14.2   28.5          
Greece 20.4 12.4 12.5 23.2 22.4 19.7 56.3 65.1 67.7  6.8   7.6   8.2 
Guatemala  33.8   22.6   43.6   4.3   4.5    
Guinea              1.7   2.1 
Guinea-Bissau                  
Haiti                  
Honduras 37.4 34.3 37.1 25.0 23.0 20.3 37.6 42.7 42.5  6.2   6.2    
Hungary 8.0 5.0 4.5 32.6 32.4 30.7 59.4 62.6 64.9  21.9   22.1   22.0 
India 61.9 56.1 51.2 15.8 19.0 22.3 22.3 24.9 26.4  2.8   2.3    
Indonesia 45.3 45.7 37.1 17.3 17.7 18.7 37.3 36.7 44.1  4.9   3.7    
Iran, Islamic Rep.  20.8   32.7   46.5      11.7   10.6 
Iraq  2.9   29.8   67.3          
Ireland 9.1 5.9 4.6 29.3 27.9 19.5 61.5 65.5 75.5  17.5   15.5   18.4 
Israel 2.9 2.0 1.7 28.7 21.4 20.4 67.7 75.7 77.1  19.0   17.2   17.0 
Italy 6.6 4.2 3.8 33.7 30.8 28.8 59.8 65.0 67.5  18.3   16.0   15.1 
Jamaica 19.5   17.9   62.6           
Japan 5.7 4.4 3.7 33.6 27.9 25.3 60.4 66.4 69.7  8.0   7.0   7.1 
Jordan  3.8   22.8   73.4   16.1   14.9   16.2 
Kazakhstan                  
Kenya 67.9 72.3  4.6 7.9  27.5 19.8   4.3       
Kiribati  3.4   6.3   90.3          
Korea, Rep. 12.4 7.9 6.6 33.3 26.8 17.0 54.3 65.2 76.4  4.3       
Kosovo  17.3   26.7   56.0          
Kyrgyz Republic 51.3   10.2   38.5    18.3   14.3    
Lao PDR   71.3   10.7   18.1        
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Table 3 Employment structure, continued
   Employment in Employment in Employment in Employment in
 primary sector (%) secondary sector (%) tertiary sector (%) civil service (%)
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia 17.3 12.1 8.8 27.2 25.8 24.0 55.4 61.8 66.9  24.4   22.7   23.2 
Lebanon  7.3   54.6   38.1          
Lesotho                  
Liberia  44.2   1.9   53.8          
Libya           36.4       
Lithuania 20.7 14.0 9.0 28.5 29.1 24.4 50.8 56.9 66.2  21.4   23.4   25.0 
Macedonia, FYR  19.5   32.3   48.2          
Madagascar 70.1   3.9   26.0    2.0   2.1    
Malawi  84.9   4.6   10.5   2.7       
Malaysia                  
Mali 70.7 58.0  6.6 12.2  22.8 29.8          
Mauritania   25.2   9.7   65.2         
Mauritius  12.0 11.5  32.4 31.4  55.6 57.1  14.0   14.7   13.8 
Mexico 23.8 14.9 13.1 21.5 25.5 25.5 54.2 59.0 60.6  12.4   8.9   8.8 
Moldova  48.7   15.8   35.5      19.3   17.9 
Mongolia   40.5   16.8   42.7         
Montenegro                  
Morocco 39.2 34.9  24.3 24.8  36.6 40.3      7.5   7.7 
Mozambique 87.2 81.2 83.5 3.9 3.2 3.8 8.8 15.6 12.7         
Myanmar                  
Namibia 44.5   12.7   42.8           
Nepal  80.1 76.3  8.1 10.5  11.8 13.2         
Netherlands 3.7 3.2 2.8 22.6 19.6 15.9 70.6 72.4 71.6  13.8   12.8   12.5 
New Zealand 9.7 7.1 6.6 25.1 22.0 20.9 65.2 70.7 72.5  12.4   10.2   10.7 
Nicaragua 43.8 35.9 31.7 14.7 18.8 18.3 41.4 45.2 50.0  5.4       
Niger                  
Nigeria 68.1   2.7   29.2           
Norway 5.4 3.3 2.5 23.0 20.8 19.7 71.3 75.7 77.6  30.9   30.1   30.8 
Oman           14.0       
Pakistan  41.8 43.4  21.3 21.2  36.9 35.5         
Panama 21.3 19.9 18.1 17.9 16.9 18.5 60.7 63.3 63.4  8.8   7.9    
Papua New Guinea   25.2   6.8   68.8         
Paraguay 40.8 32.4 25.8 16.5 15.7 19.2 42.7 51.9 54.9  5.1   6.6    
Peru 31.7 37.5 31.7 15.7 13.7 16.4 52.6 48.8 51.9     8.2   9.5 
Philippines 40.2 38.7 33.5 17.1 16.0 14.5 42.7 45.3 52.0  7.4   7.1   7.8 
Poland 22.6 17.4 12.8 32.0 29.2 30.2 45.3 53.4 56.9  16.2   11.4   10.6 
Portugal 11.5 11.8 10.9 32.2 30.6 27.7 56.3 57.5 61.4     13.6   12.5 
Romania 40.3 32.1 30.1 31.0 30.3 28.7 28.7 37.5 41.2  13.1   13.9   13.0 
Russian Federation           20.1   21.5    
Rwanda 88.6 78.0  1.7 5.0  9.7 17.0          
Saudi Arabia                  
Senegal 5.1 36.2  29.7 14.5  65.2 49.3   2.9   2.7    
Serbia   22.9   24.9   52.2        14.2 
Sierra Leone  70.8   5.5   23.7          
Singapore           5.4   5.0   5.0 
Slovak Republic 9.2 4.7 3.2 38.9 38.8 37.1 51.9 56.3 59.6  30.7   16.0   14.8 
Slovenia 10.1 8.8 8.8 43.1 37.2 32.5 46.4 53.3 58.3  11.6   15.5   16.0 
Somalia                  
South Africa 14.3 7.8  27.9 25.5  57.9 66.6   12.8   8.9    
Spain 9.0 5.3 4.3 30.2 29.7 23.1 60.8 65.0 72.6  14.8   14.1   15.5 
Sri Lanka 38.8 30.9 31.6 20.9 26.4 26.3 40.3 42.7 42.1  8.2   10.7    
Sudan                  
Swaziland 16.3   19.0   64.7           
Sweden 3.1 2.0 2.1 25.9 22.0 19.9 71.0 75.7 77.7  30.3   28.0    
Switzerland 4.4 3.8 3.3 28.6 23.7 21.1 67.0 72.5 70.9  11.8   12.4   12.1 
Syrian Arab Republic  25.4   26.6   47.9      20.7   19.8 
Tajikistan  67.0   4.5   28.5          
Tanzania  75.8 78.5  4.5 2.7  19.7 18.8         
Thailand 28.9 44.3 42.1 24.5 19.9 20.0 46.6 35.8 38.0     6.7   7.3 
Timor-Leste   50.5   9.8   39.7     3.0    
Togo  59.1   8.6   32.3          
Tonga 33.1   26.0   40.9           
Trinidad and Tobago           24.3   21.2   21.1 
Tunisia 21.8   37.2   41.0           
Turkey 43.4 29.5 23.7 22.3 24.8 26.2 34.3 45.8 50.1  9.8   11.2   12.8 
Turkmenistan                  
Uganda  73.1   6.4   20.5   1.8       
Ukraine  9.6   31.9   58.6   22.4   19.5   20.3 
United Kingdom 2.0 1.3 1.2 27.3 22.2 19.1 70.2 76.3 78.9  17.0   19.7   19.6 
United States 2.9 1.6 1.6 24.3 20.6 16.7 72.9 77.8 81.2  15.0   15.0   15.6 
Uruguay 5.2 4.6 11.6 21.0 21.9 21.4 73.9 73.5 67.0  14.1   11.2   12.5 
Uzbekistan                  
Venezuela, RB 14.2 10.4  24.0 21.7  61.9 67.8          
Vietnam 61.8 52.3 54.0 14.8 20.0 20.4 23.4 27.8 25.7     4.3   4.4 
West Bank and Gaza 11.0 6.9 26.3 41.7 38.2 32.8 47.3 54.9 40.9     23.6   23.8 
Yemen, Rep.              8.5    
Zambia  72.1   6.4   21.5          
Zimbabwe           5.9       
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Table 3 Employment structure, continued
 Wage Self- Employment in Employment in 
 employment (%) employment (%) farming (%) urban areas (%)
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan  22.6    22.2    55.1        16.5     
Albania  43.6    13.5    42.9    23.0   37.7     
Algeria                        
Angola                        
Argentina            
Armenia                  55.5     
Australia   84.6   13.6   1.8      89.7   88.8 
Austria  87.8 87.1  8.1 8.8  4.1 4.1      60.5   59.6 
Azerbaijan 78.2    12.8    9.0     46.3         
Bangladesh  36.0   20.0   44.0          24.0 
Barbados                   
Belarus               73.2     
Belgium  87.7 88.8  11.0 10.1  1.3 1.1      95.8   95.8 
Belize 65.2   18.3   16.5    52.5         
Benin  9.4    46.2    44.5        37.0     
Bhutan  23.8   9.1   67.1       22.1     
Bolivia 28.5 33.1 36.1 29.2 29.3 30.3 42.3 37.6 33.7  57.0   63.0   64.3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  69.8    9.8    20.3              
Botswana   68.4   12.2   19.3            
Brazil 58.7 62.9 66.5 22.0 22.3 21.7 19.3 14.9 11.8  77.4   81.6   83.7 
Bulgaria  92.4 86.4  7.6 10.0  0.0 3.6  72.4   54.6   50.3 
Burkina Faso 3.6 4.4   7.6 7.9   88.8 87.7    12.6   15.3     
Burundi                        
Cambodia 12.4 22.7 25.9 17.0 19.2 19.2 70.6 58.1 54.9  18.2   17.8   17.4 
Cameroon              23.0   30.1     
Canada                        
Central African Republic  10.0    24.5    65.5        42.9     
Chad                  24.9     
Chile 74.5 75.8 76.3 19.9 20.8 20.8 5.6 3.4 3.0  85.8   88.8   88.5 
China       48.0 36.8 25.8  28.0   38.0   45.6 
Colombia  50.7 46.4  36.9 41.6  12.4 12.0      76.5   78.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  9.1    20.3    70.6        31.8     
Congo, Rep.  21.6    42.3    36.1        48.2     
Costa Rica 73.0 71.3 72.6 24.2 22.8 23.2 2.8 5.8 4.2  46.8   61.9   62.1 
Côte d’Ivoire                        
Croatia  78.0    7.7    14.4        54.1     
Cuba                        
Czech Republic  83.6 84.3  15.6 14.7  0.7 1.0      59.0   59.4 
Denmark  90.6 91.7  8.1 7.2  1.4 1.1      64.4   75.6 
Dominican Republic 60.0 52.2 50.4 29.3 35.0 37.1 10.7 12.7 12.5  54.2   66.7   69.3 
Ecuador 48.9 52.0 54.6 27.3 27.4 27.7 23.7 20.6 17.7  54.5  67.0   67.7 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  53.3    13.2    33.5        38.9     
El Salvador 56.2 56.2  28.8 32.0  15.0 11.8   61.3   64.9   67.7 
Eritrea                        
Estonia  93.0 93.7  5.0 5.1  2.0 1.2      50.3   53.3 
Ethiopia 9.7 6.0   4.8 11.7   85.6 82.3    12.4   11.7     
Fiji  59.8      68.9  9.3  11.7 30.8  19.4  33.4         
Finland  86.8 86.2  10.0 10.9  3.2 2.9      46.8   46.6 
France  90.9 91.4  6.9 6.8  2.2 1.8      83.5   83.1 
Gabon  55.8    23.3    20.9        81.2     
Gambia, The                        
Georgia   52.1   13.8   34.1      38.6   40.5 
Germany  90.7 92.0  8.3 7.6  1.0 0.4      81.5   84.9 
Ghana  18.5    25.9    55.6        36.2     
Greece  65.3 66.2  23.2 22.6  11.5 11.2      42.1   53.0 
Guatemala  48.5    28.0    23.5        54.3     
Guinea 45.5    54.2    0.3     27.7         
Guinea-Bissau                        
Haiti                        
Honduras 45.9 43.0 43.0 28.4 33.0 31.9 25.7 24.0 25.1  46.9   50.8   48.6 
Hungary  84.6 87.5  13.3 10.8  2.1 1.7      58.1   55.3 
India 43.3 45.1 50.5 17.1 21.0 20.3 39.6 33.9 29.2  22.0   23.4   25.8 
Indonesia 48.6 38.6 42.3 23.7 24.9 27.3 27.7 36.6 30.4  33.6   39.2   48.6 
Iran, Islamic Rep.                  41.4     
Iraq  99.9    0.0    0.0        66.8     
Ireland  83.4 83.6  11.5 11.4  5.1 5.1      65.6   65.7 
Israel                        
Italy  74.4 75.9  22.7 21.9  2.9 2.3      82.5   83.7 
Jamaica 61.8    21.8    16.4     58.7         
Japan                        
Jordan                        
Kazakhstan              52.7   56.6     
Kenya 31.4 29.1   10.4 7.4   58.2 63.5    16.0   21.2     
Kiribati                        58.4     
Korea, Rep.                        
Kosovo  67.6    17.3    15.1              
Kyrgyz Republic 86.0    1.9    12.1     38.2         
Lao PDR   15.5   16.9   67.6  30.3      
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Table 3 Employment structure, continued
 Wage Self- Employment in Employment in 
 employment (%) employment (%) farming (%) urban areas (%)
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia  90.0 91.1  5.3 6.2  4.7 2.7      51.1   53.4 
Lebanon   .                 
Lesotho                              
Liberia     14.2       43.8    42.0        24.6     
Libya                              
Lithuania     87.3   89.1   4.8 5.9  8.0 5.0      45.8   47.0 
Macedonia, FYR     71.8       11.2    17.0        62.5     
Madagascar  12.6         18.9    68.5     15.7         
Malawi  29.3   10.2      10.8 7.0   59.9 82.8    19.8   9.0     
Malaysia                         
Mali  3.0   11.0      14.9 33.0   82.2 56.1    12.4   27.9     
Mauritania        35.6    42.8   21.6          54.0 
Mauritius     79.9   78.8   15.6 15.9  4.5 5.3      56.4     
Mexico  63.1   68.5   72.8  23.0 23.6 20.1 13.8 7.8 7.1  74.2   79.2   80.0 
Moldova     57.8       2.8    39.4        36.8     
Mongolia        49.3    11.5   39.2          51.0 
Montenegro                           
Morocco                              
Mozambique  9.7   12.9   8.9  4.5 7.3 8.6 85.8 79.9 82.5  14.8   27.9   27.1 
Myanmar                              
Namibia  54.7         9.6    35.6     42.4         
Nepal     17.2   14.4   9.6 13.3  73.3 72.6  6.0   13.4   21.0 
Netherlands     89.0   88.0   9.5 10.3  1.6 1.7            
New Zealand                              
Nicaragua     48.4       26.6    25.1    58.2   58.3   . 
Niger                    16.6         
Nigeria  9.0   19.3      23.2 57.7   67.7 23.0        43.1     
Norway     89.1   92.4   8.3 5.9  2.6 1.8      68.2   68.8 
Oman                              
Pakistan     38.3   37.1   23.8 23.1  37.8 39.8      33.1   32.1 
Panama  66.9   61.1   65.2  19.1 24.3 21.9 13.9 14.6 12.9  63.7   66.0   68.0 
Papua New Guinea        32.6    40.6   26.9          10.7 
Paraguay  37.1   46.7   51.6  26.2 24.7 24.8 36.7 28.6 23.5  51.8   58.8   60.9 
Peru  41.8   39.7   42.8  31.9 29.4 30.9 26.3 31.0 26.3  66.4   63.4   65.9 
Philippines  48.0   47.9   55.9  20.1 22.4 21.5 31.8 29.7 22.6  47.5   48.3   48.3 
Poland     78.7   80.1   8.6 8.9  12.8 11.0      55.7   54.7 
Portugal     78.2   81.2   15.2 13.1  6.6 5.7      76.8   76.9 
Romania  84.2   72.0   72.0  3.5 9.1 7.2 12.3 18.9 20.8  48.8   51.6   43.9 
Russian Federation                       78.8     
Rwanda  11.0   23.9      4.0 9.1   85.1 67.0    8.5   15.8     
Saudi Arabia                              
Senegal  39.1   23.2      58.6 42.5   2.3 34.3        45.8     
Serbia        65.6    13.5   20.9            
Sierra Leone     9.3       20.1    70.6        35.3     
Singapore                              
Slovak Republic     90.0   90.2   9.7 9.5  0.3 0.3      62.0   62.3 
Slovenia     91.6   93.1   6.4 5.6  2.0 1.3            
Somalia                              
South Africa     78.6       18.5    2.9    65.9   69.2     
Spain     83.1   83.9   14.3 14.1  2.6 2.0      75.3   75.4 
Sri Lanka  63.0   58.9   56.0  14.3 20.7 22.3 22.7 20.5 21.7  12.5   12.3   10.9 
Sudan                              
Swaziland  59.3         30.4    10.3     30.6         
Sweden     91.1   93.9   8.3 5.9  0.6 0.2      33.9   38.8 
Switzerland                              
Syrian Arab Republic     54.2       24.1    21.7        50.5     
Tajikistan     64.0       8.1    28.0        21.1     
Tanzania     8.0   8.1   17.1 11.6  74.9 80.4  25.5   25.5   21.1 
Thailand  56.4   40.6   41.3  18.0 19.8 20.9 25.6 39.6 37.8  62.2   30.6   31.3 
Timor-Leste     99.8   28.0   0.2 21.8  0.0 50.2      20.3     
Togo     9.2       32.5    58.2        32.4     
Tonga  43.1         24.2    32.7               
Trinidad and Tobago                              
Tunisia  68.3         16.6    15.0     66.0         
Turkey     54.2   60.9   18.7 16.3  27.1 22.8      58.1  
Turkmenistan                              
Uganda     18.7       13.8    67.5        17.4     
Ukraine     97.7       2.2    0.2        73.8     
United Kingdom     87.8   88.8   11.7 10.6  0.5 0.6      95.2   96.1 
United States     89.3       10.1    0.6        77.5     
Uruguay  73.1   71.2   71.3  24.7 27.0 24.1 2.2 1.8 4.6    93.9 
Uzbekistan                              
Venezuela, RB  60.0   55.7      31.9 38.2   8.2 6.2    19.4      
Vietnam  7.7   33.1   36.3  31.0 19.5 7.9 61.3 47.5 55.8  27.3   25.7   25.9 
West Bank and Gaza     58.8   66.6   25.9 21.5  15.3 11.9      56.6   72.1 
Yemen, Rep.                      34.1     
Zambia     17.2       12.6    70.2        30.4     
Zimbabwe                              
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Table 4 Living standards 
   Wages in selected occupations (2005 US$ per year) 
 Accountant  Chemical engineer Bus driver Sewing machine operator
 1995 2005 2008 1995 2005 2008 1995 2005 2008 1995 2005 2008
Afghanistan                                    
Albania                                    
Algeria                                    
Angola  7,139                  1,989                
Argentina              10,849   17,214   9,581         2,948       
Armenia                                    
Australia  32,498   40,267      39,694   59,054      28,065   29,331      22,418   21,019    
Austria  57,907         38,574         27,954         19,402       
Azerbaijan     2,769   7,483   454   1,785   6,544                   
Bangladesh  1,548         1,201         578   1,077      584       
Barbados 32,772      13,553   4806  
Belarus           1,188   2,657               761   1,133    
Belgium                             22,692   22,093    
Belize            
Benin                                    
Bhutan 25028      5967   4989  
Bolivia  12,745         5,159         1,173         2,134       
Bosnia and Herzegovina                                    
Botswana     1,528                               
Brazil     20,045                  3,134             
Bulgaria                                    
Burkina Faso  3,516                                  
Burundi                                    
Cambodia  293                  225         707       
Cameroon                                    
Canada  25,459   37,540   41,143   37,116   60,033      20,146   21,033   27,400   12,253   13,125   13,159 
Central African Republic  21,735         10,284         1,028         799       
Chad                                    
Chile     12,951                           5,184    
China  1,096   2,913      874   2,538      501         891   1,327    
Colombia                                    
Congo, Dem. Rep.                                    
Congo, Rep.                                    
Costa Rica  10,761   8,998   12,518      9,078   12,011   5,198   3,993   5,973   3,475   2,541   2,579 
Côte d’Ivoire                                    
Croatia  8,955         6,953         5,424         6,281       
Cuba                                    
Czech Republic     14,387   23,583   5,918   14,559   22,528   4,024   8,478   12,911   3,133   4,383    
Denmark     123,067         116,081         51,740         47,102    
Dominican Republic  2,561                           2,561       
Ecuador                                    
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2,778         4,469         1,041         615       
El Salvador  16,107   15,103   17,006   12,547   12,267   16,327   2,688   2,906   4,083   2,053   2,496   2,079 
Eritrea  3,077                  1,518         615       
Estonia  8,180         5,166         3,593         2,011       
Ethiopia                                    
Fiji            
Finland  42,583   59,695      44,183   55,887      30,885   32,263      23,362   24,554    
France                                    
Gabon  12,045                           2,725       
Gambia, The                                    
Georgia                                    
Germany  68,538   63,483   71,989   78,873   73,544   86,265   48,206   41,013   44,482   29,536   26,388   31,576 
Ghana  5,589   1,516      2,298   519      760         867   562    
Greece                                    
Guatemala                             1,476       
Guinea                                    
Guinea-Bissau                                    
Haiti                                    
Honduras  3,206         32,684         2,304         953       
Hungary  4,548   24,679      10,439   28,345      4,514   8,987             
India  3,261                  912         800       
Indonesia              2,533         818         731    
Iran, Islamic Rep.                                    
Iraq                                    
Ireland                                    
Israel                                    
Italy  55,684   52,973   58,298   30,449   34,726   40,328   20,270   21,559   24,880   17,366   18,269   20,791 
Jamaica                                    
Japan                    50,366   30,710   30,452   29,592   19,914   19,836 
Jordan  8,320   8,163      3,580   4,925      3,830   2,488      1,757   2,945    
Kazakhstan     5,965         3,269         2,165         957    
Kenya                                    
Kiribati            
Korea, Rep.  22,122   38,755      20,206   29,415      14,914   14,647      13,291   13,698    
Kosovo                                    
Kyrgyz Republic  605                           251       
Lao PDR                                   
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Table 4 Living standards, continued 
   Wages in selected occupations (2005 US$ per year) 
 Accountant  Chemical engineer Bus driver Sewing machine operator
 1995 2005 2008 1995 2005 2008 1995 2005 2008 1995 2005 2008
Latvia  8,347   12,686      3,837   10,368      2,763   5,877      2,181   3,066    
Lebanon                                    
Lesotho                                    
Liberia                                    
Libya                                    
Lithuania  3,939   11,976               2,864   5,228      2,030   4,155    
Macedonia, FYR                                    
Madagascar  1,205                  466   488      424       
Malawi  16,360                  1,106         389       
Malaysia                             1,673       
Mali                                    
Mauritania                                    
Mauritius  17,701   16,091   19,100            3,465   2,826   3,622   2,330   1,895   2,369 
Mexico     3,319   3,220      11,355      1,796   2,623   2,682   1,552   2,115   2,158 
Moldova  1,130   1,644   3,693      1,436   2,345      588   1,535   377   1,040   1,691 
Mongolia                                    
Montenegro                                    
Morocco                                    
Mozambique                                    
Myanmar  4,880   11,869      4,164   16,617      2,733   10,575      2,082   7,985    
Namibia  19,393                                  
Nepal                                    
Netherlands                                    
New Zealand                                    
Nicaragua  3,891         11,728         1,327                
Niger                                    
Nigeria  4,472         21,678         3,012         944       
Norway                    24,680   28,863   36,446          
Oman                                    
Pakistan     3,193         2,182         1,230         851    
Panama                                    
Papua New Guinea  16,770         23,560         5,500         3,779       
Paraguay                                    
Peru  17,836   24,789   23,679            1,543   2,181   5,702   2,516   2,474   2,579 
Philippines  5,853   3,951      6,513   3,408      2,640   1,919      2,314   1,653   2,159 
Poland  7,068   12,502      5,867   12,150      3,869   7,961      3,656   7,059    
Portugal  19,084   23,948      32,444   34,440      8,653   9,039      6,259   5,940    
Romania  4,773   9,876   15,849   3,476   5,661   10,681   2,754   3,395   6,386   1,549   2,082   3,805 
Russian Federation           2,288   2,780         2,922      759   1,542    
Rwanda                                    
Saudi Arabia                                    
Senegal                                    
Serbia                                    
Sierra Leone  5,782                  463         449       
Singapore  44,523   28,089      29,164   27,275      10,665   9,229      9,005   6,424    
Slovak Republic  4,394   7,829      2,753   7,315      2,027   5,963      2,053   2,583    
Slovenia  11,945         19,381         12,974         6,153       
Somalia                                    
South Africa                                    
Spain                                    
Sri Lanka                    1,101         1,054       
Sudan  11,213         14,663         7,095         4,341       
Swaziland  16,472                           8,697       
Sweden  37,390         33,607         24,762         28,083       
Switzerland                                    
Syrian Arab Republic                                    
Tajikistan  288         357         108         338       
Tanzania                                    
Thailand  14,657   13,861      7,118   16,327      4,072   3,291      4,343   2,562    
Timor-Leste                                    
Togo  11,021                                  
Tonga            
Trinidad and Tobago                    7,777         1,903       
Tunisia           4,911         4,702         2,849       
Turkey     14,624      16,305   17,410         5,823      3,140   5,648    
Turkmenistan                                    
Uganda  3,784         1,235         866         237       
Ukraine           1,909                  767       
United Kingdom  46,991   60,352   56,524      33,624      21,452   30,880   32,388      22,402   23,513 
United States  43,432   50,457      67,014   82,647      27,533   30,958      18,100   18,515    
Uruguay                    10,389         4,782       
Uzbekistan                                    
Venezuela, RB  7,857         7,275         2,205         1,924       
Vietnam                                    
West Bank and Gaza                                   3,464 
Yemen, Rep.  7,572         9,466         5,429         3,360       
Zambia  2,758                     522      781   304    
Zimbabwe                                   
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Table 4 Living standards, continued  
 Working poor (% below Satisfied with life  Labor share Gender gap in earnings  $1.25 PPP US$ a day) (% in latest survey) (% of national income) (women/men)
 1995 2005 2010 Employed Unemployed  Out of labor force 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan            
Albania    46.3 33.3 35.5     0.79 
Algeria    55.4 39.3 57.5 29.9 22.8    
Angola            
Argentina 0.0 5.0 1.0 87.1 71.6 90.4 37.8 34.8   0.90 0.96
Armenia  11.0     39.4 42.6 43.9   
Australia    86.9 65.6 81.5 54.3 52.8 52.5   
Austria       59.6 54.5 54.2  0.87 0.88
Azerbaijan 16.0      24.5 24.4 18.9   
Bangladesh    40.4 41.5 42.4     0.68 
Barbados            
Belarus 1.0      45.7 52.9 55.5   
Belgium       56.9 56.5 57.2  0.93 0.85
Belize 12.0           
Benin  47.0     18.3     
Bhutan  10.0      89.5 88.9   
Bolivia 17.0 18.0 16.0    37.5 37.6 31.5  0.76 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    58.7 38.2 49.1  54.3 59.9   
Botswana       31.9     
Brazil 11.0 9.0 6.0 85.6 74.2 82.3 48.8 46.7 49.1 0.84 0.88 0.89
Bulgaria 2.0 0.0  51.9 31.3 38.3 38.9 40.7 42.5  0.93 0.82
Burkina Faso 71.0 57.0  48.7 37.1 47.1  24.9 22.0 0.80  
Burundi 86.0       40.7    
Cambodia  32.0 23.0        1.05 0.99
Cameroon  10.0     22.5 20.0 20.8   
Canada    91.4 78.7 90.7 55.8 54.3    
Central African Republic  62.0      20.7    
Chad       18.8     
Chile 3.0 1.0 1.0 80.1 73.2 74.6 40.5 39.8 42.3 0.96 0.93 0.86
China    72.5 65.8 74.9      
Colombia  13.0 8.0 91.3 84.1 89.9 36.0 35.1 35.0   0.91
Congo, Dem. Rep.           0.89 
Congo, Rep.            
Costa Rica 0.0 4.0 3.0    50.0 51.9 55.4   
Côte d’Ivoire       24.1     
Croatia  0.0     56.9 57.0   0.93 
Cuba       48.5 46.2 44.5   
Czech Republic       47.5 48.0 49.2  1.01 0.99
Denmark       60.4 62.9 66.5   
Dominican Republic 5.0 6.0 2.0    37.7     
Ecuador 14.0 9.0 5.0         
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.0  52.2 42.9 54.6 24.4 27.2 26.1  0.59 
El Salvador 10.0 12.0 9.0 82.3 75.6 78.0      
Eritrea            
Estonia  0.0     59.6 49.9 59.7  0.77 0.69
Ethiopia 61.0   40.2 38.2 47.5     0.84 
Fiji       39.0     
Finland    94.4 69.9 87.4 56.7 56.4 56.6   
France    80.8 63.5 71.6 58.0 58.0 58.4  0.77 0.88
Gabon  5.0      22.3    
Gambia, The 66.0           
Georgia    42.8 28.4 33.8  19.2 33.3   0.60
Germany    86.0 50.6 78.1 59.7 55.9 54.7  0.99 
Ghana 39.0   63.3 59.7 64.9     0.77 
Greece       34.9 38.7 39.3  0.89 0.93
Guatemala  14.0  88.1 89.3 82.4  34.4 32.6   
Guinea            
Guinea-Bissau            
Haiti            
Honduras 27.0 26.0 18.0    47.7 48.7 49.5   
Hungary 0.0 0.0     54.4 54.5 54.6  1.01 
India    38.9 51.2 39.0 30.5 29.1 30.0 0.68 0.73 0.73
Indonesia 47.0 22.0 18.0 73.3 69.3 77.4     0.86 
Iran, Islamic Rep.    63.3 60.7 66.9 23.4 21.8    
Iraq    31.4 22.1 31.3 6.7 14.7 21.9  0.70 
Ireland       50.3 46.2 48.8  0.93 1.02
Israel    80.7 71.9 67.6 56.6 54.1 53.3   
Italy    85.7 69.4 80.6 45.8 45.3 46.4  1.12 0.90
Jamaica        48.5 51.0 0.98  
Japan    80.9 70.6 85.2 52.1 49.5    
Jordan    47.7 40.2 50.6 45.0 42.0 44.0   
Kazakhstan       39.0 34.4 34.4   
Kenya  43.0     35.1 41.4 40.4  0.81 
Kiribati            
Korea, Rep.    72.5 55.0 71.2 51.5 51.1 51.6   
Kosovo            
Kyrgyz Republic    64.9 73.4 64.7 40.0 27.2 32.0   
Lao PDR 49.0  34.0         
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Table 4 Living standards, continued  
 Working poor (% below Satisfied with life  Labor share Gender gap in earnings  $1.25 PPP US$ a day) (% in latest survey) (% of national income) (women/men)
 1995 2005 2010 Employed Unemployed  Out of labor force 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia  0.0 0.0    50.0 47.3 47.9  0.74 0.67
Lebanon       35.5     
Lesotho       57.4 48.8 48.4   
Liberia  84.0          
Libya            
Lithuania   0.0    41.6 45.1 49.5  0.69 0.71
Macedonia, FYR       51.1 43.9 44.0   
Madagascar 72.0           
Malawi            
Malaysia    79.6 75.0 81.2      
Mali 86.0   58.2 53.1 54.5    0.49  
Mauritania        25.2    
Mauritius       43.3 38.7 38.4  0.76 
Mexico 6.0 5.0 4.0 89.2 83.5 89.5 32.3 30.4  0.94  
Moldova 27.0 12.0  52.1 49.1 42.6 50.6 49.9 57.5  0.85 
Mongolia       27.5 26.1 33.8   0.77
Montenegro            
Morocco    36.7 20.0 52.2  37.4 34.2   
Mozambique       16.9 27.7 27.3 1.09  0.93
Myanmar            
Namibia 49.0      47.6 46.4 44.4   
Nepal  53.0 25.0         0.72
Netherlands    96.4 76.6 93.4 56.5 55.8 55.8   
New Zealand       37.0 40.6    
Nicaragua 21.0 15.0          
Niger       17.1 17.0 15.8   
Nigeria    71.4 76.7 80.6 17.3 5.2 4.1   
Norway    94.5 58.3 89.4 54.2 46.8 46.7   
Oman       33.4 26.4 32.5   
Pakistan    26.6 29.2 29.1     0.63 0.36
Panama 16.0 9.0 6.0    39.2 34.5 31.4   
Papua New Guinea       26.0 17.3    
Paraguay 12.0 7.0 7.0    35.2 36.9 37.1   
Peru 14.0 9.0 5.0 75.5 68.5 74.7 27.9 25.3 23.8 0.71 0.82 0.81
Philippines  23.0 18.0 67.4 69.5 64.9 25.3 27.7 27.9  0.89 
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 82.2 64.5 71.4 45.1 40.7 42.4  0.89 0.96
Portugal       54.7 58.2 58.2  0.83 0.90
Romania 5.0 1.0 0.0 67.4 25.7 45.6 39.6 44.3 47.1 0.86 0.81 0.89
Russian Federation    59.5 41.2 59.6 48.5 49.9 52.1   
Rwanda    42.2  44.7    0.93 0.90 
Saudi Arabia    77.2 67.1 78.6 35.1 28.1    
Senegal  34.0     17.6 24.1 21.6   
Serbia   0.0 70.9 55.9 53.1 65.7 56.6 53.6   
Sierra Leone  53.0          
Singapore    83.3 71.6 83.9 43.9 42.1 44.3   
Slovak Republic  0.0 0.0    65.1 58.1 60.9   
Slovenia    85.0 65.5 72.5      
Somalia            
South Africa    81.9 63.4 77.7 54.9 49.9 49.8  0.85 
Spain    93.4 94.5 83.6 53.0 52.9 53.3  0.80 0.83
Sri Lanka       46.4 57.3 57.3  0.86 0.80
Sudan       37.1 25.1 25.1   
Swaziland 79.0           
Sweden    92.4 77.1 88.6 60.2 62.0 61.1  1.06 0.91
Switzerland    93.7 75.6 90.7 64.1 65.8    
Syrian Arab Republic  2.0         1.08 
Tajikistan  35.0      15.9 15.7  0.66 
Tanzania    23.5 22.1 27.2     0.79 
Thailand 4.0 1.0 0.0 84.5 72.1 91.3 32.3 32.9 33.2 0.89 0.89 0.95
Timor-Leste  37.0          
Togo  39.0          
Tonga            
Trinidad and Tobago    82.5 71.6 79.8 46.2 30.6 33.0   
Tunisia       41.8 35.8 36.1   
Turkey    85.9 70.4 84.3 22.2 27.1   0.96 0.96
Turkmenistan 25.0           
Uganda    49.6 31.2 49.6      
Ukraine  0.0  60.1 57.3 48.4 53.2 55.7 56.3   
United Kingdom    89.8 79.6 91.8 58.2 60.1   0.98 
United States    85.9 81.0 87.8 57.2 56.2 56.0  0.85 
Uruguay 1.0 1.0 0.0 88.9 80.2 86.8 43.0 38.5   0.99 
Uzbekistan            
Venezuela, RB 10.0 13.0  80.8 75.0 76.6 35.6 30.6  0.93 0.94 
Vietnam 50.0 21.0 17.0 82.6 46.3 82.2    0.94 0.89 0.80
West Bank and Gaza   0.0        0.77 0.73
Yemen, Rep. 13.0          0.70 
Zambia 56.0 65.0  64.3 56.2 64.5     0.89 
Zimbabwe    25.0 25.1 28.1      
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Table 5 Productivity 
    Value added per worker (2005 US$ per year) 
 Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan                  
Albania  2,409   2,622   3,885   6,602   10,419   8,110   3,031   13,496   14,021 
Algeria    5,364       23,962       6,979   
Angola                  
Argentina  169,887   115,095   134,720   30,924   18,165   24,822   27,453   8,976   14,530 
Armenia    2,452   4,636     15,285   28,403     4,803   10,819 
Australia  40,133   61,462   70,416   73,971   95,996   90,412   55,153   70,239   89,745 
Austria  32,626   22,953   26,250   83,512   89,626   99,691   95,032   88,496   84,955 
Azerbaijan  903   909   1,627   1,915   18,994   44,847   1,115   1,939   6,286 
Bangladesh  394   398     2,406   1,720     1,914   1,348   
Barbados  25,047   24,469     19,951   19,992     22,501   23,701   
Belarus  3,261       4,693       5,595     
Belgium  51,682   40,155   67,238   103,700   93,212   91,242   104,053   99,852   99,674 
Belize  7,302   7,920     12,726   10,017     12,421   11,235   
Benin    1,066       1,960       1,684   
Bhutan    1,474   1,017     6,136   25,363     2,837   4,794 
Bolivia  22,960   827     3,106   3,780     1,971   2,861   
Bosnia and Herzegovina                  
Botswana  2,562   858     20,939   47,317     7,425   12,354   
Brazil  2,764   2,618   5,048   17,135   13,428   18,599   15,379   10,798   16,888 
Bulgaria  3,536   10,254   11,062   4,412   8,675   13,748   7,076   11,058   15,240 
Burkina Faso  207   348     3,803   6,551     2,813   3,125   
Burundi                  
Cambodia      615       3,359       2,762 
Cameroon                  
Canada  42,189   46,905   84,494   81,109   112,454   129,063   52,079   67,069   76,038 
Central African Republic                  
Chad  316       5,679       2,875     
Chile  8,839   7,230   7,742   20,778   32,805   39,481   14,640   18,340   21,281 
China  576   912   1,649   3,077   6,683   10,799   1,972   4,425   7,788 
Colombia  143,353   3,298   5,171   9,289   13,472   23,951   7,423   8,389   12,101 
Congo, Dem. Rep.                  
Congo, Rep.    626       16,495       2,705   
Costa Rica  6,904   6,367   7,964   13,678   14,495   16,232   11,644   11,324   13,886 
Côte d’Ivoire                  
Croatia  5,509   8,061   12,516   16,501   26,744   34,397   18,959   33,420   39,446 
Cuba  2,778   2,396   2,848   7,880   8,687   12,553   10,416   10,477   12,875 
Czech Republic  10,589   21,146   30,708   13,520   26,449   38,029   17,605   31,396   41,145 
Denmark  78,444   46,179   65,098   83,948   107,422   120,024   93,598   95,626   108,138 
Dominican Republic  4,614   5,113   4,814   10,323   14,995   17,142   6,144   10,549   11,879 
Ecuador  17,147   1,428   1,942   6,974   13,671   14,885   4,995   7,264   8,338 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2,299   2,125   2,759   6,839   7,234   10,894   5,391   4,543   7,308 
El Salvador  3,217   4,267   4,839   6,845   10,911   10,641   7,131   8,254   8,561 
Eritrea                  
Estonia  286   1,122   1,831   477   1,338   1,992   538   1,770   2,157 
Ethiopia  264   216     1,986   678     1,619   1,136   
Fiji                  
Finland  44,202   46,796   63,793   97,244   105,407   111,333   75,501   78,173   83,346 
France  61,774   51,238   59,087   84,530   77,422   83,291   98,683   95,476   107,508 
Gabon  4,968   4,517     92,742   113,418     24,212   11,700   
Gambia, The  665       2,418       7,841     
Georgia    1,091       10,531       5,537   
Germany  39,654   37,059   35,975   83,494   83,183   82,362   102,070   87,032   82,997 
Ghana    1,204       3,353       3,797   
Greece                  
Guatemala  2,485   2,226     5,193   7,885     10,519   7,908   
Guinea  434       6,850       4,665     
Guinea-Bissau                  
Haiti                  
Honduras  1,441   1,373     3,167   5,364     3,032   5,649   
Hungary  15,389   24,218   22,162   13,658   27,139   31,452   16,227   30,227   31,631 
India  530   620   1,154   1,919   2,733   4,089   2,395   3,917   6,775 
Indonesia  1,223   947   2,527   7,292   7,779   15,500   3,393   3,462   5,637 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  9,417   3,798     16,510   13,886     14,977   9,339   
Iraq                  
Ireland  53,117   27,237   22,334   88,974   127,274   172,844   60,801   100,012   103,349 
Israel                  
Italy  36,317   49,362   41,152   68,402   77,744   75,596   85,677   98,654   93,103 
Jamaica  2,865   3,409   3,123   13,424   14,414   13,113   6,946   10,989   11,501 
Japan  32,158   28,324   30,531   116,579   93,297   115,414   131,008   99,791   107,592 
Jordan    10,358   27,585     13,865   26,114     9,033   13,463 
Kazakhstan    1,725   3,016     18,115   28,778     8,638   13,905 
Kenya    644       3,941       2,425   
Kiribati                  
Korea, Rep.  15,783   15,431   14,515   37,835   51,736   91,830   28,615   33,609   30,423 
Kosovo                  
Kyrgyz Republic  1,035   921   1,550   1,274   1,399   2,183   1,125   1,166   2,142 
Lao PDR  690       5,064       2,400     
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Table 5 Productivity, continued  
   Value added per worker (2005 US$ per year) 
 Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia  3,207   5,585   11,889   7,771   14,025   23,498   8,546   20,297   28,582 
Lebanon                  
Lesotho  652       6,868       2,365     
Liberia    888   879     1,717   489     1,146   526 
Libya                  
Lithuania  4,290   6,692   10,421   8,886   22,045   31,384   9,674   21,276   27,697 
Macedonia, FYR    6,775   8,551     9,675   14,199     13,631   17,705 
Madagascar    207       2,309       2,047   
Malawi                  
Malaysia  9,322   7,825   11,257   18,628   23,171   26,866   13,692   10,460   12,878 
Mali    881       6,310       2,198   
Mauritania                  
Mauritius  8,652   7,300   6,256   9,137   10,423   14,876   13,003   13,840   17,007 
Mexico  2,494   5,183   6,269   13,386   27,286   27,497   13,003   22,058   21,103 
Moldova  929   1,055   1,468   2,606   2,262   3,040   1,148   3,305   6,502 
Mongolia  1,779   1,355   1,825   4,588   5,234   8,190   2,048   2,385   3,915 
Montenegro                  
Morocco  13,450   1,949   2,764   5,359   8,431   10,669   4,611   9,749   11,517 
Mozambique    188       4,724       1,556   
Myanmar  4,933       4,676       6,976     
Namibia  2,600   3,717   8,562   18,084   22,451   30,857   11,804   12,665   11,758 
Nepal                  
Netherlands  71,226   56,148   54,577   97,454   97,381   124,750   79,808   82,539   86,039 
New Zealand  36,258   45,578     52,576   67,432     49,929   57,782   
Nicaragua  1,506   1,539     5,147   3,503     3,252   2,359   
Niger                  
Nigeria    1,796       8,285       1,333   
Norway  56,806   72,622   85,197   138,356   290,065   318,919   82,263   105,301   118,318 
Oman  9,161       158,023       14,500     
Pakistan  1,139   1,139   1,187   2,564   3,092   3,519   2,929   3,172   3,968 
Panama  3,933   4,407   4,143   10,280   11,691   13,451   12,711   14,334   18,196 
Papua New Guinea                  
Paraguay  2,743   2,149   5,335   7,104   4,204   6,493   6,952   3,642   6,241 
Peru  58,831   46,902   61,865   7,986   9,308   12,014   5,533   5,007   6,279 
Philippines  1,860   1,197   1,724   7,581   7,197   9,750   4,380   3,716   5,093 
Poland  4,038   5,933   7,196   12,748   23,585   27,886   14,647   27,215   30,078 
Portugal  15,813   9,349   9,359   30,226   32,333   34,814   40,227   50,158   51,660 
Romania  2,410   3,564   4,085   6,205   13,115   15,498   5,560   16,253   27,896 
Russian Federation  2,951   5,713   7,744   7,167   14,600   19,908   7,369   10,919   16,432 
Rwanda    295       2,134       1,698   
Saudi Arabia    33,414   30,025     146,499   120,850     19,343   20,513 
Senegal    857       3,030       3,406   
Serbia    5,228   5,949     10,346   16,543     11,991   18,115 
Sierra Leone    395       2,099       750   
Singapore  9,160   3,408   2,873   67,962   90,290   87,976   61,005   55,810   64,964 
Slovak Republic  256   539   45,309   377   691   33,247   422   790   35,907 
Slovenia  53   51   11,699   99   156   41,034   161   202   48,714 
Somalia                  
South Africa    6,241   10,725     22,418   22,059     18,468   16,554 
Spain  32,396   41,405   48,517   63,427   64,101   80,812   70,171   66,716   69,968 
Sri Lanka  1,545   1,366   2,015   2,866   4,160   6,217   3,686   5,467   7,548 
Sudan                  
Swaziland                  
Sweden  84,800   57,864   93,839   98,760   119,616   135,069   78,875   87,010   94,173 
Switzerland  61,238   34,325   48,439   124,652   122,634   166,833   120,305   106,178   130,553 
Syrian Arab Republic  17,111   34,206   61,887   9,922   44,830   40,385   17,821   31,138   38,924 
Tajikistan  245   355     923   1,624     379   1,648   
Tanzania    303       4,392       1,888   
Thailand  1,294   1,252   1,934   14,421   11,532   15,349   12,577   6,490   8,209 
Timor-Leste                  
Togo    619       2,450       1,119   
Tonga                  
Trinidad and Tobago  3,466   3,403   3,883   28,504   54,117   82,586   12,489   17,024   24,172 
Tunisia                  
Turkey  4,162   7,974   10,596   16,599   25,270   27,153   16,311   29,236   33,775 
Turkmenistan                  
Uganda    293   395     3,951   4,542     1,655   1,870 
Ukraine  1,405   2,366   3,997   3,199   5,825   11,824   6,283   4,419   7,756 
United Kingdom  55,402   58,380   56,013   68,950   92,373   88,189   57,625   86,429   75,957 
United States  41,807   57,756   59,247   85,509   100,647   118,051   77,029   93,562   97,669 
Uruguay  35,312   26,313     21,948   15,641     18,551   10,712   
Uzbekistan  1,312       2,437       1,900     
Venezuela, RB  4,708   5,358     20,515   36,656     10,073   7,370   
Vietnam  351   538     2,391   2,846     1,979   1,862   
West Bank and Gaza                  
Yemen, Rep.  6,093       30,134       19,342     
Zambia    534       7,446       3,541   
Zimbabwe    285       2,776       3,404  
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Table 5 Productivity, continued
   Value added per worker Employment in micro-enterprises Informal employment 
 (2005 US$ per year) (% of non-agricultural employment) (% of non-agricultural employment)
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan            
Albania  2,935   6,784   8,379       
Algeria    11,055         
Angola            
Argentina  29,815   12,243   17,954   57.7 55.9 44.0  49.7
Armenia    5,399   11,088       49.6
Australia  58,730   75,297   89,305   31.7 30.7   
Austria  86,977   85,765   85,704   32.1 34.6   
Azerbaijan  1,026   3,584   9,545       26.5
Bangladesh  967   948         
Barbados  19,868   20,723         
Belarus  4,565           
Belgium  102,383   96,998   96,414   25.3 24.0   
Belize  11,094   10,353         
Benin    1,429         
Bhutan    2,798   3,525       
Bolivia  2,720   2,242     79.3 80.5  75.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina            
Botswana  10,235   14,150         
Brazil  12,450   9,633   15,252  60.0 57.0 55.3 47.3  42.2
Bulgaria  5,391   10,176   14,455   25.2 22.9   
Burkina Faso  523   868         
Burundi            
Cambodia      1,270       
Cameroon        95.3    
Canada  58,070   76,449   88,633       
Central African Republic            
Chad  807           
Chile  15,308   20,223   23,977  52.1 44.9 44.7 33.1  
China  1,500   3,386   6,145       
Colombia  9,380   8,253   13,223    70.0 53.4 63.5 59.6
Congo, Dem. Rep.            
Congo, Rep.    4,819         
Costa Rica  11,089   10,938   13,136  52.1 51.5 47.9 39.6 39.9 43.8
Côte d’Ivoire            
Croatia  15,556   27,173   34,043       
Cuba  7,923   8,521   10,912       
Czech Republic  15,574   29,321   39,648   31.6 30.7   
Denmark  90,386   96,856   109,655       
Dominican Republic  6,918   10,290   11,621       48.5
Ecuador  6,160   6,486   7,810    42.2 45.5  71.3 60.9
Egypt, Arab Rep.  4,658   4,431   6,677       51.2
El Salvador  6,000   8,041   8,216       66.4
Eritrea            
Estonia  492   1,591   2,073   21.4 21.1   
Ethiopia  404   366         
Fiji            
Finland  78,868   84,467   88,167       
France  93,016   89,373   100,485   28.7 29.2   
Gabon  24,595   22,182         
Gambia, The  2,773           
Georgia    3,530         
Germany  93,510   84,878   81,878   26.2 22.6   
Ghana    2,257         
Greece        56.8 54.3   
Guatemala  5,276   6,028         
Guinea  1,581           
Guinea-Bissau            
Haiti            
Honduras  2,475   3,921    58.7 60.6 66.3 49.0 54.6 73.9
Hungary  15,312   28,939   31,419   37.3 35.8   
India  1,163   1,846   3,318   79.4 77.8  83.5 
Indonesia  3,140   3,176   6,273      63.2 61.6
Iran, Islamic Rep.  13,874   9,318         
Iraq        72.4    
Ireland  68,280   103,279   113,892   34.5 41.1   
Israel            
Italy  77,205   90,200   86,879   47.7 47.8   
Jamaica  7,303   10,241   10,099       
Japan  120,171   93,118   105,389       
Jordan    10,087   16,149       
Kazakhstan    8,132   13,573       
Kenya    1,445         
Kiribati            
Korea, Rep.  29,831   37,049   39,749       
Kosovo            
Kyrgyz Republic  1,108   1,124   1,949       
Lao PDR  1,053           
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Table 5 Productivity, continued
 Value added per worker Employment in micro-enterprises Informal employment 
 (2005 US$ per year) (% of non-agricultural employment) (% of non-agricultural employment)
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia  7,344   16,901   25,859   29.9 26.8   
Lebanon            
Lesotho  2,064           34.9
Liberia    650   696       60.0
Libya            
Lithuania  8,412   19,457   26,750    20.2   17.5    
Macedonia, FYR    10,994   14,788    29.0     12.6
Madagascar    585        73.6 
Malawi            
Malaysia  14,397   13,983   16,556       
Mali    1,576        81.8 
Mauritania            
Mauritius  10,838   12,093   15,443    35.5     
Mexico  10,565   20,886   20,837   71.0   59.8   63.4   54.8 53.7
Moldova  1,273   2,216   4,249       15.9
Mongolia  2,381   2,457   3,720       
Montenegro            
Morocco  5,349   5,975   7,741       
Mozambique    543         
Myanmar  5,406           
Namibia  9,068   11,449   14,685       43.9
Nepal          93.0    
Netherlands  81,927   80,589   83,545       
New Zealand  49,224   59,050         
Nicaragua  2,639   2,350        58.8 65.7
Niger            
Nigeria    2,362         
Norway  93,069   143,121   158,628       
Oman  25,608           
Pakistan  2,047   2,282   2,627    94.2   96.2    78.4
Panama  10,430   11,998   14,765   44.8   50.5   45.1  33.7 44.1 43.8
Papua New Guinea          78.3    
Paraguay  5,294   3,254   6,106       70.7
Peru  6,704   6,508   8,211      78.0 70.6
Philippines  3,783   3,404   4,612       70.1
Poland  11,599   22,272   26,446    43.0   43.5  12.7  
Portugal  34,097   40,237   42,290    43.7   43.0    
Romania  4,500   11,251   17,157    20.2   19.4    
Russian Federation  6,594   11,503   16,536       
Rwanda    607         
Saudi Arabia    45,337   40,961       
Senegal    1,972         
Serbia    9,975   14,802      47.8    6.1
Sierra Leone    607      85.3     
Singapore  63,970   62,872   69,405       
Slovak Republic  389   738   35,205    42.7   43.7    
Slovenia  122   170   42,848    23.9   25.6    
Somalia            
South Africa    18,701   17,639    46.2     32.7
Spain  64,748   64,666   71,604    41.1   42.6    
Sri Lanka  2,484   3,583   5,238       62.1
Sudan            
Swaziland            
Sweden  84,223   93,600   102,345       
Switzerland  119,203   108,315   129,181       
Syrian Arab Republic  15,173   35,585   43,556       
Tajikistan  376   920         
Tanzania    768       87.6    76.2
Thailand  7,079   5,246   7,083       42.3
Timor-Leste         96.6   100.0    
Togo    931         
Tonga            
Trinidad and Tobago  15,785   27,808   42,053       
Tunisia            
Turkey  10,987   22,158   26,490    54.6   46.6    30.6
Turkmenistan            
Uganda    789   1,057       68.5
Ukraine  2,099   4,322   8,090       
United Kingdom  60,062   86,592   77,322    27.6   28.2    
United States  78,008   95,269   100,365       
Uruguay  20,492   12,684      54.5   51.3   44.6 39.8
Uzbekistan  1,666           
Venezuela, RB  11,929   13,319      60.3     47.5
Vietnam  885   1,370         68.2
West Bank and Gaza            57.2
Yemen, Rep.  13,181           
Zambia    1,649         69.5
Zimbabwe    945        51.6 
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Table 6 Social cohesion  
 Trust  Civic participation Wage inequality
 (% in latest survey)  (% in latest survey) (90%/10% ratio)
   Out of   Out of 
 Employed Unemployed labor force Employed Unemployed labor force 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan        2.5 
Albania 22.4 27.5 26.8    2.6 3.9 
Algeria 10.1 10.6 13.9      
Angola         
Argentina 19.9 10.1 15.5 32.4 32.0 28.7  5.8 5.5
Armenia         
Australia 49.2 38.5 41.2 64.9 28.7 55.0  10.3 8.8
Austria    41.9    4.4 5.2
Azerbaijan       10.0  
Bangladesh 24.8 24.6 23.7     3.8 3.8
Barbados       6.1  
Belarus        4.7 
Belgium    29.5    2.9 3.0
Belize       5.7  
Benin    39.5 37.7 37.7   
Bhutan         
Bolivia 21.6 16.3 21.9 31.2 29.3 30.9 10.0 8.5 7.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 13.9 16.1 18.0      
Botswana 17.3 12.3  55.0 42.3 55.3   28.3
Brazil 8.4 11.3 10.4 66.8 50.0 72.8 10.4 7.4 6.0
Bulgaria 21.3 23.0 22.9 11.4 6.6 5.8  3.6 4.5
Burkina Faso 12.3 13.3 17.5 43.7 35.2 33.0   
Burundi         
Cambodia       20.0 6.9 8.6
Cameroon        10.4 
Canada 44.9 36.5 40.3 72.4 46.6 63.4   
Central African Republic         
Chad         
Chile 14.1 18.5 10.2 45.5 44.2 42.2 7.0 5.5 5.5
China 52.7 43.1 53.0 15.7 26.0 23.5  5.6 4.0
Colombia 16.0 12.5 11.4 36.2 33.1 39.1  6.5 6.6
Congo, Dem. Rep.         
Congo, Rep.         
Costa Rica 10.1 4.6 6.9 30.9 20.3 28.0   
Côte d’Ivoire         
Croatia        2.9 
Cuba         
Czech Republic         
Denmark    47.3     
Dominican Republic         
Ecuador 12.2 8.7 11.6 19.8 0.0 16.8 6.5 6.6 4.9
Egypt, Arab Rep. 16.9 17.3 20.0 11.8 4.6 3.0   
El Salvador 15.8 12.2 13.7 34.1 35.9 27.3   
Eritrea         
Estonia        4.3 4.3
Ethiopia 21.4 27.2 26.9 49.5 36.5 52.6  11.8 
Fiji         
Finland 65.9 44.5 52.6 54.4 42.3 43.0   
France 19.4 18.5 17.7 43.6 27.5 34.7  4.7 4.9
Gabon        10.7 
Gambia, The         
Georgia 21.2 10.4 21.7 7.4 4.7 3.5   7.4
Germany 40.6 22.6 34.1 47.1 25.5 44.6  6.3 
Ghana 8.7 8.0 8.7 81.7 76.2 81.2  9.1 
Greece    8.8    4.3 4.2
Guatemala 17.5 24.1 10.6 35.9 32.0 35.0  6.2 
Guinea         
Guinea-Bissau         
Haiti         
Honduras 18.2 13.8 16.4 51.0 59.3 49.8 6.6 9.7 8.8
Hungary        4.2 
India 23.4 19.1 27.1 54.2 40.6 34.6 12.1 11.4 10.7
Indonesia 45.7 25.0 40.7 60.6 51.2 58.9 10.4 4.2 8.6
Iran, Islamic Rep. 11.2 10.3 10.0 50.0 43.4 33.5   
Iraq 36.7 46.0 43.2     4.4 
Ireland    34.7    5.8 5.6
Israel 27.5 17.6 18.1      
Italy 31.3 26.3 26.1 44.4 22.8 35.7  3.4 3.2
Jamaica       5.7  
Japan 39.3 12.5 40.3 34.1 31.3 39.7   
Jordan 33.6 27.1 23.9      
Kazakhstan         
Kenya    73.3 74.3 70.1  13.3 
Kiribati         
Korea, Rep. 30.0 40.3 25.6 36.4 23.6 33.5   
Kosovo        3.5 
Kyrgyz Republic 17.6 12.4 17.4      
Lao PDR         
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Table 6 Social cohesion, continued 
 Trust  Civic participation Wage inequality
 (% in latest survey)  (% in latest survey) (90%/10% ratio)
   Out of   Out of 
 Employed Unemployed labor force Employed Unemployed labor force 1995 2005 2010
Latvia      4.7 6.1  
Lebanon         
Lesotho 3.3 4.0  44.6 44.6 44.9   
Liberia    83.8 78.5 80.6   
Libya         
Lithuania        4.9 4.3
Macedonia, FYR 11.7 14.7 15.0 12.3    2.7 
Madagascar    12.5 10.3 9.4   
Malawi 44.4 45.3  75.3 62.9 61.7  10.1 
Malaysia 9.5 9.6 7.7 29.4 21.2 28.0   
Mali 16.6 20.0 17.1 65.6 59.4 51.6 24.4  
Mauritania         
Mauritius        5.8 6.7
Mexico 17.5 15.1 12.8 64.6 50.5 59.7 8.4  6.5
Moldova 16.0 14.6 22.3 36.0 18.9 33.9  8.1 
Mongolia         3.6
Montenegro        2.9 
Morocco 12.3 20.8 17.5 17.0 8.7 11.1   
Mozambique    62.8 58.1 52.6 6.7  10.5
Myanmar         
Namibia 33.3 36.2  35.2 33.4 39.1   
Nepal         6.0
Netherlands 47.0 25.8 42.7 60.3 31.3 57.0   
New Zealand         
Nicaragua 21.5 24.2 20.5 46.8 42.7 42.7 6.8 5.8 
Niger       7.0  
Nigeria 24.9 27.2 26.3 63.8 60.0 61.1 5.0 28.8 
Norway 77.4 66.7 66.3 58.3 45.5 46.6   
Oman         
Pakistan 32.5 25.4 29.7     6.3 6.4
Panama 27.6 12.5 21.7 25.6 34.9 22.9 7.6 6.7 5.5
Papua New Guinea         10.9
Paraguay 5.5 9.3 6.3 45.1 52.2 38.8 6.8 6.5 5.3
Peru 5.7 9.0 7.1 54.7 36.4 42.6 6.3 6.8 6.1
Philippines 8.1 12.4 6.8     6.1 6.3
Poland 19.3 21.8 18.9 28.2 15.6 27.7  5.4 5.2
Portugal    8.2    4.9 4.3
Romania 18.7 14.3 22.1 19.6 6.7 8.4 3.2 5.5 3.7
Russian Federation 26.7 18.1 26.7 13.2 6.6 17.7   
Rwanda 4.0  8.4 70.8  70.8 37.8 31.3 
Saudi Arabia 52.6 62.7 52.4      
Senegal    50.3 42.9 40.0   
Serbia 15.9 11.1 15.8 18.6 15.1 9.8   3.8
Sierra Leone        4.7 
Singapore 15.8 16.7 18.7      
Slovak Republic        3.0 
Slovenia 17.7 13.3 19.2 51.4 32.6 38.6  3.2 3.2
Somalia         
South Africa 16.1 21.6 19.3 66.3 52.9 66.2  14.0 
Spain 22.0 23.8 17.4 28.4 24.9 22.2  4.5 4.2
Sri Lanka        6.2 5.7
Sudan         
Swaziland         
Sweden 72.3 43.8 60.4 63.7 52.3 59.9  4.3 3.8
Switzerland 59.4 7.5 45.6 69.5 51.2 64.0   
Syrian Arab Republic        3.3 
Tajikistan        15.0 
Tanzania 7.6 9.3 6.7 79.9 75.1 74.8  12.9 13.3
Thailand 42.7 32.4 44.4 35.4 24.7 37.9 8.9 10.8 9.6
Timor-Leste        8.5 5.5
Togo        14.6 
Tonga         
Trinidad and Tobago 3.8 3.0 4.1 59.0 56.0 63.6   
Tunisia         
Turkey 4.8 3.3 5.1 13.8 6.6 4.0  4.0 4.2
Turkmenistan         
Uganda 7.0 4.7 9.6 60.4 55.2 54.3  13.6 
Ukraine 29.1 35.7 25.3 19.2 22.1 13.9  4.7 
United Kingdom 31.0 19.5 32.0 66.2 38.2 57.5  5.3 
United States 40.2 36.5 40.7 66.1 47.0 63.2  12.5 
Uruguay 30.2 15.7 29.4 29.5 29.8 30.9 6.0 6.4 5.8
Uzbekistan         
Venezuela, RB 16.9 16.7 13.4 33.7 27.3 30.5 4.6 5.5 
Vietnam 51.9 52.2 53.7 49.6 51.5 59.0 7.7 8.0 8.7
West Bank and Gaza        3.8 4.0
Yemen, Rep. 42.4        
Zambia 11.5 12.5 10.6 81.0 70.3 78.7  11.1 
Zimbabwe 13.9 10.4 5.3 59.4 61.3 65.4   
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Table 6 Social cohesion, continued
 Youth unemployment (% of youth labor force) Youth not in school or at work (% of youth cohort)
 Men Women Men Women 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan               8.2       50.0  
Albania     22.8  26.2  16.6 28.3  50.2   33.7    41.7   35.1  
Algeria     42.8    46.3               
Angola                        
Argentina  29.9   21.6  18.8 37.6 28.0 24.7     14.7  14.8     24.8  24.8
Armenia     47.2  37.4  69.4 54.7     52.2       67.2  
Australia  15.9   10.9  11.9 14.8 10.4 11.1     15.3  18.1     18.5  19.0
Austria  4.8   10.7  8.9 5.6 9.9 8.8     14.5  18.5     14.5  20.0
Azerbaijan     18.2  13.4  10.4 15.5  49.3       57.8     
Bangladesh  8.0   8.0   5.7 13.6               
Barbados  33.3   24.1   42.4 28.7   23.1       28.9     
Belarus               53.4       60.3  
Belgium  19.7   21.0  22.4 23.7 22.1 22.4     10.6  12.7     15.1  11.6
Belize  19.1   13.8   31.7 28.8   26.6       69.2     
Benin               14.9       20.1  
Bhutan     5.5  10.7  7.2 14.7     17.7       22.8  
Bolivia  5.2      7.0    3.5   5.5  15.8  17.0   18.3  18.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina     60.4  44.7  65.6 51.9     32.0       33.7  
Botswana  33.5      42.4         25.7       38.9
Brazil  9.7   15.3  13.9 14.1 24.9 23.1  10.4   11.5  12.1  28.2   26.0  24.8
Bulgaria     23.4  24.1  21.0 21.7  33.5   29.3  17.4  36.0   32.3  29.6
Burkina Faso     4.6    2.9   5.8   5.7    17.5   15.0  
Burundi                        
Cambodia       3.5   3.3  7.9   4.0  3.6  15.2   11.5  10.6
Cameroon            20.0   7.8    34.2   19.6  
Canada  16.3   14.2  17.1 13.2 10.6 12.4              
Central African Republic               26.4       27.0  
Chad                        
Chile  10.8   17.3  16.6 12.7 23.8 21.7  11.6   13.5  17.6  30.4   24.5  26.8
China               9.8  12.8     9.4  11.0
Colombia  15.6   17.9  18.2 21.8 28.3 29.9     16.9  14.5     38.4  33.3
Congo, Dem. Rep.               13.2       23.1  
Congo, Rep.               6.0       13.4  
Costa Rica  10.2   11.3  9.6 13.0 21.5 13.4  11.5   9.3  12.8  37.5   28.2  27.1
Côte d’Ivoire                        
Croatia     30.2  31.1  35.1 35.0     20.8       20.5  
Cuba     3.5  2.8  4.4 3.5              
Czech Republic  7.2   19.4  18.3 8.7 19.1 18.5     11.5  9.6     15.3  12.3
Denmark  7.8   8.6  16.1 12.3 8.6 11.8     9.5  11.9     15.1  14.5
Dominican Republic  20.9   21.2   41.5 44.5   10.6   14.5  14.1  31.7   28.8  28.1
Ecuador  13.0   12.2  11.7 18.6 20.6 18.1  6.8   7.9  8.3  31.1   27.6  23.6
Egypt, Arab Rep.     23.3    62.2      15.2       45.7  
El Salvador  13.4   11.3   13.0 8.4   13.0   14.1  13.5  41.7   39.3  36.7
Eritrea                        
Estonia  21.0   16.6  35.4 15.4 15.1 30.0     16.0  10.6     13.3  11.2
Ethiopia     4.1    11.2   7.5   1.8    43.6   10.9  
Fiji  11.3      16.8    24.0     19.6  49.9     36.7
Finland  25.7   18.4  21.6 28.7 19.4 18.9     20.2  17.2     15.1  13.1
France  23.7   19.5  22.2 30.6 21.9 23.7     8.6  10.5     12.7  10.5
Gabon  41.7      40.2       20.0       31.3  
Gambia, The                        
Georgia     26.8  32.4  30.6 40.7          
Germany  8.3   16.1  10.4 8.0 14.0 8.8     15.3  13.0     9.0  8.5
Ghana               12.9       20.8  
Greece  19.4   18.7  26.7 37.7 34.8 40.6     17.3  16.1     21.3  20.2
Guatemala               4.6       40.7  
Guinea            6.6       16.9     
Guinea-Bissau                        
Haiti                        
Honduras  4.3   5.2   6.9 11.2   9.3   10.2  10.0  51.7   43.0  42.7
Hungary  20.7   19.7  27.9 15.6 19.1 24.9     13.6  13.1     12.4  19.4
India  8.3   9.9  9.9 8.0 10.3 11.3  9.7   10.0  10.0  56.1   51.8  50.5
Indonesia  14.3   28.8  21.6 17.0 37.7 23.0  19.3   23.3  13.8  45.1   44.0  33.6
Iran, Islamic Rep.     21.2  20.2  34.0 33.9     21.6       55.1  
Iraq               25.6       75.6  
Ireland  20.3   9.1  34.0 17.4 7.9 21.5     9.9  17.0     11.8  17.1
Israel  12.8   17.0  14.5 17.1 18.6 12.9              
Italy  29.8   21.5  26.8 38.2 27.4 29.4     20.5  20.7     22.6  20.6
Jamaica  25.1   22.0  22.5 44.6 36.3 33.1  20.5       44.0     
Japan  6.1   9.9  10.4 6.1 7.4 8.0              
Jordan     23.7  22.6  47.9 45.9              
Kazakhstan     13.1  6.8  15.7 8.2  54.0   13.8    56.9   14.9  
Kenya            24.5   16.3    36.8   31.6  
Kiribati               21.8       22.4  
Korea, Rep.  7.8   12.2  11.2 5.3 9.0 9.0              
Kosovo               37.7       59.3  
Kyrgyz Republic     13.3    16.2   24.9       36.7     
Lao PDR  6.4      3.9         2.1       5.3
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Table 6 Social cohesion, continued 
 Youth unemployment (% of youth labor force) Youth not in school or at work (% of youth cohort)
 Men Women Men Women 
 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia  34.2   11.7  35.4 34.1 16.1 33.5     10.2  11.8     14.0  15.8
Lebanon     20.3    19.0      18.1       33.3  
Lesotho  37.9     29.0 58.5  41.9              
Liberia     5.7  3.4  3.7 6.6     6.8       15.2  
Libya                        
Lithuania  28.5   16.0  38.4 21.7 15.3 30.8     11.9  8.0     12.3  3.6
Macedonia, FYR     63.0  53.8  62.1 53.4              
Madagascar     1.7    2.8   8.8       12.2     
Malawi            19.4   5.4    44.9   11.1  
Malaysia     10.5  10.3  11.5 11.8       12.2       21.4
Mali            10.2   26.7    19.8   47.6  
Mauritania                 23.9       34.6
Mauritius  21.4   20.5  19.4 28.1 34.3 29.0     27.6  26.1     45.7  39.0
Mexico  9.2   6.1  9.0 15.3 7.4 10.1  11.3   10.9  12.0  41.9   34.3  33.7
Moldova     19.1  20.1  18.3 15.0     5.8       6.6  
Mongolia     19.5    20.7        14.0       16.9
Montenegro               32.3       24.9  
Morocco     16.2  22.8  14.4 19.4              
Mozambique            15.3   9.0  5.9  19.7   11.5  8.3
Myanmar                        
Namibia  29.6   36.7  54.6 33.8 47.0 63.8  20.4       29.2     
Nepal            33.5   8.4  8.3  36.2   19.6  15.4
Netherlands  11.5   8.0  8.8 12.7 8.4 8.6     8.3  11.9     10.7  12.8
New Zealand  12.3   9.4  16.8 12.2 10.1 17.4              
Nicaragua  22.4   8.1   24.7 9.7   20.9   10.5    52.3   39.4  
Niger            15.2       45.3     
Nigeria            7.2   22.2    43.4   36.1  
Norway  11.9   12.5  10.9 11.8 11.5 7.7     7.4  17.8     6.1  20.5
Oman                        
Pakistan  7.6   11.0  7.0 18.1 14.9 10.5     11.4  9.9     65.8  59.6
Panama  23.0   18.5  11.7 35.6 29.6 21.1  15.4   11.8  10.6  36.4   30.1  30.8
Papua New Guinea                 17.3       18.7
Paraguay  5.5   12.1  8.7 7.3 20.5 16.8  6.3   9.7  9.9  27.7   29.7  28.3
Peru  9.8   16.2  12.5 13.6 17.4 15.6  11.9   15.4  11.7  25.3   28.7  21.6
Philippines  14.4   14.9  16.2 19.1 18.9 19.3  10.6   10.7  19.9  24.9   27.4  31.9
Poland  29.0   36.7  22.4 33.8 39.2 25.4     16.4  8.5     17.7  12.3
Portugal  14.1   13.7  21.1 17.7 19.1 23.7     12.3  13.4     13.3  15.2
Romania  18.8   21.5  22.3 23.1 18.4 21.8  30.8   2.0  11.3  32.8   6.3  16.7
Russian Federation  17.8   14.5  16.9 20.0 17.2 17.5              
Rwanda  1.0      0.5    13.9   4.1    15.5   4.5  
Saudi Arabia       23.6   45.8              
Senegal     11.9    20.1   13.4   19.8    50.5   58.7  
Serbia     43.2  31.0  55.5 41.3       23.4       19.1
Sierra Leone     7.3    3.5      16.0       25.6  
Singapore  4.5   6.4  9.8 5.5 11.6 16.6              
Slovak Republic  26.0   30.7  34.7 23.1 28.8 32.0     12.5  6.6     11.4  8.8
Slovenia  18.1   14.5  15.2 19.6 17.8 13.8     6.8  5.1     5.3  4.1
Somalia                        
South Africa     42.7  47.2  54.7 54.6  18.0   27.4    27.0   36.8  
Spain  33.6   16.7  43.2 49.2 23.5 39.8     12.4  19.6     15.8  18.1
Sri Lanka     20.4  17.1  37.0 27.9  4.0   19.3  14.6  28.9   32.9  36.1
Sudan                        
Swaziland  44.2      43.0    2.2       13.4     
Sweden  20.6   22.3  26.7 18.4 21.6 23.7     14.5  15.7     11.7  13.7
Switzerland  5.7   8.5  7.3 5.3 9.1 8.4              
Syrian Arab Republic     12.7  15.3  46.1 40.2     13.3       55.4  
Tajikistan               26.9       43.4  
Tanzania     7.4    10.1   3.2   5.3  9.5  17.5   9.1  16.9
Thailand  2.6   4.9  3.7 2.3 4.6 5.1  5.4   1.6  2.5  13.0   11.5  12.0
Timor-Leste               10.4  15.6     26.5  22.5
Togo               6.2       13.0  
Tonga  32.0   9.9   27.0 15.1   22.9       34.9     
Trinidad and Tobago  28.3   12.9  8.8 35.2 21.6 12.9              
Tunisia  33.3   31.4   29.0 29.3           
Turkey  16.9   19.5  21.0 13.1 20.6 23.1     27.3  21.9     57.9  46.9
Turkmenistan                        
Uganda               3.8       13.5  
Ukraine     15.2    14.4      17.6       24.2  
United Kingdom  17.9   13.6  21.3 12.2 10.7 16.9     12.7  12.8     18.4  16.4
United States  12.5   12.4  20.8 11.6 10.1 15.8     10.7       13.8  
Uruguay  21.3   25.4  16.9 29.2 34.9 26.5  15.3   15.0  14.2  25.2   23.5  22.1
Uzbekistan                        
Venezuela, RB  20.2   14.3  12.3 35.2 22.0 15.9  15.0   10.2    36.0   20.5  
Vietnam  3.4   4.4   2.9 4.9   9.3   4.6  4.3  14.3   7.4  7.9
West Bank and Gaza               21.3  19.6     37.9  30.6
Yemen, Rep.  20.2      9.8                
Zambia               21.8       22.4  
Zimbabwe  20.7   7.6   12.4 7.6               
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Table 7 Policies and institutions
 Core ILO  Minimum wage Separation cost (weeks of salary) Union membership
  conventions ratified  (2005 US$ per year) After 1 year  After 10 years (% of wage employment)
 2012 2007 2010 2012 2012 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan 5 0 0 13.0 30.3   
Albania 8 1,608 2,160 4.3 34.4   
Algeria 8 1,848 2,460 17.3 17.3   
Angola 8 1,296 1,308 8.6 80.1   
Argentina 8 2,952 4,824 8.7 52.0   
Armenia 8 540 948 13.0 13.0   
Australia 7 13,464 13,896 5.0 16.0 32 22 19
Austria 8 6,780 7,704 2.0 2.0 41 33 28
Azerbaijan 8 648 1,068 21.7 21.7   
Bangladesh 7 288 252 9.3 54.3   
Barbados 8       
Belarus 8 936 1,104 21.7 21.7   
Belgium 8 15,996 18,804 5.0 8.0 56 53 52
Belize 8 3,300 3,156 2.0 14.0   
Benin 8 600 732 5.6 18.4   
Bhutan 0 0 0 5.3 10.3   
Bolivia 8 696 960     
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8 4,092 4,356 2.0 16.4   
Botswana 8 1,308 1,164 6.7 42.0 9  
Brazil 7 2,136 3,000 5.9 20.9  30 29
Bulgaria 8 1,296 1,788 8.6 8.6 39 22 20
Burkina Faso 8 672 756 5.4 16.3   
Burundi 8 48 36 4.3 26.0   
Cambodia 8 468 444 4.3 34.4   
Cameroon 8 504 684 5.8 23.8   
Canada 5 13,104 17,952 2.0 18.0 34 30 30
Central African Republic 8 408 432 21.7 21.7   
Chad 8 552 780 4.3 20.6   
Chile 8 0 0 8.6 47.6 16 13 14
China 4 1,080 1,728 8.6 47.6 92 74 79
Colombia 8 2,076 2,628 4.3 30.0   
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8 180 696 4.2 16.8   
Congo, Rep. 8 864 1,296 4.3 17.8   
Costa Rica 8 3,600 3,852 7.1 29.5   
Côte d’Ivoire 8 0 0 5.6 22.8   
Croatia 8 4,452 5,748 4.3 25.1   
Cuba 7       
Czech Republic 8 3,996 4,608 21.7 21.7 44 20 17
Denmark 8 0 0 0.0 0.0 77 72 69
Dominican Republic 8 2,700 2,436 7.8 45.8   
Ecuador 8 1,800 2,328 14.1 54.2   
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8 276 336 13.0 67.2   
El Salvador 8 768 936 4.3 42.9   
Eritrea 7 0 0 4.0 29.3   
Estonia 8 3,264 4,236 8.6 17.2 32 9 7
Ethiopia 8 0 0 8.6 30.1   
Fiji 8 2,472 3,132 5.3 14.3   
Finland 8 18,816 22,212 4.3 17.3 80 72 70
France 8 7,284 8,484 5.2 17.3 9 8 8
Gabon 8 432 516 1.0 26.0   
Gambia, The 8 0 0 26.0 26.0   
Georgia 8 252 264 4.3 4.3   
Germany 8 9,816 12,276 6.2 39.0 29 22 19
Ghana 7 252 276 10.7 91.0   
Greece 8 10,512 12,756 24.0 24.0 31 25 24
Guatemala 8 1,776 1,992 5.1 50.6   
Guinea 8 0 0 3.2 13.0   
Guinea-Bissau 7 0 0 13.0 43.3   
Haiti 8 504 1,356 4.3 17.3   
Honduras 8 1,788 3,504 8.7 52.0   
Hungary 8 3,516 4,200 4.3 20.9 49 17 17
India 4 204 264 6.5 25.8   41
Indonesia 8 1,104 1,140 17.3 95.3 5 11 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 5 1,848 3,324 4.3 43.3   
Iraq 7 0 1,248 0.0 0.0   
Ireland 8 16,992 19,308 2.7 11.0 52 37 37
Israel 8 9,036 10,608 8.7 47.7 61 34 
Italy 8 16,236 18,768 6.5 8.7 38 34 35
Jamaica 8 2,388 2,232 2.0 26.0   
Japan 6 12,108 14,652 4.3 4.3 24 19 18
Jordan 7 1,752 2,160 4.3 4.3   
Kazakhstan 8 864 1,200 8.7 8.7   
Kenya 7 924 1,068 6.5 25.8   
Kiribati 8 0 0 4.3 4.3   
Korea, Rep. 4 6,960 6,756 8.6 47.6 13 10 10
Kosovo 0  0 13.0 26.0   
Kyrgyz Republic 8 96 132 17.3 17.3   
Lao PDR 5 300 684 11.6 84.4   
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Table 7 Policies and institutions, continued
 Core ILO  Minimum wage Separation cost (weeks of salary) Union membership
  conventions ratified  (2005 US$ per year) After 1 year  After 10 years (% of wage employment)
 2012 2007 2010 2012 2012 1995 2005 2010
Latvia 8 2,424 3,816 5.3 14.0 28 19 15
Lebanon 7 2,244 3,408 4.3 13.0   
Lesotho 8   6.3 24.3   
Liberia 6 588 564 8.3 44.3   
Libya 8       
Lithuania 8 2,460 3,552 17.3 30.3 33 10 9
Macedonia, FYR 8 1,104 1,824 8.7 17.3   
Madagascar 8 288 420 3.1 21.0   
Malawi 8 192 252 6.3 34.3   
Malaysia 5 0 0 5.7 41.3 13 10 
Mali 8 156 156 9.5 18.4   
Mauritania 8 876 888 5.4 16.3   
Mauritius 8 1,188 1,692 4.7 18.6   
Mexico 6 1,368 1,332 14.6 30.0 18 18 
Moldova 8 648 1,044 18.3 27.3   
Mongolia 8 660 888 8.7 8.7   
Montenegro 8 732 1,572 28.1 28.1   
Morocco 7 2,364 2,736 6.5 36.0   
Mozambique 8 732 1,032 6.5 69.3   
Myanmar 2       
Namibia 8 0 0 5.3 14.3   
Nepal 7 360 660 8.6 47.2   
Netherlands 8 9,672 11,448 4.3 13.0 26 21 19
New Zealand 6 14,292 14,868 0.0 0.0 27 21 21
Nicaragua 8 996 1,308 4.3 21.7   
Niger 8 612 636 9.5 7.8   
Nigeria 8 0 0 6.3 26.9   
Norway 8 36,444 45,504 4.3 13.0 57 55 54
Oman 4 3,528 3,924 4.3 4.3   
Pakistan 8 372 480 8.6 47.2   
Panama 8 3,192 3,984 3.4 34.0   
Papua New Guinea 8 456 1,296 3.7 21.3   
Paraguay 8 1,464 1,824 7.1 52.9   
Peru 8 1,728 2,004 2.9 17.1   
Philippines 8 1,500 1,860 8.7 47.7 31 12 
Poland 8 2,724 4,080 8.7 26.0 31 19 15
Portugal 8 6,660 8,520 17.3 54.0 25 21 19
Romania 8 1,776 2,316 8.3 8.3 69 34 33
Russian Federation 8 2,544 3,816 17.3 17.3 76 44 43
Rwanda 8 228 0 8.6 17.3   
Saudi Arabia 5 0 0 6.5 36.8   
Senegal 8 780 828 6.4 20.6   
Serbia 8 1,296 2,196 1.4 14.4   
Sierra Leone 6 636 552 17.5 152.7   
Singapore 5 0 0 1.0 4.0 14 19 18
Slovak Republic 8 2,892 4,752 17.3 26.0 56 23 17
Slovenia 8 7,356 11,160 5.2 17.3 60 44 27
Somalia 3       
South Africa 8 5,472 5,556 5.0 14.0  32 28
Spain 8 9,432 11,400 5.0 30.7 16 15 16
Sri Lanka 8 396 384 15.2 104.3 20  
Sudan 7 780 984 4.3 47.7   
Swaziland 8 1,080 912 3.4 26.6   
Sweden 8 0 0 4.3 26.0 87 76 69
Switzerland 8 0 0 8.7 13.0 23 19 18
Syrian Arab Republic 8 1,272 1,440 8.7 8.7   
Tajikistan 8 72 156 13.0 19.5   
Tanzania 8 408 648 5.0 14.0   
Thailand 5 744 852 19.3 54.3   
Timor-Leste 4 0 0 4.3 4.3   
Togo 8 288 648 5.6 18.4   
Tonga 0 0 0 0.0 0.0   
Trinidad and Tobago 8 0 0 8.6 34.6   
Tunisia 8 1,176 1,308 6.0 17.3   
Turkey 8 4,440 5,436 8.3 51.3 13 8 6
Turkmenistan 7       
Uganda 8 36 36 4.3 13.0   
Ukraine 8 888 1,344 13.0 13.0   
United Kingdom 8 16,044 16,188 1.0 15.1 33 29 27
United States 2 13,992 13,488 0.0 0.0 15 13 12
Uruguay 8 1,560 2,532 5.2 31.2   
Uzbekistan 7 108 264 17.3 17.3   
Venezuela, RB 8 2,472 3,504     
Vietnam 5 228 408 8.7 43.3   
West Bank and Gaza 0 0 0 8.7 47.7   
Yemen, Rep. 8 1,140 1,068 8.6 47.6   
Zambia 8 840 624 13.0 91.0   
Zimbabwe 8 72 2,040 26.0 143.0   
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Table 7 Policies and institutions, continued
   Labor market policies  Social security contributions Social security coverage 
 (spending in % of GDP) (% of salary) (% of employment)
 1995 2005 2009 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan                 3.7    
Albania        34.4   23.1         37.9 
Algeria        34.0   34.0          
Angola                     
Argentina   4.97  45.4   24.7   24.8         47.0 
Armenia   1.89     3.0   3.0         32.1 
Australia 1.95 0.91 0.87     9.0   9.0      90.7    
Austria 1.97 2.13 2.34     37.7   37.8      93.7    
Azerbaijan        25.0   25.0      35.4    
Bangladesh   0.09              2.5    
Barbados        17.6   17.6      83.5    
Belarus        22.0   29.5         93.5 
Belgium 3.94 3.41 3.77     22.3   22.4      91.4    
Belize                    61.0 
Benin        14.0   12.5      5.5    
Bhutan                    14.0 
Bolivia        22.2   20.5         12.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina                    24.5 
Botswana                 9.0    
Brazil     31.0   29.0   29.3         59.3 
Bulgaria        30.2   21.3   81.1      78.7 
Burkina Faso        14.5   18.0      1.2    
Burundi        9.5   9.5      3.5    
Cambodia                     
Cameroon        12.0   10.1      16.2    
Canada 1.83 0.94 1.33     14.6   14.0   95.4      87.4 
Central African Republic                 1.5    
Chad        8.5   8.5      2.7    
Chile   3.13  24.7   20.3   18.0         57.7 
China   0.06     32.0   32.0         33.5 
Colombia   0.00     40.0   44.8         27.8 
Congo, Dem. Rep.        8.5   8.5         14.2 
Congo, Rep.        14.3   14.3         9.7 
Costa Rica   0.60     23.3   23.8         58.6 
Côte d’Ivoire     11.5   13.0   11.5      12.8    
Croatia        36.7   36.7         76.0 
Cuba        14.0   14.0          
Czech Republic 0.24 0.48 0.72  34.0   34.0   31.5      95.4    
Denmark 6.02 3.92 3.33     8.0   8.0      92.9    
Dominican Republic     12.5               26.9 
Ecuador        24.5   19.0      26.4    
Egypt, Arab Rep.        35.0   35.0         55.1 
El Salvador                    22.9 
Eritrea                     
Estonia  0.19 1.62     34.5   29.9      94.5    
Ethiopia        10.0   15.0          
Fiji     16.0 27.0         
Finland 5.27 2.81 2.80     32.9   28.9      89.7    
France 2.70 2.49 2.42     34.9   34.9      87.3    
Gabon                     
Gambia, The                 2.7    
Georgia        20.0   25.0      29.2    
Germany 3.51 2.93 2.53     41.5   38.9      86.9    
Ghana        17.5   17.5         8.7 
Greece 0.78       25.2   25.2      86.0    
Guatemala        15.5   15.5         20.3 
Guinea                 12.1    
Guinea-Bissau                 2.0    
Haiti        15.0   15.0          
Honduras        10.5   10.5         17.3 
Hungary 1.29 0.69 1.15     45.5   38.5   79.9      92.0 
India   6.74     22.2   22.2      10.3    
Indonesia   0.15  12.2   5.7   5.7         11.0 
Iran, Islamic Rep.        30.0   30.0          
Iraq                    43.1 
Ireland 3.91 1.46 3.47     14.8   14.8      88.9    
Israel  1.02 0.90     6.7   8.9          
Italy  1.34 1.86     39.5   40.1      90.1    
Jamaica   0.00  5.0   5.0   5.0      17.2    
Japan 0.69 0.60 0.85     31.8   31.9      95.4    
Jordan     15.0   16.5   18.0   25.6   38.4    
Kazakhstan        10.0   10.0         62.5 
Kenya   3.78     10.0   10.0   20.8   7.5    
Kiribati     15.0 15.0         
Korea, Rep.  0.32 1.02     12.4   28.8      49.5    
Kosovo                     
Kyrgyz Republic     39.0   29.0   27.3   52.7      40.4 
Lao PDR        9.5   9.5         
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Table 7 Policies and institutions, continued
   Labor market policies  Social security contributions Social security coverage 
 (spending in % of GDP) (% of salary) (% of employment)
 1995 2005 2009 1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia   0.11     33.1   33.1         91.7 
Lebanon        8.5   8.5      34.5    
Lesotho           4.4    
Liberia               
Libya     14.3 14.3     68.5    
Lithuania     31.2 31.3        82.9 
Macedonia, FYR              52.3 
Madagascar     11.8 11.8        5.3 
Malawi               
Malaysia   0.57  24.3 24.3        49.0 
Mali   0.22 20.0 13.0 11.5        7.9 
Mauritania     6.0 6.0         
Mauritius   0.04  9.0 10.0        53.4 
Mexico   0.04 26.0 7.2 7.2  32.0      27.4 
Moldova     29.0 29.0        56.7 
Mongolia              33.5 
Montenegro               
Morocco     12.9 12.9     23.8    
Mozambique           1.9    
Myanmar               
Namibia              9.6 
Nepal     20.0 20.0        3.4 
Netherlands 4.14 3.31 2.92  25.5 22.4     90.7    
New Zealand 1.80 0.81 0.84            
Nicaragua     32.8 19.8        21.7 
Niger           1.9    
Nigeria     15.0 15.0     8.1    
Norway 2.33 1.24   21.9 21.9     93.2    
Oman               
Pakistan   0.33  14.0 12.0        3.9 
Panama     18.0 19.8         
Papua New Guinea     13.2 14.4        4.4 
Paraguay     23.0 23.0     12.4    
Peru   0.06  23.2 23.2        21.7 
Philippines   0.02  10.4 10.6     25.0    
Poland   0.30  26.0 26.7        81.4 
Portugal 1.32 1.94 2.08  34.8 34.8     92.0    
Romania     36.8 33.7        67.9 
Russian Federation     24.1 33.3     66.8    
Rwanda     8.0 8.0     4.6    
Saudi Arabia     20.0 20.0         
Senegal     16.5 16.5     5.1    
Serbia   0.13        45.0    
Sierra Leone     15.0 15.0     5.5    
Singapore     36.0 35.0  66.2      62.1 
Slovak Republic 1.18 0.60 0.93  29.6 23.6  81.9   78.9    
Slovenia  0.68 0.96  37.5 37.5        87.4 
Somalia               
South Africa     2.0 2.0        6.7 
Spain 2.86 2.24 3.86  37.8 37.3  85.6   69.4    
Sri Lanka     20.0 20.0  21.8   24.1    
Sudan     25.0 27.0     5.2    
Swaziland              15.4 
Sweden 4.62 2.44 1.84  28.7 28.7     88.8    
Switzerland 1.59 1.66   10.4 10.4     95.4    
Syrian Arab Republic     24.0 24.0        26.8 
Tajikistan               
Tanzania     20.0 20.0     4.3    
Thailand   0.04  9.7 9.7     22.8    
Timor-Leste               
Togo           7.3    
Tonga               
Trinidad and Tobago   1.20  9.9 10.8        71.1 
Tunisia     25.8 23.0     48.6    
Turkey   0.12  30.5 38.0  16.2      58.6 
Turkmenistan     23.0 23.0         
Uganda   0.78  15.0 15.0     10.3    
Ukraine   0.00  38.8 41.8        62.1 
United Kingdom 1.13 0.62 0.71  23.8 23.8     93.2    
United States 0.52 0.37 1.18  18.6 18.6     92.2    
Uruguay   0.01 40.5 35.5 32.0        78.5 
Uzbekistan     36.5 29.0         
Venezuela, RB    25.5 14.2 23.9        33.9 
Vietnam    20.0 20.0 23.0  9.2      19.3 
West Bank and Gaza              14.0 
Yemen, Rep.    15.0    10.7   10.4    
Zambia           10.9    
Zimbabwe     6.0 8.0     20.0   
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Table 8 Connectedness
   Conventions on  Immigrants Emigrants Remittances 
 migration ratified   (% of population) (% of native population) (% of GDP)
 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan 0 0.3 0.3 0.3   6.4   
Albania 3 2.0 2.5 2.8 6.0 25.5 31.6 17.6 15.4 9.7
Algeria 2 1.1 0.8 0.7 5.9 4.2 3.3 2.7 2.0 1.3
Angola 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 0.1  0.1
Argentina 1 5.1 4.2 3.6 1.4 1.6 2.4 0.0 0.2 0.2
Armenia 2 18.6 18.7 10.5 14.0 25.1 23.9 4.5 10.2 10.6
Australia 0 21.0 21.0 21.1 2.2 2.9 2.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Austria 0 10.3 12.4 15.6 6.8 7.0 7.8 0.4 0.9 0.9
Azerbaijan 1 5.0 4.3 2.9 13.4 16.3 14.0 0.1 5.2 2.7
Bangladesh 0 0.8 0.8 0.7 4.6 3.7 3.5 3.2 7.2 10.8
Barbados 1 8.2 9.2 10.3 27.5 26.6 30 3.3 4.5 3
Belarus 0 12.3 11.2 11.5 22.5 16.4 17.4 0.2 0.8 0.7
Belgium 1 8.9 8.6 8.9 4.3 3.5 4.4 1.7 1.9 2.2
Belize 2 16.1 14.6 13.6   14.4 2.2 4.1 5.7
Benin 1 1.6 2.1 2.6 5.4 5.2 5.8 5.0 4.0 3.8
Bhutan 0 4.3 5.6 5.5 2.7 2.1 6.1  0.2 0.3
Bolivia 1 0.9 1.1 1.5 3.3 4.2 6.5 0.1 3.6 5.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 1.3 2.6 0.7 16.3 26.5 28.1  18.7 11.4
Botswana 0 2.0 3.2 5.7 5.1 2.2 3.2 1.2 1.3 0.7
Brazil 1 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2
Bulgaria 0 0.2 1.2 1.4 7.0 8.8 13.9 0.5 5.6 2.9
Burkina Faso 3 3.7 4.7 6.3 9.8 10.6 9.3 3.3 1.0 1.1
Burundi 0 5.9 1.2 0.7 4.1 3.3 4.1  0.0 1.4
Cambodia 0 0.4 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5 0.3 3.2 3.3
Cameroon 2 2.2 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.9
Canada 0 16.2 18.1 21.1 4.7 4.7 4.2   
Central African Republic 0 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.2 0.7 2.9 0.0  
Chad 0 1.2 1.3 3.5 2.7 1.7 2.2 0.1  
Chile 1 0.8 1.2 1.9 3.6 3.2 3.6  0.0 0.0
China 0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.9
Colombia 1 0.3 0.3 0.2 3.0 3.7 4.4 0.9 2.3 1.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0 2.1 1.2 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.4   
Congo, Rep. 0 5.4 3.3 3.5 2.3 2.0 5.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Costa Rica 0 13.6 7.9 10.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 1.1 2.1 1.5
Côte d’Ivoire 0 14.5 14.1 12.2 2.7 3.7 6.3 1.4 1.0 0.8
Croatia 0 9.9 13.9 15.8 8.2 14.1 16.9 2.5 1.6 2.2
Cuba 1 0.3 0.2 0.1 7.7 8.6 9.8   
Czech Republic 0 4.1 4.4 4.3 5.8 8.2 3.5 0.3 0.8 0.6
Denmark 0 4.6 6.9 8.7 4.1 4.1 4.9 0.3 0.3 0.2
Dominican Republic 0 4.0 4.1 4.4 6.0 9.3 9.8 5.1 8.0 6.5
Ecuador 2 0.8 0.8 2.7 2.2 4.9 7.5 1.9 6.7 4.4
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 3.3 3.2 4.4 5.4 5.6 3.5
El Salvador 1 0.9 0.5 0.7 9.7 13.7 17.1 11.2 17.7 16.1
Eritrea 0 0.4 0.4 0.3 9.4 8.9 15.2   
Estonia 0 24.3 18.2 13.6 14.1 17.1 12.8 0.0 1.9 1.7
Ethiopia 0 2.4 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.4 1.4 0.8
Fiji 0 1.9 2 2.2 9.3 13.7 17.8 1.7 6.2 5.8
Finland 0 1.3 2.6 4.2 6.2 6.9 6.0 0.1 0.4 0.3
France 1 10.1 10.3 10.3 2.3 2.7 2.9 0.3 0.6 0.6
Gabon 0 13.7 17.0 18.9 1.7 1.4 2.0 0.1 0.1 
Gambia, The 0 12.2 14.3 16.8 2.7 3.1 4.3  9.3 11.0
Georgia 0 7.0 4.9 3.8 16.6 21.2 19.8 8.1 5.4 6.9
Germany 1 7.5 12.1 13.2 4.1 4.7 4.7 0.2 0.3 0.3
Ghana 1 4.8 7.9 7.6 2.7 2.6 3.5 0.3 0.9 0.4
Greece 0 4.1 6.7 10.0 9.8 9.3 10.6 2.5 0.5 0.5
Guatemala 2 3.0 0.4 0.4 3.4 4.8 5.7 2.4 11.3 10.2
Guinea 2 4.2 8.5 4.0 7.0 5.3 5.3 0.0 1.4 1.3
Guinea-Bissau 0 1.4 1.6 1.3 6.4 5.7 6.9 0.7 3.5 5.8
Haiti 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 6.6 8.0 9.2  23.7 22.6
Honduras 1 5.5 0.5 0.3 3.2 5.2 7.0 3.2 18.7 17.3
Hungary 0 3.3 2.9 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.6 0.3 1.8 1.8
India 0 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.7 2.7 3.2
Indonesia 0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.3 1.9 1.0
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 7.8 4.3 2.9 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.8 0.5 0.3
Iraq 0 0.5 0.6 0.3 3.6 4.1 4.6  2.3 0.1
Ireland 0 6.5 10.1 20.1 22.5 24.5 17.1 0.5 0.3 0.3
Israel 1 35.0 35.9 38.6 14.5 15.0 17.9 0.7 0.6 0.6
Italy 2 2.5 3.7 7.4 6.4 5.4 5.8 0.2 0.1 0.3
Jamaica 2 0.9 1.0 1.1 20.8 26.1 27.0 11.2 15.8 14.5
Japan 0 0.9 1.3 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jordan 0 36.2 40.2 49.2 32.6 27.7 19.3 21.4 19.9 13.8
Kazakhstan 0 22.1 19.3 18.9 18.7 21.8 21.9 0.6 0.3 0.2
Kenya 2 0.7 2.4 2.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 3.3 4.3 5.5
Kiribati 0 3 2.4 2 6.8 11.9 6.2 12.3  
Korea, Rep. 0 1.3 1.2 1.1 3.6 3.9 4.1 0.7 0.8 0.9
Kosovo 0        18.8 16.7
Kyrgyz Republic 2 14.2 7.6 4.1 12.7 13.2 10.6 0.1 13.1 26.6
Lao PDR 0 0.5 0.4 0.3 6.5 6.0 5.6 1.3 0.0 0.6
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Table 8 Connectedness, continued
 Conventions on  Immigrants Emigrants Remittances 
 migration ratified   (% of population) (% of native population) (% of GDP)
 2012 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1995 2005 2010
Latvia 0 24.3 18.1 15.0 13.6 14.9 12.6 0.7 2.4 2.6
Lebanon 0 17.8 18.5 17.9 19.8 18.1 16.1  22.5 19.4
Lesotho 1 0.5 0.3 0.3 16.7 8.2 16.5 50.4 44.1 34.2
Liberia 0 3.8 5.6 2.4 4.3 9.0 10.0  5.9 2.7
Libya 1 10.6 10.7 10.7 1.8 2.3 1.9  0.0 0.0
Lithuania 0 9.4 6.1 3.9 15.0 14.0 12.0 0.0 2.1 4.3
Macedonia, FYR 2 5.0 6.3 6.3 11.0 15.4 18.8 1.5 3.8 4.2
Madagascar 1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Malawi 1 12.3 2.5 1.9 3.2 2.1 1.4 0.0  
Malaysia 1 5.6 6.6 8.3 3.3 5.0 5.4 0.1 0.8 0.5
Mali 1 1.9 1.5 1.1 7.0 6.5 6.2 4.5 3.3 4.6
Mauritania 1 4.7 2.4 2.9 4.4 3.6 3.4 0.4  
Mauritius 1 0.8 3.3 3.4 8.8 6.9 10.2 3.3 3.4 2.3
Mexico 1 0.8 0.5 0.6 5.4 8.8 9.5 1.5 2.7 2.1
Moldova 1 15.7 13.0 11.5 16.4 17.0 19.6 0.1 30.8 23.6
Mongolia 0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.2  7.1 4.5
Montenegro 2   6.7   0.0  5.3 7.3
Morocco 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.2 5.3 8.6 6.0 7.7 7.1
Mozambique 0 0.9 2.0 1.9 4.1 4.0 4.9 2.6 0.9 1.4
Myanmar 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.1   
Namibia 0 7.9 6.6 6.1 7.6 3.4 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1
Nepal 0 2.3 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.3 1.3 14.9 21.7
Netherlands 1 8.0 10.0 10.5 5.0 5.0 6.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
New Zealand 1 15.2 17.8 22.0 10.9 13.5 15.5 2.6 0.7 0.6
Nicaragua 1 1.0 0.6 0.7 7.2 9.1 11.3 2.4 12.6 12.5
Niger 1 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.5 0.4 1.9 1.6
Nigeria 2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 2.9 3.0 5.1
Norway 2 4.6 6.6 9.9 3.9 4.6 4.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Oman 0 22.7 27.5 29.7 12.4 14.3 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.1
Pakistan 0 5.9 2.9 2.4 3.2 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.9 5.5
Panama 0 2.6 2.9 3.4 5.9 5.7 4.0 1.4 0.8 0.9
Papua New Guinea 0 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.2
Paraguay 1 4.3 3.3 2.5 7.0 7.1 7.5 3.6 3.6 3.7
Peru 1 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.3 2.6 3.6 1.1 1.8 1.6
Philippines 3 0.3 0.4 0.5 3.2 3.8 4.4 7.2 13.2 10.7
Poland 0 3.0 2.1 2.2 9.7 12.0 7.8 0.5 2.1 1.6
Portugal 2 4.4 6.2 8.6 15.7 12.2 18.7 3.4 1.6 1.6
Romania 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 7.1 5.5 11.5 0.0 4.8 2.4
Russian Federation 0 7.8 8.1 8.6 8.6 7.3 7.8 0.6 0.4 0.4
Rwanda 1 1.0 4.8 4.4 4.5 3.0 2.5 1.6 0.8 1.6
Saudi Arabia 0 29.4 25.6 26.6 1.4 1.4 0.9  0.0 0.1
Senegal 1 3.7 2.4 1.7 4.3 3.5 5.0 3.0 9.1 10.5
Serbia 2 1.3 11.4 7.2   2.8  7.9 8.7
Sierra Leone 0 3.9 2.3 1.8 1.6 3.6 4.4 2.7 0.2 3.0
Singapore 0 23.9 33.6 38.7 6.3 9.6 8.7   
Slovak Republic 0 0.8 2.2 2.4 6.6 9.3 8.9 0.1 1.5 1.8
Slovenia 2 8.9 8.8 8.0 4.3 4.8 6.5 1.3 0.7 0.7
Somalia 0 9.6 0.3 0.2 3.1 4.8 8.0   
South Africa 0 3.5 2.3 3.7 1.1 1.6 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.3
Spain 1 2.1 4.4 13.8 4.0 2.8 3.3 0.5 0.7 0.8
Sri Lanka 1 2.7 2.1 1.6 3.7 4.0 8.3 6.2 8.2 8.4
Sudan 0 6.2 3.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.9 2.5 3.7 2.9
Swaziland 0 8.3 3.6 3.8 8.5 4.7 13.7 4.9 3.7 2.9
Sweden 1 9.1 11.2 13.9 2.7 3.3 3.8 0.1 0.2 0.1
Switzerland 0 20.5 21.8 22.5 6.0 5.5 6.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Syrian Arab Republic 1 5.6 5.8 10.8 3.9 3.7 4.9 3.0 2.9 2.8
Tajikistan 3 8.0 5.4 4.1 6.6 8.6 10.7  20.2 40.0
Tanzania 1 2.3 2.6 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1
Thailand 0 0.7 1.3 1.7 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.6
Timor-Leste 1 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.5 1.9 1.5   
Togo 0 4.4 3.7 3.1 4.6 4.9 5.9 1.1 9.1 10.5
Tonga 0 3.2 1.6 0.8 22.4 31 31.5 15.1 26.5 23.7
Trinidad and Tobago 1 4.2 3.2 2.6 14.9 19.4 21.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Tunisia 0 0.5 0.4 0.3 6.5 5.6 5.8 3.8 4.3 4.5
Turkey 1 2.1 2.0 1.9 4.5 4.6 5.6 2.0 0.2 0.1
Turkmenistan 0 8.4 5.4 4.1 9.0 7.3 5.1 0.2  
Uganda 2 3.1 2.6 1.9 1.2 2.2 2.3  3.5 5.3
Ukraine 0 13.3 11.2 11.5 14.3 11.8 13.8 0.0 0.7 4.1
United Kingdom 1 6.5 8.1 10.4 7.3 6.9 7.7 0.2 0.3 0.3
United States 0 9.3 12.3 13.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 2 3.2 2.7 2.4 6.9 6.8 9.7  0.4 0.3
Uzbekistan 0 8.1 5.5 4.1 5.9 6.6 6.7   
Venezuela, RB 2 5.2 4.2 3.5 1.1 1.4 1.8 0.0 0.1 0.0
Vietnam 0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.6 2.2 2.5  6.0 7.8
West Bank and Gaza 0 46.0 46.9 49.3   60.4 18.1 17.6 
Yemen, Rep. 0 2.9 2.3 2.2 4.3 3.4 4.6 25.4 7.7 4.0
Zambia 1 3.6 3.5 1.8 2.3 1.6 1.4  0.7 0.3
Zimbabwe 0 6.0 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.9 9.3 0.6  
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Technical notes 
Table 1: Labor force
•   Population: Number of people living in the 
territory of a country or economy; in mil-
lions; total and by gender (three indicators). 
Figures are from population censuses and 
demographic estimates. Data source: World 
Development Indicators (WDI), at http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.
•   Working age population: Persons aged 15 to 
64 as a fraction of the population; in percent; 
total and by gender (three indicators). Data 
source: see table 9.
•   Participation rate: Share of the working age 
population that is in the labor force, with the 
labor force defined as persons who work or 
are unemployed during a reference period; 
in percent; total, by gender and by age group 
(five indicators). Data source: see table 9.
•   Unemployment rate: Share of the labor force 
that is unemployed, with the unemployed 
defined as persons who are available to work 
and are actively looking for a job during a 
reference period; in percent; total and by gen-
der (three indicators). Data source: KILM, at 
http://www.ilo.org/kilm.
Table 2: Skills 
•   Average schooling: Mean of highest complet-
ed level of formal schooling among all persons 
aged 15 and above; in years; total and by gen-
der (three indicators). Figures are estimated 
based on data from population censuses. The 
methodology is described by Robert J. Barro 
and Jong-Wha Lee, 2010, “A New Data Set of 
Educational Attainment in the World, 1950–
2010,” NBER Working Papers 15902, National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Data source: 
http://www.barrolee.com. 
•   Skills as a constraint: Share of firms identi-
fying an inadequately skilled workforce as a 
“major” or “very severe” obstacle to business; 
in percent. Figures are from enterprise surveys 
covering firms with at least five employees 
and mainly formal. “Major” and “very severe” 
are the two top levels in a scale of five. Data 
source: International Financial Corporation/
World Bank Enterprise Surveys, at http://
www.enterprisesurveys.org.
•   Educational  attainment: Average score in 
reading, mathematics and science; units are 
such that the mean is 500 and standard de-
viation is 100. Observations from PISA are 
from students aged between 15 years and 
3 months and 16 years and 2 months at the 
beginning of the assessment period. Observa-
tions from TIMSS (marked with an asterisk) 
are from a nationally representative sample 
of all students enrolled in the grade that rep-
resents 8 years of formal schooling, provided 
that the mean age at the time of testing is at 
least 13.5 years. TIMSS does not assess edu-
cational attainment in reading. Data sources: 
PISA at http://www.oecd.org/pisa, and TIMSS 
and PIRLS International Study Center, Lynch 
School of Education, Boston at http://tims-
sandpirls.bc.edu/index.html.
Table 3: Employment structure
•   Employment by sector: Share of employment 
in primary, secondary, and tertiary activities, 
based on the International Standard Industry 
Classification (ISIC); in percent (three indi-
cators). The primary sector corresponds to 
division 1 (ISIC revision 2), tabulation cat-
egories A and B (ISIC revision 3), or tabula-
tion category A (ISIC revision 4); it includes 
agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing. The 
secondary sector encompasses divisions 2–5 
(ISIC revision 2), tabulation categories C–F 
(ISIC revision 3), or tabulation categories 
B–F (ISIC revision 4); it includes mining and 
quarrying (including oil production), manu-
facturing, construction, and public utilities 
(electricity, gas, and water). The tertiary sector 
corresponds to divisions 6–9 (ISIC revision 
2), tabulation categories G–P (ISIC revision 
3), or tabulation categories G–U (ISIC revi-
sion 4); it includes wholesale and retail trade 
and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, 
and communications; financing, insurance, 
real estate, and business services; and com-
munity, social, and personal services. Data 
sources: see table 9.
•   Employment  in  civil  service: Share of total 
employment in the public sector; in percent. 
Public sector employment includes all em-
ployment of the general government as de-
fined in System of National Accounts (SNA) 
1993, plus resident and operating at central, 
state (or regional), and local levels of govern-
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ment. Persons employed directly by these in-
stitutions are included regardless of their type 
of employment contract; workers in state-
owned enterprises are not included. Data 
source: LABORSTA tables on “Public Sector 
Employment” and “General Employment 
Level,” at http://laborsta.ilo.org.
•   Employment  by work  status: Share of em-
ployment in wage work, self employment, and 
farming; in percent (three indicators). The 
self-employed include employers and non-
remunerated family workers outside farming. 
Data sources: see table 9. 
•   Employment  in  urban  areas: Share of em-
ployment in cities and towns; in percent. 
Urban is defined by national statistical offices. 
Data sources: see table 9.
Table 4: Living standards
•   Wages by occupation: Average wages of ac-
countants, chemical engineers, bus drivers, 
and sewing machine operators; in annual US$ 
at 2005 prices (four indicators). Wages are 
based on data from the ILO October Inquiry 
database, calibrated into a normalized format 
referring to average monthly wage rate for an 
adult worker and transformed into dollars 
using the exchange rate of the local currency 
in the same year. The data are then converted 
to 2005 prices using the U.S. GDP deflator. 
The methodology is described by R.H. Oos-
tendorp, 2012, “The Occupational Wages 
around the World (OWW) Database: Up-
date for 1983–2008,” background paper for 
the World Development Report 2013. Data 
source: http://www.worldbank.org/wdr2013. 
•   Working  poor: Share of total employment 
represented by workers who are members of 
households living in extreme poverty; in per-
cent. Households living in extreme poverty are 
identified on the basis of poverty rates comput-
ed from the international poverty line of 1.25 
US$ PPP per day at 2005 prices. The use of the 
international poverty line means that figures 
are not necessarily comparable to estimates 
generated using national poverty lines. Data 
sources: see table 9, and for the poverty rate, see 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/.
•   Life satisfaction: Persons aged 14 and above 
who answered affirmatively to a survey ask-
ing them whether they were satisfied with 
their life at the time of the interview; in per-
cent of all respondents; by work status (three 
indicators). The question in the survey is: “All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with 
your life as a whole these days?” Possible an-
swers range from 1(“completely dissatisfied”) 
to 10 (“completely satisfied”). Responses of 6 
or higher were considered affirmative. Data 
source: World Values Survey, 1999–2008, at 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
•   Labor  share  of  national  income: Compen-
sation of employees as a share of GDP; in 
percent. Compensation of employees cor-
responds is measured by account D.1 in the 
SNA, and GDP by account B.1 in the Sys-
tem of National Accounts). Compensation 
of employees includes payments in cash and 
in-kind. It also includes government contri-
butions to social insurance schemes that pro-
vide benefits to the employees. Data source: 
UNDATA, at http://data.un.org. 
•   Gender  gap  in  earnings: Wage earnings for 
women relative to the wage earnings of men 
having the same characteristics; as a ratio. The 
estimate is based on a country-specific regres-
sion of the logarithm of monthly earnings in 
local currency on years of education and po-
tential years of experience (and its square), 
controlling for industry, occupation, urban 
residence and gender. The methodology is de-
scribed by Claudio E. Montenegro and Harry 
Anthony Patrinos, 2012, “Returns to School-
ing around the World,” background paper for 
the World Development Report 2013. Data 
sources: see table 9.
Table 5: Productivity
•   Value-added  per  worker: Total value-added 
per worker; in annual US$ at 2005 prices; to-
tal and by sector of activity (four indicators). 
Value-added is the output of a sector net of 
intermediate inputs. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabri-
cated assets or depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. The origin of value-added 
is determined by the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. 
Value-added data are converted to US$ using 
current exchange rates and then converted to 
2005 prices using the U.S. GDP deflator. Data 
source: WDI, at http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
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•   Employment  in micro-enterprises: Share of 
non-agricultural employment in firms with 10 
or less employees; in percent. In some coun-
tries the cutoff point is 9 employees. All own-
account workers and unpaid family workers 
are counted as working in micro-enterprises. 
Both formal and informal firms are included. 
Data sources: see table 9. 
•   Informal  employment: Share of informal 
 employment in non-agricultural employ-
ment; in percent. Informal employment 
includes employment in informal sector 
enterprises and informal jobs in formal 
firms; it excludes agricultural employment. 
In principle, informal sector and informal 
employment are measured according to the 
Resolution of the 15th International Con-
ference of Labor Statisticians (ICLS). How-
ever, there is wide variation in definitions 
and methodology across countries. Data 
sources: KILM, at http://www.ilo.org/em-
pelm/what/WCMS_114240/lang--en/index.
htm and Vanek, Joann, Martha Chen, Ralf 
Hussmanns, James Heintz, and Françoise 
Carré. 2012. Women and Men in the Infor-
mal Economy: A Statistical Picture. Geneva: 
Women in Informal Employment: Global-
izing and Organizing and International La-
bour Organization.
Table 6: Social cohesion
•   Trust: Share of people who report that oth-
ers can be trusted; in percent; by work sta-
tus (three indicators). The figures are based 
on responses to surveys asking the question: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people?” The in-
terviewed are at least 14 years old in the case 
of the World Values Survey, 16 years old for 
the Latinobarómetro, 18 years old for Arab 
Barometer, and 15 years old for the Afro-
barometer. Data sources: World Values Survey, 
1999–2008, at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
org; Afrobarometer, Round 1, Year 2004, at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org; Latinobaró-
metro 2007 at http://www.latinóbarómetro.
org; and Arab Barometer 2006 at http://www.
arabbarometer.org/. 
•   Civic participation: Share of people who re-
port being engaged in matters related to their 
community or country; in percent; by work 
status (three indicators). The figures are based 
on surveys asking the question: “Now I am go-
ing to read off a list of voluntary organizations. 
For each one, could you tell me whether you 
are an active member, an inactive member or 
not a member of that type of organization?” 
Possible answers include a variety of church or 
religious organizations; sports or recreational 
organizations; arts, music or educational or-
ganizations; labor unions; political parties; 
environmental organizations; professional as-
sociations; humanitarian or charitable orga-
nizations; consumer organizations; and oth-
ers. Respondents need to be at least 14 years 
old in the case of the World Values Survey; 18 
years old for Afro Barometer; 15 years old for 
Euro Barometer; and 16 years old for Latino-
barómetro Data sources: World Values Survey, 
1999–2008 wave, at http://www.worldvalues 
survey.org; Afrobarometer, 2008–09, at http://
www.afrobarometer.org; Latinobarómetro 
2007 at http://www.latinobarometro.org; and 
Euro Barometer 2007 at http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/index_en.htm. 
•   Wage inequality: Labor earnings at the 90th 
percentile of the wage distribution; as a ratio 
of labor earnings at the 10th percentile. The 
wage distribution of each country is con-
structed based on earnings data from wage 
workers who report positive wages and iden-
tify the frequency of their payment. Data 
sources: see table 9.
•   Youth  unemployment: Share of the labor 
force age 15 to 24 that is unemployed; in per-
cent; by gender (two indicators). Data source: 
KILM, at http://www.ilo.org/kilm.
•   Youth not in school or at work: Share of the 
population aged 15–24 that is not engaged in 
education, employment, or training; in per-
cent; by gender (two indicators). Data sources: 
see table 9. 
Table 7: Policies and institutions
•   Core  ILO  Conventions  ratified: Indicates 
how many of the following have been rati-
fied by the country: Convention 29, concern-
ing forced or compulsory labor; Convention 
87, on freedom of association and protection 
of the right to organize; Convention 98, con-
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cerning the application of the principles of the 
right to Organize and to bargain collectively; 
Convention 100, on equal remuneration; 
Convention 105, concerning the abolition 
of forced labor; Convention 111, concerning 
discrimination in respect of employment and 
 occupation; Convention 138, on the mini-
mum age for admission to employment; and 
Convention 182, concerning the prohibi-
tion and immediate action for the elimina-
tion of the worst forms of child. Data source: 
NORMLEX database, at http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en.
•   Minimum wage: The lowest a private sector 
employer can pay a 19-year-old worker who 
has no previous experience in the economy’s 
most populated city; in US$ at 2005 prices. 
The applicable minimum wage can be legally 
enacted or agreed upon in collective bargain-
ing agreements. When a zero is reported, it 
does not necessarily mean that there is no 
minimum wage in force in the country or 
economy. For instance, there may be rates ap-
plicable to regular workers but not to appren-
tices. Data source: Doing Business Indicators, 
at www.doingbusiness.org.
•   Separation  cost: Severance pay and others 
costs associated with redundancy dismissal; 
in weeks of salary per separated worker; after 
1 and 10 years of continuous employment 
(two indicators). For comparability, figures 
refer to a hypothetical worker and firm across 
all countries. The worker is a male, non- 
executive employee, earning the economy’s 
average wage. The firm is a limited liability 
company with 60 workers in the manufactur-
ing sector of the economy’s most populated 
city. Separation costs include the cost of ad-
vance notice requirements, severance pay-
ments and penalties in the case of redundancy 
dismissals justified by economic, operational 
or structural reasons, not by the behavior of 
the worker. Data source: Doing Business Indi-
cators, at www.doingbusiness.org.
•   Union  membership: Share of wage work-
ers with union membership; in percent. Data 
source: Jelle Visser, Data Base on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960– 
2010 (ICTWSS) Jelle Visser Amsterdam Insti-
tute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS Uni-
versity of Amsterdam, Version 3.0, May 2011, 
at http://www.uva-aias.net/208.
•   Labor market policies: Government spending 
in programs to help the unemployed back to 
work, or to support the income or consump-
tion levels of unemployed or inactive persons; 
in percent of GDP. Seven types of programs 
are considered: macroeconomic stimulus 
policies, measures to increase labor demand, 
active labor market policies, unemployment 
benefits, other social protection measures, 
social dialogue and compliance with labor 
standards. Data sources: International Labour 
Organization/World Bank, Inventory of policy 
responses to the financial and economic crisis: 
Joint synthesis report, mimeo, July 2012; and 
OECD (2012) Employment and Labour Mar-
kets: Key Tables from OECD, at: http://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LMPEXP.
•   Social  security  contributions: The sum of 
employer and employee contributions to-
wards social security programs for sickness, 
old age, injury and unemployment; in percent 
of the employee’s gross salary. Data sources: 
ILO SECSOC Database of the Social Security 
Department, at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/protection/secsoc; Martín Rama and 
Raquel Artecona, 2002, “A Database of Labor 
Market Indicators across Countries,” Com-
missioned by a Committee of the National 
Academies. 
•   Social  security  coverage: Share of the labor 
force actively contributing to old-age pension 
schemes; in percent. Data sources: Montser-
rat Pallares-Miralles, Carolina Romero, and 
Edwards Whitehouse, 2012 “International 
Patterns of Pension Provision II. A Worldwide 
Overview of Facts and Figures,” SP Discus-
sion Paper No. 1211. World Bank, Washing-
ton, DC; Martín Rama and Raquel Artecona, 
2002, “A Database of Labor Market Indicators 
across Countries,” Commissioned by a Com-
mittee of the National Academies.
Table 8: Connectedness
•   Conventions  on  migration  ratified: Indi-
cates how many of the following have been 
ratified by the country: ILO Convention 97, 
concerning migration for employment; ILO 
Convention 143, concerning migrations in 
378  WO R L D  D EV E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 3
abusive conditions and the promotion of 
equality of opportunity and treatment of 
migrant workers; and the United Nations 
(UN) Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families. In the case of the UN Con-
vention, accessions and successions are also 
treated as ratifications. Data source: ILOLEX: 
Database of International Labor Standards 
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1 
.htm; and United Nations Treaty Collec-
tion, at http://treaties.un.org/pages/View-
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
13&chapter=4&lang=en.
•   Immigrants: Share of the population that is 
foreign born; in percent. Data source: Özden, 
Çaglar, Christopher Parsons, Maurice Schiff, 
and Terrie L. Walmsley. 2011. “Where on 
Earth Is Everybody? The Evolution of Global 
Bilateral Migration 1960–2000.” World Bank 
Economic Review, 25 (1): 12–56, at http://data 
.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL.
•   Emigrants: Share of the native population that 
is residing in another country or economy; in 
percent. The native population is computed 
as the total population minus immigrants 
plus emigrants. Data source: Özden, Çaglar, 
Christopher Parsons, Maurice Schiff, and 
Terrie L. Walmsley. 2011. “Where on Earth Is 
Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral 
Migration 1960–2000.” World Bank Economic 
Review, 25 (1): 12–56, at http://go.worldbank 
.org/JITC7NYTT0. 
•   Remittances: Foreign currency inflows from 
workers abroad; in percent of GDP. The in-
flows comprise current transfers by migrant 
workers and compensation earned by non-
resident workers. Current transfers from 
migrant workers are considered remittances 
when workers have resided in the host coun-
try for more than a year, irrespective of their 
immigration status. Compensation earned by 
nonresident workers refers to the wages and 
salaries of migrant workers having lived in 
the host country for less than one year. Data 
source: World Development Indicators, at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF 
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Selected databases Selected databases
1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
Afghanistan LSSN Latvia OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Albania LSSN LSSN Lebanon LSSN
Algeria Lesotho
Angola Liberia LSSN
Argentina MIX MIX MIX Libya
Armenia LSSN Lithuania OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Australia OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Macedonia, FYR OECD/EU OECD/EU MIX
Austria OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Madagascar LSSN
Azerbaijan LSSN Malawi LSSN MIX
Bangladesh LSSN LFSN Malaysia
Barbados LFSP Mali LSSN LSSN
Belarus LSSN Mauritania LSSN
Belgium OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Mauritius LFSN LFSN
Belize LFSN Mexico LSSN OECD/EU OECD/EU
Benin LSSN Moldova LSSN
Bhutan LSSN Mongolia LSSN
Bolivia LFSN LFSN LFSN Montenegro LFSN
Bosnia and Herzegovina LSSN Morocco CENSUS CENSUS
Botswana LSSN Mozambique LSSN LSSN LSSN
Brazil LFSP LFSN LFSN Myanmar
Bulgaria LSSN OECD/EU OECD/EU Namibia LSSN
Burkina Faso LSSN LSSN Nepal LSSN LSSN LSSN
Burundi Netherlands OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Cambodia LSSN LSSN LSSN New Zealand OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Cameroon LSSN LSSN Nicaragua LSSN LSSN
Canada OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Niger LSSN
Central African Republic OECD/EU LSSN Nigeria LSSN LSSN
Chad LSSN Norway OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Chile LSSN OECD/EU OECD/EU Oman
China MIX MIX MIX Pakistan LFSN LFSN
Colombia CENSUS LFSN LFSN Panama LFSN LFSN LFSN
Congo, Dem. Rep. LSSN Papua New Guinea LSSN
Congo, Rep. LSSN Paraguay LFSN LFSN LFSN
Costa Rica LFSN LFSN LFSN Peru LFSN LFSN LFSN
Côte d’Ivoire Philippines LFSN LFSN LFSN
Croatia OECD/EU OECD/EU Poland OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Cuba Portugal OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Czech Republic OECD/EU OECD/EU Romania LSSN OECD/EU OECD/EU
Denmark OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Russian Federation LSSN
Dominican Republic LFSN LFSN LFSN Rwanda LSSN LSSN
Ecuador LFSN LFSN LFSN Saudi Arabia
Egypt, Arab Rep. CENSUS LSSN Senegal LSSN LSSN
El Salvador LFSN LFSN LFSN Serbia LFSN
Eritrea Sierra Leone LSSN
Estonia OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Singapore
Ethiopia LSSN LSSN Slovak Republic OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Fiji CENSUS LSSN Slovenia OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Finland OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Somalia
France OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU South Africa LFSN LFSN
Gabon LSSN Spain OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Gambia, The Sri Lanka LSSN LFSN LFSN
Georgia LSSN LSSN Sudan
Germany OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Swaziland LSSN
Ghana LSSN Sweden OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Greece OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Switzerland OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Guatemala LFSN Syrian Arab Republic LSSN
Guinea LSSN Tajikistan LSSN
Guinea-Bissau Tanzania LFSN LFSN LFSN
Haiti Thailand LSSN LSSN LSSN
Honduras LFSN LFSN LFSN Timor-Leste LSSN LFSN
Hungary OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Togo LSSN
India LFSN LFSN LFSN Tonga LSSN
Indonesia LSSN LSSN LSSN Trinidad and Tobago
Iran, Islamic Rep. LSSN Tunisia LFSN
Iraq CENSUS LSSN Turkey OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Ireland OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Turkmenistan
Israel OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Uganda LSSN
Italy OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU Ukraine LSSN
Jamaica LFSN United Kingdom OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Japan OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU United States OECD/EU OECD/EU OECD/EU
Jordan CENSUS Uruguay LFSP LFSP LFSN
Kazakhstan LFSN LSSN Uzbekistan
Kenya LSSN LSSN Venezuela, RB LFSN LFSP
Kiribati LSSN Vietnam LSSN LSSN LSSN
Korea, Rep. OECD/EU OECD/EU West Bank and Gaza CENSUS LSSN LSSN
Kosovo OECD/EU LFSP Yemen, Rep. LSSN
Kyrgyz Republic LSSN Zambia LSSN
Lao PDR LSSN LSSN Zimbabwe
CENSUS Data from population census by IPUMS
LFSN Labor force survey with national coverage
LFSP Labor force survey with partial coverage
LSSN Living standards survey with national coverage
MIX A combination of micro data from censuses with key ratios from household surveys
OECD/EU Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or Eurostat
Table 9 Micro-data sources
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Aadhaar (Indian identification program for social insurance 
programs), 276b
access to finance, 11, 23, 294, 295f
access to information, rights, and voice, 140–41
access to jobs, inequality in, 13, 137, 138b, 139f, 140, 173f
accountability, 176. See also transparency
active labor market programs (ALMPs), 267–72
delivering better outcomes, 270–72
types of programs, 267–70
public works programs, 269–70
training programs for job seekers, 269
wage subsidy programs, 268–69
affirmative action programs, 141–42
Afghanistan
female employment in, 194
foreign assistance, effect of, 294
illegal poppy cultivation in, 194
skills level as constraint in, 181n81
Africa. See also specific countries and regions
micro- and small enterprises in, 110b
age discrimination, 215
age of workforce, 6, 51. See also aging population; youth
agglomeration effects, 27, 161, 167–68, 167f, 193, 200, 202, 239
aging population
need for new jobs and, 51
retention in work force, 90b
aging societies
defined, 281n1
incentives for job seekers in, 270
jobs agenda in, 18, 20f, 190, 213–16, 214–16f, 216b
long-term credibility of social insurance system in, 275
mix of labor policies and institutions in, 259f
policy making in, 31, 302b
tax wedge effect in, 274, 275f
agrarian economies
defined, 281n1
jobs agenda in, 18, 20f, 190–93, 192–93f, 194b
mix of labor policies and institutions in, 259f
policy making in, 3, 29–30, 301–2
tax wedge effect in, 275f
agricultural sector
environmental spillovers and, 170
fertilizer use and, 192
health insurance, subsidizing farmers’ participation in 
programs, 276
irrigation and, 192
life satisfaction of farmers, 85, 86f
manufacturing earnings vs., 165f
prevalence of jobs in, 3, 5, 49
productivity, 79, 81, 88
extension services and, 246
farm size related to, 106–7, 119n29, 191
innovation and, 107, 191–92, 197
poverty reduction, effect on, 191
sharecropping, 197
small farms, 88, 104–6
subsistence agriculture and unemployment, 272
targeting investment in, 217–19
technological progress, 106–7, 119n32
Aid for Trade initiative, 33, 308
ALMPs. See active labor market programs
alternative dispute resolution, 141, 142b
antidiscrimination policies, 141–42
apprenticeship programs, 176
Arab Spring, 13, 127, 137, 207
ARB (Asociación de Recicladores de Bogotá), 267b
Argentina
as aging society, 213
child care and female labor participation in, 30b, 300b
educational attainment in, 7, 55
informal sector in, 211
benefits for workers, 62b
job loss, social effects of, 131–32, 133b
job security rules in, 261
microenterprises in, 105
“one-stop shops” for administration of both social benefits and 
ALMPs in, 270
Trabajar programs, 270
wage subsidy programs in, 269
Armenia
high youth unemployment in, 19
inequality in access to jobs in, 137
underemployment in, 49
Arrow, Kenneth, 145n11
Asia. See also specific countries and regions
agrarian economies in, 191–92, 192f
jobs creation in, 7
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Botswana
as resource-rich country, 200f
social skills in, 176
Bourdieu, Pierre, 128b
brain drain, 234, 236, 310
brain gain, 236–37
brain jobs and gender equality, 33, 309
brain waste, 248n20
Brazil
cash transfer programs in, 212
child care and female labor participation in, 30b, 300b
child labor in, 157b
debt and high-inflation crisis (1980s), effect of, 293
electronic payment systems for social insurance programs in, 
276b
environmentally friendly industries in, 169
global financial crisis (2008), effect of, 61
idleness rates of youth in, 51f
informal workers in
legal protections for, 141
voluntary exit from formal sector, 211
internal migration in, 37, 316, 320n134
investment in agricultural research in, 218
jobs migration to, 20
labor market regulation in, 213, 315
management of small enterprises in, 116
microenterprises, formalizing of, 211
minimum wages in
for domestic workers, 141
impacts on employment, 263
National Pact to Combat Slave Labor, 307
policy removal of constraints to job creation in, 31, 32f, 302b
poverty reduction in, 87
private sector in, 7, 58
public-private partnership in, 307
services sector in, 241
social protection system in, 302b
spatial relocation of manufacturing sector in, 101
trade liberalization in, 168
training funds in, 181n82
unemployment insurance’s effects in, 273
union wage effect in, 263
urban scale and productivity in, 167
youth issues in, 6f
budget deficits, 23, 293–94
Bulgaria
inequality in access to jobs in, 137
job loss, social effects of, 131–32
low fertility rates in, 213–14
“one-stop shops” for administration of both social benefits and 
ALMPs in, 270
poverty reduction in, 166, 166f
regime change and unemployment in, 133b
training programs purchased by public employment services 
in, 269
Burkina Faso
conditional cash transfers, household effects of, 164
skills level as constraint in, 181n81
manufacturing sector in, 117
small and family farms in, 11, 98, 104, 104f
Asociación de Recicladores de Bogotá (ARB), 267b
Assured Labor, 268b
A.T. Kearny’s Foreign Direct Investment Index, 240b
Australia
educational level of migrants to, 234
migrant population as percent of total population in, 233
Austria
unemployment insurance savings accounts in, 273
unemployment rates in, 49
autonomy and creativity in job, effect of, 129
Azerbaijan
inequality of job opportunities in, 137
“one-stop shops” for administration of both social benefits and 
ALMPs in, 270
self-employment in, 56
B
Babajobs (job assistance program), 55, 268b
Bangladesh
agricultural advances in, 198
economic success story of, 197–99, 197b
Employment Generation Program for the Poorest, 142
entrepreneurs in, 198, 198b
garment industry in, 15, 117, 117b, 134, 171, 172f, 198, 222n39
industrialization process in, 197–99, 222n39
jobs strategy vs. growth strategy in, 89
meaning of “job” in, 63
migration from, 19, 52, 234
wages and unemployment rates, effect on, 236
partition’s effect on population of, 234
poverty reduction in, 9, 79
productivity effects of jobs in, 161
public works programs in, 270
special economic zones (SEZs) in, 221b
structural transformation in, 88
as urbanizing country, 197–98b, 197–99
women’s income, household effects of, 15, 164
bargaining between firms and workers. See collective bargaining
Barroso, José Manuel, 304
Beautiful Serbia program, 283n62
benefits
portability of, 276
value of, 9f, 82–83, 83b
Better Factories Cambodia, 306, 307b
Better Work program, 307b
Bhatt, Ela, 63, 135b
bilateral trade agreements, 32, 306, 307b
blue-collar jobs, migration of, 232
Bolivia
informal employment rates in, 64b
microenterprises in, 105
Booth, Charles, 77b
Bosnia and Herzegovina
ethnic/racial cross-cutting interactions at work in, 15, 135
population decline in, 214
 Index  383
good jobs defined as having access to pensions and health 
insurance in, 15, 275, 275f, 283n82
health insurance benefits in, 83b
hukou (household registration system) in, 314, 315, 315b, 317, 
317f
industrialization in, 238
innovation in, 108
jobs migration from, 245
jobs migration to, 20
labor force growth in, 6
labor reallocation and urbanization in, 37, 100, 104, 316
labor regulations in, 314, 320n132
“meaningful” work, value of, 83b
microenterprises in, 105
network effects of working in, 171
outsourcing attractiveness of, 7, 54, 55
pension benefits in, 83
population decline in, 214
private sector in, 7, 8f, 58, 60f, 68n49
productivity growth in, 104
road construction in, 162
services sector in, 241
spatial relocation of manufacturing sector in, 101
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in, 7, 8f, 104, 108,  
279–80
trade liberalization in, 168
upsizing in, 11
urban scale and productivity in, 167
value of jobs to individuals and society in, 158, 159f
churning, 111, 112, 260
civic engagement. See trust and civic engagement
civil service, 7, 58, 137, 158
civil society organizations, 135, 140
climate change, 169, 169f
Club de Madrid, 128b
collective bargaining
coverage of, 263–64, 264f, 282n27
ILO core labor standards on, 157b, 297
productivity and, 264–65
unemployment and, 265b
wages and, 26
collective voice, 258, 263–67, 298. See also collective  
bargaining
Colombia
autonomy and creativity in job, effect of, 129
electronic payment systems for social insurance programs in, 
276b
Empleo en Acción, 270
fairness in access to job opportunities in, 172
Familias en Acción, 62b
female labor participation in, 30b, 300b
good jobs defined as having access to pensions and health 
insurance in, 15, 275, 275f
health insurance benefits in, 83b
Hogares Comunitarios, 30b, 300b
informal sector in, 211
job security rules in, 261
Jóvenes en Acción, 269
C
Cambodia
Arbitration Council, 141, 142b
Better Factories Cambodia, 306, 307b
bilateral trade agreement with U.S., 32, 306, 307b
garment industry in, 142b, 306
Canada
educational level of migrants to, 234
migrant population as percent of total population in, 233
poverty reduction, effect of jobs on, 78
union wage effect in, 263
carbon emissions. See environmental impact
cash-for-work programs, 143b, 195
cash transfer programs, 212–13, 212b, 273
Central America Free Trade Agreement, 306
Central Europe. See Eastern and Central Europe
Chad as resource-rich country, 19
Charoen Pokphand Group (Thailand), 12, 111
charter cities, 218
child care and female labor participation, 30b, 300b
child development, 24–25, 296
child labor, 15, 50–51, 65–66, 65f, 66b, 155b, 157b, 201, 246, 297
Chile
as aging society, 213
cash transfer programs in, 212
exchange rates in, 303, 319n71
export diversification of, 303, 304f
idleness rates of youth in, 51f
job protection policies in, 279
job security rules in, 261
jobs migration to, 20
labor market regulation in, 213
manufacturing sector in, 11, 103
microenterprises in, 106b
minimum wages, effect on employment of women in, 282n16
policy removal of constraints to job creation in, 30–31, 32f, 301, 
303–4
services sector in, 241
Solidarity Fund to assist during times of financial weakness in, 
30–31, 273, 319n70
training programs in, 62b, 181n82
upsizing in, 11
youth issues in, 6f
China
as aging society, 213, 215
agricultural sector in, 81
autonomy and creativity in job, effect of, 129
civil service in, 158
collective bargaining and unions in, 27, 264–65, 266b
competition in, 104, 317
educational attainment in, 7, 54
entrepreneurship in, 117
environmentally friendly industries in, 169
export patterns of, 249n59
fairness in access to job opportunities in, 172
family businesses, growth of, 12
footwear industry in, 12
global financial crisis (2008), effect on, 61
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Democratic Republic of Congo. See Congo, Democratic  
Republic of
demographics
aging population. See aging population
in formalizing economies, 212b
population decline, 6, 214
poverty reduction and, 78–79
shifts in, 6. See also international migration
workers, 48
youth, 51. See also youth
developing countries. See also low-income countries
ALMPs, effectiveness of, 270
corporate codes of conduct in, 306
diversity of jobs and types of work in, 5–6
female labor participation in, 30b, 300b
global financial crisis (2008), effect on, 61, 61f, 293
informal employment in, 6
job protection policies in, 279–80
labor earnings, growth in, 58
macroeconomic instability in, 293
micro- and small enterprises as job creators in, 11, 13f, 105, 
105f, 108–9
productivity in manufacturing sector in, 107–8, 108f
resilience of employment in, 293
skipping over industrialization phase of development in, 241
social insurance coverage in, 273, 274, 274m
structural transformation in, 52
trade in services in, 33
unions’ political involvement in, 265
disability insurance, 272, 273, 302b
disabled persons, employment of, 84
discrimination. See ethnic differences; labor discrimination
displaced persons, 133, 195b
dissimilarity index to measure inequality, 132b
distrust. See trust and civic engagement
diversity in world of work, 49
Doha Development Agenda, 33, 307–8
Doi Moi (Vietnamese land reform), 29, 301
domestic violence, 133b
domestic workers, 31, 141, 141b, 156, 267
Dominican Republic
Central America Free Trade Agreement and, 306
female labor force participation in, 54b
job satisfaction in, 86
Juventud y Empleo program, 15, 142–43, 171, 269
micro- and small enterprises in, 110b
poverty programs in, 276b
returns to education in, 178
skills training in, 181n100
special economic zones (SEZs) in, 221b
downsizing, 11, 101, 103, 133b, 280
dual economies, 64b
Durkheim, Emile, 128b
Dutch disease, 199, 205
E
earnings. See labor earnings; wages
ease of doing business, 24, 194b, 295
“meaningful” work, value of, 83b
minimum wage in, 26, 263
pension benefits in, 83
productivity and trade liberalization in, 168
social identity and jobs in, 134b
social insurance contributions in, 274
underemployment in, 49
value of jobs to individuals and society in, 159f
wages in, 243
waste pickers, organization of, 266, 267b
Commission on Growth and Development, 293, 296
Communist Party, 132b
community-based programs for jobs, 195
community involvement, 131, 132f, 145n13, 145n15. See also trust 
and civic engagement
competing for jobs globally, 37, 194b, 234, 243–47. See also 
globalization
conditional cash transfers, household effects of, 164
Confederation of South African Trade Unions, 265
conflict-affected countries
defined, 281n1
demobilization programs in, 140, 195
jobs agenda, 19, 20f, 190, 193–96, 194–95b, 196f
mix of labor policies and institutions in, 259f
policy making in, 3, 30, 302–3
tax wedge effect in, 275f
conflict studies on job spillovers, 160b
Congo, Democratic Republic of
community-based programs for jobs, 195
cost of integration program for excombatants, 301
as resource-rich country, 19
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 276b
contracts, ability to enter into, 297
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN), 65, 66b
Cook Islands, sustained growth in, 204
coordination failures, 218b
corporate social responsibility, 32–33, 198, 306–7
corruption, 198, 276b, 295, 297
Costa Rica
Intel location of semiconductor plant in, 178, 245
services sector in, 241
Côte d’Ivoire
productivity and trade liberalization in, 168
women’s income, household effects of, 164
crowd-sourcing tools, 240b
currency overvaluation, 23, 294
Czech Republic
minimum wages for domestic workers in, 141
Roma children, discrimination against, 157b
D
data needs
approaches to, 28–29, 299
jobs numbers, need for, 34–35, 311–12, 312b, 320n116
job spillover effects, need for data sources on, 163, 163b
Decent Work and Decent Work Agenda, 15, 158, 158b, 170b, 246
deforestation, 170, 170b
demobilization programs, 140, 195
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exports, 54
good jobs defined as having access to pensions and health 
insurance in, 15, 275, 275f
health insurance benefits in, 83b
informal employment in
gender differences in, 210
of youth, 206–7
irrelevant skills acquired in, 176
“meaningful” work, value of, 83b
migration from, 248n10
pension benefits in, 83
skills level as constraint in, 181n81
unfairness in access to job opportunities in, 137
value of jobs to individuals and society in, 158, 159f
elderly. See aging population
electricity, access to, 30b, 294–95, 295f, 300b
electronic payment systems for social insurance programs, 276b
El Salvador
financial crisis, effect on, 91n8
microenterprises in, 105
migration from, 19, 52
public works programs in, 270
Temporary Income Assistance Program, 143
Empleo en Acción (Colombia), 270
Employee State Insurance Act of 1948 (India), 320n122
employment histories, need for, 163b
employment protection legislation (EPL), 260–62, 260b, 261t, 
281n13, 282n20
employment shocks
effect on living standards, 9
idiosyncratic nature of, 277–78
systemic nature of, 277–79
employment support. See also cash-for-work programs; wage 
subsidies
pro-poor, pro-youth, and pro-women programs, 198
targeting of investment climate and, 217–21
employment-to-population ratio, 41n145, 320n117
employment turbulence, 98–104
empowerment, 76, 126
enabling business environment, 23–24, 294–96
enterprise surveys, 219, 219b
entrepreneurship, 12, 36, 114–18, 115f, 195, 198, 198b
environmental economics, 28, 160b, 299
environmental impact, 16, 161, 167–68, 169–70, 169f, 170b
EPL. See employment protection legislation
EPZs. See export processing zones
equity analysis on job spillovers, 160b
Estancias Infantiles (Mexico), 30b, 300b
Ethical Trading Initiative (UK), 319n91
Ethiopia
economic development without reduction of poverty in, 87
entrepreneurship in, 117
gross job creation and destruction in, 99
growth elasticities of employment in, 88b
household businesses in, 112
manufacturing sector in, 11, 103, 194b
onchocercal skin disease, effect on labor earnings in, 296
Productive Safety Net Program, 143
East Asia and Pacific. See also specific countries
child labor in, 51, 157b
dynamic skills development in, 177b
economic development in, 87, 112
“flying geese” pattern of development in, 238, 247
global financial crisis (2008), effect on, 61
jobs migration to, 237, 247
jobs strategy vs. growth strategy in, 89
labor productivity in, 55f
manufacturing sector in, 22f, 238, 238f
migration from agriculture in, 52, 53f
need for new jobs in, 51, 52f
nonwage jobs in, 5f, 50, 50f
reallocation of labor in, 100, 101f
special economic zones (SEZs) in, 221b
trade liberalization in, 168, 309f
urbanizing countries in, 197, 198b
Easterly, William, 128b
Eastern and Central Europe. See also specific countries
aging societies in, 213
dual model apprenticeships in, 176–77
fairness in access to job opportunities in, 172
manufacturing sector in, 11
unemployment insurance in, 62b
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. See also specific countries
global financial crisis (2008), effect on, 61
labor productivity in, 55f
manufacturing sector in, 238
microenterprises in, 106
need for new jobs in, 51, 52f
population decline in, 214
self-employment in, 56
trade liberalization in, 309f
wage vs. non-wage jobs in, 5f, 6, 50, 50f
economic development
decomposition of, 99b
drivers of, 99b
job spillovers to, 16–17, 17f, 160–61, 160f
link with jobs, 9, 87–88, 88b, 99, 99f
prosperity and, 56, 57f, 58
strategies, 87–89
economic downturns. See financial crises
economic geography on job spillovers, 160b
Ecuador
poverty reduction, effect of jobs on, 78
youth unemployment associated with violence in, 132–33
educational attainment
high-skill jobs and, 55, 178
human capital and, 24–25, 296
incentives for educated workers to return to home countries, 236
of migrants, 234
private sector employment and, 7, 58
returns to education, 178
in urbanizing countries, 198
youth unemployment and, 7, 58, 207
efficiency gains, 102f
Egypt
autonomy and creativity in job, effect of, 129
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incentives for job seekers in, 270
jobs agenda in, 18, 20f, 190, 210–13, 211f, 212b, 213f
mix of labor policies and institutions in, 259f
policy making in, 3, 31, 302b
social cohesion in, 89
tax wedge effect in, 274, 275f
unemployment/under-employment in, 277
formal sector
in agrarian economies, 191
voluntary exit from, 211
fraud in social insurance programs, 276b
freedom of association, 65f, 157b, 179n10, 297
Fukuyama, Francis, 145n11
fundamentals. See job creation
G
Gallup World Poll
on creation of good jobs, 244
on youth preference to work in public sector, 223n75
gangs. See youth
garment industry
Better Work program, 307b
entrepreneurship training for, 117, 117b
global competition in, 194b
health and safety risks in, 84b
industrial sector diversity and, 222n39
labor regulations for, 142b
organizing rights of, 298
social identity and, 134, 171, 171f
in urbanizing countries, 198, 198b
Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia, 142b
GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), 33, 308, 310
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 307
“gazelles,” industrial countries as, 12, 110
GDP. See gross domestic product
gender differences
in employment, 6, 50, 210
job spillover effects and, 162
in unemployment and “unhappiness effect,” 84
in wage income, 50, 77, 79f, 164, 165f
in working hours, 52
gender studies on job spillovers, 160b
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 307
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 33, 308, 310
Georgia
ethnic differences, jobs connecting people across, 136b
inequality of job opportunities in, 137
Germany
apprenticeships in, 176–77, 181n97
educational attainment in, 7, 55
JobCentre, 270
job protection policies (job sharing) during recession in, 26, 
279, 280b
migrant population as percent of total population in, 234
poverty reduction, effect of jobs on, 78
union wage effect in, 263
Ghana
female owners of microenterprises in, 116
as resource-rich country, 194b
skills level as constraint in, 181n81
timber industry in, 194b
upsizing in, 11
ethnic differences, jobs connecting people across, 13, 134–36, 136b, 
172, 319n66
Eurobarometer, 132b, 244b
Europe/European Union. See also Eastern and Central Europe; 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
corporate codes of conduct in, 32, 306
debt and vulnerability in, 60–61
disability insurance systems in, 273
transition economies in, 103–4
trust issues and unemployment in, 132b
union productivity in, 264
women’s working hours in, 52
exchange rates. See foreign exchange rates and earnings
export processing zones (EPZs), 37, 316, 316f
exports, 54, 199, 249n59, 303, 304f. See also trade liberalization
extractive industries, 83, 133b, 155b, 191, 199–202, 200f, 303
F
Factories Act of 1948 (India), 320n122
fairness, sense of, 16, 90b, 137, 139f, 140, 161, 171f, 172, 173f. See 
also access to jobs, inequality in
Familias en Acción (Colombia), 62b
family businesses, 111, 156. See also household businesses
family farms, 11, 98, 104–5. See also small farms
farming. See agricultural sector
FDI. See foreign direct investment
female labor force participation. See women
fertility rates, decrease in, 213–14, 216b
fertilizer use in agrarian economies, 192
Fibre Citoyenne (Morocco), 319n94
Fiji
female labor force participation in, 54b
migration from, 19, 52
as small island nation, 203–5
financial crises
decoupling from job creation from job destruction during, 277, 
278f
effect on jobs, 8, 58–61, 293
effect on unemployment insurance coverage, 273
Great Recession, 60–61, 61f, 62b, 88b, 236
unemployment in U.S. and, 278
financial sector, 245, 294
food prices, 60
forced labor, 14–15, 31, 65, 65f, 68n75, 155–56, 157b, 246, 297, 307
foreign direct investment (FDI), 15, 168–69, 168f, 219, 240b, 
301–2, 305, 316, 316f
Foreign Direct Investment Index (A.T. Kearny), 240b
foreign exchange rates and earnings
macroeconomic stability and, 294
in resource-rich countries, 23, 202
risk management for, 319n71
sovereign funds and, 318n10
formalizing economies
defined, 281n1
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HOI (Human Opportunity Index), 138b
household businesses, 11, 98, 104–5, 110b, 179n12
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decision making when women have labor income, 15, 160, 
164–65, 166f
jobs as source of, 78, 80f
job spillover effects on, 160–61, 164–65, 166f
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hukou (Chinese household registration system), 314, 315, 315b, 
317, 317f
human capital accumulation, 24–25, 99b, 296–97. See also 
educational attainment
child development and, 24–25, 296
Human Opportunity Index (HOI), 138b
human rights, 5, 14–15, 156. See also child labor; forced labor
human trafficking, 235, 246
Hungary
self-employment in, 56
training programs purchased by public employment services 
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underemployment in, 49
I
ICLS. See International Conference of Labour Statisticians
identity economics on job spillovers, 160b
idleness rates of youth, 6, 6f, 50, 51f
IFC (International Finance Corporation), 179n9, 307
illegal activities in conflict-affected countries, 194
ILO. See International Labour Organization
incentives
for educated workers to return to home countries, 236
for job assistance providers, 267–68
for job seekers, 270
unemployment insurance’s effects on, 273
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Aadhaar (identification program for social insurance 
programs), 276b
as aging society, 213
Babajobs, 55, 268b
child labor in, 157b
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educational attainment in, 7, 54
educational learning outcomes in, 296–97
electronic payment systems for social insurance programs in, 
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Employee State Insurance Act of 1948, 320n122
ethnic/racial cross-cutting interactions at work in, 135
Factories Act of 1948, 320n122
firm size and growth in, 12, 112
garbage collectors, organization of, 266
idleness rates of youth in, 6f, 51f
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, 313, 314, 320n122
informal employment rates in, 64b, 315
information technology (IT) sector in, 54, 117, 246
infrastructure constraints in, 317
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Jobs provide higher earnings and better benefits as countries grow, but they 
are also a driver of development. Poverty falls as people work their way out  
of hardship and as jobs empowering women lead to greater investments  
in children. Efficiency increases as workers get better at what they do, as more 
productive jobs appear, and less productive ones disappear. Societies flourish 
as jobs bring together people from different ethnic and social backgrounds 
and provide alternatives to conflict. Jobs are thus more than a byproduct of 
economic growth. They are transformational—they are what we earn, what 
we do, and even who we are.
High unemployment and unmet job expectations among youth are the most 
immediate concerns.  But in many developing countries, where farming and 
self-employment are prevalent and safety nets are modest at best, unemploy-
ment rates can be low. In these countries, growth is seldom jobless. Most of 
the poor work long hours but simply cannot make ends meet. And the 
violation of basic rights is not uncommon. Therefore, the number of jobs  
is not all that matters: jobs with high development payoffs are needed.
Confronted with these challenges, policy makers ask difficult questions. 
Should countries build their development strategies around growth, or 
should they focus on jobs? Can entrepreneurship be fostered, especially 
among the many microenterprises in developing countries, or are entrepre-
neurs born? Are greater investments in education and training a prerequisite 
for employability, or can skills be built through jobs? In times of major crises 
and structural shifts, should jobs, not just workers, be protected? And is there 
a risk that policies supporting job creation in one country will come at the 
expense of jobs in other countries?
The World Development Report 2013: Jobs offers answers to these and other 
difficult questions by looking at jobs as drivers of development—not as 
derived labor demand—and by considering all types of jobs—not just formal 
wage employment.  The Report provides a framework that cuts across sectors 
and shows that the best policy responses vary across countries, depending  
on their levels of development, endowments, demography, and institutions. 
Policy fundamentals matter in all cases, as they enable a vibrant private sector, 
the source of most jobs in the world. Labor policies can help as well, even  
if they are less critical than is often assumed.  Development policies, from 
making smallholder farming viable to fostering functional cities to engaging 
in global markets, hold the key to success. 
